

CHINA
HER HISTORY, DIPLOMACY, AND, COMMERCE



RICCI AND PAUL ZI (COSTUME OF MING DYNASTY)
From an old picture published by the Chinese Jesuit Père Huang

TRANSLATION OF WORDS IN CORNER
The sire Zi (canonised as) Wên-t'ing (learned,
resolute) with Li-tsu Ma-teu ("Licinius," or

[Frontispiece

CHINA

HER HISTORY, DIPLOMACY, AND COMMERCE,
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES
TO THE PRESENT DAY

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TO THE BURMA GOVERNMENT

WITH MAPS

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PREFACE

It is just sixteen years since I penned prefatory remarks to the first edition of this book : this was when the South African War and the "Boxer" trouble were both being settled up, the first having naturally tied our hands a little in dealing satisfactorily with the second ; but the alliance with Japan in 1902 restored a balance satisfactory to our general interests in China and the Indian Ocean, whilst two great wars have had the effect of transferring to Japan a large, well-merited, and honourable share in the policing of the China's seas as the trusted ally of both Russia and Britain. Meanwhile China herself has passed through the throes of an incalculable upheaval, and a number of important events foreshadowed in the earlier impressions of this work have actually taken place. Apart from the disappearance on very generous terms of the once prudent and illustrious Manchu dynasty itself—a picturesque catastrophe which after all chiefly concerns the family pride of a few foreign princely families,—means have been found quietly to merge the mass of settled Manchus, including their characteristic "pigtail," in the general body of Chinese—from whom, especially in the north, the males are physically almost indistinguishable—with liberty to intermarry, engage in trade, travel freely, and so on ; yet the "pigtail" is by no means penally tabued, even

among Chinese cranks. [Although the Republican flag of five colours, adopted with that end in view, gave expression to the hope that Mongols, Tibetans, and Turki (Mussulmans) might also find in the vast undivided domain a common level to the general weal, yet separative aspirations to complete independence may in the end defeat this desire so far as the two first are concerned, whilst the Chinese themselves apparently now see clearly, so far as touches the third, that only a modified equality can be arranged for uncompromising religionists, some Turki speaking, other Chinese speaking, who live largely under the government of their own princes and beys, or even under semi-independent Chinese Muslim generals.

The last of the three new chapters added to the present edition endeavours to give a succinct account of how political reform arose from humiliating foreign defeat, and how the hitherto suppressed and stunted spirit of democracy asserted itself through these vague yearnings for reform, so there is no prefatory need to labour this particular point again here. Suffice it to say that, although in Europe we seem day by day to hear chiefly of revolts and political squabbles in China, as a matter of fact the "Eighteen Provinces" are not in such a very parlous condition after all, the chief reason for this modicum of happiness being that China is, as it ever has been, a nation of small owners and hardy cultivators, whose ethical teaching has for 2,000 years past inculcated a spirit of deference and order, a right to self-protection, and a family or clannish detachment from public and political authority. In spite, then, of alarums and excursions on all sides, the Foreign Customs revenue for 1916 is in sterling the very highest ever collected, whilst the Salt Gabelle, under the vivifying influence of

Sir Richard Dane's purifications, promises to rival the Customs itself in "rich blessings." Even the Post-office, owing its success to French brilliancy of strategic management, is a vast paying concern. I have not given a special chapter to Railways, for they are diffusing themselves apace over the Chinese dominions in such wise that any statistics ventured upon to-day would be practically obsolete a year hence. Up to the moment of writing 15,000 miles of first-class lines have been conceded, of which total two-fifths are now actually working, with another fifth under construction. It is understood that Russia, Japan, Britain, and France are financially interested to the extent of over sixty million pounds sterling, against seven millions for Germany and fifteen millions for China herself (at present high silver rates). All these railways develop trade in a marvellous and scarcely hoped-for way by opening up vast tracts of country twenty years ago almost as little known to the foreign trader as Tibet, and by enabling the industrious Chinese farmer to get rid of vast surpluses of produce formerly too often an indigestible drug on the local markets: with the absence of roads and banking facilities there was previous to the advent of the steam horse no stimulus to produce more than at best a prosperous clan subsistence, whereas now the railway brings exchange imports so to speak to the very door; and the foreign commercial traveller, no longer condemned to sail in cramped boats over dangerous rapids, or to wheelbarrow and donkey-riding over apologies for roads, for weeks at a time, with unrestful repose in verminous inns, can now fly hither and thither with his flaming posters, heavy samples, and cash exchange or credit facilities in a comfortable sleeping-carriage, creating demand in

every village for foreign "fancies." Besides, the Post Parcel Office is teaching the interior Chinese that a vast miscellaneous trade can be done in this way too without any effort at all.

Long before the "Boxer" war and the consequent native yearning for better things in their political administration, it had been evident that the German merchants were taking more pains and bestowing more intelligent thought in the conduct of their business than the conservative and unimaginative British trader of the old school. All over the Far East they enjoyed complete "freedom of the seas," and in our colonies and settlements, where they were much esteemed as solid and orderly guests, they shared absolute equality of right and privilege; but they never at any time showed any particular inclination to "rough it" either in the commercial or the missionary line, and it was only when the French railway to Yün Nan and the steamer facilities to Sz Ch'wan and Hu Nan opened up Central and West China, in a way never seen before, that the careful Germans, finding they could operate safely and comfortably, hastened to take full advantage of British, French, and Japanese pioneering. The result has been that they have opened up, chiefly in Central China, entirely new export trades in native produce, besides securing almost a monopoly of electrical, mining, and other engineering in provinces scarcely even visited, except by missionaries, twenty years ago. Moreover, in doing all this they have received from unsuspecting British banks facilities greater than any German bank would risk. There may have been good-natured professional envy, often mixed with admiration, on the part of the less active British trader of "muddled oaf" tendency, but there was certainly no angry hostility, still less any of the malignant Prussian hatred the

existence of which the Great War has generated and propagated in the naturally meek German mind: the superior energy and foresight of the Teuton traders were freely if regretfully admitted, and many were the occasions on which British and American consuls, customs officials, travellers, etc.—the present writer himself often included—called attention publicly to the neglect on the part of British trade generally to revise its methods; especially in the direction of advertising, preparing intelligible price-lists, visiting likely customers on the spot, granting less rigid terms of credit, shaking off compradoric strangulation, treating the native trader more courteously and indulgently, and so on.

It is right to admit that these lessons have been taken to heart in a few cases, and it is well known that certain British tobacco and patent medicine enterprises have made huge successes on these new lines; one or two British exporters of fresh and frozen provisions, following Teuton example, have organised proper receiving, cleaning, and packing establishments for facilitating the collection, shipping, and distribution, and for the sorting and repacking in workmanlike condition of edible produce; and besides this, at least one British firm or syndicate has secured a strong controlling position in connection with the output of important Chinese mines; so there is a fair prospect that in the near future the old “sit still at the chief port and as to inland depend upon the compradore” system will gradually be replaced by one of more hustle and energy, especially as the Shanghai Municipality—and no doubt other analogous bodies—has recently seriously roused itself to wakefulness upon the necessity of teaching the young British trader practical Chinese, so that import agents, buyers, and exporters may move freely

off beaten tracks and visit native exporters, importers, producers, and consumers at any likely spot in the interior, making their own transport, *likin*, and credit arrangements, free from the shackles of compradoric restraint and monopoly. Honourable competition on these lines may easily be hoped for in neutral China; but so long as the tame and subservient German race remains under the baleful spell of the neurotic Prussian braggart and moral abortion whose blasphemous buffooneries have plunged Western civilisation into a caldron of boiling passion, making both cowards and bullies even of the non-Prussian army and navy officers, it will be quite impossible, so far as British colonies are concerned, to grant or to allow British banks to grant to German banks and traders the generous facilities they enjoyed in such amplitude before the war, and of which they everywhere took a mean advantage, under the cunning and unscrupulous wire-pulling of Potsdam, in order to secure in their own exclusive hands the key-strings of finance, and the key-commodities of commerce and (ultimately) of war. Until this contempt of human law and decency be purged clear, the German—official, commercial, or other—should be treated as a *lupinum caput*, unworthy of trust in or near any isolated fold, and above all not be suffered to gain a foothold anywhere in the Far East, whether at Tsing-tao or in Indo-China. Every one knows the many innate good qualities of the genuine Germans; but the Prussian Old Man of the Sea must be first cast off by the German Sinbad, and ample reparation made before pardon can be granted or any off chances taken.¹

¹ In Vol. xxiii. (May–July, 1820) of the *Quarterly Review* (John Murray), an able writer who reported on German conditions after the Napoleonic wars thus delivers himself:—"These very qualities which we so much admire are liable on the other hand

As things now stand, there is every prospect of China going smoothly ahead under the conciliatory presidency of Li Yüan-hung, so long at least as the Prussian viper is not allowed to find another nestling-place in her bosom, wherein to brew its poison. Sir Robert Hart, Sir Richard Dane, M. Piry, Mr. Kinder, Dr. Timothy Richard, may be cited as but a few instances of Britons and Frenchmen who have loyally served with great and permanent results the exclusive interests of China: but where is the German, official or missionary, who has ever done any thing disinterested? The eagerness to undertake army instruction, to supply men-of-war and guns, the monopoly in the miscellaneous arms trade, the greedy hold on mines and electric engineering,—this is all part and parcel of the ultimate design to secure military control in the interests of the Potsdam octopus. Japan's recent attitudes have from time to time been considered harsh towards China, but it must be remembered that she also is now fighting for her future life, and she is as fully determined that China shall never again have a German-com-

to be perverted in the most mischievous manner. The sincerity of the Germans exposes them to be the dupes of others to a dangerous degree; their enthusiasm is apt to evaporate in absurd projects, and their perseverance to degenerate into obstinacy. . . . The composure and secrecy of debate on grievances suit the genius of the German better than any sudden exertion for their removal. His imagination dwells with delight on gloom and mystery, to the neglect of all its gayer and more airy fancies, whilst the milk of human kindness with which his bosom may be stored is apt to turn to a mixture of ferocity and sentiment extremely disgusting. Hence this country has at all times been fertile in secret and peculiar associations, into which its natives have entered with an enthusiasm totally unknown in other parts of the world. . . . The whole system of the Prussian Government, although carried on with a strict attention to the principles of justice, is extremely severe in its mode of operation. Their fiscal regulations are in many respects arbitrary and vexatious in the extreme, especially where their newly acquired provinces are concerned."

manded (for that is what German-trained means) army and navy as she is resolved that Germany shall never again, if she can prevent it, set foot in Tsing-tao or any other vantage point on the China coast: it has recently been "mooted" (probably indirectly, as a feeler from Potsdam) that Germany would give back Alsace in exchange for Indo-China; but even if Japan would tolerate German presence anywhere in the China seas, France is far too generous and noble-minded a nation to hand over the effeminate and defenceless Annamese she has christianised to the tender mercies of a pack of unnatural Karl Peters and Puttkamers, whose cowardly brutalities in Africa have an appropriate sequel in the recent Prussian treatment of Belgians, Serbians, Armenians, and French *occupés*; not to mention the craven business of the *Lusitania* and the sinking of numerous hospital ships. Japan, true, is not of our blood, faith, or habit, but her record for a generation has been steadfast and honourable, and she is—despite this natural separation in sentiment—a far more noble ally to cultivate than any wedge-pated Hohenzollern of Prussia can ever be again; and, indeed, it is doubtful if the Po-Russians or "next to the Russians" are ethnologically related to us at all; they seem to have "adopted" German just as the Bulgarians have adopted Slav.

As to what the real policy of Japan towards China is to be, no better definition of it could be desired than that set forth in Viscount Motono's speech as Foreign Minister delivered in the Imperial Diet on 23rd January last, and telegraphed *in extenso* to the *Times* of 27th January. Certainly, there are some points in the general settlement of disputes on which China and Japan have not yet arrived at complete agreement; probably this is because Japan cannot well

declare, and China neither feels nor understands, the importance, in her own interests as well as in the interests of peace and civilisation, of extracting the viper's fangs once for all. As to American suspicions of Japan, these may be dismissed at once if the United States will only continue to approach *chocs d'opinions* in a spirit of reasonableness; and indeed some of our own colonial dominions may well revise their attitude, if only in recognition of Japan's spontaneous assistance in scotching the serpent's head.

E. H. P.

14 (FORMERLY 18), GAMBIER TERRACE,
LIVERPOOL,
8 *March*, 1917.

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
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RICCI AND PAUL ZI (COSTUME OF MING DYNASTY), FROM
AN OLD PICTURE PUBLISHED BY THE CHINESE JESUIT
PÈRE HOANG *Frontispiece*

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CHINA

CHAPTER I

GEOGRAPHY

IF we desire to obtain accurate notions touching the political and commercial capacities of China, we must first endeavour to realise what her territory is like. It has been the native practice in modern times to style "China Proper" by the collective name "Eighteen Provinces." As a matter of fact, since frontier questions with European Powers became acute, the "East Three Provinces" (Manchuria) and the "New Territory" of Turkestan have been so reorganised that there are now practically twenty-two directly governed provinces; and Formosa formed in a modified degree yet another new one, until, some twenty years ago, the Japanese insisted upon its cession. It will be more convenient to ignore these recent changes, and to consider first the compact and thickly populated territory lying between the various deserts or steppes and the sea—in other words, the "Eighteen Provinces," which are, or were until recently, surrounded to the north, west, and south by tributary or independent states, and to the east by the Pacific Ocean. The natural boundaries of China Proper, as thus limited, have always been much the same—that is,

deserts or steppes beyond mountain chains have prevented the rapid expansion of cultivators in any direction except along the valleys of rivers which run eastwards into the sea. If the political boundaries have in our times, as often before, been pushed into the desert or upon the plateau, that does not seriously affect the one salient feature of the vast Chinese Dominion, which is that, out of an irregular triangle covering an area of 5,000,000 square miles and supporting a total population of 400,000,000 souls, one corner embracing barely one-third of the total surface consists of regulation provinces, ruled under one uniform system, and containing nine-tenths of the population; whilst the rest of the triangle, so far as it has not, either *de facto* or *de jure*, seceded from Chinese control, consists of poorly watered desert or plateau, thinly peopled by races forming majorities over the Chinese settlers. It was only when, as in the case of Manchuria and the New Territory of Turkestan, the Chinese element became in some way predominant or equal, that political measures were taken to assimilate an "outer" portion.

The Eighteen Provinces thus form a roughly circular mass occupying nearly one-third of the dominion's surface. But, if we bisect this mass from north to south, we shall find that the western half has a general tendency to be mountainous, whilst the eastern half has a corresponding tendency to be flat. We shall find, moreover, that out of a total population of between 300,000,000 and 400,000,000, the eastern half contains three-quarters, whilst the mountainous half only contains one-quarter.* As we proceed with our inquiry, we shall discover, besides, that, taken as a whole, the western half is barely self-supporting, and contributes even in

theory very little to the Central Government at Peking, whilst the eastern half can support itself, feed the Central Government, and also assist the impecunious west, always supposing that war and revolution do not queer the normal pitch. The wealthy province of Sz Ch'wan rather interferes with the truthful harmony of this sweeping arrangement; but none the less the broad facts are as stated, for it is only the eastern half of Sz Ch'wan that pays a surplus; in fact of very recent years the western half has been constituted a separate government for many exceptional purposes.

We have now got under our eyes a material upon which to work, and it is thus evident from a commercial point of view that the interests of Great Britain lie almost entirely upon the coasts, upon the embouchures of three or four great rivers, upon the valleys of those rivers and their tributaries, and upon the head waters of the Yang-tsze in Sz Ch'wan. In other words, geographical considerations indicate the eastern half of China Proper as the most accessible and the most valuable field for our commercial development; and, if this region be kept open to us, we can, without great violence to our feelings, relegate to a second place Manchuria, Tibet, and Yün Nan, in the first of which the legitimate competition of Japan and Russia is likely to be most keen, whilst India and China have joint interests in the tea trade of Tibet, and France through Tonquin has as much to do with Yün Nan as we have through Burma.

Familiar though the names of Chinese provinces are to those who have passed a lifetime in the Far East, I am aware that the general reader is apt to get confused if too many strange names be thrust upon his attention at once. I therefore give here a simple map with a list of the

Eighteen Provinces in order to illustrate my remarks (see next page).

When we Europeans approach China, which is usually done by sea, we are unconsciously impressed with the notion that, the farther inland we go, the more we leave "civilisation" behind us. But it must not be forgotten that, from the native point of view, the coasts are the ends of the earth, and the places where least of the true Celestial spirit is to be found. All the solid part of Chinese tradition and history seems to show that the original inhabitants of the Central Kingdom (who have never possessed any national or ethnological designation in the sense of "German," "Turk," "Russian," etc.) were first heard of as moving from the north and west down the valley of the Hwang Ho (Yellow River), the lower half or mouth of which has shifted from time to time, sometimes leaving the mountain mass known as the Shan Tung Promontory to the south, and sometimes to the north. The old capitals of the kings were all in the valleys of the Yellow River or in those of its tributaries, such as the River Wei in Shen Si. Hence all the legends of even the mythical emperors are centred between Si-an Fu and Peking, near which place (Tientsin) the Yellow River once entered the sea. In fact, the trade area now belonging to the single port of Tientsin nearly covers the whole of semi-historical China. Even so far north as Kalgan there are ancient remains of what appear to be signal towers or tombs dating as far back as B.C. 200. On this undoubted fact—that some of the earliest known Chinese advanced from the north and north-west—many ingenious theories have been propounded, connecting them with Babylonia, the Accadians, Persians, Hindoos, and what not. By assuming errors in ancient Chinese records

THE EIGHTEEN PROVINCES, Etc.

Name of Province	Translated Meaning.	Archaic Name (as separate State)	Remarks.
An Hwei	Peace-Glory	Wan	{ Part of old Kiang Nan; i.e. An (king) and Hwei (chou)
Chêh Kiang	Chêh River	Yüeh	
Chih Li	Direct Rule	Y en	{ The Kiang (Yang-tsze) once had a mouth here Peking never under Vice-roy
Fuh Kien	Happy-Establish	Min	
Ho Nan	River South	Yü	{ Established (I think) about A.D. 700 South of the (Hwang) Ho
Hu Nan	Lake South	Ch'u	
Hu Pêh	Lake North	Ngoh	{ South of the (Tung-t'ing) Lake North of the (Tung-t'ing) Lake
Kan Suh	Sweet-Sedate	(no general name)	
Kiang Si	River West	Kan	{ Kan (chou) and Suh (chou) (prefectures) West (reach of the) Kiang
Kiang Su	River (and) Su	Wu	
Kwang Si	Broad West	{ Yueh	{ The west and east parts of Kwang Nan, or the old Annam seat of power
Kwang Tung	Broad East		
Kwei Chou	Noble Tract	K'ien	{ Perhaps a euphonic form of the old "K'wei State," or Devil Country Chih Li used once to fall within the parts east of the (Hang) Mountain Range
Shan Si	Mountain West	Tsin	
Shan Tung	Mountain East	Ts'i	{ West of Shen (an old state practically meaning "the Pass") Once called "Three Streams"
Shen Si	Shen West	Ts'in	
Sz Ch'wan	Four Streams	Shuh	{ South of the Sz Ch'wan Mists, or the Misty Range (Yun Ling)
Yün Nan	Cloud South	Tien	
Shêng King	Prosperous Capital	Liao	Also called Fêng-t'ien
Kih-hn	Happy Forest	(none)	{ The ancient Manchu cradle, possibly from the old Chinese-Corean Kih-n Province Also called Tsitsihar
Hêh-lung Kiang	Black Dragon River	(none)	
Sin Kiang	New Domain	(none)	Kashgaria-Dzungaria
T'ai Wan	Terrace Bay	(no general name)	Formosa (now Japanese)

It will be noticed that there are two Yueh and two Kiang. The Chinese characters alone can express the distinctions to the eye.

here and there, by rigidly adhering to our own Scriptural texts, and by indulging our imagination a little, we might perhaps even trace the first Chinaman back to the Tower of Babel, or, for the matter of that, to the North Pole. I can only state the moderate impressions which the perusal of original Chinese history has left upon me. A capable and settled political race is first heard of in possession of lands along the Yellow River: it is occupied in fighting for its existence with the horse-riding nomads to the north, who raid the stores of wealth accumulated upon cultivated lands by industrious workmen, and who disappear, when pursued, into their trackless deserts. It is continually being reinforced by other bodies of its own kind coming from the north-west.

The next great historical advance seems to be south-west into modern Sz Ch'wan ("Four Streams"), and then through the two great lake regions down south by way of the navigable Kan river of Kiang Si, and the Yüan and Siang rivers of Hu Nan into the region of Canton, which, as will be seen from our sketch map, belongs to an entirely different catchment area. But the valley of the Yang-tsze, as a whole, and the provinces south of it and at its mouth, do not appear to have become properly assimilated, either politically or industrially, before the commencement of our Western era. Moreover, the portions of all the seaboard provinces lying very near to the coasts seem to have been out of hand up to a very recent date—say 500 years ago; so that we must picture in our minds the Chinese race spreading like a fan from the southern bend of the Yellow River towards the Upper Yang-tsze and the coasts, its political force becoming weaker and weaker as it approaches those coasts and the Indo-Tibetan highlands. Hence we

find that, whereas throughout the whole of interior China one tongue is now spoken—subject to more or less serious variations in dialect, never of an incongruous or impossible kind—in the coast provinces south of the Yellow River, and in those alone, are spoken dialects so exceptional as to rise almost to the distinction of separate languages; but only so in the sense that Swedish, Danish, German, and Dutch are languages foreign to one another; that is, though words differ in sound, they are easily traceable to one indefinable or elastic original. Thus we Europeans, approaching China from the sea, are at once confronted with a practical difficulty which is not nearly as much felt by the Chinese themselves approaching the extremities from the heart, and one of the chief obstacles to our success is this confusion of tongues, which unduly localises every European's efforts.

I have above divided the Eighteen Provinces into the eastern and western halves. In a very rough way the eastern half may be stated to be rich, and densely populated by pure Chinese; the western half to be poor, and thinly populated by mixed races, often exceeding the Chinese in numbers. In the northern portion of the eastern half there is probably not now left a single individual of aboriginal race, though up to about a thousand years ago certain unidentified "barbarian" tribes were still mentioned along the southern (Hwai River) bed of the Hwang Ho. In the southern portion of the eastern half there are still a few independent or semi-independent tribes, known as Yao or Miao, occupying the border mountains which separate Kwang Tung on the south from the Hu Nan and Kiang Si on the north. But these tribes give very little trouble, and possess no political importance of any kind. In the mountains of Fuh Kien I have

myself come across remnants of strange aboriginal tribes, and even in Chêh Kiang there are a few. Still, in a general way, and ignoring trifles, it may be truthfully stated that the wealthy, populous, eastern half of China Proper contains none but pure Chinese, or aborigines so closely assimilated as to be indistinguishable from Chinese; and in all cases these aborigines are of the monosyllabic and tonic tongues so characteristic of China.

On the other hand, the western half of the Eighteen Provinces is largely foreign. The miserably poor province of Kwang Si contains many obscure tribes, usually grouped under the main heads of Shan (Siamese) or Miao (no ethnological clue as yet). Not only so, but there are still many aboriginal officials, responsible, however, not to the Central Government direct, but to local Chinese prefects or magistrates. In the adjoining province of Kwei Chou there are also a good many Miao tribes, some groups of which I saw myself when there; they are in appearance not unlike the Kachyns of the Burmo-Chinese frontier, who are known to be of Tibeto-Burman origin. In Yün Nan there are a great many tribes of the Shan race, not only within the border, but also in those recently delimited districts which now belong politically to Burma (Great Britain) or Tonquin (France). Among the mountains of north-east Yün Nan and south Sz Ch'wan, the powerful confederation of so-called Lolo tribes still maintains its independence. A French missionary named Paul Vial, who had lived amongst them, twenty years ago published a very valuable memoir upon the subject. The Lolos possess a written system of their own, a specimen of which (discovered by Mr. E. C. Baber in 1880) I have before me, together with a sheet from Père Vial

throwing light upon its nature. Since then the Mission D'Ollone of 1906-1909 has published two very interesting works about the Lolos and their language, the literary expression of which, however, is of an unsatisfying nature. From time to time very serious collisions take place between the Lolos and the Chinese armies, the result always being a patched-up peace, leaving the uncivilised men very much to their own devices as before. The Kachyn tribes¹ seem to form a link between the homes of the Shans and Tibetans. They extend along the Upper Irrawaddy and the western frontiers of Yün Nan. M. Jacques Bacot in 1912 published an equally illuminating book upon the writing system of the Moso tribes nearer to Tibet than the Lolos. The Kamti tribes of the Upper Irrawaddy (the Mali-kha branch) are, however, pure Shans, and their language possesses a strong affinity with Laotian and modern Siamese. On the western frontiers of Sz Ch'wan we have numerous and sometimes very formidable independent Tibetan tribes, such as do not fall within the hierarchical administration of Tibet proper. Mrs. Bird-Bishop has given us interesting particulars about some of these, but she appears to have some reasons (not stated) for suggesting that they are not Tibetan as usually supposed. The cave-dwellers of eastern Sz Ch'wan have mostly disappeared, but their abandoned dwellings in the mountain-sides may still be seen anywhere to the west of Chungking; some of these tribes still exist to the extreme south-east, near the Kwei Chou frontier. In the island of Hainan there are at least two groups of "savages," or non-Chinese, one of which I personally ascertained to be of Shan kinship. Despite the utter con-

¹ Cf. my detailed account of these tribes. *Fortnightly Review*, 1897.

fusion which reigns both in the Chinese and the European mind touching the south-west barbarians, taken as a whole, I am disposed to think that in all probability most of them will be found to range themselves either under the Shan or the Tibetan head. In this connection the Rev. Samuel Clarke published a very informing work in 1911, showing that none of the other south-west tribes ever had any writing system, notwithstanding their intelligence and their quickness in picking up our romanising novelties.

We have seen how the advance of Chinese civilisation has been along the Yellow River and then up its great tributary, the Wei, to the head waters or tributaries on the left bank of the Yang-tsze. A combined movement from those head waters and from the lakes of the Hwai (old Yellow River mouth) system seems then to have gradually taken in the whole Yang-tsze Valley, including the old *débouchure* at Hangchow. A glance at the map will show how their next obvious move was across the Poyang and Tung-t'ing lakes to Canton. Let us examine these rivers in order. The Yellow River, the discovery of whose exact source engaged the earnest attention both of the ablest Mongol and the most ambitious Manchu Emperors, rises among a group of small lakes called Odon-tala (lat. 35° N., long. 96° E.). It then runs through Charing Nor eastwards for 300 miles, turns sharply back to the north-west, bisects Kan Suh north-east, and takes a tremendous northerly sweep round part of the desert, inclosing within its bend the often-contested Ordos region. It then turns due south, and forms the dividing line between Shen Si and Shan Si. The pass of T'ung Kwan, at its southern bend, was for many centuries the key to the possession of empire, in the days when the political centre of gravity

always lay within a hundred miles' radius of that point. The water is clear up to its entry into the *löss* region—in fact, the Mongols style it the Black River; but so soon as it reaches Shen Si it begins to take a yellowish tinge from the fine “loose” sandy soil which covers a vast area on both sides of its valley, and the presence of which, according to a theory of the distinguished geologist Von Richthofen, is to be accounted for by untold generations of dust blown over from the deserts. Quite recently the American traveller (and humorist) Mr. Rodney Gilbert has given us vivid pictures of Mussulman life in these desert regions. This part of the Yellow River is extensively used by salt boats, and by junks conveying iron and other metals from the Shan Si mines; but from the moment it emerges into the lowlands (between Hwai-k'ing and Ho-nan cities), it becomes erratic, and is practically useless for navigation. Every year or two it bursts its banks, and temporarily destroys some tract or other; every few centuries it changes its course altogether. Its old bed is often useless, whilst the new one has to be raised or buoyed up between dykes, sometimes high above the surrounding plain. Directly or indirectly, millions of taels have been annually wasted in patching it up and in feeding a corrupt army of peculating official harpies. In a word, the Yellow River amply justifies its traditional sobriquet of “China's Sorrow,” and it would be a great blessing for China if proper scientific European specialists would take the matter seriously in hand; in fact, at this moment, an American syndicate is in treaty with the Republic for a thorough-going reform of the whole Hwai River, Grand Canal, and string of lakes tangle. Meanwhile the Chinese engineers who manipulate the complicated system of lakes and levels

forming a network about the Grand Canal and Hung-tsêh Marsh, are almost as expert in an empirical sense as the wary Dutchmen who keep an ever-watchful eye upon the Zuider Zee and the intricate system of Netherlands dykes. - The supply of water and the sacrifice of land are carefully measured and jealously watched with a view to keeping open the Canal and preventing disasters of great magnitude.

The Yang-tsze River is considered by the Chinese to take its rise in the north-west corner of Sz Ch'wan, not far from the point where the Yellow River, as above described, suddenly turns north-west between mountains 20,000 feet high. The reason for this view of the matter is that the rich plain of Ch'êng-tu was colonised centuries before anything of a definite nature was known of Yün Nan, which remained practically a sealed book up to the time of Kublai Khan, 650 years ago; and even now the Chinese have comparatively little acquaintance with what we call the Upper Yang-tsze above P'ing-shan, which is the limit of navigation for all but very small boats. After this, up stream for some distance, it is to nearly all intents a Lolo river, and for several hundred miles forms the boundary between Sz Ch'wan and Yün Nan. When we speak of the Yang-tsze valley in a commercial sense, we really, without intending it, mean the river taken in its Chinese sense just described, and this river with its feeders drains half the area, containing one-half the population of the Eighteen Provinces.¹

I need not say any more about the rest of the stream, the Middle and Lower Yang-tsze, which

¹ The Rev. S. Chevalier, s.j., in 1901 published a magnificent atlas, with detailed plates, showing the exact configuration of every fraction of the Great River's course between P'ing-shan and Ich'ang.

is already so well known from Ich'ang downwards. European pilots know every bank, and follow the changes of channel day by day: it is marvellous with what skill they will bring a huge steamer down at full speed on the blackest of nights. Touching what European geographers consider the source of the Yang-tsze—that is the longest water-course above Sz Ch'wan—its head waters are not very far from those of the Yellow River. The latest maps of the Upper Yang-tsze show three small streams in the lofty valleys between the K'unlun and Tangla ranges (lat. 34° N., long. 90° E.). These three combine to form the River Drichu, which flows south-east through the country of the Dargé tribes, past Bathang, into Yün Nan. A thousand years ago the possession of all this western Yün Nan region was being contested by the Shan empire on the one side, and the Tibetans on the other. At present it has no commercial, and very little political significance, and is one of the least known parts of the world; the Indian Government, however, keeps its eyes wide open on behalf of Burma, and has recently established a new commissionership in the Putao region (west of Yün Nan), which effectively secures to us command of all the Irrawaddy sources.

There yet remains a third great water system, that of the Si Kiang, or West River of the Two Kwang provinces. All its head waters are in eastern Yün Nan, and for some distance it forms the boundary between Kwei Chou and Kwang Si. The trade of all its branches and tributaries concentrates at the new treaty port of Wu-chou on the borders of Kwang Tung and Kwang Si.

In touching upon the above drainage systems, I wish first of all to illustrate how naturally the invading Chinese have in their expansion invariably followed the lines of least resistance;

and, secondly, to prepare the reader for certain important results affecting the course of modern trade, and more especially the enormous native salt trade, which is organised strictly in accordance with the facilities offered by rival water routes. Handled in a masterly fashion by Sir Richard Dane, the Salt Gabelle has now become one of China's best financial assets. I think it specially useful to insert here a sketch map of the Yang-tsze Valley, so as to bring vividly before the eye some points upon which I have touched. What little there is to be said about the geography of Tibet, Mongolia, and Manchuria will be introduced under those or other heads. It only remains now to mention one or two of those historical mountain ranges of the Eighteen Provinces which play a part in determining political or commercial divisions.

The great natural barrier between the Chinese and the Tartars has always been, and to a great extent still is, the range known as Yin Shan, or "Sombre Mountains," which may be roughly stated to form a backing to the Great Wall all the way from the northern Ordos bend of the Yellow River to Corea. Then there are the Nan Shan, or "South Mountains," of Kan Suh, which divide off the Turko-Tartar from the Tibetan groups: it has always been the policy of China to keep these two groups apart. Another important range separates the valley of the Wei (tributary of the Yellow River) from that of the Han (tributary of the Yang-tsze): it is called by various names in the maps, but I have never been able to satisfy myself what the proper Chinese name is. Then there is the Mei Ling, or "Plum Range," which separates the river systems of the Yang-tsze and the Chu Kiang (Pearl or West River). There are many other notable mountain ranges in China, mostly off-

shoots of the great Central Asian Range usually known as the K'unlun. Several of these ranges I have crossed myself; but it would be of barren interest to enumerate them here, or to enter into wearisome details as to what this spur does, or how that system re-appears. I confine myself therefore to naming the few chains which, in my own experience of history and travel, appear to play a prominent practical part. The best way for those readers who really take a close interest in the geographical features of the Eighteen Provinces to gratify their special propensities would be to study the map which I have always found the simplest and clearest for general purposes—that of Dr. Bretschneider (revised edition, 1900). It is wonderfully accurate, and sets out all topographical peculiarities in excellent proportion. Although the *fu*, *chou*, and *t'ing* cities are no longer, under the Republic, distinguished from the *hien*, it will be some time before even the Chinese themselves lose sight of the old “ranks” of walled cities; and in any case these distinctions of political size and quality must be kept in mind when we consult books on China published before the general hotch-pot rearrangements fitfully made since 1911.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY

THE human interest in Chinese history in the case of non-specialists begins with foreign relations. Just as early Roman history loses itself in an ill-defined mist of Etruscans, Volscians, Sabines, or other petty tribes, and makes the ordinary reader, who honestly desires to start from the beginning, anxious to get on to the livelier subjects of the Carthaginian and Gallic wars; so do students of Chinese, who have embarked on the voyage of discovery, dread the wearisome duty of wading through the insipid stories of early Chinese times: how the great Yü cleft the mountains and guided the waters; how the noble king A, of a new dynasty, got rid of the tyrant B of an old one, when he was feasting on mountains of flesh and rivers of wine, regardless of his people's poverty, surrounded by beautiful, if mischievous, houris. I have been through it all thrice in the original, and will therefore be more merciful to those who do me the honour to read me than I have been even to myself: in making these irreverent remarks I must add that the true dated Chinese history only begins in 842 B.C., at which date a great revolution took place, not only in politics, but also in letters. I will not inflict any earlier or traditional "history" upon my readers—not so much as a summary—I sweep it totally away.

Even Confucius' history, which treats of events well subsequent to the Triumvirate of 841 B.C., and describes comprehensible human beings who do not irritate us with their excessive rectitude and virtue, is inexpressibly flat and insipid. He may be said to be the very first to deal at all with concrete facts, extending in this case over 250 years of his own state's experiences (722-481 B.C.): but he wrote merely as a pedagogue, utilising these events as lessons for the "unruly" ruling princes, and with the single object of magnifying the imperial or royal supreme house, which had been effete and ineffective ever since the republican outburst. The earlier histories, or such fragments, "gingered" up by Confucius, as remain, are downright stupid. There are no intelligent generalisations: simply bald annals interspersed with a few exhortations, orders to act, and a few personal anecdotes. Chinese thought, usually very hazy, appears rather in their ethical works, and these only became possible after an enlarged script had been thought out in principle at the time of the Triumvirate—or perhaps Duumvirate. I am not surprised that the first Great Emperor, who effected a pretty clean sweep of the ancient kings, the feudal princes, and the literary men about 220 years after Confucius' death, made a desperate effort to annihilate the existing literature too—more especially that portion which consisted of polemics, philosophy, and opinion—sparing only works on matters of positive fact, such as medicine, husbandry, divination (by astrology, then ranked as an historical science); and particularly the annals of his own time. There are, however, some smart conceits even in the "Spring and Autumn" annals, or history of Lu (Confucius' own state); and the industrious French sinologist M. Edouard Chavannes has

recently provided us with a word for word translation of Sz-ma Ts'ien's great history, which practically tells us all that is known of ancient times, and may be regarded as the true basis of all Chinese history. I refer to that monumental work those whose consciences will not permit of their resting satisfied with my assurances as to the unprofitable nature of earlier annals: there is no excuse for their shirking the duty, if they think someone should undertake it, as the *Shi-ki* now exists in accessible form, done into faithful French.¹

The things which chiefly interest me in ancient

EARLY CHINESE DYNASTIES

Name of Dynasty	Number of Rulers.	Duration of Dynasty.	Remarks
"Five Monarchs" Hia	Nine Eighteen	2852-2206 2205-1767	Altogether mythical. Legendary and largely mythical
Shang	Twenty-eight	1766-1122	Chiefly legendary.
Chou	Ten	1122-828	Semi-historical kings.
"	Twenty-five	827-255	Recognised as historical by Sz-ma Ts'ien

Chinese records are a few observations about the raids of the horse-riding nomads of the north, and the measures the Chinese took to repel them; but it is only in the second century before Christ that we get any consecutive account of these movements. The Great "First" Emperor of the Ts'in dynasty, who unified the Chinese dominion in 222 B.C., and whose ancestors seem to have been, in part at least, of a race more or less foreign to the earliest lettered Chinese,

¹ M. Chavannes unfortunately stopped at the 47th of the 115 chapters, his labours in the direction of Buddhism, the Turkish history, Sir Aurel Stein's discoveries, and other intensely interesting subjects having weaned his appetite for the milk of antiquity in favour of the strong meat of practical matter.

broke away impatiently from all old traditions, and became sole master: hitherto his external influences had been chiefly exercised over Tibetan and Tartar tribes. Dr. Bretschneider's map, which gives in various tints a very good idea of the land levels, shows clearly what was the natural configuration that determined this great unifying movement. In the words of the late W. F. Meyers, who possessed in the highest degree the historical instinct, the new empire extended "from the plains of Yen and Chao (the modern Ho Nan and Chih Li) to the banks of the Yang-tsze and the hills of Yüeh (the modern Chêh Kiang), and from the Lake of Tung-t'ing to the Eastern Sea." The nomads, then called Hiung-nu, were for the first time driven beyond the northern bend of the Yellow River, and nearly the whole of what we call Southern China was officially annexed, if in a loose sort of way. All China and Indo-China was, and still is, peopled by a set of people who speak monosyllabical languages, with tones for each separate word; just as Aryans are inflective, and the Turanians agglutinative in their genius. The quality of these southerly annexations and the degree of human kinship existing between the Chinese and the peoples of the south may be compared with the northerly annexations of the Romans, and the degree of Aryan kinship existing between them and the Gauls and Germans. Similarly, though in the reverse direction, the hereditary enemy Carthage may be compared with the ancient Hiung-nu foe. But despite the division of nearly the whole area of the Eighteen Provinces of to-day into thirty-six governments, this first truly imperial dynasty, called that of Ts'in from the principality of its origin (Shen Si), seems only to have ruled immediately and directly over the original

Chinese plain. Like the earliest settled states of America, the oldest of these thirty-six divisions were conceived on a very small scale, whilst the newly conquered "territories"—like early and half-Spanish Texas as compared with ancestral Massachusetts—each covered an area almost as great as that of all Old China.

This powerful dynasty of Ts'in soon collapsed, apparently from a general incapacity to digest and assimilate all it had so hastily conquered. The Hiung-nu soon reappeared upon the frontiers. It was now that the first definite tidings of Japan (then only known as an agglomeration of the Wo or Wa tribes) began to arrive over the sea. Amongst the ambitious generals who contested the imperial succession was a self-made man of peasant origin named Liu Pang: he after three years of incessant fighting was proclaimed Prince of Han, and ultimately assumed the imperial title as Emperor of the Han dynasty. To this day, in memory of this glorious house, the Chinese (with the exception of the Cantonese) call themselves "men of Han" when they wish to differentiate themselves from Tartars, Tibetans, or foreigners. This is, indeed, the nearest approach to a national designation. During his seven years of effective reign (202–194 B.C.), and during the administration of his puppet son, subject to and followed by the usurpation of the widowed consort (194–179) (the first of the Chinese "Catherines," and in political character very like the Dowager-Empress who died in 1908), there occurred the first really authentic and properly recorded relations with the Hiung-nu, who were then quite able to assert their perfect equality with China, and even presumed to talk of marriage alliances. The Great Khan Mehteh (= Baghdur) even sent a flippant poem to the Dowager, proposing what

he called a "swap." The whole history of the Hiung-nu wars of the Han dynasty is intensely vivid and interesting, yielding not one whit in any respect to the Greek accounts of the Scythians and Huns in the respective times of Alexander and Attila. There is excellent ground for believing that the Scythians, Huns, and Hiung-nu were practically reshuffles of one and the same assemblages of people—the Turks and Mongols of later date.

The ill-assimilated conquests of the short-lived Ts'in dynasty left to the Han house, in addition to Tartar troubles, a legacy of further wars with Corea (then called Chaosien) and the southern coasts of China. It is possible that one of the motives for marching on Corea was the desire to turn the left flank of the Hiung-nu. Although in modern times the "Yüeh" of Canton is written at least (but not spoken) in a different way from the "Yüeh" of Chêh Kiang, there was no such difference then, and there is reason to believe that one race, more akin to the Annamese than the Chinese, then occupied the whole of the coast regions south of the Yang-tsze, including the whole valleys of the Canton (Si Kiang) and Tonquin (Red and Black) rivers. It also seems that most, if not all, of the settled countries bordering on China were then ruled by Chinese adventurers; or at all events by native princes acquainted more or less with the Chinese system of records, and having a Chinese blend in their blood derived from immigrants. Here, again, we must look for a parallel to the Romans, who, simply from the fact of their possessing business-like records and archives, soon spread out on all sides, and colonised the surrounding Italian or Gallic towns or states. The period of conquest extended from 138 to 110 B.C., and at the time when Wu Ti began his military career

(128-108), the King of Ch'ang-sha (now still the capital of Hu Nan) was the only one of the vassal kings enjoying independent hereditary power, though really subject to the Emperor of China. The Canton state was called "South Yüeh," and the Foochow state "Min Yüeh"; even the north part of the latter, with capital at the modern Wênchow, was called the "Eastern Seaboard of Yüeh." The princes of both the latter were descendants of one common King of Yüeh, in Confucian feudal times a powerful sovereign. Subsequently to 110 B.C. their populations were moved to the River Hwai region. The conquest of Corea led to the further discovery *by land* of the Japanese, who then occupied (whether as immigrants or as aborigines is not yet settled) the tip of the Korean peninsula, as well as the southern half of the Japanese islands. The necessity of "turning the right flank" of the Hiung-nu, over whom the Chinese gained a decisive success in 119 B.C., led to alliances with other nomad races in modern Ili and the New Territory, and finally to the annexation of Khotan, the Pamirs, Kokand, and, in short, the whole modern Manchu Empire as it existed up to its fall. Although the Hiung-nu were not yet completely subdued, yet their lines of communication were pierced. Parthia, Mesopotamia, and even Syria were distinctly "located," if not officially visited, and there are numerous indications pointing to an acquaintance with the Greek dynasties of Bactria and Affghanistan. Now first Buddhism was distinctly heard of, and India; the attempt to reach India by way of Yün Nan carried with it the discovery and partial annexation of the various Shan, Miao, and Tibetan tribes. Hindoo missionaries began to find their way to China through Turkestan, and the Burmese (then called Tan) are first mentioned.

King An-tun, of Great Ts'in, is said to have sent an expedition or mission by way of Tan in A.D. 166, and there seems good reason to suppose this word must be "Antoninus." Whoever the traders were who undoubtedly used to come from the West by sea, it is stated that they were called Ts'in (possibly = Syr) on account of their comely appearance like the Chinese Ts'in people. The annexation of Nan-yüeh involved that of Hainan, Kwang Si, the Lei-chou peninsula, and at least half of Cochin-China. It is even thought by zealous believers that Christians and Jews found their way to China *viâ* Tartary during the After Han dynasty, which reigned for two centuries after Christ at modern Ho-nan Fu, as the Early Han had done for two centuries before Christ at Ch'ang-an (Si-an Fu).¹

Instead of the thirty-six provinces of Ts'in, the After Han dynasty divided the modern Eighteen Provinces into only thirteen, of which eight represented Old China, which then as now extended up to modern Shanghai and the sea, whilst the whole of the south was divided into four, and the west was made one, proof that these parts were still but half opened to civilisation. The satrap system was in full vogue; princes were given provinces "to eat," and not merely to govern as centralised officials. North of the Great Wall were the Hiung-nu (now broken up and partly driven west) and the Tungusic

¹ As to Early Han, I append particulars of the dates of Wu Ti's conquests in tabulated form:—

127-125 B.C. Ordos, both corners of the northern bend of the Yellow River.

115-111 B.C. Modern Kan Suh (Suh-chou, Liang-chou, Kan-chou), up to Tun-hwang (Purun-ki River)

111 B.C. Modern Canton, Tonquin, Hainan, Kwang Si, and part of Kwei Chou.

110-109 B.C. Western Yun Nan and Sz Ch'wan. Eastern ditto.

108 B.C. Corea (northern half only).

hunter-nomads (aiming at the decrepit empire of their former masters the Hiung-nu). Then came the pastoral Tibetan tribes of the Kokonor region and the Upper Yang-tsze, gradually merging into the Shan peoples of Yün Nan, the unorganised Miao of Kwang Si, and the slowly retreating Yüeh tribes, originally extending from modern Ningpo to Canton. These last seem to

CHINESE DYNASTIES WITH A CONTINUOUS INTELLIGIBLE HISTORY

Time of Period or Dynasty.	Duration	Number of Rulers	Remarks
Ts'in	255-206	Five	The fourth declared himself "First Emperor" in 221. From 206 to 202 there was general anarchy.
Han	202 B.C.-A.D. 220	Twenty-seven	From A.D. 25 the eastern branch moved its capital from modern Si-an Fu to modern Ho-nan Fu.
Three Empires	220-265	Average of three in each	The northern one (Wei) is the one chiefly in evidence.
Tsin	265-420	Seventeen	From A.D. 317 the eastern branch moved its capital to modern Nanking.

From 309 to 439 there was a bewildering succession of Hiung-nu, Bastard Hsiung-nu, Tungusic, Tibetan, Tibeto-Tungusic, Migrated Tungusic, and rebel Chinese "dynasties," ruling in various parts of the north, from Corea to Kokonor; in addition to, and in competition with, first the Tsin Empire, and then the Northern Empire of the Tobas and the contemporaneous Chinese Empires at Nanking.

It must be remembered that the old *fu* cities are now abolished under the Republic, but for many years the habit of using the term must continue, if only in order to make use of existing maps.

They have very soon lost their separate identity, and seem to have either permanently retired into Annam proper (Tonquin) or to have been merged into the Chinese.

From A.D. 220 to about 265 China was split up into three empires: a branch of the old Liu family of Han in Sz Ch'wan (Shuh), the Sun family south of the Yang-tsze (Wu), and the usurping Ts'ao family in the north (Wei). This

state of affairs is very similar to the partition of the Roman Empire into the East and West monarchies at Constantinople and Ravenna, or Rome. The continuity of imperial history is now broken, for the southern dynasty has nothing to do with the long struggles between Tunguses, Hiung-nu, and Tibetans for predominance in the north; whilst the northern dynasty lost all touch with the Syrians, Hindoos, Javans, and other mercantile people coming in trading vessels to Canton and other marts on the coast. In A.D. 222 the Emperor of Wu divided the old realm of Kiao-chi (South Yüeh) into two manageable halves. The name Kwang-chou, later Kwang-nan, was given to what is now the double Canton province, and Tonquin was called Kiao-chou. Corea slipped away, and Chinese influence disappeared from the Far West. In a word, the whole *Weltpolitik* of the great Han dynasty crumbled to pieces. This period of division is by no means uninteresting, but events are not sufficiently connected to admit of portraying the situation with a few strokes in a brief sketch like this.

From A.D. 265 the Sz-ma family (distantly related to the famous historian) were for a time nominally sole rulers of China, under the style of the Tsin dynasty. This word must not be confused with the older Ts'in, which, by retrospective philological processes peculiar to China, means that *Sein* must not be confused with *Zün*. The imperial house was distinctly literary and peaceful, rather than warlike and ambitious;—in fact, it developed those qualities which we now consider peculiarly Chinese. It was the great age of calligraphy, *belles lettres*, fans, chess-playing, wine-bibbing, and poetry-making; of strategy rather than hard fighting, and of political timidity. From this time dates the rule that no one should

set foot in China, at least to remain, without bringing tribute. Moreover, a succession of Tartar dynasties of very short duration kept the whole of the extreme north in a perpetual ferment. One curious and permanent result of all this was that the Chinese centre of gravity was entirely changed. At the present day, if we wish for etymological accuracies, we find them most perfect in Canton and Corea; that is, the best representative of the language spoken under the two divisions of the Han dynasties is now to be found in the descendants of emigrants to the south; whilst the Coreans, cut off for many centuries by Tartars from intercourse with literary China, have rigidly preserved, in or according to their ancient form, the early Han pronunciation of the Chinese words they borrowed 2,000 years ago. The rough nomads who swarmed into North China not only mixed their blood with that of the Chinese, but debased the language; hence we find that the "mandarin" forms of speech, in their relation to old theoretical Chinese, bear much the same relation to the coast dialects that French does to Spanish, Portuguese, or Italian, which, though not so fashionable, are all of them nearer old Latin than the French can claim to be.

The rival Tartar dynasties in the north were finally dispossessed by a Tungusic family called Toba, which ruled for 200 years with great vigour over North China, whilst the pure Chinese governed the southern half. This was the period known as the "North and South Dynasties"; and ever since that time it has been as much the rule as the exception for Tartars of some kind to divide the empire on equal terms with native dynasties. Here, again, we find a close parallel in Roman history. The Stilichos, Ricimers, Alarics, and Theodorics all made way

for the permanent northern Frankish empire of Charlemagne. But neither the northern nor the southern half of China was continuously ruled: instead of puzzling the reader with a confused narrative of how this was arranged, the result of which would probably be to leave him in as thick a fog as before, I draw up a short

Dynasty.	Family Name.	Capital (modern name).	Duration (A D)	Remarks.
(West) Tsin .	Sz-ma .	Ho-nan Fu .	265-317	Pure Chinese.
(East) Tsin .	do. .	{ Nanking Si-an Fu }	317-419	do.
Sung .	Lau .	Nanking .	420-478	do.
Ts'1 .	Siao .	do. .	479-502	do.
Liang .	do. .	do. .	502-556	do.
Ch'ên .	Ch'ên .	do. .	557-588	do.
Sui .	Yang .	Si-an Fu .	581-618	do.
Han .	Liu .	{ Ho-nan Fu Si-an Fu }	304-329	{ Hung-nu; descended from Han by marriage.
Chao .	Shih .	Ho-nan Fu .	319-352	{ "Wether" tribe of Hung-nu.
Yen .	Mu-yung	{ Lun-chang Ting-chou }	334-399	A Tungusic family.
Ts'in .	P'u (or Fu) .	Si-an Fu .	352-395	A Tibetan family.
(After) Ts'in .	Yao .	do. .	384-417	do.
(West) Ts'in .	K'i-fuh .	near Kokonor	385-428	A Tungusic family.
Hia .	Hê-lien .	Ning-hia .	407-428	Hung-nu.
Wei .	Toba .	Ho-nan Fu .	386-534	Tungusic.
(West) Wei .	{ Yu-wên Toba . }	Yung-p'ing Fu	535-557	do.
(East) Wei .	Kao .	{ Ho-nan Fu Lun-chang }	534-550	do.
(North) Ts'1 .	do. .	do. .	550-577	do.
Chou .	Yu-wên .	Si-an Fu .	557-581	do.
Sui .	Yang .	do. .	581-618	Pure Chinese.

table showing the succession of Tartar and Chinese houses, one to the other. I must mention that capitals were often temporarily shifted; also that the list of northern dynasties here given is by no means exhaustive. It will be noticed that the intermarriages between Han and the Hung-nu produced dangerous results, for one barbarian based his claim to found a Chinese

dynasty on the pretext that he was the only true direct descendant of the first Han emperor. It will also be seen that the Tibetans never had more than one short innings; never again did they assume imperial airs, although they made many conquests in later times. But the Hiung-nu (Turks) and Tunguses (Kitans, Nuchêns, Manchus) will often reappear; as to the Mongols, they seem to have been Turkified Tunguses.

At last Yang Kien, an energetic general of distinguished descent in the service of the Chou dynasty, succeeded in unifying China once more under one sceptre. He was murdered by his son, who, though a madman of the Caligula type, ruled for a few years with extraordinary vigour, and carried his arms or his prestige to the uttermost ends of the empire. It is recorded of this monarch that he wished to communicate with Fulin, or "the Franks." Some argue from this that their name could not have been known so early, and that "Fulin" must mean some other people. But it must be remembered that this allusion is made retrospectively by historians of the T'ang dynasty after it was known who the Franks were. Exactly the same thing occurs in the Ming History, which explained all about the Franks of 1520, under the events of that date, but after Ricci, in 1600, had for the first time made it clear that the Franks, Fulin, and Ta Ts'in were all one.

To revert to the Toba Tunguses of North China, who for 200 years had managed things pretty much in their own way. During this period (386-582) another nomadic power called the Juju, or Jeujen (Gibbon's Geougen), had become formidable in the Desert region, and had also succeeded in subduing most of the Hiung-nu remnants in Southern Siberia and elsewhere. One of their subject Hiung-nu hordes was that

of "Türk," so called from an alleged native word meaning "helmet," having reference to the helmet-shaped mountain over-shadowing one of their chief valleys (lat. 40° N., long. 102° E., or thereabouts). These Turks were mostly smiths by profession, and were employed by their Jeu-jen masters to forge weapons and armour; but as the power of the Tobas declined, the Turks found an opportunity to measure their strength with the Jeu-jen. Not only did they destroy this nomad power and take its place, but they began to domineer over the last two Tungusic dynasties of North China, and to demand marriage alliances. The Sui dynasty (581-618) succeeded in repelling the pretensions of the Turks, and also overran Corea as a punishment for her diplomatic coquetting with their Khan. At that time the modern Mukden was the Corean capital, and the old name of Chaosien had been abandoned in favour of Kaoli (locally pronounced exactly like our word "Corea"). Relations with Annam were reopened; that country was divided into thirteen provinces in Chinese style, and tribute was exacted for the first time. The attempted conquest of Corea brought a mission in A.D. 608 from Japan, which now for the first time took the name of Jī-păn, or "Sun's-rise," and claimed an imperial status. In the same way the closer relations with Annam had the result that Chinese envoys were despatched to Red Earth State. By this appears to be meant the modern Siam, but the Tai or Shan race had not yet been given that name, which is simply the Burmese word Sham, written by the Portuguese Sciam, and corrupted by us into a dissyllable. For the first time Loochoo was heard of, and by that name (Liu-k'iu); the Chinese even sent a quasi-piratical expedition in order to exact tribute. Strange to say,

nothing whatever is yet known even of the bare existence of Formosa, though later tradition mentions it as a dependency of Loochoo, at first under the apparently Sanskrit name of P'i-she-ja (some such sound as Vichâna or Vaisadja). The Western Turks were an impenetrable barrier between China, Persia, and India; and the Tibetans had not yet become an aggressive power. Such was China under the Sui dynasty, which collapsed before the T'ang house as quickly as, 800 years earlier, the house of Ts'in had fallen before Han; and for the same reasons: it was too revolutionary, and it was unable to digest all that it had swallowed.

The Great T'ang dynasty (618-907) ranks with the Han as one of the two "world-powers" of Chinese history. To this day the only Cantonese word for "Chinaman," is "man of T'ang," which fact tends to show that the south had been isolated ever since the Han lost their prestige there, and that none of the short-lived Nanking dynasties had left any permanent impression on the popular mind.

Li Shī-min, the real founder of the T'ang dynasty, son of the nominal founder, Li Yüan, is perhaps the only instance in the whole course of Chinese history of a sovereign who was, from a European point of view, at once a gentleman, and a brave, shrewd, compassionate man, free from priggishness and cant. He personally subdued the Turks and Tunguses in such a way that for half a century the Tartars were under direct Chinese rule from Corea up to the frontiers of Persia, the fugitive sovereign of which latter country actually came to China for protection. For the first time in Chinese history the Emperor effectively conquered the three kingdoms of the Corean peninsula, which was also for a few generations governed directly as a set of pro-

vinces. During the reigns of his successors (one of them was a concubine, Chinese "Catherine" No. 2, who became rather irregularly the Empress of his son, and Regent over his grandson) the Turkish power, after a period of revival, was finally broken, and passed into the hands of a kindred race known as the Ouigours. Within the past generation numerous Turkish and Ouigour monuments have been discovered, chiefly by Russians. Not only has it been possible to reconstruct the old Turkish language by the light of these inscriptions, sometimes bilingual or trilingual, but the main points in Turko-Chinese history are sufficiently confirmed by them. The Turks clearly were, and are definitely stated to have been, the old southerly Hiung-nu; and the petty Ouigour sub-division of the Baikal group of Hiung-nu, which of course had no cause for appropriating the equally petty tribal name of "Türk," did, when it became the ruling tribe over kindred tribes, exactly what the Osmanli, Mongols, Manchus, Russians, English, French, and other dynastic families have done all over the world,—it applied to the whole dominion the generalising name of a tribal part of it.

The Mahometans, in their struggles with the Turks of the Bokhara region, were soon brought into contact with China, and relations with the Caliphs became fairly regular and intimate. The Tibetan *gialbos* of Lhasa also first became a power contemporaneously with the T'ang dynasty: bilingual inscriptions of this date, in Chinese and a modified form of Sanskrit, are still to be seen at the Tibetan capital, and, indeed, were found still *in situ* when we entered it in 1904. A third great power, which seems to have been practically Siamese, contested supremacy with the Tibetans in the Yün Nan-Sz Ch'wan region, and we find both Ouigours and

Abbasside Arabs taking part with the Chinese in these struggles round and about the Upper Yang-tsze. Both the Tibetans and the "Chao confederation" (*chao* is still Siamese for "prince" and "principality") came within an ace of securing the imperial throne under the weaker T'ang emperors; and as it was, the Tibetans for some decades held possession of Chinese Turkestan. During this dynasty an able Korean general in Chinese employ, whose footsteps have just been dogged by Sir Aurel Stein, carried the Chinese arms into the region of Kashmir and Balti, and Nepaul is also heard of for the first time; the various princes of India then opened up diplomatic relations with China. Annam remained a Chinese prefecture, but had to be defended against the ambitions of the Siamese confederation and of Ciampa. Since A.D. 940 Annam has been ruled by native dynasties tributary to China, but now of course it is manipulated by the French. The relations with the South Seas seem to have had leisure to develop themselves peacefully during these severe struggles all along the line of the land frontiers. The Hindoo trading colonies of Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and Sulu were gradually displaced by those of the Arabs, whose merchants also acquired a firm footing in Canton, Zaitun (Ts'üanchou), Canfu (Kanp'u near Hangchow), and other places on the Chinese coast. Europeans now begin to be vaguely heard of as Fulin, Folang, or "Franks" (a name which is almost certain to have been introduced by the Arabs overland by way of Persia, for even in India the English were known to the overland Manchus as the "P'i-ling"). The Fulin are identified by the Chinese of the eighth century with the old Ta-ts'in; and, as all the world knows, the celebrated Nestorian Stone of the eighth century discovered by European

missionaries at the T'ang capital of Si-an Fu 300 years ago, describes in Syriac and Chinese the Christian religion of Ta-ts'in. At this time the Chinese do not seem to have quite understood that the sea and land routes to Arabia both led to the same place; nor is there yet any trace of "Franks" coming by sea.

Just as the destruction of the Hiung-nu power by the house of Han paved the way for Tungusic dynasties in North China, so the destruction of the Turkish power by the house of T'ang paved the way for the Kitans, Nüchêns, Mongols, and Manchus. Moreover, just as a few Hiung-nu dynasties enjoyed short leases of power before the Tobas obtained a firm seat, so a few Turkish dynasties reigned in the north before the Kitans (the name origin of Marco Polo's Cathayans) secured a real hold. The T'ang power finally collapsed in 907, and of the five dynasties that rapidly succeeded one another, until the house of Sung once more reunited the greater part of China in 960, three were of Turkish extraction. It was during this period of anarchy that Annam finally slipped away from China's direct rule.

The Sung dynasty (960-1260), like the Tsin, was never able to get quite rid of unpleasant northern intruders; and, also like the Tsin, it was peaceful, literary, and strategical in its inclinations rather than warlike, bold, and ambitious. The Sung era is undoubtedly the Augustan era of China in all these senses. The Kitans formed a powerful empire (with a capital for the first time at modern Peking) which lasted for 200 years (915-1115). They were replaced by their eastern subjects the Nüchêns, the southern branch of whom had already (700-900) formed an influential and civilised buffer state (Puh-hai) on the north frontier of Corea. The Nüchêns governed their empire with success for

over a century (1115-1232), until they in turn were overthrown by the Mongols. Roughly speaking, both Kitans and Nüchêns ruled only over Old China, *i.e.* the four provinces of Chih Li, Shan Si, Shan Tung, and part of Ho Nan; but also over what we now call Mongolia and Manchuria:—in other words, over the trade area now fed from Tientsin. Turkestan and Tibet lay entirely outside their spheres, and a semi-Tibetan, semi-Toba state called Hia (Marco Polo's "Tangut") formed in the region of Ordos and the Yellow River Loop a barrier (895-1237) between them and the West. During all this time the Sung dynasty, with capitals at various towns in modern Ho Nan province, and finally at Nanking and Hangchow, had a complete monopoly of southern affairs and the ocean trade; whilst Corea, Hia, and the Ouigours kept up a trimming policy, first with one, then with the other, often with both of the Chinese powers. It is curious to observe that the true Chinese were not now to be found in Old China, but in all those parts which, as emigrants, their ancestors from Old China had populated. It is like Scotland being repopulated at the expense of the Picts and Scots coming from Ireland.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century there arose the mighty Genghiz Khan, whose vast empire had its origin in a petty squabble between himself and an envoy sent by his Nüchên suzerain to enforce from him more respect. The Mongols soon made short work of not only both the Chinas, but also of their tributary states, such as Hia and the Ouigours; they moreover swept over Turkestan, Persia, and the steppes beyond; annexed Russia; ravaged Hungary; and even threatened the existence of Western Europe. In the south, Kublai for the first time effectively conquered Yün Nan,

and even Burma, Annam, and several of the Shan states lying between them. It must here be mentioned that so far back as 330 B.C. the feudatory King of Ch'u (Hu Nan) had conquered Yün Nan; but owing to wars with revolutionary Ts'in the conquering general could not get back, and he had therefore founded a kingdom there. To resume,—Corea was made a subservient dependency, and Mongol influence was extended all over the southern seas, at least as far as Ceylon. But Kublai came to signal grief in his attempt to subdue Java; still more so in his persistent and presumptuous expeditions against Japan, not one inch of whose soil has ever been sullied by foreign conquest. Kublai Khan perhaps came nearer being Emperor of the World than any monarch, Eastern or Western, has ever been before or after him; and, though the Chinese affect to despise the “frowsy Tartars” (*sao ta-tsz*), their historians frankly admit that “Hu-pilié” (as they call him) ruled over a vaster empire than any other Chinese sovereign had ever done before.

But the Mongols soon became quarrelsome and degenerate after Kublai's death. A young bonze named Chu Yüan-chang, from an obscure village not very far from the Han founder's birthplace, raised a patriotic force of “Boxers,” and drove the Mongols back to their pristine deserts. He speedily established friendly relations with Corea, united the whole of the Eighteen Provinces once more under a native Chinese dynasty, sent a Frank messenger back to Europe to notify the change, and summoned all the petty powers of the southern seas to their “duty.” Never was there such marine activity in China as during the early reigns of the Ming dynasty (1368-1424). Chinese junks, under the command of a very distinguished eunuch, amply supplied with funds,

ammunition, and fighting men, went as far as the Arabian and African coasts; the Red Sea was first vaguely heard of, and tribute was for some time regularly sent from Arabia, Ma'abar or Malabar, Ceylon, Sumatra, the Malay states, Siam, Java, Sulu, Loochoo, and Borneo, besides innumerable other petty island rulers too insignificant to enumerate here. Towards the end of the sixteenth century the armies of the great Japanese Napoleon, Hideyoshi, overran Corea, his ultimate aim being to conquer China. The Ming dynasty, though already decrepit, rendered signal aid to Corea in driving the Japanese out. During the two preceding centuries the Japanese pirates had actively harassed the Chinese coasts, and in 1609 they temporarily carried off China's tributary, the King of Loochoo. Manchuria is scarcely even mentioned during the 280 years this house of Ming occupied the throne. There were frequent wars with the Mongols, and it was in the course of this isolated period that the obscure power of the Western Mongols or Eleuths had time to grow. One Chinese emperor was taken captive by their ruler Essen at a place (still so called) just outside the Great Wall styled T'umu, and was detained by that chief for some years. Bell of Antermony gives us the best account of the Eleuth doings with Russia.

Luzon (Manila) is first mentioned in 1410 as sending tribute to China; but nothing more is heard of the place until 1576, when the sea-borne Franks (Fulangki) begin to attract serious attention. At first this term was applied indifferently to the Portuguese, Spaniards, and French; but the Dutch (Ho-lan), and afterwards the English, were specially known as "Red-hairs." Chinese influence had almost disappeared from the South Seas before Europeans put in an appear-

ance, and after the settlement of Malacca by the Portuguese, the whole political field was practically abandoned; the Chinese traders there willingly submitted to the government of natives and Europeans without attempting to secure the protection of either the Ming or the Manchu power—in fact, the latter was always disposed to view trading emigrants in the light of pirates or traitors. In one case, however, the Manchus put their foot firmly down: they secured possession of Formosa, whence the Dutch were ignominiously driven. Since the “Boxer” affair of 1900 the Manchu and Republican governments in turn have shown more solicitude for the welfare and dignity of their subjects abroad.

The Ming dynasty waged a long war with Burma and the Shan states under the latter's protection; on the whole successfully. It also maintained a preponderating influence in Annam, Siam, Ciampa, and Cambodgia. Tribute was occasionally sent from Arabia, Samarcand, the Pamir states, and various parts of Turkestan; but in the main Chinese influence in Tibet and all places west of it and of the Yellow River was fitful and feeble. In spite of the vigour of the founder of the Ming dynasty and of his warlike son, who in 1421 finally transferred the capital from Nanking to his own appanage Peking, on the whole no impression of affection or respect has been left upon the Chinese mind by this ruling house, the emperors of which soon dropped into the hands of eunuchs and favourites; and it perhaps ended as pitifully and contemptibly as any Chinese dynasty ever did.

The way the Manchu dynasty came into being was this. During the Mongol times (1260-1368) the warlike spirit of the Tungusic hunting tribes had been kept up to the mark by employment

on a large scale in the expeditions against Quelpaert and Japan. As we have seen, the Ming dynasty left the whole region of what we now call Manchuria very much to itself; as it bore the Mongol name Uriangkha, it seems likely that when the Mongols were driven out of China

CHINESE DYNASTIES WHOSE GENERAL RULING PRINCIPLES
CORRESPOND WITH THOSE NOW IN VOGUE

Name of Dynasty or Period	Duration.	Number of Rulers.	Remarks.
Sui	580-618	Four	Two effective rulers only. A wonderfully active dynasty.
T'ang	618-907	Twenty-two	Three of the five were of Turkish origin. The Kitans ruled to the north of them all. South and West China was nearly independent of them all, and under separate rulers known as the "Sixteen States."
Five Dynasties	907-960	Average two each	
Sung	960-1260	Eighteen	There is no such name at this date as "North and South Dynasties," but there ought to be. The Chinese affect to regard Sung alone as historical China, but from 1127 the Sung had to abandon all China north of the Yang-tsze, and for 300 years the Peking plain was in Tartar hands. Kublai and his successors first occupied the Peking throne. The first native dynasty to rule the north since 450 years.
Kitans, 912-1117 Nuchêns, 1117-1232 Mongols, 1229-1260	960-1260	Twenty-two	
Yuan	1260-1368	Nine	
Ming	1368-1644	Seventeen	
Ta'ing	1644-1911	Ten	As with the Mongol Khans previous to Kublai, so with the Manchu Khans previous to 1644—they do not count as "Sons of Heaven."

they, and more especially the Uriangkha tribe, retained political influence in Prince Nayan's old appanage, which had in Kublai's time been practically modern Manchuria. The name of the celebrated Mongol general, Uriangkhadai, simply means "man of Uriangkha." The only occasions on which the people in these parts

seem to have had friendly intercourse with the Ming power was when they took advantage of frontier fairs to bring down horses, furs, and skins for sale or barter to the Chinese. During this obscure period of imperial inaction, the tribes now grouped together as the Manchu race must have had ample opportunity to develop; but the Manchus themselves are not able to tell us much of their own origin and doings previous to the time when their chief Nurhachi conceived and carried out the bold idea of welding all the Tunguses into one nation. Some of the southern chiefs, tinged with Mongol blood, objected to this fusion, and either took refuge in or intrigued with China. This led to frontier wars and recriminations, and finally to the conquest of the Chinese borderlands by Nurhachi's son, Abkhai. Meanwhile a great rebellion broke out in degenerate China, and the Ming general, Wu San-kwei, who had been sent against the Manchus, was recalled to quell it. Peking fell into rebel hands, and Manchu assistance was foolishly sought by Wu San-kwei. The Chinese Emperor having meanwhile committed suicide, and there being no proper heirs, the Manchus saw their opportunity, and promptly took it. Abkhai's son and successor became the first Manchu Emperor of China in 1644. Previous to this Corea and Eastern Mongolia had been reduced to submission, and special measures were now taken to draft the capable Mongol troops into the Manchu military organisation. The Coreans were allowed to govern themselves on the tacit condition of furnishing troops when called for. China was soon conquered, and then came the turn of the overweening Wu San-kwei and other revolted Chinese satraps, the Western Mongols, the Kalkhas and Eleuths, Kokonor, and Tibet. By the time of the

Emperor K'ien-lung (1736-1795) the Chinese Empire had reached its climax. The necessity of completely subduing the Eleuths and Dzungenarian Kalmucks led to the conquest of Ili and Kashgaria. The wars with Tibet similarly led up to the conquest or pacification of Nepaul. There were also long wars with Annam and Burma, in which the Manchus often came off second best, but which resulted in a more or less genuine recognition of Chinese suzerainty; an authoritative tone was assumed even over Siam when that country became involved in the peninsular question. Of course these southern nations knew next to nothing of Manchu-Chinese distinctions. The Manchus have always left Japan severely alone, but in Loochoo they found a faithful vassal (equally complaisant to Japan) until about forty years ago, when Japan, in consequence of Formosa disputes, uncereimoniously gave the Chinese notice to quit. The Sultans of Sulu have also been respectfully disposed towards the Manchus, and the tomb of one of them who visited Peking and died in Shan Tung has been kept up at the public charge down to our own times. With these exceptions the Manchu dynasty, which had no real aptitude for the ocean, always, following the example of its kinsmen the Kitans and Nüchêns, cut itself off entirely from political relations with the Southern Seas. It was only after the Japanese and "Boxer" wars of 1894 and 1900 that China's pride began to be touched on the subject of "bullying" her emigrants in the South Seas and America. As a land power, however, the Manchus have been even more solidly established than the Mongols were; for although the immediate successors of Genghiz commanded the personal attendance before their desert throne of Russian, Armenian, and Persian princes, the

most powerful Mongol Emperor, Kublai, really ruled in an effective sense over the Eighteen Provinces alone, and was at perpetual loggerheads with his vassal relatives of Persia, Mongolia, and Manchuria; moreover, the Mongols were not the intellectual or literary equals of the Manchus, and never had either the same prudence or the same financial grasp of the country's resources. As to the relations of Europe with the Manchu Empire, that subject requires a special chapter. It only needs to be remembered at this point that Chinese struggles with the nomads and Tartars begin with the dawn of history, and are carried down to our own day, when the "Boxers" and reformers have succeeded between them in securing what the Taipings just missed—the regaining of China for the Chinese. The Taiping rebellion began at a place called Kin-t'ien (Sün-chou Fu) in Kwang Si, and is considered by the Chinese to have been owing, like the earlier "Boxer" revolt of 1808-16, to the influence of foreign religion.

CHAPTER III

EARLY TRADE NOTIONS

THE history of Chinese trade, like their general history, only becomes really interesting to most of us in its relation to foreign countries. From the very first the trader seems to have taken rank with our conventional usurer, and to have been regarded as a small-minded person whose main object in life was, not to increase the public wealth, but to corner supplies; nor does the abstract idea of more legitimate trade appear ever to have been conceived in the sense of "mutual exchange for the furtherance of comfort and luxury," but rather in that of "steps to keep the needy from starving, and the armies supplied with food and weapons." The *Book of History* says: "Do not overvalue strange commodities, and then foreigners will be only too glad to bring them." In purely mythical and semi-historical times there are traditions of islanders bringing tribute from the south, and of tattooed tribes from part of Yüeh (modern Wênchow) carrying swords, shields, and fish-skin boxes for sale or barter. The so-called "tribute" of ancient times seems to have practically meant "trade," for each province was supposed to bring to the metropolis the superfluity of that which it produced easiest and best, receiving bounties or presents in return. Swords, gold and silver, piece-goods, tortoise-shells, and,

later, copper coins were used as currency, the chief preoccupation of the Government apparently being to keep the people supplied with a sufficiency of this primitive money. The swords seem to have become gradually symbolical in the shape of "knife coins." To this very day the majority of the Burmese are as indifferent to private wealth as we are led to believe the Chinese once were. It was well before Confucius' time—the period of the Rival (princely) States under the nominal hegemony of the Emperors or Kings—that the idea of accumulating profit seems to have energetically possessed men's minds. One statesman (Kwan Chung, died 643 B.C.) is said to have invented a kind of *lupanar* where trading visitors from neighbouring states were encouraged by "Babylonian women" to leave their gains behind them; thus this enterprising (Ts'i) state sold its goods at a profit, and got the money back in part. As the historian says: "Roguery and violence now began to take precedence of right and justice: greed for the possession of riches replaced modesty and humility in men's minds: huge fortunes were made by some callous ones, whilst others were starving before their eyes." In 522 B.C. customs barriers and duties are mentioned in considerable detail.

When the great Ts'in conqueror, the self-styled "First" Emperor (221-209 B.C.), united the empire into one whole, the currency is stated to have consisted in pounds of unminted gold, and half-ounces of some kind of copper coinage. Silver, pewter, jewels, cowries, and tortoise-shell all had their fluctuating market values, but were not legal currency. The long-continued efforts made to repel the northern nomads had greatly exhausted the Empire; and when, in addition to all this, the struggle of competing

generals for the succession had ended in the triumph of the Han house, the price of grain and of horses had become fabulously high. The founder of this active dynasty may have been a great man, but he was certainly not a refined one. In order to show his contempt as a sovereign for "writing fellows," he more than once deliberately used the hat of a literary man for the basest of purposes; and to evince his hatred as a legislator for huckstering, he "forbade merchants to wear silk or ride in carriages, piling upon them taxes and charges of all kinds, in order to humiliate and make them miserable." His wife and son after his death somewhat alleviated these burdens as the Empire gradually settled down into a better financial condition; but the sons of "merchants were still unable to occupy any official post,"—an incidental statement of the historian which leads us to infer that traders were under a social tabu.

The chief subject for commercial speculation was grain for the armies, and the trader of the period appears to have been the same objectionable kind of person as the ubiquitous army purveyor and commissary so detested by Napoleon during his Italian campaigns. Other fortunes were made by "melting iron and evaporating salt"; the rich so manipulated their wealth that, like Orgetorix, they got the poor into their power as serfs. Later on, provincial satraps and wily officials exploited "copper mountains" for their own profit; clandestine coinage reduced the value of the standard currency; and so on. The famous Emperor Wu Ti, of the early Han dynasty (141–87 B.C.), whose military activity first opened the West to China, and in whose time the prestige of China was at its climax, adopted the arbitrary methods of some of our English kings: he sent commissioners round to

levy fines and benevolences upon the rich, even to confiscate fortunes which were shamefully large. An officer was established at the capital whose functions were, like those of a Baron Potocki, to "prevent traders and shopkeepers from making huge profits, to take charge of all transport and delivery, to place artisans under official control, and to keep all prices of commodities steady."

These are only a few of the devices employed by the early Chinese legislators to evince their suspicion of and contempt for traders, and it is evident from even the meagre details which go to make up the above account that merchants in those days were viewed much as Jews were regarded by King Edward I. It does not give us much insight into the methods of early trade, nor is there a word said about organised foreign commerce. But, as hundredweights of grain and pieces of silk goods are counted by the five or six million in prosperous years, we may assume that the backbone of revenue and also of internal trade consisted in grain for armies and poor districts; salt to make the grain palatable as food; iron to make pans for boiling the brine, and to manufacture weapons for the soldiers; horses, provender, and carts for military transport; silk for clothing and wadding (no cotton in those days); and copper for common currency. Gems of all kinds were purely articles of luxury, used then, as now, for hoarding purposes. There is nothing extraordinary in all this. Even now the only wealth in many prosperous Chinese villages consists in a woman, a "water buffalo," a pig, and a few fowls; iron pans for cooking, a rough spinning machine, a few strings of cash, and suits of silk or cotton clothes; with lumps of salt or (at all events until the recent prohibition of smoking


and poppy growing) ounces of opium for barter. The up-to-date novelties are cotton, kerosene, cigarettes, spirits, fancy soap, perfumes, and beer. This being the condition of Chinese wealth as I have myself (1869-1894) seen it in a dozen different provinces, it may be easily imagined what the degrees of poverty must be, even allowing for ultra-modern republican progress.

So soon as ever foreign nations are mentioned in Chinese history, we hear first of exchange presents between equals, or tribute from inferiors, both of which are merely trade in its earliest form. In offering his hand and heart to the Chinese Empress-Dowager, the poetical if not Rabelaisian Hiung-nu Khan Mehteh (209-173 B.C.) said: "I should like to exchange what I have for what I have not." He probably hinted at trade, though the Empress, woman-like, construing the offer in a more personal sense, protested that her bodily charms—more especially her hair and her teeth—were inadequate; probably she knew of the Tartar custom of "taking over" a deceased father's wives; at any rate, a "girl of the blood" was sent to him for his immediate needs. He himself sent camels, horses, and carts, receiving as an equal in return wadded and silk clothes, buckles, hair-pins, embroidery, etc. Sometimes the Hiung-nu were able to insist on regular subsidies of grain and yeast besides these complimentary presents; for even then the Tartars were drunkards, and loved to vary their native kumiss with Chinese samshu. But frontier "fairs" and even clandestine trade are also specifically mentioned as early as 140 B.C. The nomads used to bring horses and beasts for sale; more especially the "300 mile a day" or "blood-sweating" horses of Kokand were highly prized. Horses, pearls, sables, and excellent wood for making arms are

mentioned amongst the earliest products of North Corea, which then extended far into Manchuria; the same thing, *plus* flax or hemp, of the Tunguses bordering thereon; the buck-thorn arrows with petrified resin or lapis-lazuli tips brought by the latter were known by report even in Confucius' time (550-480 B.C.). In the eastern part of the Korean peninsula iron was the sole currency: both the Japanese and the other Korean states used to purchase their iron there. When the Emperor of China was engaged in turning the flank of the Hiung-nu, he sent the now celebrated traveller Chang K'ien (160-110 B.C.) on a mission to some of their enemies whom they had driven to modern Ili. Before the envoy got there, these nomads had been driven by the occupiers of Ili to Græco-Bactria, and after driving over the Oxus the Aryan people of that state, already enfeebled by Parthian attacks, had possessed themselves of the country; thence they crossed the Oxus, and subsequently formed (150 B.C. to A.D. 50) the Indo-Scythian empire, one of the kings of which, Vasudeva, actually accepted a Chinese title a century or two later (A.D. 229). The last Greek seems to have been Hermaios, conquered in A.D. 50 by Kadphises; but Gondophares of Parthia a few years later still had a few minor Greek kinglets under his sway. Chang K'ien, taken prisoner by the Hiung-nu, escaped after ten years' captivity to modern Kokand, whence he found his way into Græco-Bactria. On his return to China he brought a report upon West Asia from Mesopotamia to the Pamirs. He narrated his having seen Chinese goods in Bactria, and having ascertained that they came through India. This led to his being sent on a second mission to Ili and Kokand, which country was at last conquered and forced to

accept suzerainty. Attention was also given to Yün Nan and Canton, the first because it was expected to lead to India, the second because it was found that Yün Nan produce came to Canton by river: this led by degrees to the conquest of both regions, and to the better knowledge of several new trade routes; but to this day the hoped-for southern line of posts extending from Canton to Bactria has never been achieved. In the negotiations which preceded the conquest of Canton (110 B.C.), the King of South Yüeh complained that he was not allowed to import iron, agricultural implements, or female animals. His return presents include such things as rhinoceros horns and peacocks, which probably came northwards to Canton by sea in the way of trade. From all this we may gather a tolerably accurate notion of what the ancient land commerce of China must have been. For clearness' sake I use the modern names of some places.

The Phœnicians, Carthaginians, and Syrians were already old hands at conducting sea trade when China under the Han dynasty first found herself with an unbroken line of coast, and it is abundantly clear from the works of Pliny and Ptolemy that an active trade between Alexandria and the Far East had already been in existence for some centuries before our era. Kattigara was the extreme point known to the Red Sea navigators, and of course each specialist has his own theory as to whether Rangoon, Singapore, Canton, or some other modern mart is meant. It is also a knotty point to decide whether "King Antun's" messengers already mentioned reached China in A.D. 166 by way of Rangoon or by way of "Faifo" in Annam: I have wandered on foot over and examined both these places, and also inspected nearly every business



port of importance on the coasts of Burma, Siam, the Malay Peninsula, and Indo-China, besides reading up the special ancient lore of each place. Conditions of tide, sandbanks, current, alluvion, etc., change with each generation, just as do the vicissitudes of government. All trade ports become so because the embouchure of some great river facilitates distribution, because the anchorage is spacious and safe, or for other similar reasons; and the number of such desirable sites must then, as now, have been limited to a narrow choice. I am disposed to think that trade went on between the Syrian merchants and the natives exactly as it does now, and probably at most of the same places, between Canton and the coasts of India; but as the Burmese, Annamese, and Siamese as we now know them had not then reached the countries in which we at present find them; the Arabs had not yet displaced the Hindoos, nor the Europeans the Arabs; as, moreover, the Chinese, notwithstanding the "First Emperor's" forced migrations, had not yet moved outwards or down to the south on a wholesale scale as far as the sea coasts, it is futile to waste labour over unessential discussions as to detail; and better to content ourselves, at least in an outline work of this kind, with what we know for a certainty. It is quite incontestable that the Roman Empire is stated by Pliny to have obtained from China silk, iron, and furs or skins: it is also distinctly stated by native historians that the Chinese obtained from Ta-ts'in glassware of all kinds, asbestos, woven fabrics, and embroideries, drugs, dyes, metals, and gems. So far as the northern parts of China, and therefore the Government and the historians, were concerned, this important trade was chiefly known of as a land trade by way of Parthia

(which, it is interesting to note, the Chinese always call Arsac, from the generic name of the Parthian kings); and if small stress is laid upon the part which came by sea, this is easily to be explained by the special circumstances I have already touched upon: (1) the lateness of China's appearance on the coast; (2) the fact that during half of her historical existence China has been divided into two empires; and (3) the failure in even modern times to realise the true position of the West, and to identify persons coming from the south-west by sea with the same persons coming from the north-west by land. In the year A.D. 94 special facilities were given to hawkers, as distinguished from great traders, throughout the empire.

In A.D. 98 a Chinese agent, sent by a general in the field on a voyage of exploration in order to learn more about the mysterious Ta-ts'in, arrived on the western confines of the Parthian Empire, and endeavoured to take passage to the countries beyond in a local ship,—the only possible direction in which this ship could have sailed was down the Persian Gulf or westwards from Gujerat to Aden;—but the skippers at the port, which was either Basra or other port of ancient Babylon, or some landing-place contiguous to it up to which the sea is then known to have reached, successfully endeavoured to dissuade him. The key to their motives is found in the same history that narrates the above incident: "The Ta-ts'in merchants traffic by sea with Parthia and India: their kings always desired to send missions to China, but the Parthians wished to carry on the trade with them in Chinese silks, and it is for this reason that they were cut off from communication. This went on until the King Antun," etc. All this is perfectly plain; in the first century of our

era, at least, a brisk trade in silk had already grown up between China and Rome. The Parthians tried to monopolise it, and the Romans, in order to escape Parthian cupidity, had recourse to the sea route, with which official China had no opportunity of acquainting herself before the second century. The one link, and that an important one, between the land and the sea routes was subsequently forged by such travellers as the Buddhist priest Fah-hien, who, beginning with the fifth century, reached Turkestan by way of the Pamirs, and groped their way home through India, and thence by sea along the Java, Cambodgia, and Malay coasts. According to Gibbon, a Chinese envoy appeared in Aurelian's triumphal procession after the Parthians had been replaced by the Persians.

Shortly after this, it will be remembered from our slight historical sketch, North China was politically cut off from the southern coasts for four centuries. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the northern Tobas have nothing new to say about the South Seas, whilst the southern dynasties at Nanking are correspondingly ignorant of events along the desert routes. But these southern dynasties kept up their relations with Ceylon, India, and Indo-China, and there is every reason to believe that a brisk trade went on without interruption as before. Up to the time of Mahomet, it seems that colonies sent out from India had managed or financed the entire ocean trade with the Far East, if they did not also in most cases directly rule the coast peoples of Java, the Malay Peninsula, and Indo-China. Profound international peace appears to have reigned, so far as Chinese trade was concerned. There were no very violent attempts made by junk-masters to conquer the natives, nor by dark-skinned rulers to

harass or practise extortion upon the traders. There is one specific but not very well authenticated mention in A.D. 226 of a Ta-ts'in merchant coming to the court of the Emperor of Wu (at Nanking, but later at Wu-ch'ang opposite Hankow), who gave him some black dwarfs to take back as curiosities; otherwise nothing new is said of that country except in connection with the trade of India. The history of the Toba dynasty, in adding a few new details about Ta-ts'in, says that the capital is called Antu (Antioch). The early histories, in describing the capital, do not give it this name. Curiously enough, this northern account goes on to describe "another way to Ta-ts'in by water *viâ* Yung-ch'ang"; this (practically the head waters of the Irrawaddy) evidently has reference to the old story about An-tun, for it is almost certain that nothing fresh had occurred in connection with the Roman Empire. These various historical accounts, however, though manifestly often copies from one another, or from one common original document stowed away in the imperial archives, are often important as supplementing details omitted by other copyists as being unessential. The single important point, and that upon which to lay stress, is this: both Roman and Chinese accounts make it perfectly clear that land and sea trade in silk, iron, glass, textile fabrics, and many other articles existed between the Red Sea ports (Petra, etc.) and the Indo-Chinese ports (Rangoon, etc.), and also between Mesopotamia and Si-an Fu, during the first five or six centuries of the Christian era; but so far it does not appear that the foreign question of customs duties, transit charges, or tonnage dues ever came to the front prominently, if at all, in China, though customs barriers are mentioned in the year 483 as being

relaxed in suffering places,—apparently affecting trade between the Northern and Southern Empires.

The Arabs are first heard of by the Chinese in A.D. 628, under the name of Tajik, or Tazi, and in connection with a revolt of Persia against her overbearing task-masters the Western Turks. As Mahomet was not yet dead, and means of communication were not more rapid then than they had been 600 years earlier, we have here a good instance of the speed at which news of political changes in Europe might reach China. The name Fu-lin now also appears for the first time, and the people of that country (which I take to be Fereng, or “Frank”) are baldly stated to be “also called Ta-ts’in.” The energetic but crazy Emperor of the Sui dynasty, whom I have already characterised as a sort of Caligula, is stated to have unsuccessfully attempted to open communications with Fu-lin. As this monarch sent an envoy by sea to Siam, personally visited the Turkish Khan in his own tent, and was present at the capture of the then Corean capital (now called Mukden), it is evident that he had both energy and curiosity enough to solve the European mystery if he could; at the same time, even in his day artisans and traders were forbidden to enter officialdom. There have been interminable learned discussions as to what Tazi and Fu-lin really mean etymologically, but there is scarcely any doubt that the Arabs of Bagdad and the Nestorian Christians of Syria are at least sometimes intended. We have much the same anachronism, confusion, or extension of ideas in the Far East in connection with the Russian word Kıtat (Mongol plural Kitan), still applied by them to all Chinese, though only a small portion of China was ever governed by Kitans, and none of them were so

governed when the Russians first picked up the word.

It needs not to be told again how Arab traders and missionaries spread themselves along the African and Arabian coasts, boldly navigated the Indian Ocean, established factories on the Gujerat and Malabar coasts, in Ceylon, Sumatra, and Java, and then in Canton and other Chinese ports. In 658 the Chinese established a mathematical college. In the middle of the seventh century we also first hear of tithes being levied in kind, upon imports of spices, camphor, and precious woods, by an officer appointed specially to oversee the foreign trade: one of these functionaries is stated to have been on duty at Canton in A.D. 763, just five years after the Arabs and Persians had made a filibustering attack upon and then pillaged and burnt some warehouses in that city, as recounted in the history of the T'ang dynasty. The reports of the Arab merchant Suleiman upon the condition of trade in the Far East during the ninth century, and the comments of the Arab geographer Abu Seïd, who wrote about one century after this again, confirm what the Chinese say, and make it quite certain that a lively international traffic then pervaded the whole of the Indian Ocean. Even the Chinese accounts speak of foreign ships at Canton having a capacity of 1,000 *bharams*,—an Indian word having the meaning of “a quarter of a ton.”

Towards the end of the fifth century the Turks appear on the Chinese frontiers, in order to purchase silk and wadding in exchange for articles of their own production. The Turks were workers in iron, and the district of Liang-chou, in or near which they are first heard of, was, as we have seen, precisely the most ancient iron-producing place mentioned in Chinese

history. Tea now appears for the first time as an article of commerce, and from that day to this Turkestan, Siberia, Tibet, and finally Europe, have regarded this as the main staple of their trade with China. The Nestorian Stone with Syriac and Chinese inscriptions, dated A.D. 781, to which allusion has also been made in other chapters, gratefully acknowledges the toleration shown to Christian travellers by the monarchs of the T'ang dynasty. At this time there were over 4,000 foreign families in Si-an Fu, and owing to the Tibetans having just then occupied Turkestan, most of them were obliged to settle in China for good. Foreign traders from the West were taxed at Bukur on the Tarim River, the fund going to defray the expense of keeping the high road open.

During the period of anarchy which intervened between the collapse of the T'ang dynasty and the rise of the Sung—that is, during the greater part of the tenth century—Canton seems to have lost its place as the main centre of foreign trade. In 985 the sea traders were prohibited from exercising their calling. The explanation probably is that petty local dynasties ruled all over South China, at Canton amongst other places; and until the Sung dynasty had settled the question of respective political spheres with the Kitans in the north, it could not give attention to such remote districts as Canton. Hence there are more frequent allusions to the land trade between Tangut and Corea than to the junk-borne commerce of the South Seas. The result was a partial transfer of sea trade to Hangchow and (modern) Ningpo, to which places customs inspectors were, at the request of the foreign spokesmen, appointed in A.D. 1000; efforts were also made to obtain a similar appointment for Ts'üan-chow (Marco

Polo's Zaitun), and this was granted in A.D. 1087; but I observe in the Sung history a statement in the year 1114 to the effect that the Hoppo of Canton was then still obliged to send to Court annual presents of pearls and ivory. The Bavarian sinologist Dr. Frederick Hirth, succeeded about twenty years ago in obtaining a very rare Chinese work, *Upon Foreigners*, composed by an imperial scion of the ruling Sung house, who actually occupied this last-named post towards the end of the twelfth century; he and the late Mr. W. W. Rockhill (then U.S. Ambassador at Constantinople) about four years ago published in their joint names a painstaking review and development of the whole subject of ocean trade. As piracies at Swatow, off Fuh Kien, Canton, and the Lei-chou peninsula are frequently noticed in the standard Chinese histories, it is probable that the whole coast was in a disturbed state at that time; but in the year 1141 it is recorded that "rules governing sea-going junks" were drawn up. In 1132 the Fuh Kien customs officer was abolished. In 1156 the taxing stations in all the provinces were closed up, in order to facilitate trade. In 1157 the Hoppo of Canton was directed to scrutinise the doings of foreign traders pretending to bring tribute. In 1166 the two maritime customs stations of Chêh Kiang were closed. In 1173 and 1182 foreign traders were restricted in their dealings with bullion; and in 1199 Japanese and Corean traders were limited in some way in their copper "cash" operations; it is remarkable that similar suspicious copper cash operations were exciting grave attention at the moment I wrote these lines in 1916. In 1204 Canfu was first garrisoned with marines; and in 1205 eighty-one Cantonese sub-stations (? *likin*) were abolished. In 1211 Kwang Si cattle taxes were stopped. And


so on. The space at our disposal only permits of it being stated here that the Chinese had then acquired a knowledge of the African coast down to Zanzibar, the Red Sea, and even (to a limited hearsay extent) of Egypt and Sicily. The great centre of Arab trade in the Far East was Sarbaza, or the modern Palembang in Sumatra, between which place and the coasts of Fuh Kien Chinese junks plied regularly with the two monsoons, carrying their cargoes of porcelain, silk, camphor, rhubarb, iron, sugar, black dwarf slaves, and precious metals to barter at Palembang for scents, gems, ivory, coral, fine swords, prints, textile fabrics, and other objects from Syria, Arabia, and India. Cochin-China—probably “Faifo,” near the modern Tourane—joined in this trade as a sort of half-way house, but levied the heavy charge of 20 per cent. upon all imports. It is specifically stated that there was no foreign trade with the northern part of the peninsula, *i.e.* what we now call Tonquin. After Palembang the most important trade centres were Lambri (Acheen), and ports in Java, Borneo, and perhaps Manila. That there was an active trade with North China is also evident, for in 1130, when the Nüchên Tartars had driven the native Chinese Sung dynasty across the Yang-tsze, “Fuh Kien, Canton, and Chêh Kiang trading junks were forbidden to go to Shan Tung lest the Nüchêns might make use of them as guides.” In 1173 the export of silver and silk “to the north” was forbidden, and in 1178 it was made a capital offence to export tea thither “on ox or horse back.” In 1192 the Ya-chou (Sz Ch’wan) custom-house was abolished—evidently referring to Tibetan teas.

The accounts given by Marco Polo of this same ocean trade, as it existed when he visited the South Seas, were at first received in Europe

with incredulity, but almost every place named by him, whether it be in Africa, Arabia, India, Sumatra, or Java, can be identified with trade marts mentioned either in Mongol history or in the above-cited work of the Sung dynasty, or else in the history of the Ming dynasty which succeeded the Mongols. The late Colonel Yule has treated this subject so exhaustively in his immortal work on Ser Marco Polo¹ that it is quite superfluous to cite further evidence, unless it be to demonstrate the accuracy or inaccuracy of insignificant points in detail. Full accounts have also been published, by various gentlemen competent to examine the Chinese originals, of the voyages of Chêng Ho and other Chinese eunuchs, despatched early in the fifteenth century by the Ming emperors reigning at Nanking and Peking upon various diplomatic and commercial missions to most of the countries in the Indian Ocean between the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Singapore.

The above historical sketch of early trade, imperfect and superficial though it necessarily is, will perhaps suffice, when read in connection with the preceding chapters, to prepare the way for an account of the great turning point in the annals of the Far Eastern trade—the arrival of Europeans in the China seas.

¹ Revised and enlarged in 1903 by Henri Cordier.



CHAPTER IV

TRADE ROUTES

AFTER the first land discoveries of Han Wu Ti's generals, the Chinese laid it down quite clearly that there were two main roads to the West, and to this day they are still known by their old names of North and South roads—*i.e.* of the T'ien Shan (Celestial Mountains) which divide off the two. In the Han times the "six states north of the mountains" were nomad, and the "thirty-six town-states" were settled in their habits. The North, or Sungaria Road, or Great Road, is the one which leads from Si-an Fu, north of Kokonor, past Kan-chou, Suh-chou, and the Purun-ki River at Ansi Chou to Hami, Barkul, Manas, Urumtsi, and Ili. The T'ien Shan "must be crossed" at either Hami or Turfan, which last place, under various names, has always been a pivot of Chinese power—*i.e.* whenever it reached so far. In other words, on leaving Barkul for Urumtsi you can go by Turfan if you like. The South, or Kashgaria Road, or Short Road, branches off from the North Road, either at Turfan for Harashar, or at the Purun-ki River for Lob Nor; there it again divides into two:—you can either go past Korla north of the Gobi steppe and of the Tarim or Yarkand River; or you can go south of the Gobi steppe past Khotan and Yarkand, passing to the north of the Karakoram Pass which leads into Kashmir,

and of the watershed of the K'unlun Range which shuts off both Tibet and Kashmir. This Karakoram Pass must not be confused with Karakoram city in Mongolia; nor must it be forgotten that names of places frequently change, and that I ignore many of these changes in order not to crowd my book with ungainly sounds. From Kashgar it is clear the earliest Chinese travellers passed over the Pamirs to Badakshan and Kandahar or Kabul. As I prepare this new edition, Sir Aurel Stein sends me an account of his most recent travels in the Wakhan region, in the course of which he tramps over and personally identifies the old landmarks of 2,000 years ago.

There is an old Chinese legend about foreign envoys having been sent back to Annam in "south-pointing carriages," from which story some persons have rashly inferred that in 110 B.C. the use of the magnetic compass was known. What we may fairly conclude is that in those times there was already an overland commerce with the South. When, in or about 134 B.C., a Chinese agent was visiting the modern Canton, he noticed some strange produce which was stated to have come from modern Yün Nan. On his way back to the imperial capital the agent questioned some traders in modern Sz Ch'wan about this produce, and discovered that there was a regular junk trade between Yün Nan, Kwei Chou, and Canton; this is the identical trade, now developed by steam-launches, that Hosie and Ainscough have fully described to us within the past decades. When in 112 B.C. the generals of the Emperor marched upon Southern Yüeh in several columns by way of Hu Nan and Kiang Si, they took advantage of these discoveries to ship troops also from Sz Ch'wan and Kwei Chou, in both cases by means


of the divergent headwaters of the Western River, which will be further referred to in the chapter on "Salt." In 196 B.C. the King of South Yüeh had already complained to the Emperor that his trade in cattle, iron, and utensils was being interfered with by the Emperor's kinsman the King of Ch'ang-sha (Hu Nan); so that it is evident the trade route by the Canton North River and the (Hu Nan) Siang River had also been used long before this.

The Chinese record that the Parthians carried on a land trade in waggons and a sea trade in boats. The distances along the road are given in such a way that it seems plain a Persian *farsang* (ten miles) was used as the measure of stages. The Chinese pilgrims some centuries later measured by Indian *yôdjanas*, which are perhaps the same thing. This matter of Parthian distances has been worked out by Frederick Hirth, who shows that from the Parthian capital (at first on the Oxus, but later much farther west) a road led for 1,600 English miles eastwards to the frontier at Antiochia Margiana (near Margilan or Kokand), which place the Chinese historians of that period called Mulu—conjectured to be the Mûru of the Zend-Avesta. Westwards from the Parthian capital a second road ran 1,200 miles across the Zagros chain to Ktesiphon, whence 320 more to Hira (port of Babylon). We need not trouble ourselves much about this western part of the trade, which was monopolised by Parthians and Persians, and in which in any case no Chinese trading caravans ever engaged; but it is evident that Margiana brings us back to some place very near the Chinese frontier, or at least to the region under Chinese influence, visited first 2,000 years ago by Chang K'ien, and last contested sixty-five years ago by the Manchus. There is another

point to be remembered: even some of the river routes to Canton had only been discovered a century before our era; so that no silk could have been sent abroad from North or West China by sea, nor had the imperial Chinese any properly controlled territory or any accumulations of silk south of the Yang-tsze. Pliny (23-79) mentions iron as one of the commodities coming from China; and at the time (200 B.C.) when, as explained above, no silk could possibly have gone direct from China to Rome by sea, the Chinese specially mention a people enriched by commerce in salt and iron in the region of modern Liang-chou, and a heavy excise was laid upon iron by the First Emperor, who himself came from Shen Si. Thus it seems plain that all silk and iron went by land, until the Parthian cupidity, two centuries later, drove it to the sea route. The Chinese enumerate over fifty kinds of produce imported by them from Ta Ts'in.

Ptolemy and Arrian (second century) speak of Sina, Thin, the Seres, and the "Stone Tower" (some such place as Tashkend or Tashkurgan, *i.e.* "Stone City" or "Stone Fort," near Yarkand). Sir Aurel Stein, bringing to bear the evidence of Marinus of Tyre and Maës the Macedonian, places the Stone Tower at Daraut-Kurgan, now a Russian frontier post in the Karategin valley. In the chapter on "Early Trade Notions" I have already shown how the overland route from Rangoon and one of the three Burma roads to China by the Irrawaddy, Mekong, or Salween (*viâ* Bhamo, Esmok, Kiang-hung, or the Kunlôn Ferry), was open to the "tribute" of Antoninus.


The routes followed by the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims are not to be ignored when we attempt to decide what the ancient sea and land trade routes were. At the beginning of the fifth



century of our era the most celebrated monk of all (Fah-hien), starting from modern Si-an Fu, passed through modern Liang-chou (near the iron region of 200 B.C.), the modern Kan-chou (long the Ouigour capital), Tun-hwang (still so called), the modern Lob Nor, the modern Harashar, Khotan (still so called), the modern Kugiar, and Tashkurgan; then from the left bank to the right of the Indus by a circuitous road it is impossible to identify, but which was probably the same route as that followed by Chinese and Hindoo merchants at this day, not to mention our own travellers, sportsmen, and explorers—*i.e. viâ* Shahidula, the Karakoram Pass, Srinagar, over the Indus to Dir: here again Sir Aurel Stein has dogged the pilgrim's steps with affectionate interest. Thence Fah-hien went to modern Peshawur and Kabul, recrossed the Indus at Bannu, whence he travelled straight across India, down the Ganges Valley, to a place near modern Calcutta; took ship for Ceylon, Java, and on to Kiao Chou in Shan Tung,—notorious since 1897 for its violent seizure by the Germans, and since 1914 for their ejection by the Japanese. It appears the pilgrim's junkmen first tried to make Canton, but were carried by the wind much farther up north: thence he returned to Si-an Fu (A.D. 414).

It is stated that Alexander Cosmas, himself a trader in Arabia and India (530-50), says in his *Topography* that there was a maritime trade thence with Tzinistan, a place bordered by the Eastern Ocean. He also mentions Christianity as having existed in Merv and Samarcand a century earlier, and as having spread to the Bactrians and Huns: I myself ventured to adduce evidence upon this point a few years ago in a paper entitled the *Early Christian Road to China*.

The next Chinese pilgrim in date and importance was Hsüan-chwang. Starting also from modern Si-an Fu in A.D. 629, he reached (presumably by the same route as Fah-hien) the region of modern Turfan and Harashar, which he found then in the hands of the Türgäs branch of Western Turks; thence past Kuche (still so called) along the southern or Aksu road over one of the passes of the T'ien Shan Range to modern Issyk Kul and Tokmak. Near the "Thousand Springs" he met the Western Turkish Jabgu Khan, who gave him an interpreter to take him to Kapisa. As had happened only a generation earlier with the Greek envoy Zemarchus, no idea of the distinction between Western Turks and Original Central Turks seems to have entered the pilgrim's head. Thence he went on to Talas (modern Aulie-ata), White-water City (Ak-su, or "white water," near Tchimkend), to modern Nudjkend and Tashkend, Samarcand, Kesch, the Iron Gates (Derbend), Tokhara, Balkh, Bamian, and on to Kapisa. Here he not only brings us to the region discovered by Chang K'ien in his search for the Yüeh-chi or Indo-Scythian nomads driven away by the Hiung-nu, and which is also near the old Greek and Parthian frontier of Margiana, but he tells us stories of Kanishka, King of Gandhara, A.D. 40, who was himself one of the Kushan or Indo-Scythian monarchs; their appearance, as judged from the coins of their ruler Kadphises, is distinctly Turkish. When he passed through, the old Tokhara or "Haia-thala" empire of the Oxus had already been shattered by the Turks. He gives us quite a long account of his travels and experiences in both North and South India, whence, after innumerable interesting experiences, he returns, *viâ* Taxila, Kapisa, the Hindu Kush, and Andrab,



to the Oxus; whence again through Shignan and the Pamirs, past Lake Victoria, over the mountains to Khavanda, an old state which cannot be far from modern Kashgar: the Emperor himself went out to the city gate to witness his triumphant return. This voyage occupied seventeen years, and it is interesting to note that about ten years after that (655-60) the capital of Tokhara was made by the Chinese Emperor, Yüeh-chi Fu, or "the city of the Yüeh-chi" nomads, who had been driven thither 800 years earlier. The King of Tokhara, as friend of the Nestorians and head of the anti-Arab party, about this time sent a map to China, with a request that the Arab conquests between Khotan and Persia might be taken under Chinese protection.

These two are by no means the only priests who made important journeys. A work by the bonze I-tsing (643-713), who had himself wandered to Sumatra, "Malayu," the Nicobars, the mouths of the Hoogly, and modern Behar, returned the same way to Canton, and thence to Ho-nan Fu where the Court then was. My excellent friend Edouard Chavannes has translated the whole of this work, which, however, touches only casually on geographical points, and aims chiefly at the encouragement of Buddhism. It gives a list of sixty priests who made the *grand tour*, some by land and others by sea, all moved by a purely literary and charitable enthusiasm in the shape of an eager desire to learn at the fountain head all about the Buddhist rites: at that time these ruled supreme, and had a strong civilising influence all the way from Affghanistan to Japan: they had not yet felt the shock of competing Islam, either along the seaboard or along the land chain of states. The fact that hundreds of

Nestorian, Hindoo, and Chinese priests and bonzes were able to move freely, by land and by sea, all over Asia proves, though it may not throw specific light upon commerce, that trade routes were frequented then along exactly the same lines as they had been before, and as they are now. So far as I can see, the Mongol generals of the thirteenth century, who generally used the northernmost road, past Issyk Kul, as being in a most suitable climate for their men and beasts, never travelled by any of the more southerly roads, except on one or two occasions over parts of those traversed by Fah-hien and Hsüan-chwang. The reason is plain: there was no pasture for the animals, and no sufficient space for their huge waggons. It must not be forgotten, however, that irrigation on a large scale was introduced, or at least improved, under Chinese auspices.

The road followed in 569 by the Byzantine return mission, under Zemarchus and Maniach the Sogdian, sent by Justin II. to the Turks, as mentioned above, actually passed through Tokhara or Sogdiana, where the first Turks were encountered, offering or selling iron. The Khan was found in the "Ektag" or "Ektel" (Turkish Ak-tagh or "White Mountains"), whence Zemarchus, who had meanwhile been presented with a Kirghis concubine, accompanied him to Persia, stopping on the way at a place called Talas: the Kirghis at this time used to pay tribute of iron to the Turks. I am disposed to think that the Khan "Dizabul" was not the Great Turk at all, but the Western Khan, whose ordo was somewhere between Issyk Kul and Lake Balkash. On his way back Zemarchus crossed the "Oech" (Oxus), and, after a long journey, reached a large lake, which he skirted for twelve days. Then he crossed

four rivers, all running into the north side of the Caspian, traversed the Alan country and the Caucasus, and took ship at Trebizond for Constantinople. A few years previous to this the Turks had allowed Maniach, as a Sogdian subject of theirs, to go to Persia in order to arrange for a less obstructed silk trade with China; but an Indo-Scythian envoy there named Catulphus thwarted the project, and therefore Persia, fearing Turkish resentment, sent envoys to North China. Consequently the Turks sent Maniach by way of the Caucasus to Constantinople, and the envoy was able to state that the Indo-Scythians ("Haiathala," Ephthalites, or Chinese Eptat) had been annexed. It was now that Justin sent him back with Zemarchus to act as guide as above related. All this gives us a wonderfully clear confirmation upon numerous points, such as the ancient iron and silk trade, the West Turk encampment at Talas, the road later followed by Rubruquis, and so on.

In the early part of the T'ang dynasty (seventh century) large numbers of Persian traders are stated to have come by sea and spread themselves over the Empire. Owing to the anarchy which ushered out the ruling house (end of the ninth century), they and other foreigners at last confined their trading operations to Canton. Besides the accounts already mentioned in the chapter on "Early Trade Notions," there are the often-quoted narratives of the Arabs Wahab and Abu Seid (850-79), which testify once more to an active sea trade all along the Indian Ocean, the Persians being apparently ahead of the Arabs in numbers and energy. It is Abu Seid who describes the great massacre of Canton, when (879), apart from natives, 120,000 Mussulmans, Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians are stated to have perished.

It has already been mentioned that in A.D. 628, after a century of tyranny, the Persians threw off the Turkish yoke. Pirouz, the son of Yezdedgerd, escaped from their vengeance to Tokhara, and appealed to the Emperor of China, who sent a mission to expostulate with the Arabs in 651. The Persian King Yezdedgerd had been killed by the Arabs as he was flying to Tokhara, and the victory of Kadesieh, in 636, put an end to the Sassanides altogether. When in 661 China took over the administration of all the states between Khotan and Persia, Pirouz was appointed Chinese Viceroy. Again attacked by the Arabs, he fled in 670 to Si-an Fu, where he died. The Chinese Mussulmans have in some way confused the victorious Arab general Sadi Wakas with the first Arabs who came by sea to Canton, and have always had a legend that the famous Arab pagoda built in 751, which still stands there, is his tomb. In other Mussulman temples at Canton there are yet to be found trilingual inscriptions in Arabic, Persian, and Chinese. It appears from Arab sources that their General Kotaiba between 705 and 707 subdued Balkh, Merv, and Bokhara, on his return from which last-named place he was attacked by the Turks, Sogds (Tokhara), and Ferghana people (Kokand). They defeated the Turks in 709, and set up a King of Sogd in 710. No mention is made of any Ephthalite dominion, the very shadow of which must now have totally disappeared. All this is in accord with Chinese history. The Greek authors, in mentioning these "Abdeli" or Ephthalites, also allude to the "Taugas," a name stated by the Chinese themselves in the form *Tau-hwa-sh* to be applied by the people of High Asia to the Chinese. During the eighth century several Arab missions came to China by way of Tokhara, the

north branch of the South Road, the Purun-ki River, Si-ning, and Liang-chou. The Chinese mention Arab traders at Ansi on the Purun-ki River, and only last year [1916] the vivacious American traveller Rodney Gilbert gave us his charming sketches of Arab reminiscences and survivals in these parts. The early Arabs mention tea (*ch'a-ye*, the Russian *chai*) under the name of *sakh*. At that time the Chinese employed large numbers of foreigners in the army, and both Arabs and Ouigours (who therefore must have some of them already become Mussulmans) assisted China in recovering Si-an Fu and Ho-nan Fu from the rebels. These or other Arabs would seem to have worked their way from Si-ning down to the head waters of the Yang-tsze, for in 801 both they and the Samarcandians or Tokharans (K'ang state) were found taking part in the struggle between the Tibetans and Siamese (Chao confederacy) on the head waters of the Kin-sha (Yang-tsze) River. It is interesting to note in this connection that, during the Nepaul war of 1788, a Manchu general made a very bold march from Si-ning across the Murui-usu and Tibet direct to Nepaul. Probably it will be found that both he and the Arabs took the same route as far as Charing Nor (near the Yellow River's source), where the road branches.

There is no mention of the Arabs during the Five Dynasty anarchy, between the fall of the house of T'ang and the rise of Sung (say 900-960); but there is evidence of friendliness between Khotan and the Ouigours, and of a brisk trade along the southern branch of the South Road. During the whole period of the Tungusic, Kitan, and Nüchên reigns in North China (900-1200), the Arabs only found their way once or twice to the north. In 924 the founder of the Kitan dynasty was on the Orkhon, trying to persuade

the Kan-chou Ouigours to come back to their old *habitat* there. An Arab mission promptly turned up on the Orkhon, and applied to him for a marriage alliance. It is not likely that it arrived from the north-west by the Uliassutai Road; probably it came by way of the Great High Road to the West from Si-an Fu, which then ran through Ouigour territory. In 1120 another Arab mission, bent on a similar quest, actually obtained a Kitan princess.

On the other hand, nearly thirty Arab missions are mentioned between 968 and 1116 as arriving by sea, and we find Chinese history discussing the advantages of the sea route over that of the land. Previously to all this, in 966, a priest who had made a tour through the West by land, had taken presents to and "summoned" the King to do homage to China. In one case the King is called *K'o-li-foh* (Caliph), and in another the envoy comes along in company with a mission from Pin-t'ung (Binhthuan) in Cochin China. In 1017 half the duties "charged on foreign trades" were specially remitted as a favour to the Arabs, and these people are afterwards spoken of at Canton as belonging to a country over 40 days' sail north-west of Ts'üan-chou to Lan-li (Lambri), "whence the next year 60 more days." Later on we shall see that this wintering of Chinese junks in the South Seas was quite habitual.

During the northern Sung dynasty (from 960 to its flight south in 1127) there was a "barbarian hotel" or caravanserai at Si-an Fu, inside of the south gate of the city. Nothing whatever of the Nestorians is heard during this period; but there are still existing some records at K'ai-fêng Fu of the Jews there, who, in the opinion of Father Tobar, S.J., used most probably to come to China as merchants.

The best authorities on the sea trade during the Sung dynasty are Frederick Hirth and W. W. Rockhill, who have succeeded in discovering and translating several very valuable and rare Chinese works on the subject. As we have seen, Canton lost its monopoly in A.D. 999, when customs officers were appointed to modern Ningpo and Hangchow: Kan-p'u, Marco Polo's Canfu, was made a military or naval station in 1205, and lay opposite, between the two. The Ming history specially states that in Mongol times Canfu was a great trading centre, and that it had for that reason been walled in and created a municipal town: the place still exists under the old name of Kan-p'u, but is now quite insignificant and almost forgotten. However, in 1087, long before Kan-p'u became a famous port, the merchants of Zaitun (Ts'üan-chou) had obtained the coveted official recognition. Trade between Loochoo and Japan clearly went on, and there are full descriptions of Sumatra, Java, and Borneo, which places the Zaitun junks reached with the north-east monsoon in six weeks. But I see no evidence that Manila had yet been discovered, as suggested by Hirth. The junks usually waited until the following spring for a favourable breeze to take them on to Ceylon, the Malabar coast, and the Arabian and African ports, amongst which Berbera, Shehr or Shaher, and Djafar can be specifically identified from the Chinese characters used. There is ample evidence from standard Chinese history, as well as from Mr. Rockhill's and Dr. Hirth's rare books, that Zanzibar was included in the usual voyages, and there are also descriptions of Cambay, Gujerat, Malwa, Bagdad, Basra, and other places in the Persian Gulf. It is to be noticed that one Chinese author (A.D. 1000) identifies the "sea-trading barbarians at Canton with the "*Hien* sectarians" of the Ta-

ts'in monastery at Si-an Fu. At one time it was thought that Nestorians were referred to when these two words were used; but twenty years ago the late Gabriel Devéria proved them to have been Persian Mazdeans and Manichæans. As an instance of the slowness of the Chinese in identifying members of groups of the same nation coming by land or sea, I may mention once more that during the Nepaul war of a hundred and twenty years ago certain diplomatic representations were made by Nepaul with a view to assisting China in her action against the "Franks" of Calcutta trading "at Canton." It was only when, during the Yarkand War, the Manchu Resident there sent some mysterious information to Peking about the "Franks" having taken the Pânjâb, that the Emperor awoke to the startling fact that in both cases these *feringhi* or *p'iling* were simply his old and very objectionable friends the *Ingkili* (English); the point is of importance in connection with the Fulin question.

The conquests of Genghiz Khan once more opened freely the great trade routes of the West. The immediate cause of the conqueror's first bellicose rage was the treacherous behaviour of the frontier officials at Otrar, on or near the Jaxartes, near the Fort Perovsky of our day. He left his native place on the Onon near the close of 1218, and made straight for the Irtish; then he was joined by various allies, and proceeded by the road north of Issyk Kul to Otrar, which was captured and looted towards the end of 1219. He then marched across the Jaxartes upon Samarcand and Bokhara. Whilst at Samarcand he took it into his head to send post-haste back to Shan Tung for an old Chinese Taoist philosopher, who at once set off with his Mongol guide, *viâ* Peking and Kalgan, to the Kerulon

River; whence along the banks of the Tola, past Karakoram, to Urumtsi; then through the Ouigour country to Almalik (Ili), by the road north of Issyk Kul to Sairam, Khodjand, and Samarcand. There some messengers from Genghiz Khan met him, and escorted him through Kesch, Derbend, over the Oxus, to Balkh. This most northerly road must not be mistaken for the "North (Celestial Mountain) Road" above first described, which runs from Hami and Urumtsi to Ili, and thence over the passes to Kashgar.

In 1254-5 the King of Little Armenia sent his brother to Gayuk Khan with presents. This prince first of all visited Batu and Sartak, as Rubruquis did; then he passed through the steppe country, and travelled to the north of Issyk Kul by way of modern Cobdo and Uliasutai to Karakoram: Batu's brother, Barca, was the first prominent Mongol to adopt Islam. In returning, the Armenian took the most southerly road by way of modern Urumtsi and the south side of Issyk Kul; whence, through Tashkend and Otrar, to Samarcand, Bokhara, Tehran, and Tabriz. Rubruquis took nearly two months to get from the Volga to Talas; thence along the road running south of Lake Balkash, from which place he reached Karakoram in a month.

In the first edition I mentioned Ogdai Khan's great Kitan minister in the (now obsolete) discussion upon the Chinese Calendar. This minister's great-grandson Yelü Hiliang subsequently travelled on foot from Tun-hwang to Urumtsi, Manas, and Emil (near Tarbagatai). On the whole, therefore, the Great Northern High Road, which may be called the main road, manifestly seems preferable to those running both north and south of it, for waggons, cattle, and foot travellers alike.

Marco Polo himself seems to have followed

the usual main road from Balkh through Dogana (Tokhara), Kunduz, Talecan, Badakshan, Shignan, Tagarma or Tashkurgan, Kashgar, Yarkand (perhaps Khotan), Harashar, Lob Nor, Sha-chou (Tun-hwang), Camul (Hami, or Hamil), the *Talas* or "plain" of Chikin (the Chikin Ouigours, not the same as the Talas, near Lake Balkash), Sukchur (Suh-chou), Campichu (Kan-chou), Etzina, and Karakoram. I should mention that the Mongol history makes specific mention of the Etzina road and of many other High Asian branch roads which Kublai either improved or opened. All places I name appear upon one or the other of the accompanying sketch maps. Marco Polo's description of Yün Nan and Burma is simply that of the chief trading road of to-day by way of Momein and Bhamo (the Irrawaddy). He never went to the more southerly Shan states, nor to Siam; and consequently he does not mention the only two other peninsular trade routes, one by way of the Kunlôn Ferry (Salween), and the other *viâ* Keng-hung (Mekong). Nothing has essentially changed from that day to this, and as many as 5,000 Chinese mules from Yün Nan may be seen any day during the autumn trading season picketed amongst their burdens in the vacant fields around Bhamo. The other two routes are also in full vogue for the Maulmein and Siamese trade; and of course the French railway through Tonquin to the Yün Nan capital has given a great fillip to the sea trade with Hongkong.

There is no doubt that Marco Polo's Zaitun was to all intents one of the places immediately north or south of Amoy, and it almost certainly included, in a trader's sense, both Chang-chou and Ts'üan-chou. These are still the great emigration and trade ports for the southern ocean, and both of them lie near the European

“open port” in Amoy Bay. Learned men have long disputed what “Zaitun” specifically means, but I think it almost certainly stands for the coast town of Haitêng, which, though not made an official “city” until 1564, must have long borne that name; just as Shanghai was not made an official city till 1291, Kan-p’u not until the Ming dynasty, and Hankow not until 1899. Kan-p’u was one of the grain stores when the great Mongol general Bayen established his sea routes in 1283.


Marco Polo describes the voyage from Zaitun to Ciampa (Faifo), Java, Lochac (Siam), Pentam (Bantam, or Batavia); Little Java, Ferlech, Basman, Samara, Dagroian, Lambri, Fansur (all in Sumatra Island); Necuveran (Nicobar), Andaman, Seilan, Maabar, Masulipatam (? Chinese “Soli”), Madras, Lar, Caïl, Coilon, Comari, Delly, Melibar, Gozurat, Tana (near Bombay), Cambaia, Semenat, Scotra, “Madagascar” (Magadoxa), Zanghibar, Abascia (Abyssinia), Escier (Shaher), Dufar (Djafar), Calatu (Kalhat), and Cormos (Hormuz). Almost every single one of these names is mentioned either in the Chinese history of Kublai’s relations with the Indian Ocean, or in the Ming history of the eunuchs’ voyages to the West two centuries later. Where the names are not specifically mentioned by the Chinese, it is generally because they had apparently changed, or for other sufficient reasons; in most cases discrepancies are satisfactorily explained. These eunuch travels, coming as they did half way between Ibn Batuta’s and Vasco de Gama’s times, form a good connecting-link between the Arabs and the Portuguese.

Now, the Arab traveller Ibn Batuta sailed from Aden to Magadoxa in 1339, just between the Mongol and the Ming times. He went to Zanūj (Zanzibar), thence to “Zafār” (Djafar), Hormuz,

Lār, Bengal, Jāva (Sumatra), "Mul Jāva" (Java), and El Zaitūn in China; whence again to El Khansā (Marco Polo's Kinsai, *i.e.* Hangchow). Here he heard of the Mongol dynasty being on the point of collapse, and he returned to Zaitun, where he took a Sumatra junk for Java and Sumatra, sailed thence to Kawlam (Quilon) and Kālikūt, and got home to Zafār and other places in Arabia in 1347.

The celebrated Si-an Fu tablet discovered by a Chinese Christian, and reported on by Father Semedo in 1625, is further testimony to the fact that Syrians, if not also Europeans, had for many centuries followed the great road from Mesopotamia to China. This inscription was the work in 781 of a bonze of the Ta-ts'in monastery, and gives a full account of Christianity: the Japanese Buddhophile M. Takakusu some years ago made ingenious discoveries as to the precise identity of this learned bonze, and the difficulty found in pairing off a competent knowledge of Pali and Chinese in one man. There are many evidences that the Chinese confused Nestorians with Mazdeans and with Persians generally. That brilliant Jesuit priest the late Father Havret, even expressed his conviction that we might yet discover on the banks of the River Wei (Si-an Fu) proofs of a Christian mission contemporary with the apostolic era; but this hope I cannot help thinking too sanguine. The Nestorian stone, inscribed with perfectly legible Chinese and Syriac characters, mentions an imperial edict, dated A.D. 638, according to toleration to the Christian religion, and specifically to the priest Olopen of Ta Ts'in. The original edict was long unsuccessfully searched for by sinologists, and was at last unearthed in 1855 by the indefatigable Alexander Wylie, the only difference in the wording of his copy being that Olopen is

MAP TO SHEW CHINESE KNOWLEDGE OF AFRICA



described as a Persian instead of a Ta-ts'in man. The reason for this discrepancy has already twice been explained. In the trilingual stone inscription (Ouigour, Turkish, Chinese) discovered a few years ago by Russian travellers at the old Ouigour capital on the River Orkhon, and dating from about A.D. 830, mention is made of a western religion, either Manichæism or Nestorianism, which fact again tends to connect Syria and Persia once more, through Tokhara, with China and Mongolia. Nor must I omit to mention the eminent services of MM. Ed. Chavannes and Paul Pelliot, who, availing themselves of the great *cache* of ancient literature discovered by Stein, Tachibana, and others in the Thousand Buddha Grotto near Tun-hwang, have been able to set our knowledge of Chinese Manichæism upon a firm footing.

Then we have the mission of John of Piano Carpini, sent by Innocent IV. to Gayuk Khan in 1245-7 (he passed through the country of the Naimans and Kara-Kitans; thence along the Sungarian lakes to near the Orkhon); Rubruquis' mission of 1254 already mentioned, also through the Kara-Kitan country, near Lake Balkash; letters from Nicholas III. to Kublai Khan, sent by Franciscan friars in 1277-80; and the arrival at Peking in 1293 in order to found churches there of John of Monte-Corvino, belonging to the society of the Friars Minor. The account of his journey says the Florentine trade route lay through Azov, Astrakhan, Khiva, Otrar, Almalik (Ili), and Kanchou. In 1286-1331 Friar Odoric in his own person travelled over parts of both the land and the sea roads to China; Trebizond, Tabriz, Shirâz, Bagdad, Hormuz, India (Tana), Malabar, Quilon, Ceylon, Mailapur (Madras); thence by Chinese junk to Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Ciampa, Canton, Zaitun,

over the mountains to "Cansay" (Hangchow). This last stretch of country I have been over twice myself, crossing two sets of passes. In 1336 the last Mongol emperor sent letters by a "Frank" named Andrea to Benedict XII., who replied in the following year to the Khan's message. In 1340 the Franciscan priest John of Marignoli built a new church at Jagatai's capital of Almalik (Ili), where in 1339 Pascal's Spanish mission had been massacred. In 1342 this fresh mission was once more destroyed; and in that same year Nicolas de Bonnet arrived in Peking as successor to Monte-Corvino. We have already seen in the chapter on "History" how a "Fulang" man brought a wonderful horse to China in 1342, and how the founder of the Ming dynasty in 1371 sent a message to Europe by one "Niékulun," a "Fulin" man, who had come to trade at Peking in 1367. In 1375 another Fulin man came with the Sumatra mission to China. Both Marignoli and Pegoletti bear witness to the fact that "Franks" had nothing to do with France, but meant all the Christian peoples west of "Romania" (? Greece); even now the modern Greeks use the word "Franks" in this sense.

The Ming envoy sent to demand tribute from Tamerlane in 1395 travelled *viâ* the Kia-yüh Pass, Hami, Turfan, Ili, and Samarcand, whence he was taken on to Shiraz and Ispahan, staying some years in the country. Owing to a dispute, probably about tribute, in 1401, the envoy was forcibly detained; and in 1405 Tamerlane, for reasons not given, but evidently incensed at the demand for tribute, crossed the Jaxartes with an immense host in order to invade China. As he died at Otrar, he evidently followed so far, and intended to follow farther, but in a reverse direction, the footsteps of Genghiz Khan. The Castilian envoy, Clavijo, who was then at Samar-

cand, has left it on record that a caravan of 800 camels, laden with silk, musk, rhubarb, and gems, came from "Cambalu in Cathay" in 1404. The son of Tamerlane sent numerous missions to China, as recorded in the Ming annals, and amongst the many return Chinese envoys there was one who visited Hami, Turfan, Sairam, Otrar, Tashkend, Samarcand, Kesch, Bokhara, Herat, Termed, and Badakshan.

A Persian trader in a work cited by Dr. Bretschneider upon *Tchin* or *Khata* trading, and dated about 1500, mentions a mission to China sent by Tamerlane's grandson about the year 1449, but the Turkish translation of this Persian work does not enable us to identify the names of places along his route. The Ming history says that missions came from Samarcand in 1430, 1437, 1445, 1446, and 1449. It is interesting to note how long the word Kitan (*Khata*) and Cambalu (*Peking*) survive, together with the older word *Thin*, *Tzin*, or *Tchin*. It was reserved for Benedict Goes (1602-7), who travelled from Kabul, Yarkand, and the Upper Oxus to Suh-chou, first to prove that "Cathay" and "China" were one and the same place. Lieutenant Wood in 1838 was the next European to follow the route of Polo and Goes.

The sea trade routes followed by the eunuchs of the Ming dynasty are perfectly clear. And after all it is only in petty matters of shifting banks, shifting bars, and consequently shifting *emporia*, that we can possibly go wrong; for a junk which leaves its anchorage must either go back or go on, in either of which cases it calls at fixed places. The chief one of these leaders was the Chinese Narses named Chên Ho. In 1405 he took sixty-two junks and 27,800 men from Shanghai to Amoy, Faifo, Binh-thuan, Pulo-Condor (island), and Kampot (Cambodgia), to

all which places I went myself in 1888, and in the same order, so that I can personally vouch for the reasonableness of the eunuch's stages. Either on this or the next occasion he took Kilung (Formosa) on his way, but failed to induce the savages of those parts to bring tribute; but he left presents, and describes them, and also mentions the origin of the name Tamsui (Fresh Water), which is still that of a treaty port. In 1407-9 the same eunuch went to Palembang, Lambri, Malacca, Siam, Cail, and Ceylon, fighting several considerable battles near Acheen and Kandy, and asserting China's over-sovereignty in a very decided way. In 1412-16 he visited Pahang, Lambri, Aru, Kelantan, the Andaman Islands, Cochin, Quilon, Calicut, Hormuz, Aden, Magadoxa, Jubba, and Brava. In 1430-1 he found it necessary to go the round of most of the above places again. He himself never actually went up the Persian Gulf, nor up the Red Sea; but he sent lieutenants, who seem to have penetrated to Jeddah, as they brought back detailed accounts of the land of Mahomet. Nor does he seem to have ever gone personally to Java or Borneo, which islands, however, were both repeatedly visited by other eunuchs; as also were Madras, Bengal, and (by land) Nepaul and Tibet.

The present Manchu dynasty had to begin afresh and feel its way overland along new or forgotten ground, just as its predecessors had done. The first distant discoveries were made towards the end of the seventeenth century, when the Emperor K'ang-hi found it advisable to march as far as the Kerulon and the Tola in order to drive back a Kalmuck invasion; his historian truly boasts that no previous emperor occupying the Chinese throne and no Chinese army ever went so far west, or numbered so many as 30,000 men conveyed across the desert. The

son and grandson of this excellent monarch saw that it was indispensable to crush the Kalmuck power: they proceeded to attack them first at Kokonor and Lob Nor; then to advance along the North Road to the Purun-ki river and the Tsaidam; as a sequel utterly to annihilate the whole Kalmuck state, to annex Cobdo, Sungaria, and in the end even the Mahometan states of Little Bokhara (*i.e.* Kashgaria). The Kalmucks retreated on one occasion from Kokonor by a road running west of the Kia-yüh Pass to Hami, and not marked on most maps. They were granted trade privileges with China in 1739, and also had the privilege of going to Tibet to "boil tea"; but of course that was before their power was broken. At present there seems to be no long-distance caravan trade along the direct roads between Tibet and Lob Nor across the K'unlun Mountains. During all these conquests the Chinese armies always kept either to the northernmost road by Uliassutai, or to the North (Sungaria) Road, or the two branches of the South (Kashgaria) Road, *i.e.* to the main roads; and the same thing may be said of Tso Tsung-t'ang's reconquest from Yakub Beg in 1877, except that he never used the Uliassutai road at all: by-roads and cuts across the desert were only occasionally made use of for military surprises. The southern branch of the South Road has always been used for the Khotan jade-stone import trade, which is a very ancient one. After the subjection of Kashgaria, the Manchus for a few years extended their influence over Kokand, Bokhara, Shignan, and Badakshan; but their armies never penetrated even temporarily far beyond the Pamirs. There were continuous disputes with Kokand as to the right of the latter to tax the Kashmir trade crossing the Sarikol region; but China supplied

Kokand with tea and drugs, and was thus always able to put pressure upon the Usbeg power by stopping this important trade.

The ordinary Tibetan tribute route, over which thousands of men and animals habitually travelled to and from Peking in huge caravans, was that taken by the Abbé Huc in 1834-5. He followed the high-road from Dolon Nor to Chagan Kuren, near Baotu; cut across the Yellow River and a corner of the Ordos Desert; and recrossed it at Karahoto. Thence he followed the left bank and the Great Wall to Sayang, Nien-po, and the Kumbum Monastery, near Si-ning. From that resting-place he started once more along the road running south of Kokonor to the sources of the Yellow River; crossed the Shuga and Bayen-kara ranges, then the Murui-Usu, and on to Lhasa, apparently by the same road the Manchu Nepaul army took, as already related.

The Nepaul "tribute" (trading) mission, which still periodically visits China, invariably takes the post road, *via* Shigatsz and Lhasa, to Ta-t sien Lu. The road from Yün Nan to Tibet, though practicable, is too rough for troops, and is therefore deliberately abandoned by the Manchus, as it was 2,000 years ago by Han Wu Ti: still, Prince Henry of Orleans some twenty years ago managed to cross the extreme head waters of the Irrawaddy, the ultimate sources of which have since been accurately placed by Jacques Bacot and others. Westward from Lhasa to Lari there is a post road; but the Chinese Resident had for long been practically a political prisoner at Lhasa; *a fortiori* no Chinese trader can do much in the way of exploration farther west. Since the British expedition to Lhasa of 1904, the Chinese reconquest of Tibet, and the disorganisation of frontier affairs con-


sequent upon the fall of the Manchu dynasty, the precise status of Tibet has been in a state of "suspended animation."

It is interesting to notice what route is usually followed by modern Chinese Mussulmans on their way to Mecca. In 1893 I met one of these pilgrims at Bhamo; he had come all the way from Ho Nan province, and was going by steamer to Rangoon. In 1841 a Yün Nan Mussulman, who afterwards became prominent in the Pan-thay rebellion as "Old Papa," went by way of Esmok to Kiang Tung, Legya, and Ava (Mandalay); thence in a junk laden with Yün Nan copper to Rangoon. From this port he travelled by steamer to Calcutta, Ceylon, Malabar, Socotra, Aden, and Mocha; thence to Jeddah. The route he took back by sailing vessel was ultimately by way of Acheen; but he was wrecked on the way, and most of the places he called at are not at all identifiable by the uninitiated. Then he went to Penang, Malacca, Singapore, Canton (where he stayed in the old mosque), up the West River to Nan-ning and Peh-seh. Peh-seh is now the great trading centre for the foot traffic between Pakhoi, Kwei Chou, and Yün Nan. But he also gives us a land route, which is exactly that of 2,000 years ago, and is evidently so described by him with the intention of encouraging the Kan Suh Mussulmans to do their religious duty; to wit, the Kia-yüh Pass to Hami, Turfan, Aksu, Ush, Kashgar, Andijan, Kokand, Khodjand, Samarcand, Bokhara, Bagdad, Aintab, Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem, Cairo; or, as an alternative, Aintab, Antioch, Jaffa. Instead of going from Bokhara to Bagdad (he names eight stations), you can go from Bokhara to Balkh, Kabul, Kandahar, Kelat, and Beyla, taking ship at Beyla. The late Gabriel Devéria has collected

these and many other interesting details concerning the Chinese Mussulmans.

If we now pass on to Mongolia, we shall find that the trade of north-west concentrates at or near Baotu, at the north-east corner of the Yellow River bend, whence the ancient high-road through Kwei-hwa Ch'êng (Tenduc) permits of easy travel to Dolonor (Lama Miao) and Kalgan. From Kwei-hwa runs also the high-road to Uliassutai and the northernmost route to the Far West. These roads (soon to be railways) are of great commercial importance to the foreign trade of Tientsin, and the best first-hand authority on the subject is Rodney Gilbert, who has "roughed it" by boat, cart, and camel.

As to the roads into Manchuria, recent researches prove absolutely that the mediæval Chinese envoys to the Nüchêns followed the present high-road round from Peking, through Shan-hai Kwan, Mukden, Kirin or Ch'angch'ün, to Alchuk and Sansing. So with the modern Korean road from Söul, or P'ing-yang, by way of I-chou, whence either *viâ* Mukden and the Manchu road, or *viâ* the Fêng-hwang road and Kin-chou, where the latter joins the former: these were the roads of ancient times. The Kitan roads I have been over, for the most part, myself; they are simply the high-roads from Peking through the various passes of the Great Wall, and to this day the caravans of laden camels or mules, the droves of horses, the herds and flocks driven in for sale may be seen coming through in the winter season exactly as they came 2,000 years ago. Of course the Peking-Mukden and Peking-Kalgan railways have revolutionised part at least of the traffic, and no doubt before long the Kalgan railway will be carried on to Urga and Kiachta. The present Kalgan and Kiachta road used by the Russians



was not the one preferred by them in the seventeenth century. They used to go from Tsuruhaitu on the River Argun, across the River Hailar and the Hingan Range, down the Yall Valley to the Nonni; whence south-west through the steppes and mountainous borderland of south-east Mongolia to the Hi-fêng K'ou (pass) in the Great Wall. Between Tsitsihar on the Nonni and Peking, travellers crossed Cholin-u-ye and Mokhoi to the rivers Toro and Shara Muren, with its tributary the Loha.

The same thing may be said of the Tonquin frontier; the roads have always been the present ones; the only novelty being that the Red River route from Yün Nan past Lao-kai to Hanoi never existed in practice, even if known in theory, as a continuous road, until twenty-five years ago, when Jean Dupuis effectively discovered it. Even Haiphong had no existence as a port. Now we have a continuous railway from the port, *viâ* Hanoi and Lao-kai to Yün Nan city. The Annamese formerly discouraged trade with China, when and for the same reasons the Japanese did: first, on account of pirate complications; secondly, from the dread of opium importations.

The total result of these laborious inquiries into trade routes is, after all, a simple conclusion. With one or two exceptions, the beaten tracks are exactly the same now as they were 2,000 years ago, both by land and by sea. The marts, with similar rare exceptions, are either the old marts, or are near them, or have a special traceable reason for their modified existence. Even the peoples are the same peoples, mixed or displaced here and there by conquests, famines, or other cataclysms. Tea, known, as we have seen, to the earliest Arab visitors, became a new export when cotton became a new import:

it was first taxed in the eighth century. Cheap freights for heavy commodities in huge ships have displaced certain exchanges; as, for instance, iron, which from being an export is now an import: thousands of tons of old horse-shoes twenty years ago did, and possibly still do go out as ballast, at low freights. The great novelty and the great economic curse to China has been opium, which now happily ceases in great measure to work its evil course; but it is not fair to charge upon ourselves the whole blame for this, nor do the Chinese historians attempt to do so: on the other hand, we have not been ungenerous in our efforts to aid China in suppressing the evil within the past decade.

The way a man walks from one village to another is a road; if the walk extends to fifty villages, and a pack-mule accompanies the man, it becomes a great road; if supplied with post-stations for man and caravan, it is a high-road. People follow their noses by land, the compass by sea (or headlands if they do not understand the compass), and bones in the desert; all this now in 1917 exactly as they did 200 B.C. In other words, commercial history shows us nothing more than that with the same old materials we adapt ourselves to fortuitous circumstances exactly as our ancestors did before us. During the past sixty years these modifying circumstances have been of unusual gravity, and for that reason have caused unusual commotion—they are steam, electricity, coal, petroleum; and now last of all wireless talk, aerial and submarine locomotion; in a word, “progress.” It appears to me doubtful if we Europeans are a whit happier for “progress”; it has certainly not had cheerful results so far for the Chinese:—two dozen words originally written in 1900, truer than ever now in 1917.

CHAPTER V

ARRIVAL OF EUROPEANS

THE first European missionary who attempted to reach China by sea was St. Francis Xavier, and the first great city the Portuguese had definitely heard of was Canton ; but St. Francis died, in 1552, on his way thither, at the port of a small island called Shang-ch'uan, lying to the south-west of Macao. The name was soon corrupted into Sanciano, or Saint John, which it now bears : the Macao Portuguese still make an annual pilgrimage to this place. Macao was founded shortly afterwards, but it was not until 1582 that the Jesuits Ruggieri and Pasio actually succeeded in reaching Canton itself ; and they subsequently went on to the then provincial capital of Chao-k'ing, locally pronounced Shiu-heng. Here they were joined in the following year by the Italian, Matthew Ricci, who after various vicissitudes reached Peking with one or two companions in 1601. Now it was that the Chinese had the opportunity for the first time of comparing notes upon the subject of the mysterious Franks and the semi-mythical country of Ta-ts'in, which up to that date had been as much a puzzle to them as Serica and the Seres had been to the denizens of the West. The condition of their own practical knowledge when Ricci arrived was as follows :—

In 1517 a "Fulangki" fleet had appeared at St. John's Island, which was then the entrepôt of trade between Canton and Malacca. Why the Portuguese—for they it was, under Peres de Andrade's command—were introduced into China by this name we can only guess; probably because, as with the old Fulin, the already established Arabs had to explain to the Chinese who they were. They sent apparently to Canton or Chao-k'ing a *Ka-pi-tan Mo* (Capitão do Mar) with tribute in 1518, and then first was their name of "Frank" officially recorded: the word "Portugal" was afterwards used, but it never seems to have quite "caught on," though the "*Po-tu-ki* man" of Macao is now familiar to us all. Naturally the appearance of these strangers at Canton, to which place Andrade shortly afterwards forced his way, created great commotion in official circles, especially as other Portuguese ships had meanwhile visited Ts'üan-chow, and had exhibited considerable violence and asperity in their dealings with the various trading people along the coasts. However, a Portuguese mission, it is not quite clear under whom, got to Peking in 1520, and an attempt was then made by the Chinese Government to force the Envoy to restore Malacca to its rightful king, who was nominally a tributary of China. At least one of the members of the mission was executed at Peking, and the Envoy himself is supposed to have perished in prison at Canton, back to which place he was ignominiously escorted. This fiasco naturally led to hostilities, during which the large Portuguese cannon used in the sea-fights attracted considerable attention, and soon acquired the name of "Franks" too, which in some parts of China is still the case even to this day. The Chinese seem to have subsequently availed themselves of the assist-

ance of the Portuguese, and of these wonderful guns, to punish their own pirates: trade had meanwhile been temporarily transferred to the coast town of Tien-peh (Tín-pák), west of St. John's, but now (1534-7) the Portuguese were allowed by some official who had been judiciously bribed to occupy Macao as a commercial depôt; and from that day to this they have never been ousted from it, though their right to possess it was never put on a legal footing until some thirty years ago (1887). But they had also for a time other settlements at Ningpo and Ts'üan-chow, the former of which was destroyed in 1549, probably at the time the piratical Mendez Pinto was there. Pinto had just escaped from captivity in Mongolia, and had returned to Ningpo from a visit to Japan, which country he was the first white man to see. There was also some fighting at and near Ts'üan-chow, but both the Chinese and the Portuguese accounts leave confused impressions, and it is probable that the Portuguese never had so much to do with that port as the Spaniards.

For some years after this the severest possible restrictions were placed upon Chinese leaving their country for purposes of trade, but in 1567 the Governor of Fuh Kien obtained their removal: in any case trade at Macao went on without a break. In the main it appears the Chinese were unable or unwilling to prevent the fortification of Macao: moreover the Dutch and the Japanese were beginning to give serious trouble, and it was therefore thought prudent to conciliate the Portuguese. Their trade was limited to twenty-five ships a year. In 1667 a mission was sent from Goa to complain about obstructions to trade, and in 1710-27 the King of Portugal took prominent part in the Emperor's academic dispute with the Popes; but since

the last mission to Peking in 1753 the Portuguese have until our own days had very little intercourse with official China. Up to the time of Ricci's arrival it was not quite understood what country Portugal really was; the very name was not heard in China till 1564; and even now the vague name of "Western Ocean" men is usually employed by old popular habit to specially designate the Portuguese,—except, as explained, in "pidjin English" conversation. The physique as well as the *moral* of the mixed race now in occupation of Macao is considerably below that of pure Portuguese, and even below that of the pure Chinese. The trade of the place has dwindled into insignificance.


From the Portuguese we pass to the Spaniards. In the year 1576 the Chinese, in their pursuit of certain Japanese and Chinese pirates who had been hovering about Formosa, came across some more Franks in Manila, where there had already been large settlements of Fuh Kien traders long before the Spaniards ever appeared in those seas. A Mexican priest who had lived there, writing in 1638, said their junks came from Ocho (Foochow), Chincheo (Ts'üan-chow), and Amoy, and always went back in ballast, carrying only silver. They paid a duty of 3 per cent. upon all imports, and there were no exports: the group was nominally annexed in 1565. In 1575 two Spanish Augustines had visited Foochow and Canton on a political mission from Manila. The Chinese may well be excused for having confused the Portuguese with the Spaniards during the negotiations which took place at Manila relative to the treatment of Fuh Kien merchants there, for in 1580 Philip II. annexed Portugal, which remained for over half a century one realm with Spain. Manila, so called from a river in Luzon, was taken in 1571, and the

whole group of islands was styled "The Philippines" in honour of the Spanish king. The Chinese then used no other word than the old native name of Luzon; nor do they now. It appears that some of the speculative Chinese, evidently misled by the enormous importation of silver from Mexico, and the fact that the Spaniards never gave anything but silver in exchange for the multifarious Chinese produce at last imported, got into their heads a notion that gold and silver might be obtained in Manila for the mere picking of it up. Official personages were despatched at their instigation from China to make inquiry: the Spaniards grew suspicious that ideas of conquest were being entertained, and considerable ill-feeling was thus engendered, which culminated in a fearful unreasoning massacre. This seems to have been in 1603; nearly the whole of the Chinese were put to the sword, and even those who escaped death were sent to the galleys. Both Chinese and Spanish accounts agree, however, in stating that junks and traders soon began to arrive again as if nothing had happened. But a limit was thereafter placed upon their numbers by the Spaniards, and each man had to pay a poll-tax of eight dollars. Another massacre took place in 1662, when the Chinese pirate Koxinga, who had just ejected the Dutch from Formosa, threatened to come over and also take Manila. Since then the Chinese Government, until quite recent years, seems to have almost entirely ignored the place; and their subjects, chiefly from the Amoy region, have thriven fairly well under the strict but narrow Spanish rule. The total population of the whole group does not fall far short of 8,000,000, and, as everyone knows, the Americans are now (since 1899) in possession. The main exports are sugar, tobacco, and hemp.

It should perhaps be mentioned that in 1762 Manila was occupied by the English, but soon surrendered on payment of a ransom.

The Dutch first opened commercial relations with the Spice Islands, Bantam (near Batavia) and Acheen in 1598–1600. Coffee was first brought into Europe from Arabia in 1580, and was soon in great demand, so the Dutch sent an agent to Mocha with a view to cultivating coffee in Java. In 1610 they extended their trading relations to Hirado, in Japan: but in 1640 they were compelled to retire, and were confined to the tiny island of Decima—a mere quay—in Nagasaki Bay. It was about this period that the Chinese first heard of the existence of the Dutch: “Sailing in great ships and carrying huge guns, they went straight for Luzon (1601), but the Luzon men repelled them, on which they turned for Macao.” Just after the Japanese and Chinese pirates had been driven out of Kilung (whence the latter fled to Borneo), some Chinese fishing boats drifted to Formosa, and then traders began to settle there. The Dutch were not long in discovering this promising commerce. In 1603–4 they succeeded, with the connivance of certain Chinese traders, in effecting a landing in the Pescadore group of islands, whence they were ejected in 1624: a number of them were carried captive to Peking. In consequence of these events, the Chinese Government encouraged their people to emigrate to Formosa, and the Dutch, in 1634, also went on to found settlements in T’ai-wan (South Formosa). The oldest name for the island seems to be “Mount Kilung,” from a headland on the north promontory, and Kilung is still the name of a port in the extreme north; but no serious attention appears to have been paid to it by junkmasters until the fifteenth century, when

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE EASTERN ISLAND TRADE SPHERE



Chinese traders began to establish their station at various suitable spots in the island. Short after their exploit with the King of Loochoo, as narrated on page 40, the Japanese endeavoured to form a colony in Formosa, and had to contest possession with the Dutch; but the Dutch were ultimately driven out in 1662 by Koxinga, who was himself half a Japanese: his father, a baptized Christian named Nicholas, had visited both Manila and Japan, where he had married a native woman, Koxinga's mother. It may be explained that Koxinga is merely the Portuguese form of the Chinese words *Kwok-sing-y* or "the gentleman with the reigning surname," because a Chinese prince, then a fugitive in the south from the triumphant arms of the Manchus had caused to be conferred on him, in consideration of his heroic patriotism, the family name of the Ming dynasty. In 1665 a Dutch mission under Van Hoorn visited Peking, and the local government of Fuh Kien seems to have sought Dutch assistance about this time in connection with Formosa affairs. It was not until 1683 that the Manchus succeeded in obtaining from the Koxinga family, with Dutch assistance, a renunciation of their hereditary rights in Formosa and subsequent to that date (until its cession to Japan in 1895) the island was incorporated in the Manchu empire as part of Fuh Kien.

Chinese history gives a fairly intelligible and accurate account of the struggle between Japanese, Franks, and Red Hairs, but after the expulsion from Formosa the Dutch are not so much heard of in the China seas as other European nations. According to the arrangement which the Chinese say was made by a Dutch mission to Peking in 1656, Holland had to send tribute to the Manchu court once every eight years. A mission under Titsingh and Va

Braam visited the Chinese capital in 1793, and since then Holland appears to have gone quietly about her own business in the Southern Archipelago, without troubling herself with Manchu official relations at all; Chinese traders meanwhile managed to thrive under the strict and discriminating rule of the Hollanders. And so things went on, their Canton factory of course in full swing, until the Dutch treaty of 1863 was concluded: this was after the second Chinese war, and the occupation of Peking by the English and French. But even after this the Dutch held aloof, and probably they would never have sent a minister to Peking at all, had they not desired to obtain a liberal supply of coolies for Sumatra. The Chinese in Java and other Dutch colonies have not quite so much freedom as in Hongkong or Singapore; but they are treated with sagacity as well as firmness, and the Dutch, who watch them carefully, and nip any nascent rising or independent action in the early bud, know well how to utilise to their own advantage the capacity of the Chinese for self-government and commercial organisation. This fact began to touch Chinese pride after the "Boxer" war, and, following many years of patient negotiation, China at last gained her main point, which was to place her nationals in the Dutch islands under the "observation" at least of Chinese consuls.

All this, however, relates to the Dutch of to-day, from whom we must now turn to pick up the thread of our narrative of the earlier arrivals in China. Ricci died in 1610, and was therefore not called on to explain to the Chinese the concrete existence of any European nations except the Franks, the Italians, and the Dutch. But there is a chapter in the Ming history which states that, according to the Western men who

arrived between 1573 and 1617, their "Lord of Heaven" was born in Judæa, or the ancient Ta-ts'in. Ricci is also specifically said to have made for the Chinese a map of Europe, and to have explained to them the division of the world into five great continents. His statements were received with considerable incredulity, but he was, notwithstanding, kindly treated by the Emperor. After Ricci's death, Pantoja, Rho, Schaal (or Schall), and other distinguished Jesuits succeeded to his influence; they rendered considerable service to the Chinese in the manufacture of guns, the calculations of eclipses, and matters of science generally. Adam Schaal was in Peking shortly after the Manchus took possession; his appeal to their clemency was well received, and he was appointed President of the Astronomical Board by the prudent Manchus, who were only too anxious to avail themselves of talent, wherever found. His successor, Verbiest, assisted the Manchu commanders during the Chinese satrap rebellions to make large cannon for use in the field, and the Emperor K'ang-hi even showed himself personally very well disposed towards Christianity. Unfortunately, religious intrigues with his own sons, and disputes between rival missionary societies led to an untimely difference of opinion upon the subject of ancestor worship between the Emperor and the Pope, since which time politics have been inextricably mixed up with Western religion in China, and persecutions never entirely ceased so long as the Manchu dynasty existed.

The first English arrivals came shortly after the Dutch. According to one account cited by Chinese writers, Queen Elizabeth of England sent a letter and presents to China in 1596, but the ships of the mission were wrecked in a storm. In 1637 five English ships are stated to have

come from Sumatra to Canton, and to have commenced hostilities there, owing to the Portuguese having intrigued so as indirectly to force the local authorities to obstruct the new-comers' trade; but, it is added, they surrendered the fort they had taken, on being allowed to dispose of their cargoes. However, in both cases the strangers were, if they really did come, mistaken for Dutchmen, whose own origin again was only imperfectly understood at that period. In Koxinga's time the English are believed to have had dealings at Amoy; this is not unlikely, for they were certainly there in 1730, when their trade was stopped; at all events, the East India Company established, and for a few years kept up a factory at the Chusan Islands near Ningpo somewhere towards the end of the seventeenth century.¹ It is certain that already some time before that, in 1684, a foothold had been obtained at Canton; indeed, the Chinese state that in 1685 foreign commerce had been officially authorised at Macao, Chang-chou (Zaitun), Ningpo, and some place near Shanghai. There were several other attempts made during the eighteenth century to trade at Ningpo and Tientsin; but practically all legitimate foreign commerce, English and otherwise, was confined to Canton, until the first war with England broke out in 1840, in consequence of a misunderstanding in connection with the opium trade, and about the price to be paid for opium surrendered by us. Up to the year 1765 the import of opium, which was at first regarded in the light of a medicinal drug, had never exceeded 200 chests; but in 1796 it was entirely prohibited, on account of the rapidly increasing

¹ The correspondence of Catchpoole, who was there in 1701-2, was about twenty years ago published by M. Henri Cordier in the *Revue de l'Extrême-Orient*.

number of smokers. In 1793 Lord Macartney had audiences with the Emperor at Jêhol, but opium was apparently not one of the subjects specially discussed.¹ It seems the British Superintendent in 1795 offered China some assistance against revolted Nepal.² By 1820 the import of opium had steadily risen to 4,000 chests, and the Chinese Government began to feel justly alarmed, both at the enormous drain of silver from the country, and at the prospect of debauching the population. In 1821 the opium hulks were driven away to the Ling-ting Islands, and in 1838 severely repressive measures were begun. The whole melancholy story of the so-called "Opium War" has been frequently told, and I have myself published a *précis* translation of the best connected Chinese account of it. It is distinctly admitted that it was the stoppage of trade, and not the destruction of opium, that caused the war; also that the Emperor when the war was over voluntarily conceded the right of all but officials to smoke the drug. It is unquestionable that the smoking of opium does a great deal of physical harm, and causes a vast waste of money and energy; but even the Chinese admit that the initial responsibility for its use by smokers was as much theirs as ours; and in any case they had during a whole generation deliberately extended the evil by allowing the undisguised cultivation of the poppy on a wholesale scale in China itself. Indian opium in 1900 did not represent one quarter of the total consumption; since 1906, however, energetic steps have been taken to rid the country of the curse.

¹ I published the Emperor's amusing letters to King George III. in the *Nineteenth Century* for July, 1896.

² An official account of Lord Amherst's abortive mission in 1816 appears in the *Chinese Recorder* for 1898.

After the first war, which secured, in addition to Canton, the further opening to trade of Shanghai, Ningpo, Foochow, and Amoy as treaty ports to all the world, besides the cession of Hongkong to Great Britain, the chief points of international friction were usually found to be in connection with the contested claim of British traders to reside within the walls of Canton. In 1846 a fine junk was smuggled out of the river, taken by Captain Kellet, R.N., round the Cape to America and England, and exhibited in the East India Dock two years later. In 1856 the Viceroy Yeh categorically refused to admit the English into the city, on the pretext that Governor Bonham had formally abandoned the claim in 1849. These strained relations led gradually and indirectly up to the burning of the "Thirteen Hongs," and to the second war, in which the French also took part, and which culminated in the destruction of the Emperor's Summer Palace some miles beyond the metropolis, and the opening of Peking itself to the diplomatic representatives of European powers generally. The Treaty of Tientsin and the Peking Convention which followed it opened a number of new coast ports (Newchwang, Tientsin, Chefoo, Swatow) to foreign trade, besides certain places on the River Yang-tsze (Hankow, Kewkiang, Chinkiang), two markets in the islands of Formosa (T'aiwan, Tamsui), and Hainan (Hoihow): this last, however, was not actually utilised until 1876. Russia took advantage of the occasion to extend her Ussuri territory at the expense of Manchuria, and most of the other European powers hastened to secure to themselves by separate treaty the same commercial and religious advantages as those obtained by England and France, as will be recorded in detail under separate heads. Mis-

sionary enterprise was placed by these treaties upon an entirely new footing, and instead of being a dangerous occupation, in which the unprotected priest carried his life in his hands as a guarantee for his own prudence and moderation, it became a comparatively comfortable and safe distraction, combining the charm of agreeable travel in new lands with a reasonable certainty of consular protection. It is only fair, however, to add that some societies, as, for instance, the Jesuits and the China Inland Mission, have consistently done their best to avoid the doubtful advantage of consular interference.

We shall towards the end of the chapter take up in turn each nation as affected by modern treaties. Meantime we may remark that from 1860 to 1870 England was unmistakably the sole influential power at Peking,—perhaps with Russia, on account of her land frontiers and her consequent proximity, as a good second; but afterwards Japan began to work her way ominously to the front; whilst, after the Franco-German War, the inoffensive Prussia blossomed into a threatening state called “*Tê-i-chi*” (*Deutsch*, or Germany) and proportionately increased the scale and pretensions of her commercial and diplomatic representation in the Far East, culminating in her military direction of the Great Powers in the “Boxer” war of 1900. On the other hand, the defeat of France deprived her of the opportunity of avenging in an adequate manner the massacre of French officials and other subjects at Tientsin in 1870; and thus the influence of France fell almost to zero for some years. Then came the suspicious murder of Mr. Margary, a British consular officer conducting an Anglo-Indian expedition over the Burmese frontier into Yün Nan; the futile mission of inquiry under Mr. Grosvenor; and the prolonged diplomatic dis-

cussion which led to the Chefoo Convention of 1876. The immediate results were the opening to trade of more ports (Wênchow, Pakhoi) on the coast, and more places on the Yang-tsze (Ich'ang, Wuhu), together with certain stipulations concerning the opium trade, and the establishment of permanent Chinese Legations in Europe, America, and Japan. In 1886 these stipulations ripened into what is called the Opium Convention, practically arranging, on the one hand, for the checking of a further increase in the Indian import, and on the other for the assistance of the Hongkong Government in securing to China, under cheap conditions, an enhanced import duty on that article; but on the understanding that there was to be no further charge of any kind in the interior of China. Another open clause in the Chefoo Convention took the ultimate form of the Chungking Agreement of 1890, by which foreign commerce obtained direct admission into the heart of Sz Ch'wan. The Sikkim Convention of the same year recognised in principle the right of British India to trade with Tibet, provided for by a separate article in the Chefoo Convention.

When Upper Burma was taken, the British Government in its haste to get rid of Chinese objections had, or rather its representative had, somewhat weakly accepted a stipulation about a mission from Burma being sent with presents at fixed intervals under British supervision; this was by way of recognition of China's *de jure* suzerainty. The stipulation was contained in Article I. of the Convention of July, 1886; and, as at the same time some preliminary steps had already been taken towards opening up trade from British India with Tibet, by Article IV. it was agreed to stay further action in this

sense, and not "press the matter unduly";—in other words, to drop it, as another sop to China for holding her tongue about Burma. The Convention of March, 1894, "gave effect" to the third article of this Convention of 1886 by dealing with the Burma frontier and its trade questions alone,* but of course it omitted all allusion to Tibet. The Chinese, meanwhile, having made an imprudent treaty with France touching the cession to her of certain Shan states, which had been quite as much Burmese as Chinese, were compelled by Great Britain further to modify the Convention of 1894 by another one dated February, 1897, which rectified the frontier in other directions less clearly savouring of Burmese "rights," and therefore much to the advantage of Burma: it further provided for the establishment of British consuls at Esmok and Momein. By a special additional article, the coveted West River above Canton was at last opened to trade, together with the ports of Wu-chou and Sam-shui. Thus, after an interval of 2,000 years, we obtained the rights forcibly taken by China from the King of South Yüeh.¹ Finally, by the Kowloong Extension and the Wei-hai Wei Agreements of 1898, we enlarged our hold over the mainland opposite Hongkong, and acquired the "elements" of a new naval base in Shan Tung, which was situated right between the "spheres" of Russia and Germany. Naggings with China about Tibetan trade went on at intervals till they culminated (1904) in our occupation of Lhasa: on the Burmese frontier we have secured command of the whole Irrawaddy valley. In view of all this no one will say—however much in matters of detail we may have erred in judgment—that Great Britain has failed to

¹ Pp. 48, 61.

secure for herself, on the whole, a considerable number of miscellaneous commercial and political advantages from the *fâcheuse situation* arising out of an attitude on the part of China so hostile to "progress."

The Russians were the first Europeans to hold relations on a national scale with China, though it is highly improbable that at first the Chinese had the faintest idea of connecting them either with the ancient Ta-ts'in people, or with any other hazily conceived "tribes" of the West Ocean, or Europe. They were rather grouped, in the Chinese mind, with the Kirghis and Kipchaks as a Western Asiatic race of hyperboreans. The story of the Mongol conquests of 1240 and onwards has often been told, but it is not so generally known that Russian imperial guards are frequently mentioned at the Mongol Court of Peking at intervals up to a century later than that date, and this at a time when the Mongol dynasty at Peking was tottering to its fall, and had no more political hold of any kind upon Russia. Not one single word touching Russia appears in Chinese history during the whole interval between the disappearance of the Mongols (1368) and the rise of the Manchus (1644); but, according to Russian accounts, an unsuccessful attempt to induce the Chinese Emperor to open relations was made in 1567. It seems to be certain that there were some Russians found in Shan Si twenty years before this, but it does not appear very clearly what they were doing there: they seem to have been ultimately rescued from danger by some friendly Mongols. The chief authority for this strange incident, when I first discussed it, was the adventurous Portuguese traveller Mendez Pinto, already mentioned, who was taken prisoner by the Chinese, and put to work on the Great

Vall repairs.¹ Two Cossacks were sent, *via* Kalgan, on a mission to Peking by the Governor of Tobolsk in 1619, but with like unsatisfactory results. In 1652 there began a long struggle between the Manchus and the Russians for the possession of Yaksa, or Albazin, on the Amur. Baikoff was sent on a mission in 1653. By the Treaty of Nerchinsk of August, 1689, the Russians agreed to abandon Albazin, and a number of them were removed as prisoners to Peking, where they were incorporated in the "banner" system. Provision was made for their religious instruction, and this is really the germ of the Russian Orthodox Mission at Peking. Aigun, opposite Blagoveschtschensk, where the fighting occurred in August, 1900, was made the local Manchu capital in 1684. The history of Russian relations with the Manchus is a long one. It embraces the questions of the Turgut Longols' or Kalmucks' migration to the Volga, the Manchu envoy Tulishên's missions to them in 1715-30, and their subsequent return in a disgusted frame of mind to China in 1770; Russia's missions to China in 1719-27; the Kalmuck wars, and the surrender by Russia of fugitives; frontier disputes in 1848-9; the occupation by Russia of the Lower Amur in 1855; Poutiatin's mission; and the Treaty of Aigun in 1858. Their commercial relations with China had been confined to the tea trade of Kiachta, and to a trifling barter near Tarbagatai. In 1860 Count Ignatieff, by the Treaty of Peking, took advantage of the situation created by the Anglo-French attack upon China to secure the annexation to Russia of the whole Ussuri region. In 1862 there was concluded a convention regulating the land

¹ I have since dealt with the whole subject in detail. See *Mongolia before the Manchus*, Shanghai As. Soc. Vol. xlv, and *The Russians and Mongolia*, University Press, 1917.

trade *viâ* Kalgan, but this was subsequently superseded by another dated 15th April, 1869. When China was in the throes of the Mussulman revolt, Russia temporarily occupied the province of Ili; but, after Yakub Beg's power had been broken in 1876, energetic steps were taken by China to recover from Russia this important region, and these efforts proved successful in 1880-1. At one time the Manchu envoy Ch'unghou had nearly been persuaded, amid the Capuan delights of Livadia, into abandoning the territory, and it was largely owing to the patriotic denunciations of (the later Viceroy) Chang Chi-tung that his timorous action was repudiated by China. During all this long period of time the Russians had been carefully kept by the Chinese as far away as possible from Manchuria, the whole of which region it had always, since the Albazin affair, been Manchu policy to maintain as nearly as might be practicable in the condition of an unoccupied desert. It was only in 1888, after British consular and military officers had visited and reported on that fertile region, that China awoke to the fallacy of this timid policy. Since then the three Manchurian provinces have been civilly organised, cultivated, and populated as quickly as possible, and were thus being prepared to resist the advance of Russian power by the development of their own economic strength. But the utter collapse of the Chinese and Manchu military efficiency during the Japanese war gave Russia another opportunity, which she was not slow to take, in the way now well known to us all. Moreover, the Russian idea, first conceived at the time of the Crimean War, of constructing a Siberian railway, had come to sudden ripeness in March, 1891, when the Czar Alexander III., differing from his

ministers, took a peremptory resolution in favour of one uninterrupted line; and the time was now thought favourable for diverting this line, as originally planned under Alexander's ukase, from Nerchinsk, through Manchuria; since then, however, the Russians have seen the wisdom of continuing their "all-Russian" line to Vladivostock by way of Khabarovka. The Cassini Convention of September, 1896, secured railway powers that gave to Russia an overwhelming predominancy in the north of the Chinese Empire, as far down as the Liao Tung peninsula. As a direct consequence of the unexpected seizure of Kiao Chou by Germany, towards the end of 1897, the Russians actually occupied Port Arthur and Ta-lien Wan, as the Cassini Convention seems to have loosely stipulated,—under certain undefined conditions. Events subsequently so shaped themselves that Russia was now in quasi-possession of all Manchuria until the "Boxers" began to move. Following shortly upon that came the Russo-Japanese war, the result of which was to divide the railway administration of Manchuria between Russia and Japan; and now (1917) the chivalrous attitude towards each other of these former rivals has led to a treaty extending Japanese "rights" up to Harbin, and giving them in addition sailing privileges on the Sungari river.

The French until very recently did not make much history in China. Lewis IX. sent the Franciscan friar Ruysbroek (Rubruquis) to Mangu Khan in 1254, but the name of France does not appear in the numerous Mongol allusions to Christians. Between 1289 and 1302 there was some correspondence between the Mongol khans of Persia and Philip the Fair, and in 1342 a native of "Fulang" State is recorded in Mongol history to have brought a present to

Peking of a very fine black horse with white "stockings." The same history had already recorded the death, in about 1312, of a "Fulin" man from the West who had served Gayuk and Kublai Khans as physician, astronomer, and historian. Amongst this man Aisie's (? Isaiah's) sons were Elias, Georgius, and Luke; so that he was probably at least a Syrian, if not a Frank. In 1367 and 1375 Fulin men are heard of at the Court of the new Ming dynasty. But the name of France never appears for certain in Chinese history until the year 1718, when, in enumerating the Holan (Dutch) and other strange Western nations, the Manchu Emperor observes the "unusual ferocity" of the Holansi, who are "of the same race as the Macanese." True, Lewis XIV. had sent a letter to the Chinese Emperor in 1688, recommending to him some French Jesuits; but no mention whatever is made of this event in the Manchu history. There was, apparently, a certain amount of French trade at Canton, as is evident from the fact that the United States received French assistance there in 1785; but French interests in China up to the date of the Second War were almost exclusively religious, and her missionaries during all this long period of self-effacement suffered great persecution. In spite of the noble services done by Bouvet, Regis, Jartoux, and other Jesuits in mapping out the empire, Christianity was prohibited, and many missionaries were martyred in the provinces. But the limited toleration of Christianity secured by the Treaty of Nanking encouraged Louis Philippe to obtain in 1847 a similar treaty (Whampoa) for France, whose missionaries were thenceforward allowed to settle in the five treaty ports.

The great Taiping rebellion of 1850, to which I recur in a later chapter, had for one of its

ostensible objects the establishment of Christianity in China: This incongruous mixture of rebellion and religion naturally led to fresh persecutions, for the rebel leader claimed a kind of personal relationship with Jesus Christ. The torture and judicial murder of Father Chappedelaine in 1856 gave Napoleon III. a welcome justification for joining the British in the Second War, as a result of which further advantages were secured (in a rather underhand way) to the missionaries, and the old cathedral at Peking was solemnly re-opened. On their way back from China, the commanders of the French fleet, in conjunction with the Spaniards, who also had unredressed grievances against Annam, conquered part of Cochin China, and by the treaty of 1862 Saigon and the surrounding province was made over to the French. This led to further conquests and cessions in 1867, partly as a sequel to the explorations of Garnier and others in the Shan states and Yün Nan. Whilst the Chinese were engaged about this time in quelling the Mussulman revolt in Yün Nan, a speculative Frenchman named Dupuis conceived the idea of supplying them with arms by way of Tonquin, where the French began to make "arrangements" in 1870. This led again to further activity on the part of Garnier, who had now been to Peking and visited the Yangtsze ports; his career, however, was cut short by the border bandit Lao Vinh-phuc¹ and his "Black Flags" in 1873. The same thing happened ten years later to the adventurous Rivière, and almost on the same spot. A rebellion in Tonquin, led by a discontented Chinese general named Li Yang-ts'ai, placed China in rather a false position with the Black Flag leader, and also with the Annamese, who

¹ Died, honoured, Jan. 1917.

were thus uncomfortably placed between three fires. But meanwhile the French had been steadily tightening their hold upon Annam and Tonquin, and all this naturally made the Chinese authorities in the Two Kwang provinces feel very uneasy, not only because Annam was a tributary, but because their own frontier was placed in danger. Finally hostilities broke out; the Chinese fleet was destroyed at Pagoda Anchorage; an attempt was made by the French to occupy parts of the Pescadores and Formosa; and at last, by the Fournier Treaty of May, 1884, and its sequel of June, 1885, China agreed to recognise the validity of the treaties entered into between France and Annam, securing to the former the protectorate of Tonquin. Haiphong now became an important centre of trade, and economical development quickly followed all over Tonquin. A delimitation of land frontiers was arranged, and one of the political results has been that several new treaty "ports" have opened to the French the inland trade of Kwang Si and Yün Nan. Lungchow (now connected with Langson, in Tonquin, by railway) was opened to trade on the 1st June, 1889; Mêngtsz was also thrown open in August of the same year; and Hokow (opposite Lao-kai on the Franco-Chinese frontier) in June, 1895. The new through railway, opened in 1910, enhances the commercial importance of all these places, and places the Yün Nan capital in direct communication with the sea. Of course France alone of Treaty Powers is the one that nominally benefits by all this; but although it was intended primarily to serve the interests of Franco-Annamese traders, as a matter of fact the trade,—so far as it is not throttled by short-sighted fiscal measures,—is chiefly between the Chinese of Yün Nan and the merchants of Hongkong.

By the Gérard Convention of 1895 Esmok was opened to Tonquin trade, and a like privilege was secured to the British-protected Shan states by the Burma Convention of 1896. Thus this last place (Esmok) is the spot where British and French interests unite. The French availed themselves of the novel situation created in the first instance by Germany at Kiao Chou to claim "compensation" in the shape of the old pirate haunt of Kwang-chou Wan (Bay) opposite the island of Hainan, and proceeded to add to it *in petto* an undefined *Hinterland*: 'a dispute as to boundaries soon provoked hostilities, and it was in consequence of this that the French pushed their way up to and established a political influence at Yün-nan Fu, whence, however, they had to retire precipitately on the breaking out of "Boxer" troubles. As we have seen, things have righted themselves once more, and for many years both sides have shown tact in conserving neighbourly relations.

Germany was not even known to China by name previous to the Second War, although in 1752 Frederick the Great had founded an Asiatic Company and sent two ships to Canton; even in Ricci's time some of the Jesuits were known to hail from "Germania," but where that place was no one either knew or cared. After the British and French had got their treaties finally settled in 1860, "various smaller states," amongst which Prussia, applied for similar privileges. The Prussian treaty was signed at Tientsin in September, 1861, but for five years after that no Prussian envoy was allowed to reside at Peking. For some time after their arrival the Germans occupied a rather humble position in an insignificant tenement, which now forms a small part of the British Legation precincts; and, politically speaking, they were

simply makeweights to Great Britain's general policy. But after the successful Franco-German War they began to assume a considerably higher tone, which sometimes became aggressively haughty when the Chinese local officials ventured to question the justice of their claims. On one occasion at Swatow (I think in 1882) they landed marines and took forcible possession of a contested piece of ground; but this violent action was at once sensibly repudiated by Prince Bismarck. Notwithstanding all this, even so late as 1890 the Viceroy at Canton publicly announced that the Germans were more submissive than the English, and therefore preferable as military instructors. In consequence of these views, the military education of the Chinese has often been largely in the hands of Germans, who have also very naturally taken the opportunity to "unload" arms and ammunition. The Germans, who engineered the job, obtained some credit as joint-deliverers with France and Russia when the Chinese were helpless at the feet of Japan. But the culminating point in Germany's diplomatic influence was reached when, in piping times of peace, Kiao Chou and the surrounding territories were taken by force in ostensible satisfaction for some injuries done to missionaries, but manifestly also because China had not showed sufficiently tangible gratitude for favours received. This act, unprecedented in the annals of diplomacy and international comity, undoubtedly set the evil ball a-rolling which led to the occupation of Port Arthur and Ta-lien Wan by Russia, Wei-hai Wei by England, and Kwang-chou Wan by France: but in all three cases these Powers at least went through the form of asking before taking, and exhibited some small consideration for China's "face." In the long run, perhaps

this aggressiveness may redound to the advantage of the Chinese people; but there is rather an unsavoury smell about it all, and possibly we should have done better for our descendants if we had agreed to put things back upon their former honest basis. In any case, the propinquity of the Germans to Confucius' sacred district proved maddening to the Chinese literary mind and was of itself enough to account for at least one of the massacres at Peking, and, unfortunately, elsewhere: at the best this aggressiveness looked like hitting a weak man when he was down. Meanwhile Japan in self-defence had to re-establish herself at the cost of a war in the Liao Tung peninsula, and to eject Germany from Kiao Chou on the first good opportunity. Great Britain's hold on Wei-hai Wei has been "benevolent," savouring, in fact, of a "watching" brief: it remains for France to decide what course of action her historical chivalry will call for in the early future.

The United States sent their pioneer trading ship to China in 1785; they were first introduced by the French into the mysteries of the co-hong or "joint-stock" system at Canton but in those days foreign traders were only allowed to reside there during the trading season. For some reason this rule was not enforced strictly with the Americans, probably because they had just emerged from a war with the aggressive English, and were regarded in the light of possible allies. The Chinese at first styled them "New People," not being able at once to differentiate them from the English. Then the name "Flowery-Flag" was invented and this national name continues in popular use to our own day. In 1821 the honour of "Old Glory" was somewhat compromised by

the surrender to the Chinese for execution of one Terranuova, a European who had been inscribed on the articles of an American ship. By the treaties of Wang-hia of July, 1844, and Whampoa of October in the same year, the United States secured the privileges obtained by England for her subjects after the first Chinese war. During the progress of the Second War, the Chinese neglected no effort to use the United States as a catspaw; and indeed the Americans, who perhaps assisted us by putting moral pressure upon China, had a considerable amount of influence in arranging the final settlement at Tientsin: consequently they obtained their treaty in 1858 a week earlier than did either the British or the French, who had done all the fighting. There is, however, a tradition that a small American force gave us active assistance at Taku, when the celebrated "blood is thicker than water" episode took place. A real ground for hostilities furnished by the Chinese to the otherwise friendly Americans was the firing into two of their vessels by the forts of the Bogue on the 17th November, 1856. By the Treaty of Washington of 1868 the United States disclaimed all desire to interfere in Chinese affairs, and arranged for the admission of immigrants into the United States. The hostile feeling engendered in the western territories and states by the overflow of undesirable Chinese led to a compromise in the shape of the Commercial Treaty of 1880, and finally to the Immigration Prohibition Treaty of 1894, which in 1904 the Chinese envoy at Washington was instructed to oppose vigorously. The United States have always been somewhat prone to pose as the good and disinterested friend of China, who does not sell opium or exercise any undue political influence. These claims to the

exceptional status of an honest broker have sometimes been shaken by the sharp treatment of Chinese in the United States, Honolulu, and Manila; but perhaps the Central Government at Washington has not always the power to make its just wishes prevail over the biased decisions of state legislatures, and is not therefore to be blamed too severely. The somewhat loudly advertised return of "part of" the "Boxer" indemnity (in any case subject to conditions) simply means that America had asked for more meat than she could decently swallow. American policy in Corea, having been in missionary hands, was very creditable, and also had a decidedly favourable effect at Peking, where for many years the United States' influence was otherwise weak. However, America's abstract virtues in Corea availed her nothing against the Japanese legions. On the other hand, the earlier Chinese policy in Manila was for some time both ungenerous and suicidal: no Chinese except those who left during the war were allowed to immigrate, although Chinese labour alone had developed and can develop the resources of the islands. At present the Americans themselves do not seem quite to know what is the best thing to do with Manila. Mr. Morse is the writer who gives us the most temperate and just account of his countrymen's policy in China.

Belgium appeared amongst the minor claimants for a treaty after the second war, and one was finally concluded in 1865. She had not been much heard of in China until 1898, when her name has come prominently forward in connection with railway and other concessions. In 1900 M. Joostens pressed for Belgium's right to an envoy for herself alone, and this was conceded to in 1905.

In 1862 the Portuguese, with the assistance of

the French, endeavoured, but unsuccessfully, to obtain a formal treaty with China, but it was not until 1887 that they were officially recognised as possessors of Macao. From 1582 to 1849 they had regularly paid a rental of 510 taels a year, and the Manchu Government naturally declined to recognise the declaration of independence which followed upon the assassination, on the 22nd August, 1849, of Governor do Amaral. I possess a Chinese copy of a draft treaty dated 1862, but I do not think it was ever signed: certainly it was never ratified, nor was any Portuguese treaty right conceded. It was to the interest of both parties that this haphazard state of affairs should be rectified. China required the co-operation of Macao in order to obtain the full advantages conceded in 1886 by Great Britain in connection with the opium revenue; and in view of what had happened in Formosa during the 1884 hostilities with France, both China and Portugal felt nervous lest any other power—especially France—should appropriate Macao. Portugal therefore undertook never to alienate it without China's consent, and on these conditions she drags out a comparatively uneventful existence there. Between 1901 and 1905 the Minister at Peking, Senhor Branco, exhibited considerable activity; more than one treaty was elaborated, besides subsidiary agreements; the knotty points were Macao's food supply, nationality and naturalisation, harbour boundaries, smuggling, railway to Canton, ownership of neighbouring islands, etc. Disputes were still going on when the Manchus fell, and so far neither of the two republics seems to have "ratified."

The Japanese, who are now fairly entitled alike by right in moral principle and might of conquest to equal rank amongst the greatest of

Powers, had always been utterly ignored by the Manchus up to the date of the second war with Great Britain, and this feeling of proud aloofness was heartily reciprocated. In 1853 the United States expedition, under Commodore Perry, led to the circumscribed Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854. Similar treaties were concluded with Great Britain and Russia in 1855; and, after the Anglo-French War of 1858, Lord Elgin, by the Treaty of Yeddo, obtained the opening of Japan to British commerce. In 1868-9 took place the great Japanese revolution, the abolition of the second king, or Shōgūn, with the whole superstructure of feudalism, and the restoration to real power of the Mikado, or true Emperor. The Japanese now lost no time in preparing themselves as quickly as possible for a suitable place in the world's councils, and never in the history of the universe has a national transformation been so rapid or complete. In 1871 they succeeded in concluding their first treaty with China, which was signed by Li Hung-chang in the autumn of that year. The Chinese did not at first take the Japanese very seriously, feeling rather a contempt for a nation, of small physique withal, which so readily threw off its veneer of Chinese civilisation in favour of new-fangled European notions; but the Formosa dispute of 1874 soon awoke them to the fact that the despised islanders were not to be trifled with. That same year Japan, by a stroke of the pen, placed China's old tributary Loochoo under the control of the Tōkyō Home Office, and all China's expostulations were ignored, as well as the piteous entreaties of Loochoo itself. When, in 1883, the Powers began to conclude treaties with Corea, it was found that Japan had ancient vested rights of an unmistakably historical nature at

Fusan, and it was soon evident to all and sundry therein concerned that she was bent on developing them in other parts of Corea too. China, as Corea's suzerain, was somewhat puzzled what to do when Japan in 1876 signed a treaty with the "independent sovereign state" of Chosen; the matter became more complicated when the United States and England did the same thing in 1882-3. The negotiators of the American treaty kindly admitted to a share of privileges thus directly obtained China also, who thus proceeded to conclude a treaty with her own vassal, and then immediately set to work to intrigue with a view to substituting her own active influence in lieu of that of Japan. This led to sundry revolutions, murders, kidnappings, and hostilities, which lasted over a period of ten years, and finally culminated in the war of 1894-5, when China received a thorough thrashing, and lost both Corea and Formosa: after that for a decade her interests in Corea were semi-officially looked after by the British. In December, 1899, China concluded another treaty with the "Great Emperor" of Corea, foolishly neglecting, however, to insert a most-favoured-nation clause.—To return to Japan; the Shimonoseki Treaty and Liao Tung Convention of 1895 had at once raised Japan to the status of a *Weltmacht*, and brought her into diplomatic collision with European powers as above described. The Commercial Treaty of 1896 somewhat unexpectedly placed in the hands of Europeans many of the advantages Japan had hoped to secure for herself, and the new ports of Soochow and Hangchow were as a sequel opened to the world. *Sic vos, non vobis* is the motto applicable to Japan's action; but she took her "dishing" with great dignity, and when in 1900 the declaration by China of

hostilities against the whole world gave Japan her next great opportunity, we could only expect that she would not allow herself to be relegated to a "back seat" again. The Mikado of Japan took absolutely equal rank with the Czar of Russia and the Queen of England in settling up by telegraph the dreadful mess created by the "Boxer" fiasco. Four years after that came the unfortunate Russo-Japanese conflict, which, however, despite the intrigues of a reptile foe, has left them both mutually respecting friends of each other and allies of Great Britain. Corea is now a Japanese province, and doing well at that. Whatever Japanese past faults may have been, a courageous fighting race will always appeal to the sporting sense of fairness which has in most circumstances our national sympathies.

The Danes had a "hong" in the old factory days at Canton: they, the French, and the Swedes depended for their profits largely upon their success in smuggling tea about the English coasts. The Danes, through the good offices of Sir Thomas (then Mr.) Wade, concluded a treaty with China in 1863, and until 1893 their interests were usually looked after at the ports by the British consular authorities: in that year they were placed in Russian hands. Danish interests lie chiefly in the direction of Telegraph Conventions, and they have a large staff at Shanghai in connection with the Great Northern and Eastern Extension Companies. It need hardly be said that without the countenance and support of Russia and Great Britain Denmark would not count for much in the Far East.

The Spaniards concluded a treaty with China in 1864, but it does not appear to have been ratified until 1867. In 1877 there were negotiations about coolies for Cuba, but until 1881

the Spaniards do not seem to have had any permanent minister in China. The Chinese traders who went to Manila were always kept under in rather an uncompromising way, and it was manifestly the policy of Spain, subsequent to the events described at the beginning of this chapter, to have as little to do with official China as possible. But in 1874 the new question of the ill-treatment of Chinese in Cuba came under discussion, and a Chinese mission was sent to Cuba to inquire; the result was the treaty of December, 1878. When a permanent Chinese minister was sent to the United States in 1879 Spain and Cuba were included in his mission, and so it came about that the Spaniards had to despatch to China an envoy in return. His influence at Peking was never very great though Señor Cologan, as Doyen during the "Boxer" settlement, acquitted himself with distinction. Since the loss of the Philippine to America, Spanish influence in Peking may be said to have disappeared altogether, except in an academic sense.

Italy is recorded to have sent tribute in 1670 and the Pope in 1723; but both these alleged events are connected with the Jesuit-Dominican dispute, the stormy conference at Macao, and the unsuccessful missions of Tournon and Mezzo barba. The Italians, not having come to trade are stated by Chinese authors to be the most cultured and respectable of the barbarians, who would never have "rebelled" but for the evil example of England and France. The words of the Chinese historian are almost prophetic, in view of "Boxer"-time Italian action in Chêh Kiang. "Even Italy, the most famous and civilised of European countries, was moved by the same prospect of greed, and in 1861 an application was made by the Italian Consul for a share in trad

privileges." The first Italian treaty was concluded in 1866, but the Italians did not put in an official appearance until 1877, when a man-of-war visited the coasts of Corea. The Italian minister has usually resided in Shanghai, in order the better to push the commercial interests of his countrymen, as, for instance, the Peking Syndicate agreement, signed in 1898. It was not till 1899, in connection with the expected concessions on the Chêh Kiang coasts, that Sr. Salvago Raggi on behalf of Italy first showed signs of a spirited forward policy. Her expectations were, however, nipped in the bud by an unexpected display of energy on the part of the Chinese. It was success which followed this last gasping effort of resistance that probably inspired the vacillating Manchu rulers with a part of the courage necessary in order to brace themselves up for the crazy "Boxer" outburst. In 1902 Sr. Gallina insisted that Italy should receive a special Chinese minister, and not a mere "double-barrelled" man.

The Austrians did not draw up a treaty until 1869, and for many years they left their interests in British hands. Their minister until 1901 ordinarily resided in Japan, to which country he was also accredited, but in 1902 Baron Czikkann, following the example of his Italian colleague, demanded as a *quid pro quo* for his presence at Peking a "single-barrelled" man for Vienna. From this date Austria was a (not very) "brilliant second" to Germany in China.

The Swiss have no treaty, and their interests are commonly entrusted to French hands. This absence of diplomatic contact had its inconveniences in 1896 in connection with the Postal Conference, and again in 1904 when Red Cross matters were under discussion.

Peru drew up a treaty with China in 1875,

the interests of the latter country having special reference to the alleged ill-treatment of coolies, whilst the former's interest lay in procuring them as cheaply, and with as few restrictions as possible. The war with Chili practically snuffed out Peru, at all events so far as any influence in China was concerned, and she may be regarded for the present as non-existent in Peking councils.

Brazil (1880), Mexico (1900), and the Congo State (1898) have treaties with China, but, so far, nothing has occurred to bring any of these states prominently forward; in each case coolies were wanted by the one party, and it was desired by the other to secure for them decent treatment. Difficulties arose after President Diaz ceased his long firm rule, on account of Chinese traders receiving ill-usage at the hands of rival aspirants or their followers; but these appear to have been reasonably met on both sides.

The Swedes established an East India Company in 1627, but their nationals who visited China came on board vessels belonging to other countries. A Swedish vessel reached Canton in 1731, and fifty years later others are mentioned. There is a Swedo-Norwegian treaty with China, and Mr. Carl Bock was resident in Peking for a time (1897-1898); but since the separation of 1905 the Scandinavian interests, chiefly shipping, are sufficiently watched over by consuls-general at Shanghai; there has never been a Norwegian minister at Peking so far as I am aware; but Count Wallenberg seems to have been there for many years (off and on) as minister for Sweden.

There was some flutter when in 1889 the Sultan decided to send a frigate and a mission to Japan. The reappearance on the high seas

and in Chinese waters of the Turks so dreaded of old was a highly interesting development. They put in at Pagoda I. for refreshments, and there I endeavoured to prove to the gallant commander that he was a Hiung-nu in disguise; but the luckless *Ertogrul* came to grief on the rocks in the Inland Sea, and the fierce Turks had to be sent home as "distressed mariners." To add local colour to an amusing *dénoûment*, the Japanese man-of-war which took the men home was refused free admittance through the Dardanelles, and had to "get ready for action."

In 1882 the Serbian King Milan begged the Chinese Minister in France to hand in a letter to his august master announcing Serbia's promotion to kingly rank. Rumania had already set Balkan examples in 1881, when two separate missions were either sent (or perhaps locally commissioned) to announce (1) the accession of King Charles, and (2) his promotion to royal status. In 1915 the death of King Charles and the succession of King Ferdinand were "announced."

In 1902 "Great Han" (*i.e.* "Imperial" Korea) sent resident envoys to China, and exchanged certain consuls; but of course these amenities ceased after the Japanese had ousted all foreign political influence from Korea—as a result of the Russo-Japanese conflict.

In 1915 the newly elected President of Uruguay announced his accession.

Nerchinsk	Russia and China	27 Aug., 1869 .	Russians abandon the Amur.
Peking	do.	Winter 1720-1	Ismailoff's Agreement.
Kiaclita	do.	20 Aug., 1727 .	Signed on the River Boro.
Nanking	England and China	29 Aug., 1842 .	Five ports open to trade.
do	do	8 Oct., 1843 .	Supplementary (abrogated).
Wang-hua	U.S. and China	3 July, 1844 .	Following up Great Britain.
Whampoa	France and China	24 Oct., 1844 .	
Canton (?)	Belgium and China	25 July, 1845 .	
Canton	Sweden and China	March, 1847 (4 d. 2 moon).	
Aigun	Russia and China	16 May, 1858 .	Russians regain the Amur.
Tientsin	do.	13 June, 1858 .	do.
do.	U.S. and China	18 June, 1858 .	Gets ahead of us as a "peacemaker."
do.	England and China	26 June, 1858 .	With a supplementary article.
Shanghai	France and China	27 June, 1858 .	With six secret clauses.
Shanghai (?)	England and China	8 Nov., 1858 .	Arranging for Customs tariff.
Peking	U.S. and China	24 Nov., 1859 .	Commercial Treaty
do.	England and China	24 Oct., 1860 .	
do.	France and China	25 Oct., 1860 .	Supplementary and tariff.
Tientsin	Russia and China	14 Nov., 1860 (2 Nov. O.S.)	Further cession of Ussur.
Peking	Russia and China	2 Sept., 1861 .	With separate article.
Tientsin	Russia and China	20 Feb 1862 (O S.)	Land trade (obsolete)
Peking and Tientsin	Portugal and China	13 Aug. 1862 .	China refused to ratify.
Tientsin	Denmark and China	13 July, 1863 .	
do.	Holland and China	6 Oct., 1863 .	
do.	Spain and China	10 Oct., 1864 .	
do.	Belgium and China	2 Nov., 1865 .	
Tientsin (?)	Italy and China	26 Oct., 1866 .	
Peking	England and China	31 May, 1868 .	Joint Investigation Rules.
Washington	U.S. and China	28 July, 1868 .	Virtuous disclaimer.
Peking	Russia and China	15 April, 1869 (? O.S.)	Revised Land Trade Rule
Tientsin	Austria and China	2 Sept., 1869 .	With trade regulations.
do.	Japan and China	Autumn 1871 (29 d. 7 m.)	Special clauses.
do.	Peru and China	26 June, 1874 .	
do.	do.	7 Aug., 1875 .	

[illegible]

LIST OF TREATIES CONNECTED WITH THE CHINA QUESTION, 1689-1906 (continued)

Treaty, Agreement, or Convention	Between	Date.	Remarks.
London	England and China	1894 (? February or March)	Rosebery-Sieh ; 20 articles, carrying out that of 1886.
Shimonoseki	Japan and China	17 April, 1895	Peace and cessions.
Peking	France and China	20 June, 1895	Opening Esmok, etc.
do.	Japan and China	8 Nov., 1895	Retrocession of Liao Tung.
London	England and France	15 Jan., 1896	Chinese "spheres."
Soul	Japan and Russia	14 May, 1896	Chinese affairs
Peking	Japan and China	21 July, 1896	Commerce and navigation, 29 articles.
do.	do	19 Oct., 1896	Touching new ports.
do.	Russia and China	9th moon, 1896	Cassim Convention (made with Military Government).
? Peking	France and China	1896 (? February)	Re Russian and French arrangements for postal agencies and Swiss position.
? do.	do.	do (end of 4th moon)	Agreement of 8 articles <i>re</i> Langson-Lungchow railway.
do.	England and China	4 Feb., 1897	Penalties for cessions to France.
do.	Germany and China	6 March, 1898	Cession of Kiao Chou, and mining rights.
do.	Russia and China	27 March, 1898	Cession of Port Arthur, etc.
do.	France and China	? April, 1898	Cession of Kwang-chou Wan.
Tōkyō	Japan and Russia	25 April, 1898	Chinese affairs.
St. Petersburg	England and Russia	28 April, 1898	Chinese railway interests.
Peking	England and China	9 June, 1898	Kowloon Extension.
do.	do do.	1 July, 1898	Wei-hai Wei transfer.
do.	Congo State and China	7 July, 1898 ; 2 articles	(Date of ratification by Emperor).
St. Petersburg	Chinese Minister and Russian Eastern Railway		
Peking	China and Congo	Announced 6 July, 1898	7 articles.
Peking	Pavloff and Ministry	8 July, 1898	Joint sovereign with Belgium Coolie labour.
? Peking	China and Foreign Powers	do.	Rent of <i>Hinterland</i> ; 6 new articles to former treaty.
Peking	Giers and Ministry	Beginning of 1899	10 new Yangtze Regulations.
		Spring 1899 (Russ. 14 Feb.)	Port Arthur railway, etc ; 8 articles.

Soul . . .	China and Korean "Empire"	Autumn 1899 . .	15 articles.
? Hanoi . . .	"Marshal" Su and Ton- quin . . .	(? Oct.) 1899 . .	7 articles.
Washington . . .	Aspiros of Mexico and Wu T'ingfang (both envoys to U.S.) . .	End of 1899 or beginning of 1900	(See Treaty of 1893) 20 articles; to be ratified at Washington.
St. Petersburg . . .	Chinese Minister and Russian Government.	Early in 1901 . .	<i>Re</i> Retrocession of Manchuria, 12 articles telegraphed to Peking and sanctioned by wire.
Peking . . .	Prince K'ing, Li Hung- chang, and eleven foreign envoys. . .	7 Sept., 1901 . .	"Boxer" settlement in full (immense length).
do.	Lessar and Ministry . .	8 April, 1902 . .	Confirming Cassini Convention and re- ferring to treaties of '96, '98, '99.
do.	Mackay Treaty . . .	7 m. 25 d. (28 Aug., 1902)	Also 10 extra articles <i>re</i> navigation.
do.	Lessar and Prince K'ing . .	10th moon (Nov., 1902) . .	4 articles <i>re</i> telegraph connections.
do.	Japanese Minister and Trade Ministers . .	8th moon, 1903 (Sept.-Oct.)	Referring to Boxer treaty; 13 naviga- tion rules, and 10 inland navigation.
do.	U S. Minister and Trade Ministers	do.	do. 17 rules.
London . . .	Lansdowne-Chang agree- ment	3rd Chinese moon, 1904 . .	15 articles and 2 additional articles <i>re</i> labour for Transvaal.
? Lhassa . . .	Youghusband Treaty . .	9th Chinese moon, 1904 . .	10 articles; Resident not to sign, as England should not deal directly with Tibet.
? London . . .	Telegraphed to China . .	4th Chinese moon, 1905 . .	Supplementary <i>re</i> Burma.
? Peking . . .	Japan and China (12 articles)	Beginning of 1906	China agrees to Russian concessions to Japan, and Japan agrees to Russian- Chinese conditions.
Peking . . .	Satow and T'ang Shao-i . .	4th moon of 1906	Referring to treaties of Lhassa and Simla, and to those of 1890 and 1893, to Sikkim frontier and Youghus- band's doings about the 3 monas- teries. Final "clear up."
Peking . . .	French Minister and the Government	4th intere moon of 1906 (May-June)	Settlement of compensation question for murdered missionary in Kiang Si province.

CHAPTER VI

SIBERIA, ETC.

A HISTORY of China's foreign relations of the most sketchy description would not be complete without some separate and connected account of the Tartars who have always harassed her from the north. Just as the hyperborean regions of Europe have only become a cognate part of El Rûm, or the Roman Empire system (for that is really in a civilising sense what modern Europe still is) since Russia took them vigorously in hand, so the hyperborean regions of Asia have only become a cognate part of *Hwa-hia*, or the Chinese Empire system, since Russia gave them their bearings. But Russia is in possession of the whole, and straddles both systems by what Roman lawyers called *occupatio*, or the right of first occupant. If we omit the tropics and South Seas, we may say the old northern hemisphere consists of two groups of 400,000,000 souls each, the one being Chinese or Yellow Man civilisation, the other European or White Man civilisation. Russia now caps and overawes the pair, and is the first great instance in the world's history of a powerful empire north of the temperate zone. In fact, the Asiatic conceptions of White Czar and (so to speak) "Yellow" Czar, or of Chagan Khan and Bogdo (Holy) Khan, express the same misty idea in Tartar minds ; all the rest is Feringhi, or

“Frank,” somewhere beyond the White Czar’s domain. The Arabs call Europeans Afranghi, or Beni Asfar,—“Sons of Yellow,” *i.e.* “not dark,” and the island Greeks still have an adjective *φράγκικος*, meaning, in effect, “continental.” Europe, previously to the blossoming forth of Russia, knew practically nothing north of the menacing hordes which emerged from the east along beaten lines, and gradually became her rulers,—in parts at least. China, previously to the same event, knew practically nothing north of the hordes which moved restlessly east and west along beaten lines, and also gradually became her rulers,—in parts at least. The historical analogy between the Chinese and Roman Empires is nearly complete throughout the whole gamut of history.

First in date there was on the Chinese side the Empire of the Hiung-nu, which bounded and menaced all of the modern realm of China, from Corea to the Pamir, except Tibet and the Eighteen Provinces. No doubt these Hiung-nu nomads knew something of the petty hunting tribes in occupation of what we now call Siberia; but the Chinese knew nothing whatever of them; unless in a very vague way, and by name only, something of the Kirghis to the west and the coast Tunguses and Ainos to the east. On the Western side we know nothing of anyone but “Scythians,” and in the East the Chinese knew nothing of anyone but Hiung-nu. It is very unlikely that we shall ever know more of either than we do now, namely, that the manners of the two, as described to us by the Greeks and Chinese respectively, were nearly identical. The Hiung-nu seem to have swept to and fro then, just as the roads run now, by the northern route from Tsitsihar, Urga, Uliassutai, Ili, and Tashkend; or from the Yellow River bend north and north-

west to Urga and Uliassutai. They were driven away by the Chinese from the southern group of roads, from Hami to the Tarim valley and the Pamirs, at a comparatively early date; but, during the greater part of the time—to use the words of Chinese historians—“the Han dynasty had the sagacity to keep them in good temper by permitting a regular border trade.” The total duration of their empire, whether in a united or divided condition, was, roughly speaking, 400 years, from 200 B.C. to A.D. 200; but although the greater part of the ruling caste and the fighting men went permanently West, where some of them were to reappear as Avars, Huns, etc., in Europe, they did not expire in China without a final struggle; indeed, they ruled as Chinese “Emperors” of limited portions of China, after most of their race had gone West; and in any case they founded principalities in western parts subject to Chinese influence, thus enabling us to connect their ruling families with the Turks without a serious break. Professor Hirth of Columbia University even thought and perhaps still thinks he had unearthed Attila’s son Hernax from the Chinese records of Sogd:—but I am not in the least convinced.

Then comes the empire of the more westerly Tunguses, who were only known to China previously to A.D. 45 as vassals of the Hiung-nu. As the power of the latter was broken up by China, so were the opportunities for separate development improved by these vassals of the declining Khans. The new empire of the Tunguses thus formed was at its zenith just as the last of the genuine uncivilised Hiung-nu disappeared (in an independent political sense) for ever. This disappearance from China is coincident (allowing them time to travel) with the

sudden appearance of the Avars and Huns in Europe; it is only reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the (Hiung-nu) strangers, who pushed on Goths, Vandals, and other tribes before them, were the identical people who, as we know for a certainty, had gone from China somewhere West. But the later group of Tungusic Tartars, although their domination occasionally extended as far as Ili, never had, like the Hiung-nu, any real hold on the Tarim valley or Turkestan; they are specially remarkable for having settled a number of Japanese prisoners in Eastern Mongolia, where their power was most in evidence. The Hiung-nu had probably never heard of the Japanese. On the other hand, the Toba clan of the Tunguses was more successful than the Hiung-nu had ever been as a sedentary and a civilised ruling house, and its princes administered North China as emperors, on a footing of perfect equality with the genuine Chinese emperors of the south, for 200 years (380-580). But this preoccupation with Chinese affairs left the other and wilder Tartars time to counter-develop once more; and although the Toba dynasty of North China conducted several successful campaigns against both their now less civilised kinsmen and against the remains of the Hiung-nu tribes, they were never able to assert themselves as an effective nomad horseback power, and at the same time to sit comfortably on an imperial throne. The Mongols previous to Kublai (Genghiz, Ogdai, Kayuk, and Mangu) were the only ones that ever succeeded in this double task; and so, even with the powerful Mongols, a double *rôle* did not last very long, for Kublai was, after his return from Yün Nan and his accession to the throne, simply the sedentary and personally unwarlike Emperor of China; the Tartars, if not inde-

pendent, were all more or less rebellious vassals under disloyal relatives of his. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the Toba Tunguses eight centuries before Kublai took to the comforts of civilisation, a mixed nomad empire developed itself once more out of the leavings of the Hiung-nu and Tungusic "horseback dominations."

The very name of this third great ruling caste of nomads is exceedingly unsatisfactory; the words Juju, Jwe-jwe, or Jeujen convey to us no hint whatever such as we can gain, or at least imagine, from the earlier words Hiung-nu (Huns, or "Hün slaves") and Tung-hu (Tunguz, or "East Tartars"). Following a Chinese practice which prevails to this day, the Toba Emperor, no doubt advised by Chinese pedants, thought he would improve this apparently native word into the bastard sound Jwan-jwan, which is stated to have meant "wrigglers." There is no evidence to show that the units of their fighting power were more Hiung-nu than Tunguz, and such evidence as there is of a ruling caste is decidedly in favour of a Hiung-nu rather than a Tungusic origin; there are even very faint indications that they might have been Suomi, or Finns. At any rate, there seems to be no justification whatever for concluding, as European writers have done, that the Jeujen were the Avars: it is almost impossible that they can have been so. What is quite certain is that they had amongst their vassals, quite close to the Chinese frontier, in or near the region where money was made from the iron trade in 220 B.C., a Hiung-nu tribe called "Türk." These Turks worked as ironmasters for the Jeujen, and subsequently, when they had generated strength sufficient to assist themselves, rose against and annihilated the power

of their suzerains. There is nothing to show that the dominion of these Jeujen ever extended west even so far as Ili, then occupied by a race called "Yüeban," who, indeed (if we accept the evidence of etymology at all), may well be the 'Eban,' or "Evar,"—in other words, a branch of the Ephthalites, as the Chinese seem to make out.¹ The chief struggles of the Jeujen were with the "High Carts," or the later Ouigours, of the Lake Baikal region.

After the crushing of the Jeujen came the empire of the Turks, touching which we not only have the most precise Chinese accounts, but also a number of important Turkish and Ouigour inscriptions, discovered within the past generation in the Irtish, Orkhon, and Tola valleys, and confirming the Chinese accounts. The first stage of Turkish rule lasted from about the year 560 to 630, when the Chinese, after incessant warring, succeeded in taking the Supreme Khan captive. For fifty years after that event, Chinese political influence was dominant all the way from Corea to the frontiers of Persia; but still there is not in the whole of Chinese history one trace of a single definite name to show that they had any definite knowledge of what we call Siberia. There are vague indications in the far north of savage tribes using snow-shoes, deer-carts, dog-carts, and of

¹ It would be well for students who take a scientific interest in etymology to note that in ~~an~~ expanded Chinese dictionary partly based upon Dr. S. W. Williams' earlier work, and published a quarter of a century ago by my former colleague, Professor H. A. Giles of Cambridge, I have given the actual sounds in eight dialects of *every important word in the language*: besides their Corean, Annamese, and Japanese sounds. I have also contributed thereto, by way of extended preface, a philological essay explaining the "Grimm's Law" of the Far East, and the construction of Chinese. This knowledge is indispensable to anyone who ventures an opinion upon points connected with Chinese etymology; but of course it may be acquired by separate study independently of my pioneer effort.

other matters connected with them, suggestive of Samoyedes, Ostiaks, and Chukchis; but if the Turks then under more or less direct Chinese rule had any knowledge of insignificant peoples north of what are at this day the boundaries of the Chinese Dominion, they kept that knowledge to themselves, or never told the Chinese enough to make it worth while recording anything. In connection with the western branch of the Turks, and especially the Türgäs, the Chinese histories make numerous allusions to Persians, Syrians, Ephthalites, Kirghis, and other Western peoples, about whom they had very scant information; but there is never anything to show that organised states existed in Siberia beyond the Amur, Baikal, or Balkash. Probably the Chinese never pushed up thither because the length of the nights was so alarming and it was so cold: several times the Chinese mention with astonishment the long days of a northern summer. The accounts given of the second (main or eastern) Turkish Empire, founded by Kutlug Khan, are even more interesting and precise than those of the first. It endured from about 680 to 743, when it was replaced by the domination of a kindred race called the Ouigours. These people, however, never exercised anything like the same effective dominion that their kinsmen the Hiung-nu and the Turks had done before them, and they decidedly showed more settled inclinations, and more of a taste for science, art, and religion: by degrees they seem to have voluntarily abandoned the Urga region north of the Desert altogether, and to have settled in what are now the western parts of Kan Suh province. Chavannes and Pelliot, in their illuminating little work on the Manichæans already alluded to, have thrown much new light upon Ouigour civilisation.

Meanwhile the Tunguses, corresponding to the ancient Toba rulers, and also perhaps to the later Mongols (before they became imbued with a strong Turkish admixture), or to the modern Solons, found opportunity to develop a great political power in the Far East. There is reason to believe that their rule included, at least for tribute purposes, a great many tribes beyond the Amur, as also all the Fish-skin Tartars, Goldi, Manchus, and other unmistakable peoples of Tungusic race, right up to the Pacific Ocean and the mountains of Corea : but we cannot yet identify some, if any, of the tribal names by the light of any ethnological indications now surviving. We are therefore, so far as our inquiry is concerned, still left in the same historical position : by the light of anything that can be discovered in Chinese history, the Ouigours ruled the west whilst the Cathayans or Kitans ruled the east of what is now Chinese Mongolia ; the first never pushing their knowledge, not to say their influence, beyond the Kirghis, the second never hearing of much beyond the Amur and Lake Baikal. Then come the Nüchêns, or genuine eastern Tunguses totally unaffected by Mongol or Turkish admixtures. They are probably much the same people as those who for 200 years governed the little-known kingdom of Puh-hai (720-920), which had political relations with Japan as well as with China. They also co-existed as a political power along with the Ouigours, and with the so-called Kara-Kitans who fled west when the Nüchêns broke up the original Cathayan power. And so on until we come to Genghiz Khan, no part of whose tribal *habitat* was much farther north than the River Shilka, if indeed so far. Genghiz, as we know, swept the whole zone between Siberia (as we now understand the word), Tibet, and China.

It is in the thirteenth century that we hear for the first time in the Chinese records intelligible accounts of Kipchaks, Alans or Azes, Bulgars, and Russians. A great deal of interest attaches, in connection with the Mongol inroads, to the Hungarians, who belong to the same *souche* as the Finns : so, at least, Professor Nordenskjöld told me when he visited Canton in 1879, and so I have since satisfied myself more precisely. The Bulgars of Genghiz' time were also partly Finnish, at least so Bretschneider thought ; but they have adopted the Slav tongue. One extensive race, called the Wusun, disappeared utterly from the Ili region shortly after the Yüeh-chi, driven west by the Hiung-nu, gave way before these same Wusun, and, turning south to Bactria, founded the "Indo-Scythian" or Ephthalite dominions in the Pānjāb and Persian regions, as already explained. Some modern Chinese writers have endeavoured to identify these missing Wusun with the Russians ; but this is not likely, for the Russian language appears to be pure Aryan ; that I can see for myself. There is no evidence to connect the Wusun with the Hungarians ; but the possibility of it must not be ignored ;—in fact, Csoma the Hungarian, about ninety years ago, went on a hunt all over High Asia in search of the original Madjar language ; and the late M. Kossuth gave encouragement to my Hungarian friend Némethi Kálmán, who bespoke my co-operation on the same quest : the Chinese mention the Madjars quite plainly (Ma-cha) in Genghiz' time. I cannot recall any other instance of the utter disappearance of a considerable nation from Chinese ken, unless it be that of the Yüeban (also from Ili). The dominion of the Mongols over Russia, and to a certain extent Hungary, seems to be the first connect-

ing link forged in the chain which was ultimately to join Western Europe with Kamchatka. The hold of the Mongols over Europe and over Asia weakened simultaneously. In the West the Novgorod Republic had opportunity to develop, and in the East China was able to shake herself free. The Ostiak tribes of the Obi (Beresof and Tobolsk) had paid tribute to Novgorod before Novgorod paid it to the Mongols; but if the Mongols ever heard of the Ostiaks, they do not seem to have thought it worth while to interfere in a question of such jejune importance to themselves. The brother of Haithon of Armenia, besides Rubruquis and some of the other European pilgrims to the Mongol Court, would seem to have first suggested to Europeans the existence of a farther or Northern Siberia. The Mongols of China kept up relations with the Kipchaks, Russians, and Azes almost until their fall (1368); but the Ming dynasty had little to do, in a friendly co-operative way, even with Manchuria or Mongolia so near, let alone with the tribes of the remote western steppes. The Eleuth or Kal-muck power accordingly now developed; and Chinese history totally ceases to be authoritative on northern nations from that day to this. The Manchus knew of no people farther north than the Kazaks, or Turkified Kirghis, half of whom are now Russian and half Chinese in a political sense. The former Mongol influence over the Kipchaks in Ming times, therefore, passed from China to Tamerlane, who was treating with Kipchak envoys at Otrar, and even contemplating an attack upon China, when he died there in 1406. The word "Sibir" is about this time mentioned for the first time as part of the realm of Toctamish the Kipchak. Dr. Albert Wirth, who collected and sixteen years

ago spontaneously sent to me many valuable data touching this period, says that a Bavarian named Schiltberger, who was there as a prisoner amongst the Tartars at the time Tamerlane died, speaks of "Issibur, where carts and sledges are harnessed to large dogs."

In 1465-9 Ivan the Great annexed Novgorod, and threw off the Kipchak yoke; so that the country of Sibir, practically the modern Tobolsk, became almost independent. But by the time of Ivan the Terrible (1557) the Sibir people, or "Yugurs," had been compelled to send him their usual tribute of minivers and sables. Modern Chinese, in referring to these events, say (but do not explain at what date or on what authority) that the Russians had four great provinces—Ki-yu (Kiev), the "old tribe"; Moskwa, the "new tribe"; K'a-shan (Kazan); and Si-pi-r (Siberia), which last was subdivided into four. At present, according to Russian official documents, there are 2,000 or so of "Turalinians" between the Tobol and the Irtysh, and there are 26,000 Ostiaks in Tobolsk, Tomsk, and the Yenissei. There are also Chuvashes and Voguls in Tobolsk, but which of these tribes represents the "Yugurs" of their sixteenth-century "Sibir" I cannot say. Anyway, Ivan and his son Theodore went on with their eastern advance until they had conquered the Bashkirs and Tobol-Tartars. The Chinese record that between 1522 and 1567 the Russians conquered the Khan of "K'u-ch'êng," and removed him to the north of the Altai Mountains, thus bringing themselves into contact with the Tata (Mongols) and Wala (Eleuth).


It was just at this time (1579) that the "Strogonoff," or half-Tartar merchant guilds of East Russia, engaged the services of Yarmak and 7,000 of his Cossacks to further their interests

in Tartar regions; but after three or four years of skirmishing and scuffling with the troops of "Közüm Kan," Yarmak perished by drowning, either in the River Irtysh or in one of its tributaries (1584). In 1591 "Közüm Kan" was defeated, and again in 1598, when he fled for refuge to the Kalmucks' camp near Lake Dzaisang (north of the Altai); but the Kalmucks in turn chased him away to the Kirghis. Here, manifestly, the Chinese and Russian accounts agree fairly well in the main facts. The doings described thus brought the Russians into contact with that branch of the Mongols called the Kalmucks—styled by the Chinese Eleuths—who had meanwhile had time to gather strength and found a dominion in the region of Uliassutai, Ili, and Tarbagatai, which dominion included many Kirghis and Turkish tribes. The predatory Cossacks sent missions to the ruler of this powerful state in the name of the Russian Czar, who, like a wise man, secured all he could get for nothing but the taking, and ran no risks.

It so happens that there is a hiatus in Chinese history at this time, and the Manchu Emperor K'ienlung himself admits that between 1450 and 1650 the Chinese knew little more of the Eleuths than that they often joined other Mongols in raiding the frontiers: they do not even know the names of the khans. However, in 1616 the Ataman Wassili relates what happened to his mission sent in the name of the Czar to the Altyn-Kan (Golden Khan), at whose Court he met also an envoy from the Yellow Czar (Emperor of China)—probably the chief of as "bogus" a mission as his own. The Khan was then encamped on the Kem-chik, or "Little Kem," *i.e.* on the present Russo-Chinese frontier, due north of Cobdo. The Russians say that the Altyn Khan promised to get their trading

missions through to China, and that the Chinese even sent a mission to them in 1619 ; but, if so, the Chinese are quite unaware of it, and the very name of Russia was to all appearances totally unknown in Peking at that time. The Russians or Cossacks pushed on to Lake Baikal, and received in 1638 their first tea through the agency of this Altyn Khan, the history of whose successors, until they were destroyed by the Chinese, I have already published from Manchu history.¹ By 1643 the Russians had already reached the Sea of Okhotsk. After all, they had only to follow the compass, so far as North Siberia was concerned ; for there was not, and there is scarcely even now, a genuine native town in the place ; nor had the scant population of trappers, fishers, and hunters any desire or motive to resist their advance, which therefore required little courage. The true interest lies in the story of their pushing their way down the Shilka and the Amur. These adventures have been related over and over again, and there is very little new for me to say here. In 1654 they attempted to explore the Sungari, but the Cossack Stepanhoff was killed by the Manchu troops in 1658 ; and this event is also recorded by the Chinese. Then there was a long conflict for the possession of Yaksa, or Albazin ; but in 1689 the Russians, by the Treaty of Nerchinsk, agreed to abandon it, and also both banks of the Amur. From that time to 1855, when Muravieff " Amurski " obtained the Czar's permission to annex the Amur, the Russians remained on very quiet and inoffensive terms with China, trading only at Kiachta and Tarbagatai. In 1858 the Aigun Treaty, necessitated by these

¹ " The Kalmucks," *China Review*, vol. xxiii. " The Eleuths," *China Review*, vols. xv. xvi. See also previous references on pages 36-40.



new acquisitions, loosely defined the Ussuri boundaries ; but in 1860, by the Peking Treaty, Ignatieff secured the doubtful part east of the Ussuri ; and now Russia, biding her time, has improved her opportunities, slipped quietly in, and dominates North Manchuria.

The early history of Tibet (700-900) is bound up with that of the early Siamese empire of Nan-chao. For a time the Gialbos threatened the existence of China, and, as it was, asserted their equality, obtained princesses, and made treaties of reciprocity ; they also forcibly occupied Kan Suh and Chinese Turkestan for a number of years, right up to Lake Balkash. During the Five Dynasty, or Anarchy Period (904-960), there were a few missions to China, but practically Tibet was an unknown quantity ; and throughout the Sung dynasty (960-1260) the diplomatic relations were only fitful. During Mongol and Ming times Tibet was under military supervision, but enjoyed internal independence. After the Manchus came to power and overawed the Lamas, their Resident, except on one or two occasions when China had to assert herself, for a century and a half occupied a position in Tibet as modest and retiring, but as influential, as that of our Resident in Nepaul. Nepaul, which was forced by China to live on friendly terms with Tibet, is still tributary to China, and sends trading missions ; but she prudently avoids raising political questions, and meanwhile supplies us with some of our best mercenary troops, at the same time enjoying complete independence. Manipur, or Kasé as the Chinese call it, was only known to the Manchus for a short time during the wars with the Burmese king Alompra's successors : there is no mention of such a place in the records of any previous dynasty. China has never in modern times

had the faintest political influence in India, though all five kings of the Hindoo states sent missions to China about 1,000 years ago. True, in the middle of the seventh century the warlike founder of the T'ang dynasty, with the assistance of Nepaul, carried punitive war successfully upon a king of North India, but there the matter dropped: the Ming dynasty 800 years later had shipping relations with the Indian coasts; but none the less India has never fallen within China's political sphere. The Mongols, Mings, and Manchus have each in turn sent expeditions to Burma, but China's political influence has never continued for long there either. Siam has never been invaded either by land or sea, but from the date of her moving down definitely to Ayuthia—say A.D. 1200—from the Shan states (Old Thai¹), south of Yün Nan, until 1853, she always recognised China as a nominal suzerain, for reasons of trade policy. The Shan states—those not belonging to Burma—and also Annam, have at irregular intervals been either ruled indirectly by the Chinese or have been nominally tributary to them. The same thing may be said of Corea, but with less irregularity. Japan has never been in any way conquered by either Chinese or Tartars, nor forced to do anything; she has occasionally sent polite missions, but it is only the Chinese who call them “tributary” ones. I just mention these points in order to complete the circuit of the Eighteen Provinces, and to bring the reader back to the other side of Siberia.

¹ See p. 29. The Old and New Tai or Thai (= free) races differ in using or in omitting the aspirate, as I ascertained on the spot in 1888, from Mr. Cushing and other Shan scholars. The History of Nan-chao makes use of this national word Tai, and explains quite clearly how the Early Siamese were under the religious influence of Magadha.

CHAPTER VII

MODERN TRADE

It is not necessary to dwell upon the old co-hong trade at Canton. The former Factory site of the "Thirteen Hong" is now principally occupied by a large foreign "hong" about two furlongs below the island settlement of Shamien. Trade with the East India Company nominally began in 1680, and all privileges continued until 1783, when there were certain modifications. In 1834 exclusive rights entirely ceased. Life and trade at Canton a century and a quarter ago have been vividly described¹ by Dr. S. W. Williams, who resided there before the Factory was destroyed in 1856, and was frequently U.S. Chargé d'Affaires at Peking after the second or Anglo-French war. The merchants passed a confined, ceremonious, and reserved existence, entirely in the hands of their *fiadors* and *compradores* on the one hand, and of the Chinese co-hong on the other. No wives were allowed, and even burials had to take place at Whampoa, twelve miles down the river. It was only in 1828 that the British Superintendent first succeeded in getting his wife up: it will be remembered that this misogynist policy had already been followed 2,000 years before in the case of "female animals," the idea in both cases evidently being against increase and multiplica-

¹ *China Review*, 1876-7.

tion. British trade was, of course, the largest of all; lead (for packing tea) and woollens were the chief imports (no specie, no cotton fabrics) from England, opium from India, and the usual "Straits" produce picked up from the Dutch colonies visited by our ships *en route*. Tea and silk were the main exports then as (largely) now. The British tea consumption in 1795 was 14,000,000 lbs. a year, more than one half of which total was smuggled by foreign ships from Canton, operating in the English Channel.

The Treaty of Nanking (1842) opened four new ports, and abrogated all these restrictive rules about residence. Afterwards, as has been explained under the heading of "Europeans," by the Tientsin treaties nine, and by the Chefoo Convention again four additional ports were thrown open to foreign trade. The various wars and complications that have harassed China up to date have led to the total number of ports being increased to forty-seven, so far as the Foreign Customs is concerned. In the year 1864 the British or direct trade had already reached 101,000,000 taels, or ounces of silver, and the total, including other countries and coast trade, was 260,000,000 taels: at that date the whole trade of Japan, America, and other foreign countries only amounted in all to 10 per cent. of the British trade, including, of course, British colonies. I proposed in the 1901 edition of this book to take the year 1880, as a central point, between the period when legations were first established at Peking in 1861 and the year 1900 (that is, the trade of 1899), in order to survey rapidly the condition of foreign commerce in China. I now propose to compare these totals with the trade of 1913, that is, the trade before the great war queered the pitch. As the gold value of the silver tael is still only about half

what it was in 1880, and subject to violent aberrations at that, I think it better to give the totals in silver, as nearly as I can; for, although this plan may suggest to us a false idea of the gold cost of produce to England and Europe, it is the only true way to form a notion of the actual wealth, measured by the standards of silver and copper, which is taken out of China, for the unit of "Exchange" in Shanghai is *the rate for telegraphic transfer on London*.

DIRECT TRADE, EXCLUDING COAST TRADE AND FOREIGN
TRADE IN CHINESE JUNKS; ALSO EXCLUDING RE-
EXPORTS ABROAD

	Nineteen Ports	Thirty-two Ports.	Forty-seven Ports
	1880.	1899	1913.
British Empire	122,600,000	286,200,000	402,000,000
Japanese Empire	5,700,000	53,100,000	185,000,000
Other countries	30,000,000	113,000,000	403,000,000
	158,300,000	452,300,000	990,000,000

From the above summary it will be seen that if between 1880 and 1899 the total direct trade nearly trebled itself, between 1900 and 1913 the same direct trade about doubled itself; and the Japanese share, magnified nearly ten times during its pioneer development, has more than tripled itself again during its riper development. Look at it which way we will, there is no reason to fear that Great Britain is going to the wall, for we are still equal to the rest of the world, barring Japan. It must be remembered that England no longer takes the larger half of China tea, as she did in 1880, which deficit is more than compensated for by much greater cargoes of tea brought from India, the paid value of which remains in our own empire instead of going to that of China. It must also be remembered that the Russian and Japanese land trade by way of Manchuria

has introduced quite new elements, and that the loss of Kiao Chou to Germany in 1914 must again seriously modify the position of affairs as existing in 1913.

Out of the above trade, and of the home or coast trade in foreign or Chinese steamers, which is equal in volume to over once and a half the total of the foreign trade, the Chinese Government in 1880 derived a revenue of 14,250,000 taels, against 26,660,000 taels in 1899, and 43,900,000 taels in 1913. It will be noticed that, whilst direct trade has trebled and again doubled, the revenue on the whole trade has not kept pace: the reason is not very obvious; but as, owing to fluctuation in exchange rates and market values, the charges on imports have for many years only averaged 3 per cent., instead of the 5 per cent. average usually supposed to be levied, that fact (which of course in itself requires further specialist explanation) may partly account for it. Then, again, we must consider the British bankers, careful definition of what are called "invisible imports" and "invisible exports," *both* of which or *neither* of which must be counted. Probably a further reason is that the specific duties on comparatively high-paying articles such as tea have for many years steadily declined with the trade in those staples; whilst the specific duties on various cheap export commodities (formerly neglected, but now aggregating huge totals) are very low, and therefore do not advance pace by pace with the volume of the trade. Rice, for instance (though not exportable from China except under diplomatically arranged special conditions), is sometimes "exported" by the million hundredweight from one port to the other at a very low *likin* charge, or even free altogether. However, in 1902 the Mackay

treaty, which aimed amongst other desirable financial reforms at the abolition of *likin* in exchange for a substantial increase in import duties, did attempt to grapple with this question, and, as I write, I observe that the attention of President Li has once more been called, by his Chinese advisers this time, to the extreme desirability of effecting that important "swap."

The trade in cotton goods is the one which most interests the Englishman at home, and the Board of Trade has at last shown its good sense in establishing an Advisory Committee, with a special commissioner properly trained in the Chinese language and the cotton business alike, to deal with the textile question by studying it "on the tramp" in China. In 1880 the trade in cotton goods amounted to 23,400,000 taels, in 1899 to 103,500,000 taels, and in 1913 to 182,500,000 taels (being 38,000,000 taels over 1912). As to the yarn trade, the displacement noticed in the earlier editions of this work has now become accentuated to such a degree that Japan and India practically divide the whole foreign import in equal shares; both these, however, are now threatened in turn by the activities of Chinese mills, where docile labour is obtainable at rates defying competition anywhere abroad. There is an immense import of native raw cotton, native yarn, and native coarse cloth into Sz Ch'wan, and much cotton also comes into Yün Nan from the Shan states and Burma; of course in 1880 nothing was known of all this last, because Upper Burma was not yet under our control.

Opium, so prominent a feature in foreign trade when "China" was first published, has now happily ceased to interest us except in so far that arrangements are still incomplete for

working off stocks in hand under the terms stipulated with the late Manchu Government. President Li, as did President Yüan, shows great determination in the matter.

In 1880 over two-thirds of Chinese exports (value 81,600,000 taels) were represented by 2,100,000 cwt. of tea, valued at 35,700,000 taels; and 114,700 cwt. of silk, valued at 29,800,000 taels. It is as sad to find that in 1899 and 1913 the exports of tea only amounted to 1,631,000 and 1,500,000 cwt., valued at about 30,000,000 and 34,000,000 taels, as it is agreeable to notice the totals 281,000 and 350,000 cwt. of silk, valued at 90,000,000 and 105,000,000 taels. Thus tea is better and dearer, whilst silk is more plentiful and cheaper, no doubt owing to improvements in tea assorting and to filature developments in silk factories. India and Ceylon have done irreparable damage to the tea trade of China with Great Britain, who now ranks positively after Russia, instead of being six or eight times ahead of her. At present, however, Russia is beginning to appreciate Indian and Ceylon teas in ever-increasing quantities.

It will thus be seen that the main staples of trade remain very much what they were before what may be called the Treaty-port period. But it must be noted that an enormous business is now done in many new commodities of which scarcely anything was heard in 1880, still less in the pre-legation times anterior to the Second War of 1858; for instance, a gigantic and ever-increasing importation of kerosene oil from America, Russia, and Sumatra, which in 1897 had already exceeded 100,000,000 gallons, whilst in 1913 we have 185,000,000, including about 24,000,000 from a new rival—Borneo. Then there is cheap flour for South China from

America. These two imports alone, with a joint value of over 35,000,000 taels, have created as great a social revolution in China as did the advent of tea and the introduction of gas into England. Mules may be seen by the thousand in distant Bhamo carrying kerosene oil through the passes into Yün Nan; peasants may be met every evening in Arcadian Hainan carrying home a neat pound-bag of beautiful white flour, together with the farthing's-worth of periwinkles their ancestors have always brought home in the evening as a relish for the rice. Since 1899 quite a new import trade in cigarettes has gained a firm footing, encouraged, no doubt, by the ban upon opium: the value for 1913 was 12,500,000 taels. Foreign clothing is in demand on account of the slump in pigtails and petticoats for men: happily women have not imitated the restless and often hideous changes beloved of their Western sisters, but have confined their democratic yearnings to the tightening of the once baggy sleeves and trousers; if a mere man may venture an opinion, they looked more modest in the good old "bags." Aniline dyes and artificial indigo have had a fine time of late years, to the profit of Germany, who in 1913 pocketed a trifle of 10,000,000 taels.

The importation of miscellaneous articles of luxury has of late years increased to such an extent as to vie in aggregate amount with the totals of "regulation" staples. Thus all Chinamen who can afford it now like to have tumblers and bottles, foreign stockings, soap, lamps, cigars, preserved milk, sweets, and umbrellas; not to mention watches, musical-boxes, bicycles, motors, and toys. The women are fond of American and European scents, good mirrors, fine white sugar for powdering the face, needles,

and finger-rings. Then there is a curious though weighty import which is also an export. It actually pays better to export enormous quantities of coarse Chinese sugar to the "foreign country" of Hongkong, and re-import it thence, after refinement, as "foreign sugar," paying one export, one import, and one half or coast duty, plus two freights, than to refine it in China where labour is cheapest, or to import real foreign sugar. No more eloquent comment on the suicidal and imbecile financial policy of the provincial authorities could be made. In 1913 China spent 35,000,000 taels on this "imported" sugar.

But besides new-fangled imports, properly so called, and this hermaphrodite sugar, many new exports have either shifted bearings, or have started into prominence since the year 1880. In that year, after deducting the values of tea and silk, the total exports from China in foreign bottoms were only 12,300,000 taels, against 75,000,000 in 1899 and 260,000,000 in 1913. Thus, the beancake (manure) which used to go from Chefoo and Newchwang to South China for sugar cultivation in 1880, now mostly goes to Japan, and no longer exclusively to Amoy, Swatow, and such places. The beans from which the beancake was made (after the extraction of oil) were almost unknown as an export ten years ago, but now the beans and the cake each count for about half of a total of 50,000,000 taels, and besides about 4,000,000 taels' worth of oil goes to Belgium and Japan. The Dutch, Danes, Belgians, and Germans import great quantities of beans (and various crushed oils) for the manufacture of margarine and other foodstuffs. The Brazilians and the Italians are now growing *Soya hispida* of their own in rivalry. The export of straw-braid from Chefoo and Tientsin has doubled,

though in 1880, when it first began to attract serious notice, it had already nearly trebled itself in five years; it was never heard of in the five-port days: there was a tremendous fall in 1913 to 5,000,000 taels from 10,000,000 in 1911, no doubt in consequence of fraudulent and careless behaviour on the part of producers and dealers. Feathers of all kinds may be described as an entirely new export, which is now assuming really great and alarming dimensions owing to the organised hunt for birds other than domestic fowl. The albumen and egg export is also quite new. Both these for Belgium and Germany. The quantity of hides and skins exported had in 1898 trebled itself during six years—in 1880 the export was hardly worth special mention: in 1913 the total value was about 25,000,000 taels; here the Germans have been as active as in the notorious Calcutta hide monopoly, so dangerous to India. The trade in mats and matting, hemp, jute, ramie, leather, native spirit, wine, and oils has been advancing in a most extraordinary rapid fashion; in matting, however, there has been a recent slump, owing to some hitch in American arrangements. Still, as we get to understand better some more of the unfamiliar, ingenious uses to which the long-experienced Chinese put their numerous oils, barks, and fibres, we shall undoubtedly before long create similar large exports in other directions. There are many openings in China for the mercantile man with ideas, and whatever we may think of *Kultur*, there is no denying that the Germans are the most fertile in this thinking-out department. *Caveant consules*, therefore.

In the above remarks no account has been taken of coast trade (730,000,000 taels), which, added to the foreign trade, amounted in 1899 to

1,210,500,000 taels, and in 1913 to 1,353,500,000 taels, of which the ships of Great Britain account for 613,000,000 taels in 1899 and rather less in 1913; that is to say, the coast trade has not increased in proportion to the foreign trade, and the Chinese and Japanese steamers have taken much more of the coast trade than formerly.

As to foreign shipping, in 1880 there were 22,970 entrances and clearances of 15,874,352 tons, 60 per cent. being British; in 1899 the figures were 56,957 entrances and clearances of 38,863,902 tons, of which, again, 60 per cent. were British—at least so far as tonnage goes; in 1913 the figures were 190,738 and 93,334,830, Britain's share being 32,186 vessels of 38,120,300 tons; but in 1899 25,350 British ships, averaging over 900 tons each, carried 23,338,230 tons, whilst it took 22,548 Chinese ships, averaging over 400 tons each, to carry 8,944,819 tons; in 1913 it took 121,768 Chinese ships to carry 19,903,944 tons. Thus the British ships average about 1,200 tons to the Chinese average of 150 tons; the explanation is that steam-launches and the comparatively recent inland navigation rules have revolutionised local shipping, four-fifths of the registered "inland" vessels being Chinese. Japanese shipping has advanced with giant strides, totalling 22,716 ships of 23,422,487 tons, being more than quintuple the figures for 1899; and it will be noticed that the average is over 100 tons per ship. Other countries are still so far behind that I need not mention them; the only one to make any show at all was Germany, and even she had in 1913 fallen seriously off since 1903: of course, now, she has disappeared altogether as the baseless fabric of a dream.

The comparative number of foreign firms doing business in China (including now, of

course, Manchuria) is thus given for the three years 1880, 1899, and 1913 :—

Nationality.	1880.	1899	1913
British	236	401	590
German	65	115	296
American	31	70	131
French	16	76	106
Russian	16	19	1,229
Japanese	21	195	1,269
Portuguese		10	46
Dutch		47	133
Danish			
Spanish			
Swedish, etc., etc.			
Foreign Firms in China	385	933	3,805

The Germans and Americans, it will be observed, have increased, at first nearly, and later more than proportionately with the British. The Russians made no attempt to go beyond the bounds of their old tea trade, and their firms were all at Hankow, Foochow, and Tientsin, until the Cassini Convention presented them with Manchuria. The French increase in numbers does not bulk largely in reference to the volume of trade done; but they are especially active in silk filatures. The Japanese made a big jump after their war of 1894-5, and a still more tremendous jump when in 1904-5 they took half Russia's interest in Manchuria. The Portuguese pricked up their ears when Senhor Branco "made the fur fly" in 1904; and the *etcetera* now includes 39 Italians, 24 Austro-Hungarians, and 13 Belgians who had not found grace previous to "Boxer" eye-opening; also 7 Norwegians, who only separated from Sweden in 1905. In 1880 the total number of foreigners in China, including missionaries and other non-traders, was just over 4,000; in 1899 it had gone

up to about 17,000, and in 1913 (including Manchuria) to 164,000. Of course all this has nothing to do with Hongkong, which is no longer a political part of "China."

Let us now take the ports one by one, glance comparatively at the years 1880, 1899, and 1913, and see what prospects they give for the enterprising trader of the future.

(1) Pakhoi is the *Ultima Thule* of coast ports, as viewed from a Chinese standpoint. In 1880 the boycotting of steamers by native junk owners and monopolists had only just recently been broken up; opium was the chief import; cassia and aniseed the leading exports. In 1899 Indian cotton yarn alone represented three-sevenths in value of all imports; opium was quite insignificant. Aniseed stands for one quarter of the exports; cassia is not even mentioned. Sugar, hides, and indigo stand for over half the remaining exports. In 1913 the total trade had dwindled to a third of its 1899 value. Indian yarn stood for one-fifth of all imports, and kerosene for one-tenth; opium was extinct. Neither aniseed nor cassia is separately mentioned; sugar falls to insignificance; hides stand firm, and liquid indigo defies German dyes. Pigs and fish are now the chief stand-by of moribund Pakhoi trade.

(2) Hoihow (Kiungchow) in 1880 sent nothing abroad, and chiefly imported foreign opium, but in 1913 the import of opium was only one-twelfth in value of the total imports. Cottons, principally Indian yarn, were in 1899 far ahead of opium, and kerosene had shot up to nearly half the value of that drug. Cottons, still half Indian yarn, and kerosene now stand for half the value of the remaining total imports after the deduction of opium, and kerosene alone is four-fifths the value of opium. Pigs and sugar

have always been and still are the chief exports, amounting in 1913 to considerably more than half the total value. The export of "pine-apple" hemp and its grass-cloth continues to be considerable; the Kew authorities possess full details (from myself) concerning this important fibre.

(3) Sam-shui (including the subsidiary ports of Kongmun and Kumchuk) was only opened in 1897: cotton goods stand for over half the total imports; sugar and tobacco are the most promising exports. *Andad con Dios!* for little is ever reported of you; in fact nothing, this century, by any consul.

(4) Lappa (round Macao) and (5) Kowloong (round Hongkong). These stations were opened in order to check salt smuggling and to facilitate the working of the Opium Agreement of 1886. Their position is peculiar, as Maritime Customs officers are, practically speaking, in charge of a purely Chinese junk trade, which does not concern foreigners directly. The effects of the Kowloong extension of 1898, apart from the railway to Canton, concern the colony of Hongkong, which, possessing no statistics, is never very illuminating on the subject of trade.

(6) Canton; a strong German shipping and general trade centre before the war. In 1880 the imports were only one-fifth of the exports; most of the opium was (and was still in 1899) imported in native junks. There had been singular neglect on the part of foreigners for twenty-five years past to insist on transit-pass privileges for imports into Kwang Si and beyond. This was chiefly owing to the personal policy of my former respected chief, Sir Brooke Robertson, the British Consul, who took a sympathetic view of China's financial straits. The chief exports were silk, tea, sugar, tobacco, and

matting. In 1899 the foreign imports alone were worth more than half the exports, of which silk (filature) was then practically the sole important one. Matting only stood for one-twentieth part of the value of silk, although compared with 1880 there was twice as much of it in 1899; sugar had by no means disappeared, and glass bangles were worth as much as tea and tobacco put together. Owing, however, to matting, tea, and other produce for Europe at that time all going to Hongkong largely by junk, it was quite fallacious to take the Foreign Customs returns for Canton as a criterion of the prosperity in export business.

Li Hung-chang took a very important decision in this province before leaving for Shanghai in connection with the "Boxer" difficulties of the summer of 1900. He abolished all *likin* throughout Kwang Tung in consideration of 4,000,000 dollars a year to be paid by the seventy-two leading trades. Were this new plan to succeed permanently, it might revolutionise the commerce of the province or trading "hongs." Be that as it may, Canton trade is already galvanised into new life, and 1910 was its "record." Since then wars and revolutions have reduced it, and must have further reduced it since 1913, when its total reached 114,000,000 taels; yet its *revenue* for that year is a record. Opium has disappeared, but of course some must be smuggled. The exports now balance the imports (if we include the bullion on both sides). The Hoppo, with his nefarious native customs, is abolished. The chief imports are cotton goods, sugar, and kerosene. The chief exports remain as before, that of sugar being one-third of the import, for reasons already explained (pp. 148, 155); and matting having fallen off (p. 149).

(7) Wu-chou (40,000 inhabitants), the gate to

Kwang Si, had no existence as a foreign port in 1880. After two and a half years of life, by the end of 1899 it was found that practically the whole trade was with Hongkong. More than half the imports were cotton goods—as they still are. It is purely a transshipping centre, and the surrounding district possesses no important products of its own; motor-boats carry up country, and bring back, respectively, the imports from and exports to Hongkong and Canton by large steamers, which cannot get beyond this point. In 1907 the “port” of Nan-ning, 500 miles farther up the river, was opened, and the motor-boats could even ascend another 500 miles to Peh-ngai, on the Yün Nan frontier. After the revolution of 1912, Nan-ning was made the capital of the province in place of Kwei-lin; but in 1915 the Civil Governor went back to the old capital, the Military Governor remaining at Nan-ning. The whole trade of Wu-chou and Nan-ning combined is negligible in bulk and value, and in any case does not seriously concern foreigners at present.

(8) At Swatow in 1880 more than half the value of imports stood for opium, and sugar was the chief export. In 1889 opium represented only one-tenth, and cotton goods one-sixth; these two together just equal the value of the opium alone in 1880, and beancake (including beans) stood for nearly a quarter of the imports. Sugar remained the chief export; the value of the sugar exported about counterbalancing that of imported opium and cotton goods combined. In 1913 opium disappears, and fine Java sugars are imported in increasing quantities to the detriment of local exports, the beancake going to fertilise better-paying crops.

Formosa has now been lost to China for over twenty years, and there is no more justification for continuing to discuss its condition under

Japan than there would be for discussing the trade of Hongkong and Macao under Great Britain and Portugal.

(9) Amoy still carries on the old native "Zaitun" trade with the "Straits," the Indo-Chinese peninsula, Formosa (now Japanese), the Dutch archipelago, and the Spanish (now American) Islands, to which places large numbers of emigrants proceed annually, equal numbers returning with fortunes made. Opium and cottons in exchange for tea and sugar were the chief items in the foreign trade of 1880. Opium and cottons in 1899 still represent half the value of the foreign imports, but in 1913 opium is extinct and moreover the local cultivation of the poppy is eradicated. Amoy has long been and still is a declining port; besides, its trade has little interest for any foreigners except (as with Swatow) those trading from Hongkong and the Straits of Java. In no part of China was government more rotten than in the Fuh Kien province, to which Swatow really belongs ethnologically; possibly the reason is, in part, because all dialects spoken there are totally unintelligible to the northern officials; since the revolution of 1911, Fuh Kien has been almost a forgotten region.

(10) The North Fuh Kien port of San-tu Ao (Samsah Inlet) was voluntarily opened in May, 1899, entirely as a political move. I visited it and the alum mountain to the north of it in 1884, and travelled throughout the *Hinterland*. I am, therefore, in a position to suggest that tea and alum are likely to be the chief exports; the tea at present all goes *viâ* Foochow. No foreign business has, however, yet been reported; no foreigner is there or goes there; it is simply a question of naval harbour interest.

(11) Foochow lies midway between the last

two places. In 1880 it still possessed the largest tea export, and the memory of glorious old clipper days was yet green there. Tea in 1913 still stands for four-fifths of the total exports, as it did in 1899, but the quantity is only half of that shipped in 1880. The other noticeable exports are poles, bamboo-made paper, oranges, and edible bamboo shoots. In 1880 the imports were only one-quarter of the exports, in value, but now, as in 1899, more than equal the latter. It is at this port that, as regards shipping, both the Chinese and the Japanese flags have made the greatest inroads upon British tonnage since 1899. Opium in 1899 was still, as it was in 1880, one of the chief imports, but on a much reduced scale: the same may be said of 1913, but the suppression of the trade made it clear that by 1914 all but the illicit imports will have vanished.

(12) Wênchow has never been much of a port in our days, though it was once so in the olden times, and a good tea trade was expected from it when we went there in 1878. It is so insignificant now that the British consuls have ceased even to report upon it. There is a considerable and very ancient export of bitter oranges, destined entirely for the Mongol market by way of Tientsin; these oranges are mentioned at the "Manzi" or Sung dynasty's court of Hangchow in the year 1154.

(13) Ningpo had degenerated from 1880 to 1899 into a mere sleepy branch of Shanghai, to which place it shipped its tea, mats, fans, and rush or straw hats by the daily British or Chinese steamer, taking chiefly opium, metals, and cotton goods in return. This is still the case so far as the steamers are concerned, except that the Chinese tonnage is now far ahead of the British. The old raw cotton export continues,

but with great fluctuations. The Shanghai railway to Hangchow, and thence to Ningpo, may infuse new life into the port, but political conditions and interminable railway squabbles have seriously compromised its success.

(14) Hangchow was only opened in 1896, and has already far exceeded the expectations formed of it, though it is a mere canal appendage of Shanghai, as Ningpo is a sea appendage. In 1899 its gross trade had already nearly reached 12,000,000 taels; in 1913 17,300,000 taels. The chief imports were opium, tobacco, kerosene, beans, and beancake—but opium has been displaced by cigarettes; the exports consist principally of tea and silk. The Shanghai railway has disturbed and will further disturb the direction of trade communications, but in 1913 the railway directors had to announce a serious deficit, and both rolling stock and permanent way need renewal.

I have now worked all the way up to Shanghai from the south; but, before touching upon that great centre, I will bring down the river trade and the northern trade each to the same focus, and then collect our consideration of the whole three groups into one purview, together with that of the great dépôt for them all.

(15) Chungking was opened in 1891, but I resided there for a twelvemonth ten years earlier than that. The foreign-managed trade had already in 1899 reached 26,000,000 taels, imports and exports being equally divided; in 1913, despite revolutions, rebellions, and local squabbles, which greatly hampered trade, the total exceeded 30,000,000 taels, or only 8 per cent. below the "record" of 1909: of course this total does not cover the vast commerce of the feeding rivers, nor that portion of the Yang-tsze trade which ignores the Foreign Customs. Here the

tables are turned, and the conditions new; there has never been an import of Indian opium, but more than a third of the total exports used to consist of the native drug—now opium is not even mentioned. White wax and silk between them make up another third, and efforts are being made so to improve the silk trade as to make it fill the place vacated by opium. There is a very large export of musk from Tibet, which takes in exchange 10,000 tons of coarse tea, by way of Ya-chou. All the trade, import and export, used to be done in chartered native junks, but during the past few years small steamers and gunboats have found a way over the rapids and through the gorges, and thus may be said to have revolutionised transport, at least for six months in the year. The imports have all to pass the gauntlet of either Shanghai, Hankow, or Ichang,—sometimes of all three. The chief part consists of cotton goods, or raw cotton and cotton yarn (native as well as foreign) to be locally spun or woven into yarn and cloth. In June 1915 the important city of Wan *hien* below Chungking was opened as a branch (Foreign Customs) of the Chungking office. Though Chungking exports raw silk, it imports silk piece-goods, skilled local handiwork not yet being quite up to the mark, and silk being much worn by all classes. Chungking, representing also Tibet, is the drug-exporting place *par excellence* of China; but it is impossible in this rapid sketch even to name the many new features of trade that have recently given this vast mart exceptional importance; what is really wanted is a body of Chinese-speaking British agents, each agent representing firms in one particular line; more especially in machinery, engineering, and electricity, in which the Germans have been showing great activity.

(16) Ich'ang, at the mouth of the gorges, made

a "port" in 1877, was considered a failure already in 1880, but the opening of Chungking, with its native opium trade, in 1891 somewhat changed the face of things, and the total amount of the trade for 1899 was about fourteen times as great as that for 1880; but only a small part of it is local, the bulk is all mere transshipment to or from Chungking. The neighbourhood is too mountainous and badly supplied with roads for local trade to develop rapidly; the total of all kinds for 1913 was only about 5,000,000 taels net. As to shipping, the Chinese, and still more the Japanese are rapidly gaining ground upon the British. The Hankow-Ich'ang-Sz Ch'wan railway has not got much beyond the talking stage.

(17) Shashī is, so to speak, the port of Kingchou, which was in very ancient times an ancient royal capital, and has always been a great political centre in the past: it was still up to 1911 the residence of a Tartar garrison. Its port was opened in 1896, and is so far a failure that the British consulate has been withdrawn since 1899. There are great hopes of development when the Shashī-Hingi railway to Hu Nan, etc., is started. The total trade at present is less even than that of Ich'ang, the Chinese merchants preferring junks to steamers, *likin* to Foreign Customs, and the Back River to the Yang-tsze. But there is an enormous native cotton trade with Sz Ch'wan. I ought to say here, once for all, in connection with inter-port trade generally, that a total for all China of nearly 1,000,000,000 taels would have to be added to each 500,000,000 taels of foreign trade, if the coast trade of each port (only that managed by the Foreign Customs) were in each case included: it is difficult to guess what the *likin*-managed trade would amount to beyond that.

(18) Yochou, the key to Hu Nan, was opened

in November, 1899, but it did not properly "take down its shutters" for business until 1900. It had a fitful career of ups and downs until, in 1904, the opening of the Hu Nan capital, Ch'ang-sha, took the wind out of its flapping sails entirely. Ch'ang-sha, a great mining centre, especially in antimony, has been a great success from the beginning, and a vast lake trade has grown up with the great marts of Hu Nan, in which the Japanese take a prominent part; in fact, their shipping and that of the Chinese quite equal that of Great Britain. In spite of general and local political scares, the trade has risen steadily without a single break from 6,000,000 taels in 1905 to 24,000,000 in 1913: opium and the poppy cultivation are effectually scotched. "Chinese shipping" of course means steam craft under the Foreign Customs, quite apart from junk trade.

(19) The great entrepôt of Hankow occupies one of the finest trade positions in the world. It is the only place in China proper, as distinct from Manchuria, where the Russians are in really strong force: the largest ocean steamers from Odessa and London can anchor opposite the Consulate doors. After taking source near the same spot, and flying off from each other thousands of miles, the one towards the desert and the other towards the south, the Yang-tsze and the Yellow River approach once more to within a distance of 300 miles: one of the Hankow rivers, the Han, taps the whole of the intervening space, and after a partly navigable course of 1,250 miles joins the Yang-tsze at Hankow, which is also exactly half-way between gates or keys of the two lake systems of Hu Nan and Kiang Si. Situated as it is in the centre of China, with cheap water communications in every possible direction, it naturally trades in almost everything,

and the Germans have been as enterprising, since the "Boxer" wars, as the British have been supine, in establishing vigorous new export trades hence.

The trade of Hankow must be studied in connection with that of the ports above and below it, otherwise the grand total of 67,000,000 taels for 1899 and 154,000,000 for 1913 (or 85,000,000 taels and 175,000,000 if viewed from another standpoint) would be misleading; even the tea, which is of course a *bonâ fide* original cargo shipped direct for Europe, includes Kewkiang tea. It is found more paying to bring the leaf up river this way in native boats than to ship it on board chance steamers calling at Kewkiang, simply to fill up there if they have space. The export of tea was in 1899 fifty per cent. greater than that of Foochow; in 1913 the export was three times the value, and the import (for blending purposes) into Hankow of Ceylon, Assam, and Java dust was more than half the Foochow export, the Hankow export of teas thus blended alone far exceeding the total export from Foochow. The import of kerosene is enormous, and two 5,000-ton tanks were destroyed during the revolution of 1911. The recklessness in the use of oil-lamps had already in previous years been the cause of some very destructive fires in Hankow, which finally received its *coup de grâce* when imperialist conflagrations, during the 1911 revolt, practically annihilated the whole city, the rebuilding of which in improved style becomes more difficult the longer time is wasted. Yet what with railways, cloth and paper mills, engineering and cement works, needle and nail factory, mints, waterworks, electric installations, arsenals, mining, etc., the whole place buzzes with "unkempt" activity, and there is no space to say more here.

(20) Kewkiang was already a decadent port, and had been reduced to a British vice-consulate long before 1880, there being little in the way of either import or export, beyond sugar, shipping agencies, and tea, to interest foreigners. On the whole, though there was a great fall in 1913, tea is not now declining, and the Russians in that year did well in green brick tea, sent *viâ* Manchuria to Mongolia. There is a large native trade in porcelain from the Kiang Si potteries, but not much of it is exported to foreign countries; no wonder, for eighteen *likin* "squeezes" must be paid before it can reach Shanghai; the Republican Government is taking steps to reorganise and improve the industry. With cheap and comfortable daily, almost hourly, steamers up and down the river, native merchants naturally prefer to go to Shanghai or Hankow to make large purchases and contracts. The great summer resort of Kuling has sprung into existence since the first editions of this book appeared: the "estate" has now attained the dimensions of a Homburg or a Pöstyen, and is largely patronised by missionaries: it is five hours to the cool mountain by "chair" from sweltering Kewkiang. There was in 1899 some prospect of a valuable trade in the grass-cloth plant (*Boehmeria nivea*), which had just then attracted attention both in England and Germany: in 1913 the export had reached 116,000 cwts. Since the Inland Water Navigation rules were promulgated in 1898, an active steam-launch traffic for passengers has sprung up on the Poyang Lake: the commercial activity on this lake now bids fair to rival that of its rival Tung-t'ing; but, so far, the Kiang Si capital Nan-ch'ang has not been "opened." Even the railway to connect it with Kewkiang progresses slowly—the Japanese have a strong interest in it, and

also in the lake shipping. There is "talk" of a new railway, direct, to join the two lake capitals Ch'ang-sha and Nan-ch'ang.

(21) Wuhu, like all the ports opened under the Chefoo Convention, was in 1880 considered to be a comparative failure, and for a long time no foreigners went there. The fact is, Chinamen are conservative, and do not want more points of contact than they are accustomed to use, or are gradually brought up to appreciate. But, after all, 1899 proved its best year, more than doubling the average total annual trade for the ten previous years, and passing 20,000,000 taels: after gradually reaching nearly 30,000,000 in 1912, it resumed in 1913 the 1899 figure, the revolt of that summer having disorganised commerce, whilst the rebellious Military Governor had to flee. The gigantic export of rice (4,000,000 cwt.), largely to Canton and Swatow, was the chief cause for the unlooked-for increase of 1899; in 1913 the export was only 3,000,000 cwt., but this is always an uncertain staple, for rice can scarcely ever be sent abroad, and very special *likin* arrangements have to be made whenever shortage in other provinces renders it urgently necessary to send cheap rice to other parts of China. Rice, moreover, is quite an uncertain commodity in itself, and depends entirely upon the weather.¹

(22) Nanking, though nominally available under the earlier treaties, was not really made an open port until May, 1899, and by 1913 it had worked its way up to 14,000,000 taels. In spite of the sacking and destruction of the city during the 1913 troubles, that was a "record" year—so kindly does the Chinese eel take to skinning. Nanking now has its University, and is a railway centre of the first magnitude; four British firms do a large business there already, and its prospects are unbounded.

¹ cf. p. 144.

(23) Chinkiang was in so poor a way in 1880 that it had only three years previously earned its right to be restored to its position as an independent consulate; for some years the officer-in-charge had to submit matters involving important changes to the Consul at Shanghai. It is sickening, now that opium is practically a hideous dream of the past, to look back to the statistics of 1899, and see what a prominent part the drug then took in the trade of Chinkiang—and of most other ports. The Czar's abolition of drink in 1914 was not a more beneficial act of autocracy than the Emperor's (or rather the old Dowager's) smashing edict of September 1906; and fortunately the Republic sticks to its guns now that her Majesty's ten-year period of grace is over. In spite of the 1913 rebellion and the loss of opium revenue, Chinkiang has a hopeful future, especially when the new port of P'u-k'ou opposite Nanking springs into organised existence. As to shipping, Great Britain still has 50 per cent. of it. But at present it is rather startling to see it rank in trade volume below Chefoo, which only serves the trade requirements of one tiny corner of Shan Tung.

Having now exhausted, I am afraid in a very sketchy way, the riverine line of ports, I pass to the extreme north.

(24) Newchwang is the most northerly port of all. Although it is said to be in "Manchuria," the province of Shêng King had really no civilised Manchu population to speak of before A.D. 1600; the inhabitants are a mixed Chinese-Tungusic race, who have been as often governed by Corea and by Tunguses of various kinds as by Chinese. In 1880 all the foreign imports from abroad came *viâ* Shanghai or direct from Hongkong. Russia and Japan had not yet put in an appearance, nor had a pound of yarn been

imported. In 1899 the trade was double that of 1898, and then having gradually attained its maximum of 74,250,000 taels in the year of the revolution, 1911, it had fallen off 25 per cent. of that figure in 1913 and resumed the lower total of 1908. Having undergone Russian and Japanese occupations, the evil effects of Mongolian troubles, plague, the reflex action of the Yang-tsze revolts, and other political dislocations; having, moreover, suffered from inflated paper money and general currency chaos, injustice in settling native mercantile claims, drought, and unsatisfactory Liao River conditions, etc., etc., the foreign merchant at Newchwang has indeed been a sorely tried person for a whole decade. At present the Japanese shipping still equals and even exceeds the British, which in turn is more than that of all other nations put together. Japan, moreover, still takes half the total exports. Russia had thirteen steamers in 1899, but only three in 1913. The sole export of first-class importance in 1880 was beancake (and beans); now the *Soya hispida* export is one of the great features of Chinese trade. The port has to suffer severe competition from Dairen or Dalny, but latterly the Japanese have begun to interest themselves in the Newchwang trade too. The formerly flourishing American trade in cotton goods has received a blow, owing to the successive, and now joint policies of Russia and Japan. America looks askance at the latest position, and naturally tries to "get in" once more.

Port Arthur in 1899 was a great trading place for many nationalities, but of course in purely Russian interests. The Japanese, who now use it chiefly as a naval port, took it from China in 1894, and again from Russia in 1904; in 1910 the western harbour was thrown open, but it is

not a "port" under the Foreign Customs—in fact it is a failure in trade.

(25) Ta-lien Wan (Japanese Dairen), or Dalny as the Russians called it in 1898, is an open port in territory "leased" first to Russia and then to Japan. Before the Japanese took it the Russians had carried out stupendous public works there with a view to a great future trade, especially in coal and beans. Express trains carry you hence direct to Europe, and rapid steamers convey passengers to and from Shanghai in connection therewith. The trade for 1913 was considerable, but 85 per cent. of it was Japanese. The Chinese Maritime Customs takes cognisance of it, and the question of duties payable is a matter of arrangement based upon the plan accepted by Germany at Kiao Chou.

(26) Tientsin exported large quantities of camels' wool and straw-braid in 1880; cotton goods and opium were the leading imports, but she ranked fairly low down in the comparative scale,—far below such ports as Hankow or Foo-chow. "Syndicates," bent on "concessions" of all kinds, then began to arrive; there was great activity in connection with China's new navy and naval stations; the opening of Corea brought fresh steamers to the port, and its development continued through the time of the Japanese war in 1894-5, and the subsequent extraordinary energy displayed by the Chinese in raising new armies (1896-1900). After the "Boxer" peace settlement of 1901, the Viceroy Yüan Shī-k'ai completely reformed and rehabilitated the place. The trade had nearly trebled itself during the ten years preceding his arrival, and now ranks next to that of Hankow in value; even above it in revenue collection. Wool and raw cotton are the chief exports. The wool is chiefly sheep's, which comes in enormous quantities from distant

Mongolia; just as Tibetan wool, starting from near the same tracts, goes to Chungking; but there is a fair amount of camels' wool too. The value of hides, skins, and hair is about half that of the wool. Cotton goods are the leading imports, Japanese yarn being specially prominent. Others worth special mention are kerosene and munitions of war. The former immense importation of foreign and native opium is a thing of the past. It will assist us in forming an idea of the topographical laws which explain the most ancient Chinese migrations and settlements, if we accept the dictum that the trade area of Tientsin embraces all between the sea and the left bank of the Yellow River up to Mongolia, including both banks of the northernmost River Bend down to Ning-hia, the ancient capital of Marco Polo's Tangut, and to the outposts of Tibet. In fact, there are three drainage areas in China for trade, and the sea outlets are Tientsin, Shanghai, and Canton.

(27) Ts'in-wang Tao, nine miles north of the new sanatorium Pei-tai Ho (near the Shan-hai Kwan), had since 1898 been much talked of as a "voluntary port," like San-tu Ao; but the trouble with the "Boxers" postponed the completion of that arrangement until 1903. The advantage of this port is that it is always free from ice, and therefore affords a better and nearer channel for the K'ai-Lan (Anglo-Chinese) Company's coal export than Taku.

Kalgan, at the Great Wall, is perhaps entitled to a cursory mention, although, in spite of its excellent new Peking railway, it is not exactly a "port," even in the same limited sense as the inland and railway connected towns of Mèng-tsz and Lungchow, for it is not under the Foreign Customs. About 40,000 tons of tea used to go overland through this place to Mongolia,

employing for conveyance about 200,000 camels. These, it appears, are largely the same animals that bring sheep's wool to Tientsin from the region of Kokonor—that is, from the entrepôt of Baotu, on the Yellow River, which has already been twice mentioned in the chapter upon “Trade Routes.” About the year 1870 I paid three visits to Kalgan, and even then there was a considerable Russian settlement, which in 1900 was destroyed by the “Boxers.” The Kalgan tea trade is not so important to Russia now that direct steamers of the largest size run from Hankow to Odessa, and even to Cronstadt; such as it is, the Russians bemoan its decadence, and the decline of Kiachta energy. In 1913 the export by Chinese of green brick tea from Kewkiang to Mongolia was forbidden for a time, and this gave the Russians a short opportunity as related on p. 163. In the year 1872 I went up the Yangtze with the captain of the very first Russian steamer destined for the ocean trade, and towards 1899 there were about six of them clearing for the Black Sea or the Baltic every year. The Russian entries *and* clearances for 1914 were 55 ships of 55,000 tons, which would give an average of 2,000 tons a steamer. But these remarks belong strictly to Hankow.

Kia-yüh Kwan (lat. 40° N., long. 98° E.) possessed a “foreign” custom-house, supported by the Hankow office, but there was no European there. Since 1885 there had been a full staff, with scarcely any work to do. The idea was to accommodate the Russians who had begun to take tea in increasing quantities up the Han River, navigable for small steamers 300 miles, and for junks 600 more; but a natural death seems to have practically put an end to both causes and effects.

(28) Chefoo, like Tientsin, was an exporter of

straw-braid and beancake in 1880; her *pongee* silks, the product of the "oak-worm" like those of Newchwang, were also coming to the front. They are now well known in Great Britain under the name of "Shantungs." The total trade for 1899 was in tael value more than three times that of 1880. The energy of the Germans at Kiao Chou soon reduced the Chefoo trade to stagnancy, for in 1913 Chefoo had dropped to 9,000,000 taels, whilst Kiao Chou had gone up to 65,000,000. Of course the opening of Corea had considerable effect on Chefoo's external development up to 1899, for internally the port only deals with its immediate neighbourhood, and to this day there is no railway. In cotton goods America still rules the roost. The cattle and straw-braid exports, once so prominent, are now dead. There is an immense annual "export" of coolies to Vladivostock, and as a port of call Chefoo shows shipping activity besides being a summer health resort.

(29) Kiao Chou, or Ts'ing-tao, is another "free port" of the rather suspicious "leasehold" type; but, unlike Ta-lien Wan, it fell almost from the beginning (since 1st July, 1899) under the ken of the Foreign or Maritime Customs; it was officially opened in May, 1899, during which year the total trade amounted to 2,200,000 taels. But it was not "free" to inter-port trade at all; and the custom-house was only for the mainland commerce. However, in 1906 fresh arrangements were made, its "free" status was abolished, full import and export duties were levied, and Germany received 20 per cent. of them for her trouble as middle-man. Since the Japanese took it in 1914 it has been standing by in a more or less limp condition, waiting until the war clouds roll away.

Tsi-nan, the capital of Shan Tung province,

became a "port" in 1906, and is connected with Kiao Chou by railway, now also run by the Japanese. When the "voluntary settlement" was opened, it was officially stated that there would be "no hurry" about a custom-house. Meanwhile the Germans established themselves in force, and hustled in their own way until the Japanese gave them walking orders.

Wei-hai Wei has a status as a "port" even vaguer than that of its Russian and German colleagues, and it is not in any way affiliated to the Foreign Customs. Under the benign rule of Sir James Stewart Lockhart, the British lion here lies peaceably with the Chinese lamb, and as a "naval port" this place alone (since 1916) enjoys the blessings of a penny postage in Chinese waters.

Corea, which, as a vassal state, was opened to foreign ships only in 1882, passed to the status of an independent "empire"; but after being buffeted about between Russia and Japan, and enduring for a generation the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, she has by a *facilis descensus* settled down to prosperous obscurity as a Japanese province under a Governor-General—*Requiescat in pace!*

(30) We now come to Shanghai, the great heart from the pulsations of which nearly all the above derive their arterial not to say artificial nutriment, and to the invigorating action of which they drive their venous not to say venal blood for further treatment and distribution. In 1880 this great emporium had a direct trade of over 92,000,000 taels, two-fifths exports and three-fifths imports. The foreign complications with Russia and France helped to depress business for some years, but in 1886 trade recovered, and by 1891 it had totalled 165,000,000 taels. It must be borne in mind, however, that these

are gross figures, for a large part of the Shanghai trade reappears in the form of Tientsin, Hankow, or even Swatow trade. The true trade of Shanghai, less re-exports, for the year 1899 is only 125,000,000 taels, and for 1913, 207,250,000 taels. On the other hand, the gross trade of Shanghai (including everything from or to anywhere under all conditions) was in 1899 nearly 308,000,000 taels (roughly, £40,000,000), and in 1913, 533,500,000 taels (roughly, £80,500,000). To understand the complicated distinctions between gross and net totals, viewed from various standpoints, it is necessary for those particularly interested to study the published returns, customs as well as consular; and it must also be borne in mind that the sterling value of the tael fluctuates widely: at present (1917) silver is extraordinarily high, partly on account of Hongkong prohibitions.

(34-46) There are still a number of ports or quasi-ports which ought to be casually noticed. The trade of Indo-China for 1899 amounted to nearly £10,000,000 (say 70,000,000 taels), of which Tonquin took over £2,500,000 (say 17,500,000 taels). Reports are irregular and unsatisfactory, but I take it £20,000,000 and £5,000,000 would be nearer the mark for 1913. The trade with Mêngtsz (Yün Nan) *viâ* Haiphong, the Red River, and Hokow on the French frontier, was opened in 1889, and amounted in 1899 to 5,250,000 taels, all conducted by Chinese merchants, and mostly carried on, in mere transit, through Tonquin, with Hongkong; the figure for 1913 was 19,750,000 taels, and would have been much larger but for the cessation of the opium traffic. As early as 1140 the new Li dynasty of Tonquin had opened a port, corresponding with the modern Haiphong, to the trade of Siam and Burma, but there is no specific

mention of it in Chinese history. Trade seems to have then centred at Tourane, or rather at "Faifo," about 20 miles up the river. The "port" of Lungchow (Kwang Si) was also opened in 1889: the trade in 1899 was not only contemptible in amount, but was absolutely declining—the total was under 86,000 taels. After the extension of the Langson railway, in 1902, it rose gradually to 900,000 taels in 1908: reports are scarce, but as its customs revenue for 1913 only barely reached 5,000 taels, and as in any case the French only are concerned, we may ignore the place. Sz-mao (Yün Nan) promises better. It was opened to the French in 1895, and to the British in 1896, as already stated under the head "Arrival of Europeans." The average annual trade in 1899 had been about 225,000 taels—so far, chiefly cotton from the British Shan states; but both in total trade and in revenue it is little better off than Lungchow, and consuls no longer report upon it. Of Kwang-chou Wan, the new French station in the Lei-chou Peninsula, leased in 1898, it is difficult to say anything, except that there is a good native trade with Macao and Kongmun; however, it is a free port, and in no way falls under the Chinese (Foreign or Maritime) Customs.

Kongmun and Kumchuk have both been mentioned as being under Sam-shui (p. 153); but in the Foreign Customs revenue lists available to me Kongmun ranks (separately) higher than its parent port, whilst Kumchuk is not enumerated at all. Ch'ang-sha has been treated of under the head of its parent and guardian Yochou (p. 161), whose revenue it more than doubles. Nan-ning, which was declared an open "port" in 1907, has already been discussed under Wu-chou (p. 155), though it has separate

customs mention as one of the forty-seven. Manchouli, Aigun, Hunchun, and Suifênho on or near the Russian frontiers; Lungchingtsun in Kirin; Antung and Tatungkow on or near the Japanese (Corean) frontiers; and Harbin where Russian and Japanese interests meet, are all in the list of forty-seven revenue ports managed by the Inspector-General at Peking; but there are special arrangements with both Russia and Japan as to the nationality of the officials in charge, and other matters; besides which British interests are only remotely concerned in Manchurian regions except in so far as preferential freights and duties are on the *tapis*. Finally there is Momein or T'êng-yüeh (pp. 74, 101) which was opened in 1902 and achieved its humble "record" of 475,000 taels in 1913 with a customs revenue of 65,000 taels; but *de minimis non curat lex*: when the railway from Bhamo joins up with it, no doubt the world will discover its potentialities.

Then there are Kiang-tsz, Gnatong or Yatung (Darjiling), and Gartok (source of the Indus), which (Tibet being independent) the Foreign Customs has ceased to mention. Also Ta-chien-lu (Darchendo), the trade for 1913 in which place Mr. Assistant King (presumably from the Ch'êng-tu Consulate-General) surprises us by describing this very year (1916); as the Tibetans every now and again eject the Chinese, and as the Chinese soldiers themselves periodically sack the town in order to recover their pay, it must be a parlous spot for capitalists just now. Then there is Yün-nan Fu (the word *fu* now abolished), which was opened as a "voluntary" port in 1905; P'u-k'ou, opposite Nanking (pp. 164-5), sanctioned in 1915 because Nanking's shore port Hia-kwan is not convenient for transhipments; two high officers have been appointed to supervise the building arrange-

ments. Lung-k'ou on the north side of the Shan Tung promontory was made a subordinate office of the Chefoo customs in 1915: the Japanese for some years before the war had been making use of this place, and they made it a sort of land base in 1914 for taking the Germans in the rear. In 1905 the great marts of Chou-ts'un and Wei *hien* in Shan Tung were made subsidiary to the Tsi-nan customs when established (p. 170). Ch'ih-fêng in North Chih Li (well north of Jêhol) was declared a trading mart by mandate of January last (1916). In 1905 quite a number of "voluntary" places for trade were opened in different parts of Manchuria—to wit, Fêng-hwang, Liao-yang, Sin-min-t'un, T'iehling, T'ung-kiang-tsz, Fak'umên, K'wan-ch'êng-tsz (that is, Ch'ang-ch'un), Kirin, Ninguta, Sansing, Tsitsihar, etc. Kin *hien* (Kin-chou Fu) was "voluntarily" opened in February 1916, and Mukden would seem to be another voluntary mart.

In enumerating these odds and ends of "ports" over and above the orthodox 47, I must appeal for consideration in the matter of spelling. First there is the old-fashioned customary spelling; then there is Sir Thomas Wade's Pekingese (as modified by myself); then there is the irregular Chinese official Post-Office spelling; and finally the spelling adopted by the Foreign Customs. It is almost impossible so to decide in each case as to please everybody.

(47) Soochow has not often been included in the special trade reports issued by the Foreign Office, and is really a mere appendage of Shanghai. Still, in 1896 it acquired the dignity of being an "open port" on its own basis (see p. 116), and its separate trade under the Foreign Customs had in 1899 already reached 1,500,000 taels a year; for many years subsequent to that

it oscillated above and below 5,000,000 taels; but besides this there is the trade which pays the *likin* offices rather than the Foreign Customs, which cannot be "squared." Foreign influence is, however, more specially concerned there in developing spinning mills and silk filatures. The Shanghai-Nanking railway brings it within easy reach. There is a University, and there are a few foreigners in the Customs, Post-office, etc.

CHAPTER VIII

THE GOVERNMENT

AT first sight it might appear that, in describing the Government of China, we should begin with the Emperor, or at least, now that a Republic has been established, with the Central Administration at Peking. But as a matter of fact the Manchu power was a mere absorptive machine, whose very existence (as recent events have shown) was a matter of comparative unconcern to the provinces, each of which is even now sufficient unto itself; and exists, tries to exist, or can exist as an independent unit. Hence, just as, for the moment, we have in the first chapter eliminated Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria, etc., from the field, and have confined our preliminary geographical view of the Empire to the Eighteen Provinces, so do we for the present dismiss the President and his Ministry, as we formerly did the Emperor and his Court, from consideration, and limit our survey to what is really the living and active administration—to wit, the general constitution of China Proper, a confederation of more or less homogeneous provinces.

It will be noticed from the list given in the first chapter that nearly every one of these provinces has an ancient and purely territorial name, in addition to its present practical or descriptive appellation; this ancient or literary name is, notwithstanding political changes, still used in

official documents quite as often as the modern one. Thus the Canton Military Governor, who in effect replaces the former Viceroy, says: "Your despatch has reached Yüeh"; and the Shan Si Civil Governor, in discussing *likin*, in the usual terse literary style, talks of "Tsin li." It is just as though the modern French departmental prefects were to use the old provincial terms Gascony and Burgundy more freely than they do; or as though we English should, for elegant purposes, retain the official use of such words as Mercia and Wessex.

Now, subject to qualifications which will hereinafter be made, the main idea which runs throughout the republican provincial organisation is as follows: Each province has both a Military and a Civil Governor, who report on all formal matters to the Board at Peking, and of late have shown a tendency to "wire" their sentiments direct to the President: affairs on this point have not yet consolidated themselves. About 320 years ago pairs or triplets of provinces began to have a temporary Viceroy or Governor-General in addition to the governors; and when the Manchus came to consolidate their power, in 1640-50, such viceroys became permanent; until, after various re-shufflings, they settled down to a definite distribution, very much as they were until 1911. The original motive in appointing a viceroy was not unlike our idea in appointing Sir Bartle Frere or Sir Hercules Robinson as High Commissioner for South Africa; that is, military or other urgent considerations rendered it expedient for one strong man to deal with some wide question, involving more than one gubernatorial or divisional interest. But now one very radical change has taken place in China, and shows every sign of permanency; each province is free from the joint rule or part

superintendence of any other province. True, the precise relative duties of the Military Governor and Civil Governor are not yet permanently fixed, but at all events they do not "move" for each other's consent and signature any longer, and the Penlow-Jorkins farce that used to characterise the joint powers of the Viceroy and the Governor in Manchu times has entirely ceased. The rendering of both officials' titles has changed three or four times since the provinces "pronounced" in 1911, but now it seems definitely settled that *Tuh-kiin* (Army Director) and *Shêng-chang* (Province Senior) are most in accord with democratic needs. It is still "good form" to avoid using personal ("Christian") names; but the old appellations of "great man" (excellency), "old grandfather" (your honour), etc., have gone by the board, and now every man, from the President downwards, is plain *Sien-shêng*, or "Mister"; that is, "former born," or *Señor*. It happens occasionally that the Military Governor *acts* also for the Civil, or *vice versa*, and no special qualifications are (as yet) required for either; but no doubt, as the Republic "finds its helm," these matters will gradually be righted.

Those picturesque functionaries the Treasurer and the Judge, whose joint or several recommendations used to "move" the Viceroy and Governor (jointly or separately) to "act," still in a measure exist (after many shiftings) under the names of Finance Senior and Interior Affairs Senior; but they are both now in a more subordinate position, and moreover both take orders direct from the Peking Boards.

More or less successful attempts had been made by the Manchus since 1905 to separate the Executive from the Judicial powers, and these efforts have been continued under the Republic.

Thus we have three grades of Judges and Justices in each province, appointed by the Peking Ministry of Justice, and (as I understand it) in no way responsible to the Military or Civil Governor, or to their subordinates the Finance and Interior Elders or Seniors.

Nominally, at least, each of the "Eighteen Provinces" (that is, twenty-two) is equal to the others, but naturally a rich or important province still continues to be coveted by the avaricious or ambitious man. Yet there are a few further irregularities in detail which somewhat upset the perfect symmetry of this comparatively simple arrangement as a whole. In order to deal adequately with the Mongols, Tibetans, Turki, and other non-Chinese peoples, it has been found necessary to keep up certain military proconsulships on the basis of independent provinces. Thus the extramural part of Chih Li remains under the *tu-t'ung* of Jêhol, and the extramural part of Shan Si under the *tu-t'ung* of Kukukhoto, undemocratic titles included. Evidently it would not do to shock the Mongol princes, dukes, etc. (who still carry Manchu titles), by placing them under a mere *citoyen*. In the same way there are special arrangements for the Kokonor, Ili, Altai, and Tibetan frontiers, at all which places, however, it has been found possible to abolish the old Manchu titles in favour of more democratic appellations; still, when the Boards send circular orders to the provinces, the "scratch" governors of these more or less foreign-infected regions are treated quite on the basis of "real men."

As to Outer Mongolia, after declaring its independence under the Urga "Saint" and accepting Russian protection in a certain measure, it has come back to the Chinese fold under conditions regulated by treaty between Russia

and China ; the only unsettled question (as I write) is whether his Holiness should send members to the Chinese Parliament.

The ejected Manchus give no trouble at all. The princes and nobles enjoy their pensions and private estates under the liberal arrangements solemnly made by President Yüan Shī-k'ai in 1912, and no doubt he was wise in thus *purchasing* their innocuousness. A few able Manchus are still employed as high republican officials, but the bulk of the mixed Pekingese and the purer provincial garrison Manchus seem to have quietly "relapsed" into Chinese, just as Bosnians, Greeks, Serbians, Bulgarians, etc., with facility relapse into "Turks" when occasion required. The "wild" Manchus, Tungusic hunters, etc., remain as they were, and are probably unaware that any important change has taken place at all ; they are of no more political importance than our gipsies.

Now, each of these Eighteen Provinces is, as already suggested, a complete state in itself, whose corporate existence is in no way dependent upon any other state, except in so far that the poor ones dun the rich ones for the money which the Central Government still in theory "appropriates to them,"—when, indeed, it has even itself any money to work upon at all. Each province had its own army, navy, system of taxation, and its own social customs ; but, as regards the army and navy, things are still in a state of flux, though the tendency is, of course, to gather power as much as possible into central hands : so it is better not to attempt any closer definitions at present. The Salt Gabelle has been completely revolutionised and improved under the able direction of Sir Richard Dane, and this source of revenue is now almost as important as the Maritime Customs. Still, as regards

provincial "rights," it is too early to make any satisfying statement.

Many new taxes have been introduced, both under the Manchus and the Republic, since war indemnities and loans practically absorbed the whole "regular" revenues of China. This did not matter so much to Peking, for the existence or non-existence of a central bureaucracy was never essential to the corporate life of China; but the democratic "King's Government" in the provinces had to be carried on, and therefore innumerable new levies in the shape of wine, tobacco, and house duties; stamp, licence, and various other excise duties; transfer fees, gambling farms, and other "special" charges and monopolies have one after the other been introduced or developed by way of "raising the wind" for the sailing of the provincial barque.

Nor is the provincial government more essential to popular life than the central, from which it only differs in this—that it can get *at* the people directly. China can get on very well—so long as bandits do not disturb order—without any government at all; it is like a vast india-rubber ball, which immediately rights itself after each squeeze. Amid all this welter, one thing is now certain. Peking can no longer "sell" each province to the highest bidder or present it to the first favourite. Corruption seems to be as bad as ever; but at least the Chinese stew in their own juice, and are not dished up for the sole delectation of idle Manchus; moreover, the huge first charge on all provincial revenues for "Peking Contingent" no longer exists except in the moderated shape of pensions granted to the former ruling classes in consideration of their retiring from the empire trade, and this sum (if paid) is not "appropriated" from the provinces.

In justice to Peking, however, it must be con-

fessed that it does and has done much for justice, education, means of communication (railways, telegraphs, etc.), postal facilities, encouragement of industries, improvement of water-courses, some sanitary matters, and a thousand and one minor things in many instances totally ignored by the Manchus; in spite of the dismal tale of revolutions, China has marched, but she still remains the "free and easy" country she always was. There are no passports, no restraints on liberty, no frontiers, no caste prejudices, no food scruples, no finnikin sanitary measures, no moral laws except popular customs and criminal statutes. China is in many senses one vast republic, in which personal restraints have no existence;—in a word, Kipling's ideal place "east of Suez." The Manchus, as the ruling race, had certainly a few privileges, but, on the other hand, they suffered just as many disabilities. Barbers, play-actors, and policemen in Manchu times were under a mild tabu—more theoretical than real; but now the barber has partly disappeared with the pigtail; male play-actors are not given to the vices of Manchu fashion so much, whilst real women now act, and very often the modern policemen are quite exemplary individuals. On the other hand, aboriginal "barbarians" always could and still can easily become Chinese by reading books and putting on breeches—or "some veskits," as Artemus Ward used to say: in fact several of the most prominent Military Governors of the moment are by descent of the Shan or the Miao-tsz race. This being the happy-go-lucky condition of high office in China, there is (apart from accidental or special causes) no jealousy or class feeling in the country; it is simply a question of big fish feeding on little fish, unless and until the little fish can keep out of the way,

eat their way up, and become big fish themselves; and, so far, things under the Republic seem too much as they were under the Empire, private gain, as before, taking precedence of the public weal. The exceptions are rare.

Each provincial government being thus a state in itself, how does it go to work? It must be explained in answer to this question that the true official unit of Chinese corporate life is the *hien*, or "city district," and for 2,000 years past there have been some 1,300 of them; even allowing for the recent republican changes (shortly to be described), there cannot be much over 1,600. Each average province is divided into from 70 to over 100 *hien*, a term variously translated by Europeans "district," "department," "canton," or "prefecture." The half-barbarian province of Kwei Chou has only thirty-four; but then it has numerous "autochthonous" districts besides; that is to say, districts ruled by "barbarian" magistrates, usually hereditary, but responsible to the nearest genuine Chinese magistrate in serious matters. Chih Li has nearly 140; but this total includes the Peking and Mongol districts of the Jêhol commanderie. A *hien* is in area about the size of an English county, or a French department, with the same uncertainty or irregularity as to area and importance. It almost always consists, in purely Chinese tracts, of a walled city and an area of, say, 500 or 1,000 square miles round the town. Very often an enormous city of lower rank forms an appendage to a sleepy-old *hien*; until recently this was the case with Hankow: it has a parallel in England, when big new towns (as, for instance, Liverpool in relation to Walton) "belong" to mere village parishes, until they receive their own chartered "rights." Every Chinaman is described first of all as

belonging to a given *hien*; and so strong is the association that it follows him through life, if he gains distinction, much as the territorial surroundings of a Scotch or French magnate easily attach to his family name. Thus Li Hung-chang is often currently described as the "Hoh-fei statesman," because he hails from the *hien* of Hoh-fei; whilst his illustrious rival Chang Chī-tung is similarly called by newspaper men the "Nan-p'i viceroy," from a city of that name on the Grand Canal, south of Peking; so the President Yüan Shī-k'ai on the day of his death was spoken of as Hiang-ch'êng (his birthplace): it is like our "Thank ye, thank ye, Hawthornden."

The *hien* magistrate is still, under the Republic, the very heart and soul of all official life and emolument, his dignity and attributes, in large centres such as Canton or Chungking, not falling far short in many respects of those of the Lord Mayor of London. His comparatively low rank places him in easy touch with the people, whilst his position as the lowest of the *yu-sz*, or commissioned "executive," clothes him with a status which even a Military Governor must respect. He is so much identified with the soul of the State, that the Emperor or Government itself used to be elegantly styled *hien-kwan*, or "the district magistrate." He was before 1912 judge in the first instance in all matters whatsoever, civil or criminal, and also governor of the gaol, coroner, sheriff, mayor, head-surveyor, civil service examiner, tax-collector, registrar, lord-lieutenant, ædile, chief bailiff, interceder with the gods; and, in short, what the people always call him—"father and mother officer"; but the new republican organisation has shorn him of many of these attributes; indeed (as just said) in the last years of the Manchus the executive and legis-

lative functions were by way of being separated throughout the whole official body, whilst the new Gendarmerie Board at Peking has remodelled the police. The *hien* cuts a very different figure in a remote country district from that accepted by him in a provincial metropolis like Canton, where he is apt to be overshadowed by innumerable civil and military superiors; just as in London the Lord Mayor is outshone in a sense, even at his grand "spreads," by the Court and the Cabinet Ministers. In his own remote city the *hien* is autocratic and everybody, though possibly now the new local councils and provincial parliaments may be beginning to assert themselves. He had no technical training whatever in Manchu times, except in the Chinese equivalent for "Latin verse"; if he had obtained his post by purchase he had not even that. Now, under the Republic, there have been suggested, if not established, training schools for administration, based on the Japanese system of education, which even in the last Manchu years was seriously proposed as a general educational model for China.

The "value" of every *hien* in the empire is of course perfectly well known; but although there are bribery and corruption at Peking as well as in the provinces, the solid basis of government is not really bad, and from my experience of Chinese officials I should say that the majority of them are men no worse than American "bosses,"—that is, mere hacks or hirelings of a corrupt growth, with as much "conscience" as their system vouchsafes. Purchase of official rank, and even of office, has been sadly on the increase ever since China began to get into trouble with rebels and Europeans; even now, under the republic, though substantive office can no longer be bought, and the nine "button"—

ranks no longer exist, it is impossible to deny that jobbery is more in evidence than competency.

The serio-comic descriptions of office juggling I gave in the first editions of this work are amply borne out by the scathing denunciations of the "three good viceroys," who, after the "Boxer" war, drew up a thorough scheme of reform; the men who saved China were Liu K'un-yih, Chang Chī-tung, and Yüan Shī-k'ai. The tentative reforms of the last-named at Tientsin (1902-1907) really provided effective models for the whole of China.

Although the essence of provincial government thus consists in the *hien* and the four (now two) big men at the top of the tree, there are certain intermediaries who, in spite of recent drastic changes, cannot be ignored. Each group of two or more *hien* used to be under a *fu*, or city of the first class, and each province had from five to ten *fu*. I will not confuse the reader with too much definition. Suffice it to say that a *fu* city had no real existence of its own, but was always within the walls of one or more of its own *hien*. Thus Lü-chou Fu in An Hwei, which has under it five *hien*, was really the Hoh-fei *hien* city where Li Hung-chang was born. In a few cases, as for instance that of Kwang-chou Fu (Canton city), there were and are two head *hien* within one set of walls; but the warrants of each are limited in their run by an imaginary dividing line;—much to the comfort of local thieves. In one case, the enormous city of Su-chou Fu (Soochow), there were actually three head *hien*, i.e. three *prætoria* or *yamêns*¹ and three rulers, within one wall: but of course only the triple head of the one body was there: the *Hinterlands*, or territories subject to each one, spread out like three fans in different directions. It is

¹ "Yamên" (standard-gate) is now almost abolished in favour of *kung-shu* or "public office."

necessary to mention this in 1917, because nearly all existing maps, despite republican changes, exhibit cities graded under the now extinct system.

The duties of a *fu* (usually called a "prefect") were as unsolid and abstract as his territory. I have sat and talked with many a *fu*, but I never understood what they did (beyond rehearing as judges in the second instance), except act as a conduit-pipe for several *hien*; just as the archdeacon has been humorously defined as an ecclesiastical dignitary performing archidiaconal functions, so was the *fu* a territorial dignitary performing prefectural functions. All routine orders from above came to the *hien* through the *fu*, and conversely with the routine reports. The "head" *fu* and the "head" *hien*, when in one city with the highest provincial authorities, had to *melden gehorsamst*, or "report," every morning. In a few cases the *fu* had some special and real business, custom, salt, mercantile, or other, confided to him in addition to his nebulous supervisory functions. The notorious reformer K'ang Yu-wei pointed out to the luckless young Emperor in 1898 that *all* officials except the *hien* were useless excrescences, and ought to be abolished. No wonder the "profiteers" of the day hounded the man from Peking,—and thus indirectly the Emperor from his throne, and the dynasty from its "tripod." As a matter of fact the Republic *has* totally expunged all *fu* throughout the Dominion.

Above the *fu*, again, there was a still more modern and still more indefinite division and official called the *tao*, who had not even the loan of a walled town to live in; and there never was such a place as even a theoretical *tao* city. Like the *fu*, he was, and at this moment perhaps still is, a conduit; but a much busier man, always

provided with special duties; for instance at nearly all the treaty-ports the *tao* or *taotai* (with whom a consul ranks by treaty) manages foreign affairs. His *yamên* (now *kung-shu*) may be within the walls of a city or anywhere else. There were several grades of *tao*: there was the simple "circuit intendant"; then there was the "intendant having a say in military matters," the "customs intendant," and so on. Besides these executive *tao*, there were also others in charge of grain transport and salt gabelle; but these formed no part of the regular administration. However, the Republic began by abolishing all *tao* (except those required under foreign treaty); then it reintroduced them under the literary name of *kwan-ch'ah*; then it changed the name to *tao-yin*; and now, as I write, I witness the extraordinary spectacle of a *tao-yin* officially reporting that he (and all his kind) is a useless humbug, and ought to be abolished: under these circumstances I fail to see what honest President Li can do but knock the hydra on the head once for all. I do not touch upon the assistant administrative officials, outdoor and indoor, attached to each district. Like the Japanese artist who, with a few dashes of his brush, leaves a general impression of landscape to be gathered from a few daubs, so do I, in my imperfect way, select a few leading features in order to convey to non-specialist readers a picture which their minds may rapidly take in without undue fatigue. The provincial administration system of China is still in a state of flux, doubt, and restless, not to say meddlesome change, and it would be unsafe to count upon permanency any farther than as above.

TABLE, WITH RECENT CHANGES IN BRACKETS, TO ILLUSTRATE THE SYSTEM OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT UP TO 1911

Qualification of Town	Meaning of Term	Area of territory represented in square miles	Title of Chief Ruler	Meaning	Remarks
King	Capitol	100,000 to 1,500,000	Fu-yin (now Chao-yin)	Governor of the Fu (now Capitol)	Mukden (Shêng-king), Peking, and Nanking the only three (now practically only Peking). All <i>keng</i> and all <i>shêng</i> were necessarily <i>fu</i> also.
Fu ¹	"Cathedral" town	5,000 to 20,000	Chi-fu	Knows the Fu	One for each Province (now, besides a Military Governor).
Shêng ²	Capital	40,000 to 300,000	Sün-fu (now Shêng-chang)	Circuit Soother (Capital Senior)	Practically means "county" and "county town"; in fact, the magistrate is often called a " <i>hien</i> count."
Hien	Municipium	500 to 1,500	Chi-huen (now Chi-shi)	Knows the Hien (Knows the affairs)	This, when dependent on a <i>fu</i> , was practically a <i>hien</i> .
Chou ³	Municipium	500 to 1,500	Chi-chou	Knows the Chou	Thus, when independent, was practically a <i>fu</i> over <i>hens</i> .
Chi-h-i Chou ³	"Abbey" town	5,000 to 20,000	Chi-h-i Chou, chi Chi-chou	Knows the Chou, being independent Chou	In many respects the two last remarks might have been equally applied to dependent and independent <i>t'ing</i> .
T'ing ³	Borough	500 to 10,000	T'ung-chi	Associate Knower	
Chên	Entrepôt	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p>1 to 5 not cadastral</p> </div> <div style="width: 45%;"> <p>1 to 5 not cadastral</p> </div> </div>	Uncertain; one of the sub-magistrates, or sometimes a more <i>tu-pao</i> or "head-man." (No information as to changes under the Republic.)	All these officials were subordinate in some way to a <i>hien</i> , <i>chou</i> , or <i>t'ing</i> . (And now, of course, to the <i>hien</i> alone.)	There are many other popular appellations for towns and villages, such as <i>p'u</i> , "shop"; <i>ya</i> , "a col"; <i>miao</i> , "a temple"; <i>an</i> , "a nursery"; <i>t'an</i> , "a rapid"; <i>t'ang</i> , "a pool"; <i>tsen</i> , "an inn"; <i>ch'ang</i> , "a fair"; <i>hai</i> , "a market"; <i>wan</i> , "a bend"; <i>sz</i> , "a township, and so on; but none of them have any official status. (It is like our "Ball's Pond," "Cabbage Hall," "Potter's Bar," and so on.)
Ch'êng	Walled town				
T'un	Country town				
Chwang	Country town				
Ts'un	Country town				
Li	Village				

¹ Now, with all details, abolished.

² *Shêng* means "province" as well as "provincial capital."

³ *N. B.*—All *fu*, *chou*, and *t'ing* are now *hien* pure and simple.

CHAPTER IX

POPULATION

IN ancient times the population of China must have been very great, for even 2,000 years ago it was stated that the "whole of the nomads put together scarcely number as many as the population under a Chinese township area." Of course this loose way of illustrating the chances of success in a warlike expedition against the Hiung-nu must not be taken too strictly. Other positive statements scattered about the history books would probably between them rectify the sentence above quoted so as to mean : "the quarter of a million of soldiers which the western part of Siberia and High Asia can raise against us would not exceed the adult male population of one of our provincial county divisions." The fact, moreover, that the revenue collected in silk stuffs alone amounted at times to 5,000,000 pieces, and apparently in one year ;—collected, too, from the north only, or half the area of modern China,—points to a settled population of at least 20,000,000. The Manchu Annals for 1908 give us an account of the census as it has existed since the Chou dynasty—the millennium before our era ; and Dr. Lionel Giles of the British Museum was able only last year (1915) to unearth from the Stein documents precise details of how the census was worked at Tun-hwang 1,500 years ago. If we were to search

diligently all the early histories, we might find even more precise indications, such as those which it has been possible for historians to give during our "Middle Ages"; but the purpose of this book will be sufficiently served if we dismiss from consideration the whole period when China was divided into two or more rival dynasties, largely foreign, and begin with the native Sui rulers, who had in A.D. 600 completely unified the empire. A few years after this date (609) the population is specifically stated to have numbered 8,700,000 households, in 1,255 *hien* districts. In 652, after the fearful wars of succession and the destructive expeditions against Turks, Coreans, etc., the number of households had gone down to 3,800,000. In 654 a biennial census was ordained. The conquest of South-west Corea in 660 brought 760,000 households with it. Probably the third or South-eastern Korean peninsular state contained as many. By the conquest of North Corea in 668 China gained 170 *hien* districts containing 697,000 households; and these figures, compared with those for 609, give us a fair relative idea of each country's population. Then followed a period of recuperation, and the following official figures enable us to fix approximately the average number of "mouths" in a household:—

Year.	Households	Mouths.
733 : : :	7,861,236	45,431,263
755 : : :	9,619,254	52,880,488

Another piece of information makes it plain that not more than one person in each household could have been taxed, that some households were not taxed at all, and that only one-seventh part of the persons not ranked as

householders paid taxes; for, out of the above figures for 755, only 5,301,044 householders and 7,662,800 non-householders paid scot. Dr. Lionel Giles adduces statistics gathered from the 5,000-volume encyclopædia showing how this ratio was computed at various dates.—But, to continue our own estimates, in 807, after bloody wars with the Shans and Tibetans, 1,453 *hien* only contained 2,440,254 households, and even of this number but 1,440,000 in eight provinces (*tao*) had been counted; the rest for fifteen other provinces had been merely estimated. There can be no mistake about these figures, for it is added, “and out of this reduced population, only one quarter that of the reign period 742-756, we have 830,000 paid troops!” In the years 820 and 821 the number of “households and tents” is twice given as below 2,400,000, and the number of mouths as below 16,000,000; but in one of the two cases it is stated “this excludes (modern) Sz Ch’wan, Kwei Chou, the Two Kwang, and Annam (then Chinese)”; and in the other, “this excludes military provinces.” Finally (apparently after reconquests), we are told a few years later that “out of 3,350,000 households we are employing 990,000 soldiers; out of a total revenue of 35,000,000 (? silver ounces or taels), one third goes to the Emperor, and two-thirds are local.”

During the Turkish interregnums, or the Five Dynasty Period (907-60), which came between the fall of the T’ang and rise of the Sung dynasty, when China was really split up into a dozen petty states, there are naturally no records of population worth noticing. But I have come across the following during the eleventh century, when China, though unified, nevertheless was on the Great Wall line still under Tartar rule (pp. 33-4 and 128-133):—

Year	Households	Mouths
1014 . . .	9,055,729	21,976,965
1088 . . .	18,289,385	32,163,017
1097 . . .	19,435,570	33,401,606

The two last years, however, subdivide the householders into two classes, and use the word "adult man" (*ting*) instead of the word "mouth." A close, special study is necessary to discover exactly what this means, and Dr. Lionel Giles has made some points here too. I was inclined to think "mouth" here meant "man or woman, but not child," and *ting* meant "male capable of doing *corvée* or bearing arms." The figures for 1088 and 1097 are thus subdivided:—

Qualification	Householders	Adults
Superior. . .	12,134,733	28,533,934
Guest . . .	6,154,652	3,629,083
Lord . . .	13,068,741	30,344,274
Guest . . .	6,366,829	3,067,332

The probable meaning of this is that most Chinese freeman units furnished at least a father and one (or two) sons out of each household; but that villeins, or "copyholders" with precarious tenancy, only furnished occasional men for the wars—never more than one for each two villein households—and were practically serfs. This supposition is strengthened by the fact that the T'ang dynasty (600–900) is known to have emancipated large numbers of Government *adscriptitii*, who had, during centuries of war, sought protection under great lords; but private families continued to keep them, and the T'ang Government ceased to emancipate privately-owned serfs against their masters'

will. It was, however, the policy of the Sung dynasty (900-1200) to reduce the number of slaves in the households of the rich. It must also be borne in mind that the Kitans ruled over parts of modern Chih Li and Shan Si, and that the Sung dynasty positively declined from the beginning to have any political truck with either Yün Nan or Annam.

The Nüchêns (earlier Manchus) turned out the Kitans from North China, and, besides governing all their territory between Corea and the desert, pushed their way into real China much farther than the Kitans had done. In fact, the whole of "Old China" was in their hands—that is, the whole valley or valleys of the Yellow River enclosed between longitude 108° E. and latitude 33° N. Their official figures for three years are :—

Year.	Households.	Mouths.
1183 . . .	615,624	6,158,636
1190 . . .	6,939,000	45,447,900
1195 . . .	7,223,400	48,490,000

The figures for 1183 only include the military organisation under the Tartar *mingans* or chiliarchs, and may perhaps also serve to show what the Kitan "banner" population had been: one quarter of the mouths were slaves. It is stated that the equivalent of 26,000,000 English acres were cultivated, *i.e.* between four and five acres for each "mouth." The last-recorded number of (modern) Manchu households was in 1734, when there were 26,500,000 for all China, cultivating about 150,000,000 acres; so that the proportion in 1183 is relatively quite different, unless the word "mouth" is irregularly used. If we deduct the *mingan* population from the figures of 1190-5, we

get about 6,500,000 householders, consisting of 40,000,000 mouths, taken by the Tartars from the native Chinese Sung Empire. We have seen what the Sung population was a century earlier. If it had not increased, there would still have been 13,000,000 householders left in the southern empire, and probably (in view of incessant warring) this figure really does approximately represent the number for South China, as to which, however, there are no statistics at present available to me.

The Nüchêns were in turn driven out by the Mongols, whose first census in 1235 showed 873,781 households, with a total of 4,754,975 mouths. Over 200,000 households were added to the next census in 1252. From 1261 to 1274 there is steady progression, year by year, from 1,418,490 to 1,967,896 households; but of course these totals only include "Old China," two-thirds of whose population had either emigrated or been destroyed. In 1275 the number of households is given at 4,764,077, but it is not clear what conquered parts this total includes. The later conquests of 1275-6 are carefully recorded, together with the number of households and mouths obtained by official inquiries in each province. These conquests practically amount to the same thing as the additions to "Old China" made or consolidated by the conquering Han dynasty 1,400 years earlier, and include Hu Peh, Hu Nan, Kiang Si, Chên Kiang, and Kiang Su, with a grand total of 7,288,331 households of 14,653,820 mouths, *i.e.* if we add up each specified minor total. But if we lump specified with unspecified totals, as the Mongol historian does, we obtain, as he gives us, 9,370,472 households of 19,721,015 mouths, settled in 773 conquered *hien* districts. This agrees roughly with a casual statement

made in another chapter: "In that year (1276) we obtained ten million households from the obliterated Sung house." This Sung dynasty is none other than Marco Polo's Manji, or Manzi, this word being, as already explained in part (p. 157), the modern Chinese *man-tsz* or "southern ruffians," just as the Mongols are *ta-tsz*, or *sao-ta-tsz*, "frowsy Tartars" (p. 35). Marco Polo says there were 1,200 towns in all Manji, and 1,600,000 houses in Kinsai alone (Hangchow). As Hangchow was only the capital of one of the "Two Chêh," the conquest of which brought in 2,983,672 households, the 1,600,000 applied to the "West Chêh [Kiang]" alone would be a fair proportion: "East Chêh [Kiang]" then included Shanghai and the coast parts down to Wênchow.

The Sung history says that in 1264 that dynasty still possessed 5,696,989 households of 13,206,532 mouths, and that in 1276 the Emperor formally "handed them over" to General Bayen. In 1278 the conquest of Chang-chou (Zaitun, p. 74) and the surrounding parts brought in about another million households. An idea of the fearful slaughters which took place in those times may be gained from the statement in 1282 that Sz Ch'wan was found to contain only about 120,000 households. This is accentuated in 1285, when we are told that "Sz Ch'wan and the Kwang Tung coast districts are but sparsely populated." In 1293 the number of households is put down at 10,402,760, without any further explanation: possibly the disastrous wars against Japan, Annam, and Java may have stopped further increase. In 1294 the conquests and annexations on the Burmo-Tibetan frontier added 900,000 households to this figure. In Kublai's time 5,000,000 cwt. of rice used to be annually sent to Peking. On the whole it seems that during the 1,500

years' interval between the "First Empire" and that of Kublai, in spite of ups and downs, the population had remained stationary: it began and ended with about 50,000,000 souls.

In 1391 the purely Chinese Ming dynasty, which for the first time in 600 years held the Eighteen Provinces under one sway, free except for incursions on the Great Wall line from Tartar complications, counted its population at 10,684,435 households, of 56,774,561 adults. In 1393 there were 16,052,860 households of 60,545,812 mouths. The increase of mouths over adults is not hard to account for; but, unless we assume a new or the recrudescence of an old habit of living apart from the paternal roof, it is difficult to explain the sudden upward movement of households. This year the equivalents of 140,000,000 acres were cultivated, and it is distinctly stated that "most of the land in the empire is now under tillage." In 1491 the population went down to 9,113,446 households of 53,281,158 mouths; and in 1578 it figured at 10,621,436 households of 60,692,856 mouths. The explanation is given that (apparently in order to escape excessive taxation) "a habit had grown up of seeking the protection of rich persons, of living in boats, and of pretending to be workmen or traders."

The Manchu Government, which issued (incomplete) revenue returns from the very first year of its existence (1644), was not ready at all until 1651 with its population and land-tax statistics. At the end of that year there were 10,633,326 households. We may assume that the conquest of the Eighteen Provinces was practically complete in 1657, up to which date the number of householders had increased by one or two million each year, until they reached over 18,500,000. Various wars and disasters kept the

figures steady up to 1708, when for the first time an excess over 21,000,000 was recorded. The financial condition of China was then so prosperous that the Emperor, in the fulness of his heart, took to remitting the whole land-tax from time to time, each province taking its benefit in turn. The total cultivation had reached about 110,000,000 acres¹; that is, counting bad and good land together, land-tax upon the total area (possibly 150,000,000 or 200,000,000 acres) upon which it was due from 24,600,000 householders, was gathered in *calculated* at the rate of so much an acre of good land. The Emperor determined that the sum thus derived (not quite 30,000,000 taels, or ounces of silver) was a sufficient charge upon the land; arguing that, no matter how the population might increase in the future, the same land, now for most practical purposes all of it cultivated, would in the same future have to feed two, three, or even ten persons, instead of the one as now; which meant that the struggle for life would be greater, and each individual's power to pay taxes would therefore proportionably decrease. Accordingly, from the year 1713 the returns of "adults and mouths" was accompanied by a subsidiary return of "free ones." By 1734, the last year for which returns are published under this system, the "free ones" had increased to 937,530, whilst the other two categories remained pretty much as they were in 1712.

The words "adults and mouths" so vaguely used together now, as they were used separately under previous dynasties, must have meant in combination "tax-paying households"; for, on his accession in 1735, the practical Emperor K'ien-lung set about devising a more intelligent

¹ English.

system. He said: "What is the good of recording taxable units which never increase, and free units which pay no revenue? I want to know how many human beings there are." Consequently from 1741 to 1851 we have year by year a steadily mounting return of souls, beginning with 143,411,559, and ending with the maximum of 432,164,047. If attention be paid to the methods by which I have endeavoured to extract principles and conclusions from the above defective evidence, it will be seen that the population of China cannot at any time have much exceeded 100,000,000 souls until the beginning of the eighteenth century. By the year 1762 it had overtopped 200,000,000; and so on, doubling itself every century; so that we are probably right in concluding that it only reached 50,000,000 in 1644 when the Manchus took over the power; that is, it much more than doubled itself during the century 1650-1750, despite all wars and tribulations.

During the first years of the great Taiping rebellion (1856-60), the registered population declined by two-fifths; but, though many millions must have perished, it is not at all likely that the numbers of 1851 were more than literally decimated.¹ Even then, to kill or starve 43,000,000 people in ten years, would mean 12,000 a day, in addition to the 40,000 a

¹ In a pamphlet entitled *Population and Revenue of China*, reprinted from *Ota Mersiana*, 1899; and in a paper published in the *Royal Statistical Society's Journal* for March in that same year, I gave further specific evidence bearing upon statistics, and also discussed the question how far the Taiping rebellion of fifty years ago affected the population. I need not repeat all the arguments here. The same pamphlet gives statistics from Russian sources (Sacharoff) showing what the population of each province was in 1894. But these statistics, which I first critically examined by the light of famines and other disasters, were in their turn all obtained from the Chinese official tables. I notice that Dr. Lionel Giles has recourse to Sacharoff too.

day who (at the rate of 30 per thousand per annum) would die naturally, and would balance about the same number of births. Moreover, the rebellion only covered one-half of the total area of China, so that 24,000 a day is certainly more likely than 12,000: in other words the death-rate was nearly doubled; and in any case, from first to last, there never has been any direct evidence as to what the population of China is or has been except the Chinese official statements. I have now shown that these hang fairly well together, in spite of all defects both in quality and in quantity. We may accept them or reject them; but it is unreasonable to accept only so much as may fit in with our own preconceived notions, and reject all the rest. The mere opinions of Europeans are therefore worthless, so far as they conflict with specific evidence. The United States Minister to China, Mr. W. W. Rockhill, in 1905 and 1911 published his calculations, based on official Chinese estimates, the originals of which, for 1910, I possess; and many other less distinguished foreigners have aired their views; but, just before the fall of the Empire, the Canton viceroy frankly informed the Emperor that, so far as *his* province was concerned, the census was a hollow sham—as probably with all the provinces.

I give here a table in two columns showing the population of each province in 1842 and 1894—that is, before the Taiping rebellion, and since China has recuperated her forces. For convenience' sake I ignore fractions over or under 100,000 as being unessential to the main question. It is notorious that Chêh Kiang, Ho Nan, Kiang Su, and Kiang Si suffered most by the Taiping revolution, so that we need not marvel at their comparative backwardness. Shan Si was reduced by a terrible famine in 1877-8. Kan

Suh and part of Shen Si were ruined by the Mahometan rebellion of 1860-75. Sz Ch'wan calls for special remark: we have seen that in Kublai Khan's time it had already been once depopulated, whereas all visitors to the celebrated Ch'êng-tu plain certify to its being at the present moment one of the richest and most populous spots in China, and this plain alone (the only large plain in the province) must cover an area of 3,000 square miles.

Name of Province.	1842	1894
An Hwei	36,600,000	35,800,000
Chêh Kiang	30,400,000	11,800,000
Chih Li	36,900,000	29,400,000
Fuh Kien	25,800,000	25,200,000
Ho Nan	29,100,000	21,000,000
Hu Nan	20,000,000	22,000,000
Hu Pêh	28,600,000	34,300,000
Kan Suh	19,500,000	9,800,000
Kiang Si	26,500,000	22,000,000
Kiang Su	39,600,000	24,600,000
Kwang Si	8,100,000	8,600,000
Kwang Tung	21,100,000	29,900,000
Kwei Chou	5,700,000	4,800,000
Shan Si	17,100,000	11,100,000
Shan Tung	36,200,000	37,400,000
Shen Si	10,300,000	8,400,000
Sz Ch'wan	22,300,000	79,500,000
Yün Nan	5,800,000	6,200,000
Rough totals	419,600,000	421,800,000

During the rebellions which ushered in the Manchus 250 years ago, the depopulation was again so complete as to be nearly absolute. When wandering over the province for thousands of miles in 1881, I came across innumerable "traditional proofs" of this fact. Every villager in the province speaks of it as we in England speak of the Great Plague of 1665 (except that his historical memory is the better trained). Another specific proof is that when, in 1712, the land-tax was made unchangeable for ever, Sz Ch'wan had (with the exception of

the four half-foreign and pauper provinces, Kan Suh, Yün Nan, Kwei Chou, and Kwang Si) the lowest land-tax of all—under 700,000 taels, against an average of 1,700,000 for the other provinces. At the rate of proportionate taxation per household, this would give 700,000 households, or about 4,000,000 souls, instead of the 80,000,000 now supposed to be there.

Apart from the fact that Sz Ch'wan has enjoyed comparative peace for two centuries, there was an enormous immigration at the time of the Taiping rebellion, and from all sides; so that probably some of the losses in the registered population of other provinces reappear amongst the gain in the officially registered population of Sz Ch'wan. I found, when there, that a stream of immigrants from Hu Kwang (*i.e.* Hu Nan and Hu Peh) and Kiang Si had long been and still was steadily pouring in: I came across but one village where the original population had remained unchanged. As neither Hu Kwang nor Kiang Si has apparently suffered any great drain of population, it seems likely that the desolated provinces still farther east have during troublous times sent streams of refugees into them, which streams have either remained there, or have themselves moved through, or have pushed on before them the original population. Still, all allowances made, it is exceedingly difficult to believe that there are now 80,000,000 people in a mountainous province, the western, north-western, and south-western parts of which are still but very thinly populated by semi-independent tribes. Yet there is other and indirect evidence in favour of some really great increase in population. Whilst in other provinces no attempt has ever been made to surcharge the land-tax (except in the way of ordinary peculation), in Sz Ch'wan for many

years past one "fine" and one "benevolence" have been annually levied on owners in proportion to their land-tax: in other words, the official land-tax in imperial times was, and probably still is quadrupled; for these two items, levied only on the richer districts, amount to considerably over 3,000,000 taels a year. There is yet another indirect piece of evidence. Sz Ch'wan is notorious for the fewness of its civilian officials (all of whom, under the universal rule up to 1912, had to serve in other provinces): in other words, it was the one province in the Empire where it paid well-to-do persons better to stay at home than to "trade" abroad as mandarins; and that trade, as we all know, is still one of the most lucrative in China, and the one patronised by the most highly-educated persons, as, for instance, in the great opium smuggling "operation" carried out in 1916 by members of Parliament and a cabinet minister. As a further illustration, by exception to what I state as the rule, I may take the case 20-years ago of the General Pao Ch'ao, one of the very rare instances of a Sz Ch'wan military mandarin of capacity. After all his brave services, it was found on his death that he had been grossly corrupt, and had made his fortune in a most dishonourable way. However, the Viceroy Liu Ping-chang (himself a corrupt scoundrel, whose disgrace was subsequently insisted on by Great Britain) managed to arrange things so that the Emperor did not compel General Pao's heirs to disgorge.

It has been the practice during very recent years for British and other foreign officials reporting on Sz Ch'wan trade to reduce this 80,000,000 to 45 or 50-60 millions—apparently *mero motu*, because the total is so staggering; there is, however, no trustworthy evidence one way or the other, and we may as well follow the Board.

CHAPTER X

REVENUE

IN an outline work like this it would be unprofitable to enter retrospectively into the whole history of Chinese finance. In the chapter on "Early Trade Notions" I have made a few remarks bearing upon the subject of very early trade and taxes. The chief authority for these observations is the first standard history, by Sz-ma Ts'ien, who devotes a special chapter to the Budget; and all subsequent dynastic histories have, in imitation or continuation of this arrangement, consecrated one or more volumes to "Eatables and Goods," which expression practically means "Finance and Trade"; for the radical idea at the bottom of Chinese financial methods is "feeding the people, and feeding on the people": in accordance with this notion all salaries were once calculated in hundredweights of rice. Just as Anglo-Indians now say "he is a 6,000-rupec man" (a month), so did the Chinese once say "he is a 2,000-cwt. man" (a year).

The root of all legitimate taxation has always been a tithe or proportion, in money, kind, or both, of the land's cultivated produce. The Salt Gabelle (formerly associated with iron licences) has, dynasty by dynasty, taken but a second place in importance. Inland and Foreign Customs always held a subordinate and irregular position until our own days, being viewed rather in the light of the Emperor's personal *fiscus*,

for the Court and favourites, than of the State's exchequer; and in any case they are apparently not more than 1,200 years old, even in their infant stage (pp. 52, 55). How the different dynasties rang the changes, sometimes capriciously, upon these three main items of revenue is a matter of antiquarian rather than of practical interest: the cash was got in.

We must do the best a short span of life enables us to do, and endeavour to get a good hold of the outlines or principles of Chinese history before we devote our best energies to the elaboration of special details. With these reserves, therefore, I refer to what I have already said in earlier chapters, and dismiss the whole subject of practical finance previous to the Manchu dynasty, confining myself to a glance at matters as we find them, say, between 1715 and 1915. Up to 1734 the Board of Revenue's annual budget consisted, on the debit side, of a statement accounting for receipts of:—

1. Land-tax in ounces of silver.
2. Grain-tax in hundredweights of cereals.
3. Straw, grass, etc., in bundles.
4. Salt produced in "drafts" (quarters) for retailing.
5. Salt dues on above in taels ($\frac{1}{2}$ tael per draft).
6. Tea in "drafts" (quarters), apparently for export.
7. Copper cash coined from Government copper.

At the beginning of the dynasty the total revenue receipts in money or bullion were under 15,000,000 taels, and in 1656 under 20,000,000. At the same time, the Emperor has left it on record that he was well aware enormous fortunes were made out of the provinces by his conquering generals. In spite of expensive wars, remissions

of taxes, and imperial visits or costly tours of inspection, the average expenditure was so much below average receipts that for over half a century (1740-90) there was a balance of 60,000,000 or 70,000,000 taels always in hand. It must also be remembered that the international gold value of the silver tael was then nearer eight shillings than the present average of three shillings, and its local purchasing power was also much greater than at present. If we regard one tael as equivalent in local power to one pound with ourselves, we shall not be far wrong. During this halcyon period, the eighteenth century, the regular receipts may be roughly put down at 40,000,000, and the regular expenditure at 30,000,000 taels; the accumulated balance was only occasionally drawn upon when the annual surpluses were unequal to special demands; but these annual surpluses usually covered the exceptional expenses, just as the "free resources" of Russia under M. de Witte were always at hand (in theory at least) to defray unlooked-for charges. But every now and then, under special stress, the sale of titles or office was temporarily resorted to, in order to ease the money market. The following is a specimen of a genuine pre-Taiping budget in taels:—

<i>Receipts</i>	
Reformed land-tax	29,410,000
Profits on salt	5,745,000
Customs [very little foreign]	5,415,000
Sale of office	3,000,000
Tea, fish, rushes, mining	322,000
Transfer fees	190,000
Octroi and miscellaneous	858,000
	<hr/>
	44,940,000
Less sale of office (exceptional)	3,000,000
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Total ordinary cash receipts (taels)	41,940,000
Hundredweights of grain received (value from Tl. 1 to Tls. 2)	4,841,000
	<hr/>
Total receipts	46,781,000

All the above revenue seems to have gone either actually to Peking, or (indirectly thither) as pay to the central and provincial armies ; or to officials ; or to services connected with Peking and its armies, such as posts, grain-boats, or mints ; or to administrations of other matters associated with the Peking interests, such as repairs to the Canal, to the Peking rivers, the Hwai dykes, or the Yellow River.

Now let us take the corresponding credit side. Out of a total expenditure of 31,000,000 taels, only one two-hundredth part goes in any way directly to the public, and even this trivial sum of 140,000 taels for “ educational establishments ” probably refers to Peking official colleges, or Manchu schools.

The following is a condensed specimen, then, of a genuine pre-Taiping expenditure sheet :—

Army and army interests	.	.	.	19,599,100
Salaries, allowances	.	.	.	4,554,700
Yellow River	.	.	.	3,800,000
Posts and boats	.	.	.	2,120,000
Palaces, princes, eunuchs, etc.	.	.	.	1,309,000
				<hr/>
				31,382,800
Education	.	.	.	140,000
				<hr/>
				Taels 31,522,800

As the number of soldiers included in the above pay total is 800,000, I presume that the 100,000 or so of bannermen at Peking would absorb between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 taels, whilst the 100,000 bannermen in the provinces, *plus* the 600,000 Chinese provincial troops, would require from 16,000,000 to 17,000,000 taels.

The working revenue or expenditure of the provinces, which of course was never reported in detail, and never appeared even locally on paper in the shape of a budget, was in real fact

somewhat as follows :—about 1,500 *hien* rulers would have to net on the average at least 10,000 taels a year, over and above all allowances, in order to make their own fortunes and those of their superiors. The “allowances and salaries” issued by the Emperor were really held back as security, and very often quietly peculated, by the *hien*’s superiors. These *hien* would also have to spend on the average at least another 10,000 taels a year in order to entertain passing officials of rank, pay the cost of their own maintenance (including police), the salaries of secretaries, etc. Of course some *hien* secretaries would have their tens of thousands, whilst others would only have their hundreds of taels ; I only speak of averages. The various customs monopolists would also require 5,000,000 taels a year for their own fortunes, and to defray the cost of presents to the fisc at Peking ; scarcely any of the customs receipts went to the *ærarium*, whether local or central. In other words, the 45 or 46,000,000 of official revenue must be at least doubled if we are to get even approximately at the first instalment only of what was really extracted as actual working revenue from the popular bed-rock in a regular way. And all this, again, is quite apart from the irregular tyranny, bribery, peculation, and extortion by special inquisitors, military men, etc. ; and apart from the rapacity of tax-collectors, police, and so on. Anything done for the public good, such as road-making, bridge-repairing, sanitation, charitable establishments, municipal police, local schools, feasts, theatricals, lighting, police—in fact everything except what concerns the Emperor and his service—was, and is (subject, however, to a few wholesome reforms introduced since the “Boxer” smash of 1900), defrayed by local subscriptions or popular rates, municipally or rurally imposed, over and above

the State and official taxes levied directly or indirectly, as above described, in the name of the central or local government.

Having now taken a retrospective glance at the principles upon which revenues have been collected and spent in the immediate past, let us endeavour to gain an insight into the working of a contemporary budget as it was up to the date of post-Boxer reforms :—Towards the end of each year the Board of Revenue, like a distant embodiment of Themis, looks round upon provincial mankind, takes up its files, and sees that the following items of expenditure, in which the Central Government has an immediate interest, are good, and must be defrayed :—

	Taels.
1. Pay and salaries at Peking	8,000,000
2. Palace needs	1,400,000
3. Russian and French frontier armies	5,000,000
4. Yang-tsze defence armies	3,000,000
5. Navies	1,000,000
6. Provincial armies	20,000,000
7. Yellow River	1,500,000
8. Getting grain to Peking	1,700,000
Railways	—
Arsenals	—
Foreign loans (repaid)	—
New-fangled notions	—
Total Taels	41,600,000

It will at once be seen that, even in the good old times of comparative solvency previous to the Japanese war of 1894, the expenditure on armies, navies, and things connected with them had risen within a century from 19,000,000 to 38,000,000 taels; but after 1898, again, both the central and the provincial armies were improved at great expense, and in spite of disbandings and retrenchments in 1900 probably cost much more than 40,000,000. Hence it then became urgently necessary at once to re-

duce the 20,000,000 taels wasted upon utterly useless provincial troops; hence, again, discontent and disloyalty; but none the less reforms took place at the persistent urging of the "three good viceroys" (p. 187). The Palace needs ceased to increase. The Yellow River cost less than it did; not because its condition was better, but because times were worse, and the people must therefore suffer in the shape of extra floods and diminished public works; in 1898 Li Hung-chang himself was set to work to effect a genuine amelioration on the spot if he could. When China was building her own railways in a modest way, and at snail-like pace, the provinces had to send up between them about 500,000 taels a year for that purpose; but when, in 1886, the new Admiralty was established in consequence of the shock caused by the French war, the railway fund was partly diverted to (the elder) Prince Ch'un, the Emperor Kwang-sü's father, as Lord High Admiral. Again, when the Japanese destroyed the fleets, and Prince Ch'un was dead, portions of both funds were devoted to "pressing needs"—in this case to "building a new palace for the Dowager-Empress"; and in 1900 a beginning was being made with a new navy, whilst railways gradually got involved with foreign loans and syndicates. Arsenals had an up-and-down perfunctory and wasteful life too in their haste to complete military preparations. Finally, foreign loans, old and new, the repayment of which, and of interest thereon, in 1900 absorbed about 25,000,000 taels a year, were entirely a new charge on the revenue. New activities included concessions, speculations, mills, steamer companies, mints, foreign copper for modern coins, mines, telegraphs, telephones, electricity, etc., some of which soon began to pay, and some of which were worked at a loss; in a

few cases the central or a provincial government found itself financially involved in one or more of these, as for instance in the Shanghai-Ningpo railway and the K'ai-Lan coal industry (p. 168). In their heart of hearts the Chinese, or at least those "in" with the Manchu Government, would have liked to pitch the whole lot into the sea, and go back to happy old times. And (here I repeat in 1916 with emphasis the exact words I used in 1900) I am not sure that they are not right; "progress" does not seem to conduce to content at all; and, personally, I think there is much to be said for the life of a so-called "barbarian."

It will be seen at a glance that, bad though things were before the Japanese war of 1894-5, matters were infinitely worse in 1900 after the Germans in 1897 had set the pace for "grab." The Board had to see that 60,000,000 or 70,000,000 taels were found annually for expenses, instead of the 40,000,000 of the happy old *dolce far niente* days: this meant a corresponding diminution in the "free resources" which used ultimately to find a way into various private pockets. It may well be imagined that the result was infinitely more serious when the "Boxer" affair came to be written off, in 1901, with its damage to foreign investments, compensation for foreign expenditures, and so on. Poor old Li Hung-chang's desperate bargaining with eleven implacable envoys at Peking is one of the most pathetic stories in the world's history. On the 28th September the Board announced the trifle of 982,238,150 taels. On the 1st November the tough old statesman was reported to be spitting blood; on the 7th he was dead.

The Board found that the receipts it could, at the time of Li's death, count on for the year were (roughly):—

	Taels.
1. Land-tax, in money	26,000,000
2. Native Customs	4,250,000
3. Foreign Customs	22,750,000
4. Profits on salt	14,000,000
5. Lukin	14,000,000
6. Profits on native opium	3,000,000
7. Miscellaneous	3,000,000
Loans and benevolences	—
Sale of office	—
Foreign loans (received)	—

Total Taels 87,000,000

This total represents the maximum probable receipts up to the time when the "Boxer" rebellion broke out, and does not necessarily conflict with any other tables given in this chapter. There is even here an excess over ordinary expenditure of 46,000,000 taels, which total still leaves 25,000,000 for the service of loans; 3,000,000 for arsenals; 2,000,000 for railways, palaces, and other novelties; and 16,000,000 for provincial needs.

Things would thus not have been so very bad, in spite of parlous times, if all the receipts had been paid, in one currency, into one central chest or account (as the Foreign Customs receipts are); and if all payments had been drawn in one currency from this one chest, and remitted in one way; but, in the first place, all provinces had and have two main currencies of pure silver (several "touches") and copper cash (several qualities), the relation between which two differs in each town every day. Besides this, each province has its own "touch" and "weight" of a silver ounce; and some provinces use dollars, chopped and unchopped, by weight or by piece, as well as pure silver; and the dollar exchange varies daily locally and centrally in regard to both copper cash and silver. Even this difficulty, which involves an enormous waste of time and energy, and opens the door to innumerable and

inscrutable “squeezes,” might be philosophically ignored if receipts and disbursements were lumped in one account,—if the venous blood were allowed a free course to the heart, and the arterial blood a clean run back to the extremities. In spite of the multitudinous reforms introduced or at least favourably considered during the last years of the Empire and the five years of the Republic, most of these currency absurdities are as rampant as ever; but, before we enter into the present financial situation, let us consider the—*immensa moles* of incompetence and corruption with which men of the Sir Richard Dane type have to deal before they can make any secular impression upon, or give permanent shape to this jelly-fish mass of corruption. The Board, which was as corrupt and conservative as the provinces, went about its business in a very hand-to-mouth, rough-and-tumble sort of way. Instead of saying: “Your receipts are 5,000,000, and your disbursements 4,900,000; send 100,000 to the balance chest,” it used to say:—

“From your land-tax, eight-tenths nominal of which are this year only expected (after deduction made for disasters), 500,000 will be sent for Peking salaries (original), 100,000 for the same (extra), 200,000 for the Palace, and 100,000 to make up for shortage in the remittances to Manchuria for 1896. It must arrive (with the usual extras for Board’s fees) in part before the seventh and entirely before the tenth moon. As your salt *likin* is transferred to the Inspector-General of Foreign Customs for the service of loans, six-tenths of the ordinary *likin* which used to go to the Manchurian armies must replace the salt *likin* remittances on Peking account, whilst four-tenths will take the place of what used to be

repayments on Fuh Kien account, but which since 1886 have been transferred to the appropriation for Yün Nan copper (minus scale and waste). If this be insufficient, the saving of 7 per cent. on the scale for army payments accumulated since 1881 can be temporarily transferred to the arsenal contribution (subject to discount). The province of Kwei Chou complains that your 6,000 taels a month for its frontier army have not been sent. Sz Ch'wan has been directed to advance the requisite sum; and meanwhile, as the Inspector-General has compounded with Sz Ch'wan and Hu Pêh for a lump annual sum down instead of collecting their joint salt *likin*, you can direct the Salt Commissioner to send up quickly for the new Tientsin artillery the 200,000 taels a year formerly devoted to the Canton torpedo college."

This picture of imperial Chinese finance is of course an artificial one, slightly exaggerated with an extra tinge of local colour so as to illustrate the hopeless confusion that reigns. Each viceroy or governor used to dispute every new demand, and it was quite understood that some appropriations were intended to be more serious than others. Some simpleton of an honest man from time to time threw everything out of gear by allowing a truth to escape: but the Board never let a "flat" of this sort score in fact, even though he might appear to do so in principle. A governor could not be expected to show zeal for Yün Nan copper when he knew that the high officer in special charge was making a fortune out of it. On the other hand, the "Board's rice," though a matter of no public importance, was always promptly sent; on the same general ground that a consul, in writing to the Foreign Office, is always very careful to docket his despatches neatly—

to avoid a wiggling. It does not do to quarrel with your bread and butter ; and underlings at headquarters can easily put a spoke into the wheel of the biggest man in the provinces if he gets nasty to them.

There were many other absurd results of this rule-of-thumb system. Province A received subsidies from province B, but, itself owing others to province C, paid B on behalf of C. Thus there are two freights to pay, and two losses on exchange. Sometimes A might be directed even to pay a subsidy to a province B, which already pays one to province A. Funds which might easily be sent by draft were usually despatched in hollowed-out logs of wood, with a guard of soldiers as escort, accompanied by carts, fighting "bullies," and a commissioned officer. Even when sent by draft, there was a charge of 2 or 3 per cent. for remitting, and a commissioned officer was sent to carry the draft—(just as we send favoured officers to carry treaties or news of victory), so that he might gain "kudos" for his zeal. It was pathetic to read the accounts of hundreds of coolies trotting all the way to Shanghai from Shan Si with hollowed logs of wood containing silver wherewith to repay the interest on European loans. The extraordinary care and punctuality exacted in matters of form, duty, or national honour in Manchu times were only equalled by the shameless speculation and callous waste of time and money which prevailed in personal matters connected with the performance of the same public duty. Officers of high rank, who were known to make 30,000 or 40,000 taels a year out of their posts, gravely worked out their balances to the thousand-millionth part of an ounce, forgetting that (even if the clerk's salary were only sixpence a day) the time occupied in counting and subtracting each line of figures

would cover, ten thousand times over, the clerk's salary rate per minute. In a word, the whole Chinese financial system was, and to a certain extent still is rotten to the core; childish, and incompetent; and should be swept away root and branch. I am no financier, but, so far as I can see, Peking is as hopeless as ever, whilst the republican provinces have cut the Gordian Knot by the simple process of not sending any revenue at all. Until there is a fixed currency, a European accountancy in all departments, and a system of definite sufficient salaries, all reform is hopeless to look for, and it is astounding that the ministers do not act upon this view when they contemplate the results of Sir R. Hart's and Sir R. Dane's work.

Table of possible Revenue Items in 1900 for Eighteen Provinces of China and Three Provinces of Manchuria.¹

	Taels.
Money land tax	25,967,000
Grain tax, value in money, commuted or not	7,540,000
Native Customs	4,230,000
Taxes of all kinds on Salt, direct or indirect	13,050,000
Foreign Customs Collectorate	22,052,000
Likim, excluding that on salt and opium .	12,160,000
Taxes on native opium and opium licences	2,830,000
Miscellaneous undefined taxes, licences, fees, etc.	2,165,000
Duties on reed flats	215,000
Rents on special tenures	690,000
Corvées and purveyances (roughly valued)	110,000
Sale of office and titles	266,000
Subsidies from other provinces	9,282,000
Tea taxes	900,000
Fuel and grain taxes	110,000
Total, Taels	101,567,000

[Native loans and benevolences not included
in the Grand Total, as being exceptional] [6,334,000]

¹ For fuller particulars, see the reprint from *Oria Mersiana* alluded to in the chapter on "Population."

Table of Total Revenues of each Province forming the above total.

Name of Province.	Taels (including subsidies)	Name of Province	Taels (including subsidies)
An Hwei . . .	4,033,000	Shan Si . . .	4,040,000
Chêh Kiang . . .	5,786,000	Shan Tung . . .	4,530,000
Chih Li . . .	6,360,000	Shen Si . . .	2,380,000
Fuh Kien . . .	6,035,000	Sz Ch'wan . . .	6,050,000
Ho Nan . . .	3,235,000	Yün Nan . . .	1,985,000
Hu Nan . . .	2,765,000		
Hu Pêh . . .	7,320,000	Total, Taels . . .	97,077,000
Kan Suh . . .	5,946,000		
Kiang Si . . .	4,800,000	Shêng King . . .	3,340,000
Kiang Su . . .	21,450,000	Kirm . . .	470,000
Kwang Si . . .	1,730,000	Tsitsihar . . .	680,000
Kwang Tung . . .	7,525,000		
Kwei Chou . . .	1,107,000	Grand Total . . .	101,567,000

[Less subsidies from one province to the other] 9,282,000

Translation of official statement of expenditures for 1910 as telegraphed to each Province by the Board; it will be seen that the expenditure in 1910 was double that of the revenue in 1900.

	Taels
Fêng-t'ien (S Manchuria)	15,587,889
Kirm (Central Manchuria)	5,355,657
Hêh-lung Kiang (N. Manchuria)	2,290,906
Chih Li	23,574,139
Jêhol (military governor)	841,264
Kiang Su (Soochow Division)	24,890,000
Do (Nanking Division)	25,745,182
An Hwei	6,741,779
Kiang Si	7,895,177
Shan Tung	10,525,928
Shan Si	6,140,252
Ho Nan	6,600,094
Shen Si	4,127,565
Kan Suh	3,290,757
Sim Kiang (= New Territory)	3,346,564
Fuh Kien	6,941,107
Chêh Kiang	8,473,207
Hu Pêh	18,521,400
Hu Nan	6,424,200
Sz Ch'wan	14,964,926
Kwang Tung	27,610,227
Kwang Si	4,992,157
Yun Nan	6,983,166
Kwei Chou	1,791,056

(For further particulars, see *Economist* for 10th April 1910.)

The Board's circular instructions for 1911, the last year of the Empire, were that in making estimates of expenditure for the Budget, items must be gathered under four main heads—to wit :—

1. The requirements of the Peking *yaméns*.
2. Those of each province under the remodelled system of official appointments.
3. The internal administrative expenditure of each province.
4. Garrisons, proconsulates, residents, etc., in Mongolia and Tibet.

The deficit for 1911 was budgeted for 88,000,000 taels.

The First Republican Budget showed a deficit of 280,520,000 taels, consisting of the following :—

			Tael\$
Deficit on the Manchu Budget . . .			88,000,000
" " "Annual" " . . .			82,520,000
Provisional Expenditure . . .			110,000,000

In other words, enlightened democracy, taking Mr. Micawber as model, "gives an I.O.U. for total amount," for the Income side has "nil" entries.

The Budget for 1913 (the first complete year of President Yüan Shī-k'ai's government) was as follows :—

Total expenditure, about . . . \$903,000,000

consisting of

Total ordinary expenditure, about . . .	410,000,000
" extraordinary expenditure, about . . .	163,000,000
" reserve funds, about . . .	230,000,000
" fund to encourage industries [our old friend Yun Nan copper specially included] . . .	100,000,000

To meet the above expenditure, the available revenue is given as follows :—

Total revenue,	about . .	\$725,733,208
consisting of		
1. Land-tax	„ . .	52,690,988
2. Salt-tax	„ . .	49,954,250
3. Customs	„ . .	53,696,465
4. <i>Likin</i>	„ . .	18,292,002
5. Sundry taxes	„ . .	6,342,217
6. Government Industries	„ . .	12,549,627
8. Sundry (royalties, etc.)	„ . .	28,574,515
(a) Ordinary	255,723,208
[but the total is only \$222,100,064, and item No. 7 (which is omitted !) accounts presumably for the missing \$33,623,144]		
(b) Extraordinary (foreign loans, etc.),		
about		70,000,000
(c) Revenue to be carried forward (internal loans, etc.)	400,000,000

I do not discuss this absurd “Budget” seriously; there are numerous explanations given as to why the Customs is underestimated so many tenths, why salt so many tenths, etc., etc.—the old thimble-rigging in a new form. In short, complete incapacity of the good old order is exhibited all round. It will be noted that the above “Budget” is on a silver dollar basis, and that a dollar was (roughly) two shillings—*i.e.* has 25 per cent. less silver than a tael; hence the sterling “receipts” of this precious “budgetastro” would be very roughly about £72,000,000, or 570,000,000 taels, and the expenditure £90,000,000 or 720,000,000 taels.¹

China’s really serious indebtedness only began after her foolish Japan war in 1894–1895, and ever since then she has plunged deeper and deeper

¹ Silver has been unusually high this last Christmas, and £50 I remitted only fetched \$390 in Shanghai. Two years ago the same amount of gold remitted brought me considerably over \$600. Thus allowance must be made in all my scattered financial remarks for the *period* to which those remarks refer.

into the treacherous mire. Her total owings cannot now fall far short of £200,000,000,¹ the interest on which (including amortisation) is much greater than her total revenue (liberal "squeezes" all round included) for 1894. When the Reorganisation or Five Power loan of 1913 was on the *tapis*, a complete list of all outstanding indebtednesses was published in the *North China Herald* for 15th February 1913, to which lovers of mammon are referred.

¹ A Hongkong newspaper received as I correct proofs, says £150,000,000; but my estimate includes short loans, provincial loans, informal loans, irregular loans, etc.

CHAPTER XI

THE SALT GABELLE

THE salt industry contributes its share to illustrate for us both the natural principles on which China is divided into provinces, and the continuity of her institutions. A statesman named Sang Hung-yang is stated to have been the first (in 90 B.C.) to establish an excise upon salt. It will be noticed from the accompanying map that the areas from which a revenue is derived from salt do not entirely correspond with the political subdivisions of the Empire into groups of provinces. We have the Valley of the Canton River, the Old Region of the Northern Yüeh kingdoms, the Old Kingdoms of Wu and Ch'u, all supplied with sea-salt, extracted and prepared in different ways, according to the natural facilities at hand in each producing place. Then we have the various kinds of well-salt, with or without fuel in the shape of gas, which supply the western and mountainous parts of China, broadly corresponding to the ancient Kingdoms of Shuh, Tien, and K'ien.¹ The lake-salt of the desert competes with the pond-salt of Shan Si for the service of what may roughly be styled the mixed Tartar-Chinese regions. Finally, there are the primitive reed-flats of the north,

¹ The ancient kingdoms, and their gradual absorption, do not fall within the scope of this book; the question is analysed in *Ancient China Simplified*, published in 1908.

which serve the needs of the greater part of Old China. These administrative areas will be found to correspond in a general sense with the different stages of Chinese conquest, and with the spread of Chinese influence. A glance at the list of provinces given upon page 5 of the first chapter, and a reference to the remarks upon Han Wu Ti's annexations, in the chapter on "History," will perhaps assist to make this clearer. A reference to the first chapter will show us that the vast tract called the Two Kwang—that is, West Kwang and East Kwang—being the northern half of the old state of South Yüeh, is simply the delta about Canton, including all the network of streams which in any way contribute to it; the Swatow River system in the east is really by nature and ethnography part of Fuh Kien. Accordingly we find that the sea-salt which is prepared along the Canton coasts is, and since the fourth century always has been, all concentrated under one management. This was, and probably still is the modern administration of the First Class Salt Commissioner at Canton, aided by a Second Class Commissioner for Kwang Si, both in Manchu times subject to the supreme nominal direction of the Two Kwang Viceroy. There were seventeen subordinate mandarins on the staff, and 159 depôts of all kinds, managed by six different "chests" or counting-houses, the ancient head centre of all being, as of old, at Tung-kwan, lower down than Canton, at the junction of the "Great" and the "Lesser" rivers. Owing to financial straits, efforts were made after the "Boxer" indemnity settlement to stretch the annual yield of excise as far as possible, say, to 1,000,000 taels: in the last year of the Empire, 1911, this figure was quadrupled.

It will be noticed that the head waters of the

West River above Peh-seh rise in Kwang-nan Fu (Yün Nan): accordingly this prefecture¹ alone uses Canton salt, and in return sends supplies of copper for the mint. One of the northern tributaries of this West River rises in the township of Ku-chou (in Kwei Chou province), and in the same way that department gets its salt supplies from Canton, instead of from Sz Ch'wan or the Hwai monopoly. It is not quite so obvious why three districts in the south of Hu Nan and three whole prefectures in the south of Kiang Si should make two more exceptions, though certainly part of the so-called "North" River rises in the first-named province, and part of the "Small" River in Kiang Si: no doubt there are special local conditions to consider; and in any case the irregularity is nearly a century old, at the very least. For salt administrative purposes the Two Kwang, so far as they are drained into the delta, are divided into two distributions: that of the "Great River" (west of Canton), and that of the "Small River" (east of Canton). The Swatow River rises in T'ing-chou (in Fuh Kien province), and therefore that large prefectural area uses the Canton salt in vogue in the valley of the Swatow River, in preference to the less accessible coast salt of Hing-hwa (Fuh Kien). The island of Hainan is of course included in the Canton scheme, which thus rounds itself off by cutting corners from provinces politically and financially appertaining to rival salt industries.

The salt industry of Fuh Kien, being smaller than that above described, is managed by a

¹ Although *fu* prefectures (groups of *hien*) are now abolished, no new maps are yet published, and accordingly the old nomenclature must be, partially at least, continued for the purposes of this chapter.

Second Class Commissioner and seventeen subordinate mandarins, who were in Manchu times under the supreme nominal control of the Viceroy at Foochow: this administration (like that of Canton just described, which latter dates from the organisers of the fourth century of our era) can only be traced historically back to times when a good political hold upon the land had been first obtained by advancing Chinese civilisation (say A.D. 1000). I find that, when changes were made in 1157, the dues produced 80,000 "strings" a year. The number of subordinate salt officers employed in each province depends upon the stage at which the salt leaves official hands to pass through middlemen to the consumers: hence in Fuh Kien it is unusually large. Since Formosa became Japanese territory in 1895, the development of Fuh Kien salt productiveness has of course been further circumscribed, at least officially; but I have no doubt that, with so conservative a people, things would continue to run very much in their old channels, so long as Japanese excise and customs interests were not adversely affected. During the Taiping rebellion of 1855-1865 there was a period of spasmodic energy in Fuh Kien, owing to the transport service of the Yang-tsze or Hwai system having become disorganised; but afterwards matters settled down to a dull uninteresting routine, and very little information of interest reached the general inquirer. The total nominal income raised from Fuh Kien salt in 1899 was about 500,000 taels a year; in 1911 thrice that sum. As an instance of what "hanky-panky" goes on behind the scenes in China, I may mention that I once went to the point where the head waters of three provinces meet, and, sailing down several hundred miles to Wénchow (Chêh Kiang), met enormous fleets of

Foochow salt boats actually working their way up from behind, as it were, to the northern and inland frontiers of Fuh Kien. From inquiries made I found that a huge trade of 70,000 tons a year—that is, much more than the total official trade—was connived at by the sagacious *likin* officials of Chêh Kiang. French statistics place the salt consumption of all Indo-China in 1889 at 150,000 tons, so that my conjectural figures may not be far from the mark, having in view the comparative areas of Indo-China and the region served as explained.

Following our way up the coast, we now reach the next province of Chêh Kiang, which, for the purposes of its salt administration, is still divided into East and West Chêh. This nomenclature takes us back to times when one of the Yang-tsze embouchures entered the sea at Hangchow, and a considerable part of the very modern province of Kiang Su was included in the Chêh regions. In the year 1132, what was called the Hwai-Chêh salt system or systems was put on an Excise basis. From Shanghai, all down the coast-half of the province to the Fuh Kien frontier, was the division of Eastern Chêh; and the inner portion, including Chinkiang, Nanking, and Hangchow, was the division of Western Chêh, as already partly explained in the chapter on "Population." Just as in England our ancient dioceses overlap more modern administrative boundaries, so in China, for grain and salt purposes, the obsolete divisions of Kiang Nan and Two Chêh are still in use, though Kiang Nan has become two provinces, and the Two Chêh have become one. As the area of supply is large, there is a First Class Commissioner in charge of it, in Manchu times under the nominal supreme direction of the Governor at Hangchow; and there were thirty-nine sub-

ordinates at the various distributing depôts. As in the case of the two industries already described, the salt is nearly all, if not all, sea-salt, collected and treated under varying conditions and in different ways at certain centres along the coast. During the Taiping rebellion this salt also took advantage of the general disorganisation of transport to encroach upon the Hwai monopoly; it went far up the Yangtsze, and even down the Poyang Lake. But nearly a century back I find "Fychow" (Hweichou Fu in An Hwei) already consuming the West Chêh article; this exceptional arrangement, which perhaps is an ancient one, is easily explained by taking a glance on a good map at the river system, and reflecting that teas from the same region were driven in 1899-1900 by *likin* exactions from Kewkiang to Ningpo. There is another corner of An Hwei province (Kwang-têh), and also a wedge of Kiang Si (Kwang-sin) similarly included in the Two Chêh system, but without the justification in either case of a river source. All Kiang Su south of the Great River is included, except the extensive prefecture of Nanking. There are special arrangements for the two islands of Ting-hai and Ch'ungming (which latter produces salt of its own too), into which, however, I need not enter here, as my object is merely to sketch general principles. After the Japanese war and the consequent foreign loans, it was found necessary here and elsewhere to increase the consumers' price of salt, and of course this added something to the general feeling of discontent and unrest then already prevailing in China. For 1899 I estimated the Two Chêh salt revenue at 1,000,000 taels; for 1911 it was nearer 3,500,000 taels.

The great organisation known as the Two Hwai—that is, the Northern and Southern

divisions of the Hwai River (which, owing to Yellow River vagaries, now only exists in a truncated or mouthless condition)—is, as I stated in the earlier editions, well worthy the attention of a British syndicate, and, indeed, forms the basis of Sir Richard Dane's highly successful reforms now astonishing the world. The more the Yellow River (and fresh water generally) can be kept away, the better for the salt flats; and the Chinese engineers of the Hwai are almost as expert as the Dutch manipulators of the Zuider Zee dykes in regulating the levels of competing waters. It will be seen from any tolerably good map that the whole of Kiang Su north of the Great River and east of the Canal is a dreary flat, and a great portion of this land is very lightly taxed, owing to its brackishness, and to its inability to grow other crops than rushes. Here lie all the celebrated salt flats of the Hwai, and the business distinctions of North and South, whatever they originally meant, now refer chiefly to difference of origin, colour, and treatment in the trade article, together with capriciously demarcated respective areas of consumption, which are apt to vary a little when one or the other kind of salt runs short in its own "preserve." The Nüchên Tartars and the Sung dynasty, nearly 1,000 years ago, used to have a customs and salt station on the Hwai. Since the great Taiping rebellion, the whole system has been completely reorganised by a succession of very able viceroys ruling at Nanking. Their chief aim was how to regain for the Hwai interest the area lost during the wars and rebellions of 1855-65, and how to establish an *Ausgleich*, or *modus vivendi*, with the immense salt-well exportation from Sz Ch'wan, so as to leave the latter a fair share of the consumers' ground which

it rescued from the miseries of "insipid food" during the long Taiping anarchy; and so as at the same time to arrange that the relative prices of the rival salts should not be too high for the indigent people, or too lightly taxed to admit of a substantial revenue; and also that the general revenue systems of the three great Yang-tsze compound states—Sz Ch'wan, the Two Hu, and the Two Kiang (half the area and half the population of all China Proper)—should be sufficiently elastic to provide the usual remittances for Peking, and for the support of their own several armies, navies, and arsenals. In accordance with this complicated arrangement, the Governors of the Hu Peh, Hu Nan (Two Hu); Kiang Su, Kiang Si, and An Hwei ("Two" Kiang); and Ho Nan had no say at all in "high policy" questions of salt: the whole gabelle was under the administrative control of a First Class Commissary at Yangchow, who again was in Manchu times under the supreme "diplomatic" and (in this case rather more than) nominal supervision of the Viceroy at Nanking; this latter was *de facto*, but not *de jure*, in regular consultation with the Viceroy at Wuch'ang (Hankow) in matters affecting the *Ausgleich*. Each of the above six provinces (except An Hwei which had none, and Kiang Su which had two) had a Second Class Commissary; and there are thirty-four subordinates, but all attached to headquarters alone. Thus each province (except An Hwei, which is quite close to both Yangchow and Nanking) has an imperial accountant for purposes of local finance, but no control over distribution. The great central depôt for stored salt is Ichêng, between Chinkiang and Nanking. Of course all the above takes no account of Sir R. Dane's reforms, under the Republic, of which more anon.

It would weary the reader were I to state the names of each producing "yard"; the peculiar system of land taxation modified to suit the producing districts; the way "warrants" are issued to speculators, salt is weighed out, gross and tare distinguished, order of precedence in sales arranged, dues, *likin*, and other charges apportioned, and so on. As the merchants who practically farm the industry "offered as benevolences" 8,000,000 taels during the period 1880-1900, over and above the sums which the business was bound under regulation to yield—in other words, as the Government has dared to "squeeze" an average of 400,000 taels a year besides its regular income of 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 taels (in 1911 nearer 10,000,000 taels)—it may well be imagined that the wealthy owners of "perpetual warrants" must have made a large profit. As many distinguished families used to invest in this syndicate, just as we Europeans invest in Consols or Rands, there was, of course, a universal conspiracy not to disclose to outsiders the real profits; and, as the Viceroys at Nanking had to defend the interests of their provinces against Peking rapacity, such profits and revenues as were disclosed to them by their subordinates beyond the regular figures never reached the Peking Board's ears officially. Therefore, of course, I could not in 1900 prove by documentary evidence what everyone knew, and what Sir R. Dane *has* proved, namely, that this great organisation is capable of great and beneficial developments in honest hands.

Hwai salt, of two main kinds, is consumed in those very limited parts of Kiang Su south of the Yang-tsze not already described as appropriated to the Two Chêh trade; in all Kiang Su north of the Yang-tsze, except the wedge served

by Shan Tung; in all An Hwei, except the two corners also above mentioned, and except also in one district (Suh-chou) in the extreme north not drained by the Hwai River, and served from Shan Tung; in that south-east corner of Ho Nan which is drained by the head waters of the Hwai River; in all Kiang Si, except the corners served by the Two Kwang and Two Chêh systems; in all Hu Peh, except (*a*) the extreme south-west corner, where no navigable stream communicates with the Yang-tsze; and (*b*) (to a limited extent, but not as a trade) even in those districts of the same corner which have such navigable communication; also (*c*) only concurrently, since 1870, with Sz Ch'wan salt in the six prefectures west of the Han River; and (*d*) subject to some tolerated encroachments of local well-salt in the extreme north-west. It is also consumed in all Hu Nan, except the parts appropriated to Canton salt; and except in the extreme north, where, since 1870, it has run concurrently with Sz Ch'wan salt; finally, in the four eastern prefectures of Kwei Chou, these being drained by the head waters of the Hu Nan rivers. In a word, Hwai salt serves nearly the whole Valley of the Yang-tsze, up to the gorges and the mountains.

The great Sz Ch'wan salt industry, first organised in 1132, is totally different from all those described, and the brine is extracted from very deep Artesian wells, which also produce unlimited quantities of hydrogen gas, thus always gratuitously at hand as fuel for treating the salt; in some cases speculators distribute this fuel, like our coal gas, in long bamboo pipes.¹ The

¹ I have frequently described these wells at length, but perhaps the condensed account given in *Chambers's Journal* for 1896 is the most accessible to European readers, though since then several enterprising travellers have given further and perhaps more up-to-date descriptions.

interests involved are almost as great as in the case of the Two Hwai, and the secrecy observed (*i.e.* beyond the stereotyped official point) is quite as impenetrable to those not "in the swim." Yet there is only a Second Class Commissary in charge, with seven subordinates; but in Manchu times the Viceroy, who had nominal supervision of the whole, exercised a much more direct controlling influence over the well-salt than did even his sea-salt colleague at Nanking, with whom, as with the Viceroy at Wu-ch'ang (Hankow), he had to fight out his financial battles. In wandering over the provinces of Sz Ch'wan, Kwei Chou, and Hu Pêh, I had good opportunities for studying the working of this wonderful industry. In many places the salt, especially when of the hard kind like blocks of stone, is practically small money, and its retail value varies unerringly so many fractions of a farthing per pound according to the freight rates of boats in demand, and the number of miles coolies have to walk. A lost traveller could almost grope his way about the country by simply asking the retail price of salt at each village and at the next one in any direction. The waste of fuel, of human and beast labour, of time, and of patience is of course gigantic, but it might have serious effects upon the popular economy of the province were machinery suddenly introduced, carriage cheapened, and strict honesty incontinently insisted upon.¹ The nominal yield in taxes to the Government was in 1899 about 2,000,000 taels a year on salt taken out of 5,000 Artesian wells actually working (over 8,000 in existence). Probably 10,000,000 taels would be nearer the mark for 1911, subject, of course, to damage done to trade by revolutions and rebel-

¹ The Germans, I understand, recently obtained a contract for an Electric Power Plant, but it was annulled.

lions. The reason there are so few officials in charge is that large stocks, which are ignored by the administration when they reach the middleman's hands, can only travel by water; and the water-ways are few, shut in, unconnected by canals, and easily controlled. There is really, as I pointed out (p. 168) when I spoke of the three great trade drainage areas of China, only one great exit eastwards from Sz Ch'wan, as there is only one from Kwang Si. The salt service of course covers the whole of Sz Ch'wan province, and (concurrently with or independently of the Hwai salt) those parts of Hu Nan and Hu Pêh above specified; all Kwei Chou province, except the eastern area reserved to the Hwai system of Hu Nan, and the corner appropriated to Canton as explained; and the north wedge of Yün Nan which communicates *viâ* Lao-wa T'an with the highest navigable part of the Yang-tsze. The Governors of Yün Nan and Kwei Chou had (and perhaps have) each nominal supervisory control in their own provinces; but there was no Kwei Chou staff at all, and no Yün Nan staff for this particular salt; the Yün Nan officials were there for the management of quite another branch, now to be separately described. As to Tibet, which receives from Sz Ch'wan endless human caravans of tea by way of Tatsien-lu and Kwan Hien, I presume it must also take some of the Sz Ch'wan salt; if it does, I cannot find trace of it, though I see that in 1180 trade with certain "Tibetoid" tribes was sanctioned. There are some very ancient wells close to Tibet in the extreme west near Ya-chou (the great entrepôt of the tea trade with the Tibetan tribes) which were working 570 years ago; but as Tibet is a brackish and nitrous country throughout, I expect it supplies itself, and needs no Chinese salt: in fact Tibet used to

supply Nepaul with salt and butter in exchange for grain, and no doubt does so still. In any case plentiful supplies for the northern frontier of Tibet can be obtained from Mien-chu city in Sz Ch'wan.

In the days, over a thousand years ago, when a Shan empire ruled in Yün Nan, there was already mention of the local Black Salt-wells, and in Kublai Khan's time (thirteenth century) there is frequent allusion to trouble with the "barbarians at the salt wells." At the commencement of the Manchu dynasty, their henchman, the Chinese satrap Wu San-kwei, was allowed to increase the salt dues for a time in order to pay his Yün Nan troops; and in our own days (1864-1874) the Panthay Mussulmans held profitable possession in their turn. Except in the north corner of the province, devoted to the Sz Ch'wan monopoly, Yün Nan salt is free all over the province (with the further exception of the corner appropriated to Canton) after it has been purchased from the private proprietors of the wells and has paid Government dues; under the Manchus a Second Class Commissary and twelve subordinates used to manage the business, and the annual yield to government account was about 500,000 taels; in 1911 nearer 1,000,000 taels. Towards the Burmese and French frontiers—at Muang-u for instance—there are a few other unimportant wells, but the population there is too scant and "barbarian" for Chinese officials to make much out of that or any other industry, as we have seen under the heads of Momein and Sz-mao trade (pp. 173, 174).

We have now nothing left to consider but Old China, all the salt systems above described dating subsequently to the beginning of our era, at least so far as any known official or-

ganisation of them is concerned. In the earlier editions I left Manchuria out of consideration altogether, as the salt revenue collected there in the twelfth century by the Nüchên officials (twelfth century) never amounted to much; and the same could be said of Manchu times, previous to the reforms of the Viceroy of Manchuria, Ikotanga, twenty years ago: indeed, until 1887 salt was free altogether; but even in Nüchên and Mongol times (1150–1350) there was some official control of the Liao-yang salt flats; however, I find that under pressure of “Boxer” legacies and exigencies a very large official consumption is now recognised, as to which more further on. It is still hardly necessary to do more than, as before in 1900, merely mention Mongolia, which produced in Manchu times no revenue to the Central Government of any kind, salt or otherwise; and, now that Outer Mongolia is partly “independent,” cannot well fall under Sir Richard Dane’s reforming hand. There is, however, a Mongol-owned salt lake, called Ghilen-tai, in the Desert to the west of the Alashan Mountains, which presumably still supplies the wants of what may be called the Great North Road, from the Yellow River at Baotu, or at Tokto, where it is discharged from boats and carried east right away to Kalgan and Sūan-hwa north of Peking; and also in the other direction north-west to Uliassutai. Some restraint had to be placed upon this Mongol salt, which was almost free in Kan Suh, so as to prevent encroachment upon the Shan Si system. It is by no means improbable that this Lake Ghilen is the identical place mentioned in 200 B.C., and stated to be near modern Lan-chou, where the inhabitants, as I have stated in the third chapter, thrived famously in the salt and iron trade. The Piebald Horse

Pond salt (Hwa-ma Ch'i) from a place just south of the Great Wall, where the Kan Suh and Shen Si frontiers join, has the run of the greater part of Kan Suh, and also part of Shen Si, concurrently with Mongol salt; but the entire revenues derived from both the above industries are exceedingly small; so much so, that the management of them was left to two executive *taotais* in Kan Suh and Shen Si, of course in Manchu times subject to the Viceroy. There are also some wells in South Kan Suh, probably geologically connected with those of Sz Ch'wan: however, the whole of the salt service superficially described in this paragraph rather surrounds than belongs to Old China, which is thus hemmed in on all sides by areas supplied from wells or flats dating from some time subsequent to our era. It is well to note once more how every subject, be it trade, language, salt, or geography, tends to accentuate this one salient point—that the Yellow race or Chinese are essentially a Yellow River people, and that the disastrous irregularities of that stream are rightly termed "China's Sorrow" in a very special and literal sense. At the same time it must not be supposed that the term "Yellow" languages (first used, I believe, by myself), Yellow race, Yellow peril, and so on has anything to do with the Yellow River: it refers to the human complexion.

The oldest salt industry of all is, as we might expect, that of Shan Tung: there is no salt to speak of on the peninsula itself; it is all derived from coast places north and south of it, round about the present mouth of the Yellow River, and about the former German "sphere" of Kiao Chou, now in Japanese keeping. What with the Grand Canal, the River Wei (from Wei-hwei city, not to be confused with the Wei of

Shen Si, pp. 14, 76), and the canals connecting the various Yellow River beds, Shan Tung has unrivalled facilities for distribution, and, as might be anticipated, consumes not one pound of any salt but its own. The trade is divided into two branches, called respectively the "warrant system" and the "north and south freights," the latter being half in official hands and half in mercantile, the two working together. The warrants seem to run over the mountainous peninsula and its base down to the extreme south frontiers. The north freights evidently refer to Shan Tung itself, or the greater part of it; the southern freights to the extraneous parts of Ho Nan, Kiang Su, and An Hwei. The whole administration is under a First Class Commissary and thirteen subordinates, of course under the nominal supervision in Manchu times of the Governor. Up to 1837 the centre of the Commissary's operations was Tientsin, which I suppose means that the Viceroy of Chih Li had until then general supervision over two commissaries; but the distance was found inconvenient, and so in that year the Governor was made supreme responsible chief over his own commissary. I notice that the Mongol dynasty made several similar changes (1260-1338), and recast more than once the organisation established by the Sung house in 1181. I have no doubt the vagaries of the Yellow River often decided to which administration this or that part of the distribution service should belong. After the Japanese war of 1894-5 the retail price of salt was raised here, as elsewhere, and efforts were made to make the dues account contribute more money to the public chest. Perhaps the total credited to the Government would in 1899 have reached 400,000 taels: in 1911 nearer 4,000,000 taels—if we

include the gains credited to all provinces in which Shan Tung salt circulated.

In the chapter on "Early Trade Notions" it was mentioned how tradition says an ancient statesman once utilised the charms of woman as a lure to catch the gold of strangers. This man, usually known by his popular name Kwan Chung (700-645 B.C.), was premier of the state of Ts'i (Shan Tung), whose salt business we are now discussing; he was also the first to conceive the notion of a Government monopoly in salt and iron, based upon an average annual minimum consumption per individual of 30 lbs. of salt, and upon the indispensability of ploughshares, axes, pans, knives, and needles. But the Sang Hung-yang mentioned at the head of this chapter, a man celebrated for his mental arithmetic, was the first to tax salt *en route*. Thus it is plain other people knew how to make money out of salt and iron besides, and maybe before, the men of the Ordos Desert. The wealth thus brought to one vassal state was shared by the feudatory powers in the vicinity, who soon took to imitating so lucrative a policy. It was evidently under this first stimulus that the Sz Ch'wan salt wells were discovered (330 B.C.), and possibly the Ghilen-tai industry also: a large export to the steppes of the Hiung-nu grew up, and to those states as well which were dependent upon Ts'i for their salt supply. By the time the First Emperor came into power (B.C. 220), the salt and iron revenues of China had increased twenty-fold. Ever since those days the Shan Tung salt administration has had a steady history, but perhaps rather as an appendage of the one about to be described than as a separate organisation of its own.

The "Ch'ang-lu," or Long Rush or Reed system,

derives its name from the city Ts'ang Chou,¹ on the Grand Canal (south of Tientsin), once so called. In 1285 Kublai Khan "once more divided the Ho-kien (Chih Li) and Shan Tung interests," which, as above explained, are really one in working principle. Passing to our own days, we find in 1900 a First Class Commissary at Tientsin, with sixteen subordinates, and the Viceroy (who until about 1870 resided at the provincial capital of Pao-ting) had in Manchu times nominal supervision. The yield was about 500,000 taels a year; but here again the merchants were viewed as a milch cow, being second only to the Hwai traders in point of yielding capacity, if we may judge by the "loyal benevolences" which were frequently exacted, and the fact that nearer 8,000,000 taels were extracted in 1911. One of the latest Manchu Government plans for raising money was to issue "manifest faith" bonds, repayable after a term of years, and bearing interest; of course all loyal officials and salt merchants were expected to subscribe; naturally their exuberant loyalty was too much for them, and most of them "begged not to receive interest," and even "protested that they did not want even the capital"; *a fortiori* they did not expect "recognition in the shape of rank." The price of salt had been thrice raised one centime a kilo since 1895, and about 100,000 taels were added by the above benevolence to the 500,000 previously yielded. The service (speaking of sixteen years ago) includes all Chih Li, except those parts north of the innermost Great Wall, which use Ghilentai salt; and there are special arrangements for the city of Peking. It also covers the whole plain of Ho Nan, except the south wedge belonging to the Hwai system, *i.e.* the

¹ Now that *chou* are abolished, Ts'ang *hien*.

level tract bounded on the west by the base of the mountainous triangle served by Shan Si salt, and on the east by An Hwei, Kiang Su, and the small Ho Nan wedge supplied by Shan Tung salt. Thus Ho Nan is rent by many rival salt masters, but in Manchu times had none the less a Second Class Commissary of her own to look after both her grain and salt interests, and to arrange accounts. The harassed people in the north of China, alternately under Tartar and Chinese rulers in the remote past, never took kindly to the taxation of salt, which was every now and then abolished, and anon re-established, for various reasons, by dynasty after dynasty; but there is specific mention of salt-works near Tientsin when North and South China became reunited in the seventh century; and a century after that the great financier Liu Yen so developed the Government monopoly in salt that it produced half the total revenues of the empire. It may be mentioned that the "Long Reeds" of the locality bearing that name are useful as fuel for boiling the salt.

There now only remains to be examined the very ancient Shan Si salt organisation at present known as Ho-tung or "East of the (Yellow) River." The extreme west of China used to consume this lake salt until the Sz Ch'wan wells were discovered, and it remained a Government monopoly until A.D. 506, when the Tungusic dynasty then ruling North China threw open to free exploitation a number of the works. In 924 the Turkish reigning house representing Central China placed an official taxing superintendent over the official ponds of An-yih and Kiai city—names which exist to this day—near what is known as the Lake of Kiai. After the expulsion of the Tartars, the Sung dynasty placed eighteen

of the marshes under Government control. In 1010 and 1116 the "red salt" of this locality is spoken of officially. In 1178 the Sung dynasty, driven south, prohibited the import of Shan Si salt from the Nüchên dominions into Ho Nan. Kublai Khan's villainous "Saracen" (Ouigour) adviser Achmac, mentioned by Marco Polo, increased the dues very heavily; but still a few ponds were left free to the public. The Manchus merged the salt dues in some districts into the land-tax, so that wherever this took place the people became entitled to free salt. In 1846 the heavy cost of keeping the works in repair led the Government to consider once more the advisability of putting them up to public auction. The result of all this was that Shan Si salt had only a very limited circulation in that province; but it supplied, and still doubtless supplies, all the western half of Ho Nan—south of the Yellow River only—and the valley of the River Wei in Shen Si: this arrangement bringing it near the head waters of the River Han, precautions have to be taken to keep it out of the Hwai preserves. There was a Second Class Commissary for the province, who in Manchu times resided at P'u-chou in the extreme south, far away from his nominal superior, the Governor at T'ai-yüan; and he had eight subordinates. The revenue in 1900 was about half a million taels, and there are perhaps thirty districts possessing salt ponds; so that the whole region must be very saline. For 1911 3,000,000 taels would be nearer the mark.

In 1904 the pressure of indemnities became so great that the late Sir Robert Hart proposed a scheme for increasing the land-tax on a uniform scale throughout the length and breadth of China; but this fell through, chiefly through the opposition of the viceroys Wei Kwang-t'ao and

Chang Chi-tung. Simultaneously the (now well-known mercantile) statesman Chang Kien submitted a scheme for reorganising the Salt Gabelle. Year after year the "three good vice-roys," in drawing up their drastic schemes of general reform, gradually acceded to proposals for raising the price of salt throughout the Empire at the rate of so many copper cash the Chinese pound; in such wise that, although no one has yet dared to touch the land-tax, by degrees everyone has come round to view with equanimity considerable additions to the price of salt, which, after all, is a fleeting form of Mr. Wemmick's "personal property" and not a fixture in the soil like the land-tax; which last, moreover, the Emperor K'ang-hi had sworn by the nine gods, on behalf of the proud house then reigning, "never to tax no more."

Accordingly we find the same Chang Kien called upon by Yüan Shī-k'ai (when summoned to Peking late in 1911 to save the dynasty) to serve as Minister of Trade and Agriculture; and a little later, when the Republic was temporarily organised at Nanking, Chang Kien was chairman of the first conventicle there; he held many trusted posts during the first three years of Yüan's presidency; but in 1915 (scenting danger) applied unsuccessfully during August to go to the so-called "Watercourse Conferences" in America. He was appointed one of the "Four Cronies" when Yüan declared himself Emperor, but was conveniently attacked by a serious diplomatic malady, disappeared into space, and has hidden himself away (officially) ever since. In 1913 he published his scheme of Salt Reform, which has also been translated and published in English; this was the precursor to an invitation to Sir Richard Dane (formerly Inspector-General of Excise and Salt in India) to take over the job,

which has since been done with such marvellous success that the Salt Revenue in the short space of three years has already begun to rival the Foreign Maritime Customs Revenue in bulk and certainty. It may here be mentioned parenthetically that, previous to the death of the Dowager and the Emperor in 1908, a Chinese mission had already been sent to India to inquire into the nature of the Salt Administration there. Sir Richard Dane, or the Chinese Administration, will no doubt from time to time publish reports showing exactly how far he has dealt with each of the eleven systems, which are here illustrated more clearly by a map; how far he has left the *cadres* (so to speak) of the *personnel* untouched in Chinese hands; and so on. Meanwhile it may be stated that the official Chinese Government report for 1911, the last year of the Manchu Empire, published the following list of the amounts consumed *and taxed* during that year :—

The Two Kwang system . . .	1,954,821 cwt	(of 133½ lb.)
„ Fuh Kien system . . .	772,000	„ „
„ Two Chéh system . . .	1,700,620	„ „
„ „ Hwai system . . .	4,896,888	„ „
„ Sz Ch'wan system . . .	5,508,600	„ „
„ Yün Nan system . . .	512,300	„ „
„ Manchuria system . . .	3,840,000	„ „
„ Mongol-Kan Suh system . . .	22,781	„ „
„ Shan Tung system . . .	2,095,744	„ „
„ Ch'ang-lu (Chih Li) system . . .	3,974,000	„ „
„ Ho-tung (Shan Si) system . . .	1,589,400	„ „
	<u>26,867,154</u>	

Apart from corrupt and intentional juggling with figures, the above total does not mean very much in point of accuracy, for each place has (or had) its own special arrangements for taxes, allowances, perquisites, etc., which often meant that one cwt. nominal was in reality as

much as two at the outstart of its travels from the base to the depôts. Still less do the estimates I have formed above of the increased revenues from salt between 1899 and 1911 (based on the supposition that the Government would extract an average of two taels the cwt.) correspond place by place with the irregular reality. Here, again, local custom varies, and it is hopeless to attempt the unravelling of exchanges, proportions, relation to land-tax, fees, etc., etc. The only thing is to wait until Sir Richard Dane gradually rakes in all hitherto untouched systems, introduces intelligible general rules, and straightens out the whole tangled web. Meanwhile we cannot be far wrong in cutting the Gordian knot as we have done at, say, 53,000,000 taels; for, as we have seen, the budget of 1913 drawn up by the Chinese Minister of Finance *before* King Stork in the shape of Sir Richard Dane had replaced King Log in the shape of "old custom," put down the estimated salt revenue at \$50,000,000, one Mexican dollar and a half being (very roughly) estimated at one (government) tael for the purposes of this calculation.

CHAPTER XII

LIKIN

THE idea of this now notorious tax is repeatedly said to have been conceived in 1849-51 by the *taotai* Yao, then engaged upon certain administrative reform schemes, and his original idea was only to tax tea and salt. But the first mention I can find of *likin* in standard records is towards the end of 1852, when, during the incipient Rebellion, ten provinces were called upon to raise extra funds, and Li Hwei, the Governor of Shan Tung, instituted a *lit'ou*, to be contributed by traders. But he at once found that the expenses of collection were barely covered by the receipts. Both the above compound words practically mean a "percentage," or rather "per *millage*," as it is reckoned on thousands; not necessarily one, but two or three per *mille*. The Governor Hu Lin-yih at Hankow about this time instituted such a charge in his province in order to pay the troops operating there against the Taipings. The next thing heard of it is in the spring of 1854, when the Governor-General of the Two Kiang reported the success of the *liküen*, or per *mille* "contribution," in certain tracts drained by what is known as the Inner Lower River (north of and parallel with the Yang-tsze, between the Canal and the sea), and suggested its extension to other provinces. In 1855 there were already complaints of extortion at the

dozen or so of stations established one after the other below Yangchow on the Yang-tsze River. In Kan Suh province the new levy proved so full of abuses that it was at once suspended; but general regulations for the Empire were none the less drawn up by the Cabinet Council in that year, and the Board of Revenue was officially charged with the duty of promulgating them and exercising general supervision. Thus the tax is an imperial one.

In the summer of 1856 the late Marquess Tsêng's celebrated father, Tsêng Kwoh-fan, then in the field against the Taipings, applied unsuccessfully for permission to devote all or a part of the *likin* collected at Shanghai to the support of the armies operating against the rebels in Kiang Si; it was decided that the presence of foreigners at Shanghai was an insuperable difficulty, and that, in any case, Kiang Su had a prior claim over Kiang Si. In the absence of clearer language, it seems plain that at this stage the Chinese saw full well how far the common-sense interpretation of the Nanking Treaty was an obstacle, and that they would never have dared to place a *likin* on foreign goods had not our own boneless policy stiffened them up to it. The following year, on the recommendation of the Nanking Viceroy Iliang, the Emperor decided against the idea of levying a *likin* over and above the duty on tobacco, on the ground that the traders would be liable to vexatious interference at every place they passed. The levy is here described as an "unfortunate necessity"; so that it is plain that from the beginning the Chinese recognised its unconstitutional nature. In 1858 the Governor of Ho Nan reported the progress in his jurisdiction of the new idea, and was warned not to allow any "undue harassing" of the persons

charged with the tax. Meanwhile the Governor of Hu Nan signified his desire to stop the further levy of *likin* in his province, as being found injurious to trade: the Emperor's answer was ungraciously evasive: "I have no doubt you understand what is right more than most of them; you are no fool." The Nanking Viceroy Ho Kwei, who had expressed doubts about the wisdom of giving encouragements for "contributions" charged upon foreign goods at Shanghai, "in which there might be contraband," was told by the Emperor not to make too much fuss about imaginary difficulties, but to give the usual rewards;—in other words, to sell titles at so much per lump sum collected; which confirms the notion conveyed by the word *küen*,—that the levy was nominally at first a voluntary gift. Mention is made at the same time of *likin* paid at Taku by Canton and Foochow junks entering the Tientsin River, and of *likin* on salt at Tientsin for Sêngk'o-lints'in's ("Sam Collinson's") army. In 1859 *likin* was newly established at Chefoo, it having been found that the various junks were beginning to go there in order to evade the charges at Tientsin. Orders were next issued to charge *likin* on native as well as on Indian opium in the interior, and the *likin* per pecul on foreign opium was fixed at Tls. 20, in addition to the Tls. 30 import duty; but the local officials were only allowed to collect the former. It does not here appear who collected the latter, but I suppose the embryo of the Foreign Customs, either under Mr. Wade or Mr. H. N. Lay. At all events, it is quite clear that we gave ourselves away in the Treaty of 1858. At this time allusion is made to *likin* on native opium grown in Yün Nan, "where foreign opium scarcely exists." In 1860 a collection upon trading carts and

bullion caravans was authorised at the Shan-hai Kwan—the gate to Manchuria—based on the same rules as that collection made at Fak'umên on the Mongol frontier palisade north of Mukden. Li Han-chang, elder brother of Li Hung-chang, was entrusted with the collection of *likin* in Kiang Si, where the army of Liu K'un-yih was then operating successfully against the rebels. Chungking *likin* to the amount of Tls. 10,000 was urgently called for as a military aid from Sz Ch'wan. In 1861 efforts were made to keep open the main Chêh Kiang roads, then harassed by Taipings, so as to facilitate the collection of *likin* from passing traders. The belated *likin* accounts of Kwang Si were also called for, and orders were given to rearrange the multifarious *likin* charges in Kiang Nan.

The above precise information all comes from the original decrees forming the basis of published Manchu history, and I have thought it well to quote the facts chronologically, in order to trace the historical growth of *likin*, which in its origin may be defined as “one per *mille* unwillingly levied under stress of exceptional circumstances upon a limited number of luxuries in transit.” Specific mention is plainly made of collections in the majority of the provinces, and it is evident that if the Chinese Government has subsequently taken an ell, it is largely because we ourselves tacitly abandoned inch after inch; at the same time, it must be admitted that we are partly responsible for the financial straits which have necessitated the irregularity.

Since 1861, during the fifty years' nominal reign of the three boy emperors under the tutelage of successive Dowagers, things have gone from bad to worse. We are all familiar with the howl of despair which our merchants and consuls have raised at every port, and have

steadily kept up. My revered old chief, Sir Brooke Robertson, at Canton, had, as stated,¹ a well-defined if mistaken policy, and he was too strong a man with the Foreign Office to be overborne by Sir Thomas Wade. He said we were taking away from the wretched mandarins—who, if corrupt, were none the less victims of a system which gave them no adequate pay—their accustomed local revenues, and were leaving them no chance of reasonable gain; that therefore he would do nothing in the matter: and nothing ever was done at Canton till he had retired and died. What he meant was that, as the Foreign Customs pays in all its money to the credit of Peking, and Peking appropriates very little of it to salaries or provincial uses, the local authorities must have some new means of oiling the administrative machine. To understand his theory, which is really a very just one, reference must also be made to the remarks made in the chapter on “Revenue.” Not one cent of anything Peking could get hold of in Manchu times was ever voluntarily given up by Peking to any person for any purpose except what concerned, directly or indirectly, the interests of Peking. The Foreign Customs, of course, interfered greatly with the development of the native collectorates, which were always regarded as the great plums of Palace favour; and if the Hoppo² of Canton—to take one as an example—could not recoup the million or so of dollars he had paid for his post, how could he send a regular stream of gold watches and chocolate creams to his patrons of the Seraglio? Not only so; the Taipings had ravaged the greater part of the country, and the rebellion had seriously reduced the yield of the land-tax. If the *hien* had no longer any “superfluity” on the land-tax, how

¹ p. 155.² Abolished 1904.

was he to grease the prefect's palm, the prefect the *taotai's*, the *taotai* the treasurer's and the judge's, and so on up to the Governor, the Viceroy, the Board, and the eunuchs, not to say the Emperor and the Empress-Dowager? And, so far, things are even worse under the Republic. I do not defend the Chinese system; but I say we must put a little human nature into our condemnation of it. How are you to make bricks without straw? or, as the Chinese say: "How make a meal without rice?"

It must be remembered that Peking and the provinces were under the Manchus, and to a certain extent still are, though competing rivals, at the same time one great "trust" or "combine" for all matters connected with the great national industry of raising the wind. A *hien* to-day may be a secretary of state to-morrow. The mandarins are the skilled "hands" in a big co-operative scheme, and they will either change the foremen or strike, unless reasonable compromises are made with them. Then, the people themselves are "in it," for China was republican in fact before it was in name, and any industrious man might and may become an official. Nearly every one says (or the majority say): "All right, we know all that; reform is necessary, but give me my share of the good things in the meantime." Yet there have not been lacking officials who have taken a higher view even under the Empire. In 1879, when the Mussulman rebellions had all been crushed, and the national conscience began to wake up, the sale of office was abolished in view of renascent prosperity, and it was seriously proposed to abolish *likin* too. However, Yellow River and other disasters and complications soon drove the Government once more to the sale of titles, and sometimes of real office; so *likin* had perforce to

remain. After the "Boxer" settlement of 1901, a second move was made towards the abolition of *likin* in exchange for readjusted import duties; but owing to the difficulty of bringing all the Powers into line, Sir James Mackay's well-meant efforts of 1902 bore little fruit. In October 1903 the United States and Japan also drew up treaties with China, in which the latter formally agreed to suppress *likin* in exchange for a $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. surtax, bringing up the duties on foreign imports to an effective 5 per cent. She also consented to reform her currency, weights and measures, judicial system, mining regulations, and so on; to open Peking and certain new ports to trade; but such effect as has been given to all these treaties has not forwarded matters very much.

The omitted particulars given in the earlier editions about the *likin* collected in each province are now obsolete, and may be treated as *non avenues*, the more so in that ever since an independent *tutuh* set up in each province at the revolution of 1911, each man in local power has been more or less a law unto himself. The 1911 estimate for *likin* was originally \$36,500,000, but as some provinces, in their haste to enjoy the fruits of democracy, incontinently proceeded to abolish *likin*, the budget for 1913 only estimated the yield at \$18,250,000. Sir Robert Hart had already made arrangements during the summer of 1898 that certain of the salt *likin* offices in the Yang-tsze valley should be placed under the control of the Commissioners of Maritime Customs, and subsequently it was agreed that a number of native customs houses should be transferred to these foreign commissioners too.

When a swashbuckler like the redoubtable Chang Hün can for four years on end defy all forms of central government, set up an army of

30,000 or 40,000 men at a vital junction like Sü-chou in North Kiang Su (practically controlling both the canal and the railway, not to speak of the general communications between four provinces), and maintain those troops, defiant pigtailed included, in affluence and efficiency, it must be evident that *likin* is by no means dead in that region, for blackmail on trade is his chief means for raising the wind. Every military satrap in China, whether *tutuh* as first self-styled, or *tsiang-kün* as dubbed by President Yüan, or *tuh-kün* (a combination of the other two) as called by President Li, does the same thing so far as he can and dare, the only difference being one of degree; the majority do it to fill their own private pockets and those of their supporters; others to maintain their armies in an effective condition for the provincial good; few, very few, for the benefit of the State as a whole, and the advantage of the public.

It follows from what we have said that nothing clear can be stated statistically of *likin* at the present moment. So far as opium *likin* is concerned, it appears to be, at least *de jure*, entirely under the control of the Foreign Customs, and in any case opium is a moribund trade. So far as salt *likin* is concerned, in 1898 Sir R. Hart, as just stated, succeeded in controlling a few centres, such as An-k'ing ("Gankin"), Kewkiang, etc., whilst Sir R. Dane and his Chinese controllers (who seem to be growing more and more convinced of the excellency of his methods) are gradually raking in system after system of salt distribution, and station after station of salt *likin* exactions. Thus, as regards these two main heads of opium and salt *likin*, the reader must be referred to the special reports, so far as they are given to the public, issued by the Inspectorate of Foreign Customs and by the Salt

Control at Peking, which latter seems to be a co-ordinate branch of the Board of Finance.'

So far as general *likin* is concerned, the tacit "rule" seems to be the good old one that he shall take who has the power, and he shall keep who can. The whole financial position of China is in a hopeless jumble; the honest men with clean hands are few, and of those few scarcely any have financial capacity. No man can say what each province gathers in, but whatever doles may be vouchsafed to Peking, *likin* is not one of them. If Peking is to get anything, the *tuh-kün* (military) or *shêng-chang* (civil) governor prefers that the cadastral land-tax should furnish the fund, for here there are definite registers to consult. Ever since *likin* was introduced sixty years ago, it has been tacitly "sealed" to provincial uses, and only shared with Peking under pressure. All local officials, high and low, have therefore an equal interest in thimble-rigging. When the Peking-Hankow Railway was approaching completion, the viceroys and governors concerned made, with the approval of the Board at Peking, fair arrangements under which the provinces through which the line passed should share a reasonable *likin* levy, and presumably this arrangement still holds good, more or less, on that line. But on the Shanghai-Nanking line, and still more on the Tientsin-P'u-k'ou (Nanking) line, there have been serious complaints of the injury done to trade, and the inconvenience inflicted upon passengers. In the spring of 1914 the Legations had to protest against contraventions of the 1858 treaty touching transit dues in An Hwei province, and against the imposition of a "consumption tax" at destination. In the summer of that year both the British and the American ministers had to protest against illegal exactions and discrimina-

tions against foreigners, in the provinces of Kiang Su, An Hwei, and Chêh Kiang: a postponement of these levies was demanded. In the late summer of 1915 the British minister had to protest once more against the reintroduction of *likin* stations (abolished in consequence of the 1914 representations) on the Tientsin-Nanking line. This time the native traders of the three provinces concerned—Chih Li, Shan Tung, and Kiang Su—all joined in the protest. The An Hwei traders chimed in later: there were complaints of levies beyond the $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. authorised by treaty, and also of the rough way in which passengers' baggage was treated. Thus, not only do these miserable local exactions impose an irritating obstacle to trade, but they seriously affect the prosperity of the trunk railway lines and foreign loan interests. China can never become a real Power until provincial and separatist feelings are subordinated to the general weal of the State, and until public funds cease to be regarded as legitimate quarry for the private fortune hunter.

Having now glanced at the general effect of *likin* upon trade, I may perhaps be permitted to express a personal opinion that the merchant guilds of each province would probably be only too glad to pay a fixed sum of from 1,000,000 taels to 10,000,000 taels a year to the Government, according to wealth, provided that no *likin*, octroi, fees, consumption taxes, or any charges whatever were, under any pretext, levied on either imports or exports, except at the treaty-ports and by the Foreign Customs. Jealousy of the Foreign Customs is the less justifiable now in that within the past decade it has been subordinated to a national "Customs Department" at Peking, on the understanding, however, that the British Inspector-General is to have the free

hand he always had. It would also pay foreign commerce well to agree to a general increase of duties under the same conditions. But, hand in hand with these two reforms, which would at once go far towards restoring the financial equilibrium of the Empire, out of the 100,000,000 taels or so thus encashed, at least one-half would have to go towards inaugurating an entirely new scheme of civil service, in which all mandarins, high and low, and all "underlings," should have a sufficient and even liberal salary or wage for work done: this latter reform, indeed, was insisted upon by the "three good viceroys" in the long discussions subsequent to the "Boxer" settlement of 1901. For many years to come no unaudited accounts should be entrusted to Chinese, and a fixed currency should be at once introduced, so as to get rid of the bugbear of shroffs and compradores: as with the Chinese in Foreign Customs employ, there is no harm in their merely handling the money and acting as cashiers, so long as Europeans manage the balancing of the accounts and employ a definite currency, whether it be gold, silver, or copper. A far-reaching reform of this kind would, however, require a man of the highest calibre, and the best part of his remaining life-time at that. Unfortunately national jealousies have so far rendered such a scheme difficult of achievement; and certainly now no Prussian will ever be tolerated by the Entente as "boss," with a *Kultur* taint of dishonest croupierism, and with general falsehood, cheating, and unfairness combined in his ill-shapen distorted pate.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ARMY

AT the time the first edition of this book appeared, when the whole civilised world, so to speak, was arrayed in arms against China at bay, the question of her armaments was of unusual interest. But it was then no easy matter to pourtray the existing army from any point of view whatever; and now, when everything is modernised and changed, it is still difficult to understand the position without casting an eye back upon the historical record. First of all, there was the old Manchu military organisation into "banners," or army corps, extended after the conquest so as to include the Mongols and a few faithful (or traitor, accordingly as we may look at it) native Chinese. The late Sir Thomas (then Mr.) Wade with infinite pains drew up about sixty years ago a full analysis of this system; but at present it is totally obsolete for the effective purposes of war, and therefore not worth describing in detail. Yet it may be useful, though the Manchu has really disappeared (as it was in 1900 contemplated he might disappear), to put on record the main features of the formidable aggregation which sufficed to overrun China 250 years ago.

There is no doubt that the principles of military organisation perfected by the Manchus were conceived in the same general spirit and

form as those of their ancestors the Nüchêns, who imperially ruled North China from 1113 to 1234; and these latter again drew part of their inspiration from a distantly allied race called the Kitans, who had ruled much the same territory as northern emperors, and on an equal footing with the rulers of South China, from 907 to 1112. The Kitans, in turn, must have inherited traditions from the still earlier State of Puh-hai alluded to on pages 23, 133. As modified by the early Manchu chieftains and emperors, the latest Tungusic organisation was as follows :—

There were eight Manchu banners, in pairs of four colours (*i.e.* plain and bordered), three banners being of higher caste than the other five, like the three Kitan “superior tents,” each banner under a *tu-t’ung*. Thus, with the assimilated Mongols and the descendants of “faithful” Chinese, there were twenty-four banners, numbering in all from 200,000 to 220,000 men. Just as every ordinary Chinaman belonged and still belongs to a *hien*, and has his domicile registered in the office of his “father and mother mandarin,” so every bannerman belongs to what the Manchus styled a *niuru*, and has his military domicile registered at the headquarters of his colonel, who thus stands in the same (or a somewhat similar) patriarchal relation to his military “people,” be they princes, officers, or common troopers, as does the magistrate to his civil population: it must be added that when President Yüan “bought out” the dynasty under Republican pressure in 1912, he guaranteed many of their rights, and amongst those preserved was the Banner organisation, so far as it affected the imperial family, their descendants, and retainers: hence the *tu-t’ungs* and *niurus* still keep their titles, registers and pensions, but

under the control approval of the republican Ministry of War. About 150 years ago, when the banner organisation was at its best, there were 679 Manchu, 227 Mongol, and 264 Chinese colonels (or *tsoling*, the other current name for the Manchu *niuru*), each in theoretical command of 300 families (troopers); but the actual total has always stood at about two-thirds of the theoretical, and the natural increment of able-bodied men has from economical considerations been drafted off into the categories of expectants, supernumeraries, and so on, drawing less or no pay. With this limited force of archers and spearmen China was conquered, for the artillery supplied with Jesuit assistance was only used on rare occasions; but of course local troops had even from the first to be forced or cajoled to assist the comparatively small bodies of banner-men, who acted rather as "stiffeners" than as the main body, just as the bulk of our Indian and African armies are of native races, honourably "stiffened," in the proportion each emergency requires, with a backbone of British soldiers; or just as the Czechs, Bosnians, Poles, and other unwilling Slavs are less honourably forced or cajoled into assisting their bullying Germanic conquerors. The *élite* of the banner forces, always more than half, from the first (1644) served to hedge in majesty at and around Peking; but at certain vital provincial centres, such as Canton, Foochow, Hangchow, etc., banner garrisons with their families, forming a sort of hereditary privileged caste within the inner walls, were until the 1911 revolution kept under a Tartar General, theoretically in order to "keep down" the turbulent "Man-tsz" or Chinese, and actually to hold the keys of the city gates. The feeding of these privileged soldiery was a first charge upon the revenues of

China, and it is thus only natural that so expensive an incubus should have severely tested the loyalty of the Chinese majority not enjoying any such banner privileges. For many years previous to 1911, 7,000,000 taels had been the fixed "first" appropriation for those at Peking alone, and a "supplementary" vote of at least 1,000,000 usually followed. As all this money came from the provinces, *a fortiori* the latter had to find the money for their own local bannermen and for their Chinese armies as well. If the finances of China, already described as having been so flourishing 150 years ago, had not been shattered by a succession of rebellions and foreign troubles; if these bannermen had maintained their military virtues, their robust simplicity and manliness, the Empire would neither have felt the burden severely, nor grudged the necessity of this heavy charge: the preservation of order, and a national sense of pride in power and prestige, would have amply compensated for the price paid to a few privileged keepers of the peace and the purse-strings; just as in India the taxpayer has some satisfaction, in the shape of security for person and property, to show for the (to him) huge salaries he pays to his British administrators. But, unhappily, the inactive bannerman, both at Peking and in the provinces, had towards the end degenerated into idle, flabby, and too often opium-smoking parasites; they had long neglected even to keep up their archery, which in any case had become useless in these days of magazine rifles, though it might have nourished a wholesome muscular habit of body if persisted in, much as our nearly obsolete sailing craft nourish a bold race of turbine steamer skippers: in 1905, however, archery examinations were formally abolished. In the provinces these degenerate Manchus were often, practically,

honourable prisoners, rigidly confined within the limits of the city walls, in the midst of a semi-hostile population speaking a dialect which bannermen were brought up in, or had to learn, in addition to their own if they wished even to purchase a cabbage in the streets; and the Tartar General, who nominally outranked even the Chinese Viceroy, was really often a self-indulgent, ignorant incompetent.

The Chinese army or "Green Banner" was organised in the following way, or was theoretically so organised until (1852-1865) the Taiping rebellion and foreign wars necessitated fresh patchwork. As I did in the case of civil government, so do I now with the military administration: in order to leave clearly outlined impressions, I first state the general principles, reserving exceptions and special detail for the end. Each province had a General, in supreme command of the green troops, and in immediate command of a portion of them; his *yamên* was sometimes at the provincial capital, sometimes at a (now abolished) *fu* city, or other place more strategically important. This officer's "button" rank was one nuance higher even than that of a viceroy; but in the diplomatic and civil part of his business he had to report and memorialise conjointly with the Viceroy, who (unless the General were a very able man, and charged with very important duty) was often to most intents his superior officer. He had under him from two to six brigadier-generals, each in high command of a brigade, and in immediate command of part of one: their *yamên* in each case was either at a first-class city, or at some special point where foreigners or other objectionable persons had to be kept down. It all depended upon the real work being done. And so it went on. Colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, sergeants, and

corporals were, and no doubt still are each in command of greater or smaller bodies of men, stationed in the cities, towns, and markets, and co-operating with the civilian *hiens*, assistant magistrates, and other small fry, down to the village headman. Now (1916) the *tuh-kün* or Military Governor is the sole supreme chief in each province; the other chiefs appointed directly by the President are called *chên-shou-shī* or "Order-preserving Commissioners," and seem to correspond to the now extinct brigadier-generals; but there are also *hu-kün-shī* and other occasional *shī* or commissioners not yet very definitively sorted out.

The old term "green" has gone out of use, and the army is simply "the land army" into which Manchus, other bannermen, braves, "greens," "savages," or any one else may enlist. There is little use discussing further organisation so long as each province is practically independent of Peking. Military officers in Manchu times were always supposed to ride on horseback, and not sit in sedans; but in latter degenerate days this rule was honoured more in the breach than the observance. Civilian officers could never serve in or very near to their own province, but military officers nearly always did so; and indeed often must, for otherwise they would not be able to talk promptly to their men. This question of serving in your own province came up for serious consideration in the months immediately preceding the death (1908) of the famous Dowager, who towards the end became an ardent and convinced reformer; it was proposed to modify the civilian disabilities up to a certain grade of rank. Now, under the Republic, it is too early to speak of definite rules, but in practice the old rule is ignored; for instance, the Military and Civil Governor (*pro tem.*) of Hu

Nan, T'an Yen-k'ai, is at this moment (1917) a native, and the press hails this fact as a good qualification.

Now, for two centuries at least, all "green" officers, from general to corporal, had been engaged, despite numerous spasmodic punishments and reforms, in wholesale speculation, and neither the garrison branch nor the fighting branch of the troops supposed to be under their commands, even if in some cases it existed at all, has had more than a partial or temporary existence. A green soldier, like a bannerman, came in the long piping times of peace to regard what reduced pay and allowances his officers left to him as a sort of hereditary sinecure, there being a tacit understanding that A and his successors would pay one shilling to B and his heirs, provided B would now and for ever sign vouchers for two shillings, and clap on a uniform "to his back" each time the Viceroy or any other "big man" should come round to hold a review. This state of affairs seems to have been tacitly connived at even by the earlier and abler Manchus at Peking, who were in no hurry to see effective armies in the provinces they "fed" upon. They could easily send to any point a fighting body of mounted Mongols, or of Solon-Manchus, when danger really arose.

When the great rebellions and the foreign complications consequent thereon broke out sixty or more years ago, the imperial leaders had recourse to the device of hiring "braves" to do the fighting. That is, such "soldiers" as existed, and had no stomach for the merry wars, were left to perform garrison and police duty, whilst either sturdy peasants or such of the youthful soldiers as were willing and able to fight were engaged, at much higher rates of pay than the craven soldiers received, in order to

induce them to face the foreign enemy. Under competent leadership the Chinese brave—and indeed the Chinese soldier, when his concrete existence with all his limbs and organs about him was placed beyond cavil or doubt—was, I take it, as good as any other average fighting man. But of course a warrior to succeed must be fed, and supplied with arms at least nearly as good as the enemy's; and this even if he gets no pay, clothes, medical attendance, or protection from the elements—all which accessories a Chinese warrior of the old-fashioned pre-"Boxer" kind could and did dispense with at a pinch more or less cheerfully.

When the wars of the sixties were over, spasmodic efforts were made, not only to drill and supply with foreign weapons a certain number of bannermen at Peking, Canton, and a few other places where foreigners were well to the fore, but also to keep the braves up to the mark. The greens were too far gone for anything to be done with them, *quâ* greens; but, carefully weeded out, some of them were occasionally available as reserve braves. As a Foochow green captain wittily remarked twenty years ago, in his report to the High Commissioners, when nettled at the Board's contemptuous comments on his mere "soldiers": "After all, there is no essential difference between a soldier and a brave. Both are simply men. If you pay my soldiers as well as you pay his braves, my soldiers will be braves; but if you starve his braves as you are starving my soldiers, his braves will be soldiers. Braves or soldiers, it is in each case a question of true pay-rolls, unpeculated pay, sufficient food and drill, and good rifles."

After making a fair show in 1880 against the Russians in Ili and in 1884 against the French in Tonquin—not to mention the earlier recon-

quests of Turkestan from Yakub Beg (1874), and Yün Nan from Suliman the Panthay (1873)—the Chinese, or rather the Manchu Government, began to get presumptuous, and our own blunders led them, or contributed to lead them, on the wrong tack in Corea in 1886. The result of ten years' Korean bickerings was the Japanese war of 1894, in which navy, braves, banner-men, and soldiers were all alike knocked "sky-high"; and China, smarting under the weight of shame and a heavy indemnity, began to make genuine and serious efforts to put her military house in order. It was at once seen and admitted that, as a fighting value, the whole green army might be abolished at one stroke of the pen; it was suggested in 1896 that a standing army of 300,000 men in ten districts should be raised; but it was pointed out, and also at once admitted, that the "vested rights" even of common soldiers must be considered, or the worm might turn; not to mention the necessity of providing for gallant officers who had received brevet rank for more or less imaginary victories, and who looked to substantive promotion. Besides, feeble though the greens were, there was no other force to maintain elementary order in the country towns, to check smugglers, to guard city gates, to escort prisoners and dignitaries, to watch passes, fords, and other pivot points on lines of communication. It was therefore decided to do away with a quarter or a half of the greens in every province, according to the degree of corruption prevailing in each place, and at any rate not to fill up or create more vacancies. The difficulty about officers was, "How can we deprive His Majesty's deserving officers of their salaries and expectations? And, if we pay them for commanding, how can we entirely abolish their commands?" Then came the German

attack on Kiao Chou, and the counter demands of other Powers; German training officers were accordingly engaged to form really effective armies at Nanking and Wuch'ang. The young Emperor and his advisers were thus in a fair way to solve some, if not all, of these knotty points by introducing sweeping reforms. But His Majesty was in too much of a hurry, and, alarmed, the Empress-Dowager by a counterblast gave short shrift to most of these reforms, whilst the intrigues of disappointed speculators, both civil and military, doubtless had a good deal to do with bracing that energetic lady up to the further decisive action point of conducting a *de facto* if tacit regency once more in the name of the *de jure* Emperor. The weak part of Chinese reforms is and always has been the absence of continuity and sustained effort. The Chinese never know how to persist. No sooner are reductions made and the savings therefrom applied to new efforts, than fresh appropriations of money are required to complete these efforts. When the results are good, it is felt that economies may be made. And thus things go on in a perpetual vicious circle. Compensation to incapables who have been got rid of: savings thus overestimated, and insufficient to get good men: sudden alarms and hasty additions: ultimate extra expenditure instead of the savings expected, in order really to get the men required: reduction in the number of the men now competent, or in their pay, in order to bring the permanent expenditure back within normal limits. Meanwhile Yüan Shī-k'ai had after his Korean failure trained up an excellent force near Tientsin and had (1898) supported the Dowager against the Emperor.

Although several viceroys and governors took advantage of the Empress-Dowager's *volte-face*

to obtain "reconsideration" of certain reductions already sanctioned, each province, or at least each one exposed to "foreign insult," did really make genuine efforts within the two years preceding the "Boxer" rising to place its military power upon a proper basis. The ridiculous "Boxer" fiasco was really a manifestation of public indignation at the inability of the Manchu dynasty to preserve China's honour; that was why the Dowager, in her alarm, conceived the idea of utilising this dangerous popular movement on her own side; why she shuffled and hesitated so much; and why the two viceroys possessing German-trained armies at Nanking and Hankow (Wuch'ang) joined Yüan in ignoring her orders to massacre all foreigners. They three alone knew what real armies were, and how China was only beginning to acquire the elements of military strength; hence our characterisation of "three good viceroys."

In 1901, when the "Boxer" settlement was being arranged, the Viceroy Chang Chi-tung sent in a memorial plainly setting forth the utter futility and wastefulness of the green banner troops, and in that year a Decree approved an entirely new army scheme, including training schools for officers and men, Army Council, General Staff, an active army in twenty territorial sections or army corps, with divisions, battalions, cavalry regiments, and artillery batteries, engineer companies, etc., all complete. Total, 500,000 fighting units. Then there was to be a Reserve Force, with 9 (1st) and 3 years' (2nd) liability after active service. Most instructors were from Germany and Japan. Efforts were made to secure some sort of uniformity in artillery, rifles, small arms, rates of pay, uniforms, manœuvring, and drill. The more successful armies—those under the three good viceroys

were to draft off officers and instructors to aid the more backward provinces. There were long discussions about the necessity of cultivating the military spirit; historical comparisons showing how the soldier and civilian officers were in the good old times of equal dignity; how the military man had fallen from his high estate; how in foreign countries even princes belonged to the army or the navy; how absurd it was to lock up Manchu princes in otiose inactivity at Peking; and so on. It never seemed to strike any one that this sudden appreciation of the despised soldier might galvanise him into a Frankenstein dangerous to the dynasty; but that is what has occurred; and since the Republic was established in 1911-1912 the soldier has come into his own with a vengeance, and has become a body, or rather many bodies, of prætorian guards or janissaries, threatening at every instant the establishment of legitimate authority. Even when the Manchu dynasty in 1908 seemed to be recovering its authority, when the Dowager appeared earnestly convinced of the necessity of legal, constitutional, financial, educational, and army reform, there were signs of military restlessness; for instance, demands, even made by prominent Manchus, for the abolition of pigtails and petticoats, for recourse to a more practicable and manly dress, and for equality of status between civil and military officials. In view of this the State soon saw that railway communications were the true key to military efficiency, and thus a new struggle sprang up between provincial interests and the desire to control provincial railways on the one hand, and State interests (not unjustly suspected to be dynastic interests) counselling towards direct State control of all railways. This struggle was exacerbated by the failure of the Ningpo

and Sz Ch'wan railway projects under local control, and the determined but sensible Peking effort to lay hands nilly-willy upon the management of these lines. This question, indeed, seems to have been the one that most immediately precipitated the unripe revolution of 1911.

Meanwhile under the feeble regency (1909-1911) of the younger Prince Ch'un (the Emperor Kwang-sü's brother), who allowed himself to be controlled by Palace agencies, and above all by the vengeful spite of the new Dowager (widow of Kwang-sü), the independence of military spirit grew in proportion to the progressiveness and efficiency of provincial armies. Two of the "three good viceroys" (Liu K'un-yih and Chang Ch'i-tung) were no more, whilst the third (Yüan Shih-k'ai) having been summoned in 1907 from his Tientsin administrative successes to Peking, promptly after the Dowager's and Emperor's deaths in 1908, fell a victim to these intrigues, and was summarily ejected from the capital. Thus the one man who had practically created the modern army, and could control it, was relegated to obscurity, and, directly the Han-kow-Sz Ch'wan revolt broke out in October 1911, all these provincial army chiefs "pronounced" in O'Donnell fashion, and constituted themselves *tutuh* or independent military rulers respectively of each province, a state of affairs that, after various changes in name, practically exists in milder outward form at the moment I write.

It is unnecessary to recount the details of the army reorganisation as above described, based upon the reforms initiated in 1905. In 1912 the Republic changed the names once more, names so often changed from antiquity that any given one may mean squad, company, regiment, or army according to its adapted signification at

this or that date in the past. One word, however, has persisted through centuries, and that is *ying*, meaning an entrenched or walled-in camp of from 500 to 1,000 men, and which we may here translate "battalion," as it can be used either in an illustrative sense, as "God favours the strong battalions," or in a specific sense, as "one battalion only got across." My French colleague Professor A. Vissière (possessing the retired rank of Minister Plenipotentiary) published in 1914 an excellent account in the *Journal Asiatique* (Jan.-Feb.), and from it I take the following:—

An army corps is called a *kün* (the whole "navy" is called the "sea-*kün*" and the whole "army" the "land-*kün*"). A division is termed a *shü*; a brigade, *lü*; a regiment, *t'wan*; battalion, *ying*; and a company, *lien*. The basis of gradation is, after Japanese model, expressed by one syllable: thus all generals are *tsiang*, all superior officers are *hiao*, all subaltern officers are *wei*, and all *sous-officiers* are *shü*; but all the above are subdivided into three, *i.e.* *shang*, *chung*, and *hia*, meaning "top, middle, bottom": thus we have top general of an army corps, middle general of a division, and bottom general of a brigade; and, proceeding downwards, in the same way colonel, lieutenant-colonel, *commandant* (I presume = major); then captain, lieutenant, sub-lieutenant; and so on with the top, middle, and bottom *shü* (corresponding, I suppose, with our sergeant, corporal, etc.).—Thus M. Vissière. The rank and file have immensely improved since I penned my serio-comic and somewhat contemptuous description of the Chinese "Tommy" as he existed up to 1900; at the same time, whilst totally withdrawing it from this edition, I must remind readers that even in 1900 I expressed the utmost confidence

in Tommy's "bottom" (as Dr. Johnson embarrassingly said in the presence of Miss Hannah More), and declared that I myself would not hesitate to lead Chinese soldiers (brought into shape under my own supervision) against any troops in existence; "for, Sir, they have a *bottom* of good sense."

As to the Chinese navy, I think I was the first to greet the future Captain Lang, R.N., when, with the future Captain Ching, R.N. (two curiously Chinese names!), he brought out the first mosquito gun-boats to Pagoda Anchorage in June 1877. I again met Admiral Lang at the same place in May 1890 when, with Admiral Ting, he was in joint command of a powerful Chinese fleet.¹ Meanwhile (once more on the same spot) such fleet as the Chinese had between the above two dates was destroyed by Admiral Courbet in September 1884. The navy at present is—and politically wisely—as negligible a quantity as ever, and there would be no practical object in describing here the history of its failures.

¹ For this humorous incident see *John Chinaman* (Murray, 1901).

CHAPTER XIV

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

It is only natural that, at a moment when all Europe is watching the great issues involved in the present struggles of the Chinese democracy to carve out for itself a place in the sun of civilisation and progress, special interest should attach to the question of personal qualities. Volumes have already been written on this subject; but the Rev. Arthur Smith, in his matchless volume *Chinese Characteristics*, has for long been and still is universally regarded as having best expressed those judgments which most of us feel to be just, but few of us are gifted with the art of clearly enunciating—not to say with the *verve* and insight of the inimitable American author. I feel an unjustifiable pride in recalling the fact that, when the first papers came out anonymously about thirty years ago, I was repeatedly asked—dubiously—if I was the author; the sentiments being occasionally recognisable as mine, the just doubts being whether I was capable of writing anything so entertaining and readable. I have not to this day read any of Mr. Smith's appreciations, except the first few anonymous ones, and I now therefore simply give, not his judgment nor the judgment of mankind, but my own individual opinion after a generation of total residence in nearly all parts of China.

Of the Manchus, as distinguished from the

Chinese, I can only speak touching those who under the Empire used to inhabit Peking, Canton, Foochow, Nanking, Hangchow, and Chinkiang, and who seem to have since quietly and inoffensively merged into the local populations. Except in the case of Peking, where the Manchu and Chinese population was so mixed as to be indistinguishable to any but the most observant eye, the Manchus were all "bannermen"; that is, a privileged caste of soldiers, having their families with them, living in cantonments amongst a people speaking (except in the case of Nanking and Chinkiang) a totally different dialect. Their life was a haughty and exclusive one, and what natural characteristics they may have had were inevitably coloured by the nature of their surroundings. Mixed marriages were not allowed until after the "Boxer" settlement, when steps began to be taken to assimilate the Manchus to the Chinese in many ways. Of all these Manchus I should say their chief characteristic was a combination of laziness and pride; but wherever placed with foreigners in the relation of pupil to teacher, as for instance in schools, drill-grounds, laboratories, etc., their bearing, as was natural with a ruling race, was distinctly more dignified than that of Chinese. The specimens of Manchu mandarins (always hailing from Peking) I have met in the provinces have invariably appeared to me to be more jovial, easy-going, accommodating if not reasonable, impulsive, and careless of consequences than the Chinese: at the same time less capable of business, less cautious about public opinion, more ignorant and indiscreet. The princes at Peking were of course haughty, and often a trifle sullen, as became the degenerate descendants of fine manly fellows like the earlier emperors; for

they felt themselves *de jure* entitled to all the deep-felt respect their ancestors exacted, but *de facto* impotent to obtain even a shabby imitation of it; moreover the innumerable *tsung-shih*, or (poor) relations of the blood were not under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, until in 1907 their conduct became so offensive that Mixed Courts "of a sort" were established to deal with the anomaly. The Manchus, like nearly all northerners, have a tendency to get drunk. Here, again, they differ from the Chinese, but are not so bad as the more simple Mongols. Even at official interviews a Manchu mandarin was occasionally flushed with liquor, in which case he often adopted a braggart's airs. As to bravery, I don't believe a Manchu is by nature either more or less brave than a Chinaman. If it is brave to commit suicide rather than to suffer humiliation, then both are equally courageous. If it is cowardly to run when you have no confidence in the honesty or capacity of your officers, then both are equally cowardly. But, generally, it appears to me that true courage is often indistinguishable from pinchbeck all the world over, and depends very much upon local ideas of "good form," and external circumstances and surroundings of every kind; for instance the French and the Belgians are showing the noblest courage, whilst the Prussians are exhibiting the basest cowardice, moral and other.

With the above qualifications, and also reserving the question of the purer Manchus in Manchuria, of whom I know nothing, I should say the Manchu is indistinguishable in character from the Peking Chinaman, the Peking Chinaman from the northern, the northern from the central, and the central from the southern. In other words, they all run into each other, just as a Russian runs into a Pole, a Pole into an

Austrian, and thence into a German, Dutchman, Englishman, and American. To put it in another way, if you begin to distinguish at all, you must first decide whether you are going to split hairs or cleave mountains, for every single Chinese village differs in character from the next one adjoining. The broad lines of distinction must be taken in another way, and in order to get any real idea of how a Chinaman differs from ourselves, we must therefore ignore petty details both in ourselves and in them, and see if there are any main features of an unmistakable kind. Perhaps the easiest way to do this would be to go about it the other way, and try to see ourselves as others see us. The average Chinese does not trouble himself to decide from our complexion or our food whether we are Jews or Christians; from the vivacity or stupidity of our manner, whether we are Latins or Teutons; from our readiness to fib or our smugness, whether we are Russians or George Washingtons in disguise. No! in Empire days he lumped us all together as "foreign devils" or "barbarians" from the West, who wore tight-fitting clothes instead of baggy ones; who had long noses and deep-sunken eyes, mop-like hair instead of a pigtail; who ate ox-meat, cheese, and other coarse things instead of rice and a scrap of pork or fish—and smelt strong accordingly; who often assumed a bullying attitude and were prone to violence when misunderstandings occurred; who got drunk; and so on, and so on. Of course now the pigtail has gone by the board, and mop-like hair is fashionable, as also are many features in the foreign food, dress, and (sad to say) want of good manners.

The general reader will soon get confused if he is told that a Cantonese will scrupulously burn his incense outside his front door at 7 p.m.,

whilst a Pekingese will see his own grandmother anything but blessed before he will sacrifice to her coffin. Examples of this sort might be multiplied and diversified by thousands. The man in the street does not particularly want to know that the pigtail was only introduced 270 years ago, and was not Chinese at all, but essentially a Manchu characteristic. All he sees is that there is a vast tract of country as big as Europe, inhabited by 400,000,000 of yellow-skinned men and women with swarms of half-naked children who are still apt to yell out opprobrious epithets at Europeans. These people squat on the ground as often as they sit on chairs; are totally indifferent about air and smells; shovel their food down with chopsticks; are always scratching their persons; have slobbery mouths and plenty of vermin; get the best of every bargain; seem to tell a lie whenever they speak at all; wear Jim Crow suits of clothes when they abandon their native costume; are reputed to drown their babies; still smoke opium when they can get it; are supposed to practise the most bizarre immorality; never wash; etc., etc. These, and other points like them, exhibit the broad lines of imaginary Chinese character, and it is for us now to see how far they are true.

1. A Chinaman is universally considered to be a liar. And so he is. But, after a few years of initiation, I never found much difficulty in extracting the truth from any Chinaman, whether milkman or mandarin. Not only so,—I always felt great confidence in the truthfulness of my own servants, though they often popped out sundry lies. We have our own lies—divorce-court lies, club lies, society lies, husband-and-wife lies, and so on. The distinction is that we lie with a different motive. A Chinaman gener-

ally lies in order to get some petty pecuniary advantage, to save trouble, to conceal neglect, to avoid being impolite, or to spite an enemy. We lie in order to keep up conventional ideas of honour and virtue, to save our relations from pain or disgrace, from a feeling of *esprit de corps*, and so on. But we know the measure of our own lies; we instinctively apply the grain or the bucket of salt where we feel it is required; the shock is broken; we all do things and feel things in the same way; the motive is familiar. But with the luckless Chinaman the conditions presented to us are new and abrupt. He does his lying in a different way altogether; and so we call him a liar. He calls us liars too, and believes it; if not in money matters, at all events in "diplomacy." He is not so nice and particular about the truth as we think we are: and that is about the measure of my condemnation. On the other hand, he is not nearly so hypocritical; but he objects to "losing face."

2. A Chinaman is thought to be a thief. The "chit" system is universal in China, so that pocket-money is unnecessary. I see this very year (1916) that efforts are being made to curtail the chit habit. A "chit" is a pencil scrawl on a piece of paper, naming (in any form) a sum of money, which is "collected" from the comprador or, as Anglo-Indians say, the "butler" once a month: it may be 10 cents for a drink, or it may be for £25 lost at cards. I always kept the safe locked, possessed no jewellery I had not always on, and never locked up anything but money and important papers; particularly I never locked up wine or cigars. During the whole course of my life in China (with one notable exception, when a thief at an inn walked off with me and my bed in my sleep, deposited me in a handy spot, and

extracted a valuable fur coat from underneath me), I was never robbed of anything. I have several times been menaced with violence by men who appeared to be thieves, but who perhaps were policemen or "watchers"; yet I got off by various devices, such as firing an old pistol, or pointing a candlestick at the robbers; and I have missed silk handkerchiefs (as we miss umbrellas in England) occasionally. I usually had at least a dozen servants and retainers wherever I was, and if any of them stole my property I was never conscious of it. Of course I took reasonable precautions, as everyone ought to do; if a person deposits tempting articles in tempting places he must expect to lose them, even in a country like Norway, where simple honesty is (or was, forty years ago) carried to *naïveté*; but I possessed few tempting articles, no articles I did not need to use, and these were always in their proper place, so that I did not lose them; or, what is equally satisfactory to a sensible man, was not aware of it. I well remember once asking my permanent "boy" how it was that so many of my forks had a stain. He said it was done by various "coolies," or under-servants, each of whom in succession invariably "tested" the electro on his own account, merely as a business-like act. On another occasion, when I wished to lock up the same electro box, he said: "Not at all; if you lock it up, someone will mistake the contents for silver, and carry the whole box away, or break it open; whereas, if you leave it open, each thief will be able to ascertain for himself that it is not worth stealing."

3. Chinamen are always regarded as being dirty. This I deny; or, rather, I qualify. In the warm parts of China a Chinaman, clothes and all, is much less offensive to the senses (my

senses) than an Englishman of the same class, clothes and all. In the cold north, where fuel is dear and scarce, the custom prevails in winter of piling on clothes upon clothes, and rarely changing them. In Mongolia I fell in partly with local custom, and neither took off my clothes nor washed any part of my person but my hands and face for a whole month. No vermin will at any time touch me, so my case is perhaps special; but I noticed everyone else near me, Chinese and European, "grew vermin," to use the local term. Still, it was too cold to take any garment off for long; and so, instead of undertaking ablutions, the others all employed their energies, at leisure moments, in the same way that monkeys do, with a view to retaining the exclusive use of their own skin for themselves. In the south of China it is the custom amongst the working classes to swab, with a wet rag or dishcloth, as much of the body as can be got at without taking the trousers off. This, extended to all the body, is really all a man requires in any part of the world, and in any case it is more than our own "working classes" habitually do. The Hakka Chinese, in the extreme south, male and female, properly wash the whole body every day of their lives. But, apart from washing, the Chinese do not eat such strong food as we do, and therefore, even if they are "nasty" in their habits, they are not exactly rank and dirty—*i.e.* not ranker and dirtier than we are ourselves. Their nastiness is in form rather than fact; for instance, my servants used at a pinch to wipe my dishes with their sleeve or coat-tail; blow down the spout of my tea-pot in their anxiety not to keep me waiting for a drink; themselves take a swig from the spout; draw the said coat-sleeve across their noses; wipe their hands or faces after washing

with a pair of trousers, a coat-tail, or maybe the lining of a hat; spend hours in hunting for body-vermin (a favourite Chinese pastime); and so on. But, for all that, I do not call them dirty beyond the ordinary rancidity of poverty all over the world. The saying: "The Japanese wash their bodies, the Chinese wash their clothes" is fairly true. Nations differ in the form of their cleanliness. For instance, no matter to what continental country you go, you will get more liberal supplies of table-linen than you will in any British steamer, hotel, or eating-house. On the other hand, there is no country where window-curtains look so clean and neat as in England. I do not think there is any country in the world where the "working classes" dress so dirtily as in England; nor is there any where the homes are kept so neat by the same dirty men's wives.

4. The Chinese are said to be ungrateful. This I totally deny. The fidelity of Chinese servants is really extraordinary, if they are treated with even moderate sympathy and consideration; and this, whether it be a native or a foreign master who is concerned. Nothing makes a more powerful impression on the Chinese mind than impartial justice. To them it is a grand sight to see wages paid out without deductions on the "scale," or nibblings of any kind; to see the master refusing presents and bribes—which last, indeed, few persons dare even offer; to observe that he will not "run up" a bill for compensation in cases of riot. When they begin to get used to the cold mathematical precision of the British mind, going straight for its object without fear or favour, they begin to feel that they are in the presence of a weird, strange being of a superhuman kind. But again, when they find that, in addition to

this chilly justice, they are positively receiving some tenderness or consideration, such as gratuitous medical aid, free assistance in righting a wrong, the present of a coffin to their mothers, and such-like things indicative of disinterestedness, they positively overflow with feelings of respectful gratitude. I have seen a pack of cunning-looking Chinamen blubber like babies in taking leave of their master, and the more impassive he looked the more they blubbered. It is this gratitude for kindness that often deceives missionaries into a belief that "faith" has been aroused in the Celestial mind. Even officials of the most rascally description show great fidelity to a friend. On one occasion I procured the dismissal of a tolerably high mandarin for corruption; but, feeling rather sorry for the man, I sent him a gorgeous but useless silver presentation epergne packed in a box I had never even opened, and which was always getting into my way. He also never opened it, probably thinking I was playing him some dirty farewell trick, or was inferentially sneering at his misfortune; but, some months afterwards, when he had got to his own province, I received from him a letter, written in the best of good taste, avoiding all allusion to public matters, and sending me some little "literary" paintings of a most artistic kind done by himself, evidently at the cost of great labour. He had divined correctly that no other "presents" would be appreciated, or even accepted. On yet another occasion I asked a high official to put in writing some facts touching a matter in which both he and I had been deceived. He said, "X. has certainly behaved badly; but he was my friend when he did it, as you are now; and I would no more tell you in writing that he did it than I would tell him that you asked me to give infor-

mation against him." In fact, there is a very high standard of both gratitude and honour amongst friends in China, in spite of treacheries and rogueries. I cannot recall a case where any Chinese friend has left me in the lurch or played me a dirty trick; and few of us can say the same of our own colleagues and countrymen.

5. Chinese politeness is generally termed hollow. Chinamen are not so effusive and formal as the Japanese (old system), and on the other hand they are much more ceremonious than even the French; of course the Republic has affected their outward bearing. It is only given to the few in any race of mankind to possess the instinctive and inborn politeness which comes of kindness taking its own natural form. For most of us fixed formalities are necessary, just as the letter of the Law is found indispensable, with or without the rigid dogmas of religion, to restrain the vast majority of persons who are not sufficiently well-balanced by gift or training to be competent to set up and adhere to their own standard of right. In this sense, therefore, the Chinese politeness is hollow; but it achieves its object, and, being under the old Confucian ideals absolutely fixed, it, like the rules of the confessional, saves the trouble of thinking, and prevents men from the *gaucherie* of external "sin" in form. Chinese male simperings and our own "feline amenities" are cast in much the same mould. The stupid, gawky clownishness, or rudeness, of the English rustic or factory hand is quite unknown in China. There are no *h's* to leave out, and no man is ashamed either of his own relations or of his friends. There is a natural ease of manner amongst all degrees, which the "classified" British mind cannot even conceive. It is akin to the outspoken frankness and ready wit of the French, which contrasts so painfully

with our self-consciousness, starchy snobbishness, and *mauvaise honte*. The Chinese are (unlike the Japanese) much given to brawling and coarse language; they are as badly off for respectable adjectives as Tommy Atkins himself. In a word, they are not at heart so kindly and sympathetic as we are, but they certainly are more sprightly and polite, and they rarely "take social liberties."

6. I think it must be conceded that the Chinese are cruel. Nearly all domestic animals are treated without any consideration whatever—not of an interested nature. If kindness or tenderness is shown, a great parade is made about it. Children are rarely checked in their cruelty to mice, flies, and such creatures. Buddhism has certainly had some mollifying effect, even upon the Chinese heart; for instance, there are societies for "preserving life," and dens or keeps for "letting animals go" in; and some people—especially Mongols—pay attention to Buddha's precepts about not taking even the smallest life, even to the extent of killing a flea. But all that is a mere drop in the ocean of cruelty, or rather callousness. Perhaps one reason is that the standard of bodily comfort is so low in China that the slightest divergence from it in an unfavourable direction means cruelty. If an ordinary Chinaman lives over a sewer or a pig-sty, as I have often had to do in Chinese inns; if he feeds on coarse grain, wears rags, sleeps on the dank floor, and possesses only 5s. worth of property in the world, all told; how are you to make criminals object to the rigours of prison life? Yet it is a fact, in spite of this specious way of putting it, that the Chinese seem positively to gloat over misery. Where is there a country in the world where you will see, as you might have seen in Shanghai

twenty years ago, prisoners, surrounded by a jeering crowd, starving to death in the sun and rain, suspended by the neck for days and nights so that the toe-tips just touch the floor? Where was there ever a country (except perhaps Bokhara) where maggots were positively bred up to bore into the wounds of chained prisoners? The callous way in which beggars are left to die in the public streets; the brutal treatment of foreigners when at the mercy of a mob; the contemptuous ignoring of drowning men; the lingering executions; the swarms of lepers left to rot on the roads; the tyranny of gaolers;—all these and many other things go to show that the Chinese are undoubtedly as low down as the Prussians in the scale of downright cruelty. It is but right to add, however, that a great many official cruelties were denounced a dozen years ago by the humane viceroy Liu K'un-yih and others, and some very drastic changes have since been made.

7. As to mercantile honour, in spite of occasional lapses, such as occur in all countries, it is so universally admitted that Chinese credit stands deservedly high, that I need not say another word about it, except that unhappily it has quite recently somewhat degenerated owing to the competition of crooked foreign traders eager for business. It is also a curious fact that, although Government credit *vis-à-vis* of the people stands so low that it could not well go lower, as regards foreign obligations it is, subject to political risks, as good as that of almost any country. It is quite pathetic to watch the extraordinary assiduity with which funds are collected for the service of the foreign loans; and even touching to read of coolie caravans trudging laboriously along with loads of silver all the way from Shan Si to the

banks of Shanghai, where the bullion is paid into the credit of the Customs treasury for the benefit of overfed financiers in Europe. Nearly all foreigners who have ever been employed by Chinese have noted the scrupulous punctuality with which their salaries are paid, at all events when it is possible: the national honour seems very sensitive upon this point. At times the treasury may be hopelessly depleted, and underlings, through whose hands the money passes, will always endeavour to make a "squeeze" on the scale, or on the exchange; but that does not seriously affect the main consideration herein indicated.

8. "Morals" is of course a vague and comprehensive word, but I use it here, advisedly, in the contracted sense of popular English usage. The Chinese are undoubtedly a libidinous people, with a decided inclination to be "nasty" about it. Herein they differ from the Japanese, who are excessively lax, but very rarely *raffinés*. A check is placed upon this national Chinese characteristic by the almost universal practice of early marriage. Moreover, 90 per cent. of the population are too poor even to think of any further sexual indulgence than the possession of a single wife affords. Among the well-to-do classes the civilian mandarins, who in Manchu times never served in their own province, are often forced to lead a secluded and sedentary life, and in most cases prefer to leave their first or legitimate wives at home, partly on account of the dangers of travel, and partly in order to look after the family graves, documents, and honour. Hence concubines are in these cases almost recognised as a necessity. Most rich mandarins, however, go beyond necessity, and they are the most profligate class. Next come the wealthy merchants; but these, when

living at home, are naturally more bound to decency by family ties than are the mandarins who move about to temporary habitations with their servants and concubines. Still, amongst all classes and ranks the "moral sense" is decidedly weak, and there is hardly a Manchu or a Chinese living possessed of that form of "Puritanical" virtue seen in some Europeans,—that condition of mind which frowns at a ribald or even a *risqué* story, sternly refuses any sexual temptation that may offer, or forces itself to be content with a chivalrous platonic attitude. The depressing spectacle of 2,000,000 old maids in England (the proportion would be 20,000,000 in China) has no counterpart there. Neither man nor woman exists in China to whom the functioning of his or her own nature remains a sealed mystery. Of Chinese women it is less easy to speak than of men, for (subject to the effect of "progress" during the last twenty years) nearly all respectable ones lead a *purdah* life; but to judge by the language of novels, what one reads of in law cases, and sees in street life; by the jealous behaviour of men, and the brutally cruel customs in vogue for punishing all female lapses, "every (Chinese) woman is at heart a rake," and precautions are taken accordingly by their lords and masters. Some provinces have decidedly more "conscience" than others. The Cantonese, though exceedingly libidinous, disapprove of "artificial vice" of all kinds. On the other hand, Fuh Kien has an infamous reputation, possibly owing to its ancient connection with traders from beyond the seas; and undoubtedly the morals of that province are made worse by the fearful prevalence of female infanticide, and the consequent comparative scarcity of women. The northerners, more especially the crapulous leisured classes of Peking, used openly to flaunt

the worst of vices, and I have not heard of improvement. No doubt Tartar influence has had its effect, for from Bokhara to Corea all Tartars seem fashioned from one mould in this respect. Offences which with us are regarded as almost capital—in any case as infamous crimes—do not count for as much as petty misdemeanours in China; not even in Canton, where disapproved. This easy-going view works both ways: it obtains for the Chinese the mistaken reputation of universally indulging in vile gratifications; but such indulgences, by the mere fact that they are no crimes, soon run themselves out harmlessly in youth, while ridicule suffices to do the rest; and what an old scamp does in his harem concerns no one but himself and his slaves. Anyhow, there is no humbug, concealment, or Mrs. Grundyism. In sum, I am disposed to say that the Chinese, taken as a whole, are not much, if any, worse than Europeans; in each case, some countries (or provinces) being greater sinners than others.

9. The Chinese do not treat children well. Japan has been justly described as the paradise of children. China is the reverse. Fathers and mothers, especially rich ones, of course pet and fondle pretty children of both sexes, and they like to see them well dressed. Also fathers of old or official family are careful to have their sons well trained, according to native ideas of propriety. But the masses of fathers ignore their daughters altogether, or regard them as *impedimenta* of the female department, to be kept safely out of the way, and dry, like any other indispensable stores. Within the past dozen years, however, female education has been largely introduced, and women's "rights" have broadened as much as their former loose and airy clothing has tightened. Sons are viewed

as links, spiritually connecting the person with one's ancestors and futurity. The American idea of children—and indeed they are often pert, “marred” little creatures, brought up under exaggerated ideas of liberty—is monstrous in Chinese eyes. No such sight existed in imperial China as a father sitting down to dinner to eat, smoke, and chat with his sons, and even to exchange “views.” The only approach to such easy familiarity was when a busy shopman and his sons, usually with other relatives or *employés*, sat round one table for convenience’ or economy’s sake, and snatched a hasty meal by shovelling rice down together from one big dish; but even then the sons had to mind their *p*’s and *q*’s: to sit down before a father is “seated unco’ right,” or, as each in turn picks a bit with his chopsticks from the meat or condiment plate, to “bag” the best piece of meat out of the tureen in a playful way, would still be an outrage on the paternal dignity. *A fortiori* a wife, still less a daughter, can (or could) never join the festive board on even terms, as with us. During the drafting of law reform ten years ago, several prominent viceroys strongly protested against the introduction of so much personal or individual right at the cost of the old patriarchal authority, and of the husband’s ancient privileges. Mothers are essentially “spankers”; even if kind at times, their tempers are so ill-balanced that they are apt to scold and slap on the slightest provocation. The cries of the child only feed their spite, and urge them on to downright cruelty, as though “inebriated with the exuberance of their own verbosity” and screams. Fathers do not beat children much; their castigations are reserved for their wives. When a boy gets beyond the “spanking” age, his mother has to treat him as a superior being, and the father would not

tolerate any further beatings of the son except under his own authority. Girls were steadily beaten and bullied by their mothers from weaning time until they were women, when they became a prey to something worse—mothers-in-law; I cannot say if the Republic has worked improvement. It is by no means rare, however, for a father, or mother, or both, to show excessive affection for one or all of their children. There are kind good hearts in China, as elsewhere. I am only speaking of “averages” as seen by myself. The *patria potestas* as it obtains in China is totally foreign to our English ideas; of European nations the French alone, and to a limited extent the Spanish and Italians, have any vestiges of it left: not many. No doubt it is found best, so far as and wherever it exists, for the country concerned, for we must assume that all institutions become such or remain such because approved. *Nolumus mutare*, etc. But the product in China is not always pleasing to us. The very words used in politeness for “your father” and “your mother” show us what the Chinese think:—“your honourable severe” and “your honourable tender one.” In China children certainly romp about with great freedom; but so do the pigs; they are none the less capriciously treated and cuffed about: they fear rather than respect or love their parents.

10. Temperance in “self supply” is a Chinese virtue; in that respect we are inferior to them in quite a disgusting degree. Drunkenness is so rare that it is not regarded as disgraceful at all, but rather as good form, to get tipsy at a feast; just as with us the act of kissing is so little connected with lust that it is quite “the thing” to do it in public. But a Chinaman thinks it even indecent to use the word “kiss,” and our walking out with women to be barefaced immorality;

but here the Republic has worked a change, and women not only have more freedom, but seem to use it discreetly. Strong drink is sometimes disapproved of in political or economical philosophy because it causes anger and a waste of good grain; never because men get drunk: accordingly, in times of scarcity distilling is often forbidden or checked. In the extreme north (especially Manchuria) liquor is considered almost a necessity, and there is a good deal of red-nosed tippling among the well-to-do. Occasionally soldiers get flushed and violent, but that is on the same principle that they eat criminals' hearts and livers—to gain pluck. Notwithstanding all this, in a word, neither drunkenness nor “drinking” exists in China: the exceptions are a minimum quantity, and if a falling off has taken place recently, it is probably to counter-balance the abstention from opium. In eating there is no question of indulgence in the case of 95 per cent. of the population: a man shovels down all he can get for his money, and if he can afford to buy more than is necessary, a little extra rice, millet, or buckwheat does him no harm. “Indulgence” only exists amongst the mandarin and rich mercantile classes, and their chief idea is to “feed up to the occasion”; hence the enormous consumption of expensive aphrodisiacs, real and imaginary, such as bird's-nest jelly, sea-slugs, ginseng, cats' organs, deers' horns, and a host of other trumpery and even disgusting objects. I have often been asked by mandarins why their powers were failing, and what they ought to eat in order to raise a larger family, or at least to “take steps” thereto.

11. Industry is the ruling virtue of the Chinese, from the top of the scale to the bottom, but with the not unreasonable qualification that a man must be working for himself. No one is more

industrious in amassing pelf than the identical mandarin who neglects to bestir himself to do justice. No one works better (always) than the builder or artisan on a piece job, or worse (sometimes) than the same man on a time job. All Chinese (except opium-sots and the over-married) are risers with the sun ; usually before it. Until (in very recent years) kerosene was introduced, there was no artificial light worthy of the name ; hence everyone was in bed by six or eight, according to season. If the days in winter were as short as with us, the Chinese would probably have adopted the lazy, sleepy habits of the last generation of Russians before night workshops came into vogue ; but the days according to season do not vary much in length, especially in the south parts. In these circumstances, it is no great virtue to get up at four and six, or even at two or three. All Chinese inns are in full swing of motion two hours before daylight, and there is much night travelling in parts. A Chinaman works hard all day, but never feverishly ; he stops for an occasional snack, swig, or smoke, and is always ready for a running chat. The tacit principle of Chinese industry is to neglect all secured rights and aim at more. Thus, a man will work well for £50 a year ; but if you give him £1,000 to do the same work, he will probably neglect part of it in order to turn £50 more in some fresh way. No matter what takes place, or under what circumstances, a Chinaman, whatever be his rank or position, at once sees money or money-loss in it. If you give him a free passage, he smuggles ; but a free passage alone will do, if the smuggling is impossible ; if it is easy, he lets his friends smuggle too. A classical instance occurred last (1916) summer, when the Minister of Justice, a number of M.P.'s, and some high military officers

travelling on duty from Yün Nan, were all mixed up in a wholesale smuggle of opium,¹ *via* Tonquin, into Shanghai. If nothing else occurs to the hunter after profitable game, there is chance of compensation after a disaster; hence arson is a common offence in these days of insurance. If you give him a present, he will even ask—if possible—for a “better dollar than this one,” or count up the copper cash to see if they are all good and sound: (copper “cash” are, however, being rapidly ousted in favour of a foreign style coin dubbed “a copper”). If a mandarin admits a claim, there is certain to be a hitch in the quality and weight of the silver before you actually encash it, and all attempts to reform the currency have so far failed. A boatman delays you an hour because “fuel is cheap here.” In a word, the whole wits of nearly every living Chinaman (and woman) seem to be devoted to turning to pecuniary profit every incident in which he has had, has, or may have a hand, direct or indirect. Accounts are kept by considerable traders with scrupulous exactitude. No Chinese ever needs information as to market prices or values; or, if he does, he knows how to get it without having to trust anybody. In short, as traders the Chinese are easily “number one.”

12. We talk about Jack being a “handy man,” but he must take points from a Chinaman. The usual exceptions excepted, every Chinese knows the time without a watch; can at a pinch buy, prepare, and cook his own food; wash, patch, if not make his own clothes; judge the weather, till the fields, carry a pole and its load; indicate the north, manœuvre a punt, sail a boat, catch fish, saddle and act as “vet.” to a horse; tackle animals, birds, and reptiles of all kinds under unexpected circumstances; walk or ride

¹ See page 204.

a long distance, sleep anywhere at any moment, take no exercise whatever for any length of time, loaf time away; gain the graces of any woman of any nationality (if she will let him); eat anything, go anywhere, remain without change—and do other things innumerable. What a Chinaman cannot do may be summed up as follows: Shave himself; do up his own hair (but since the abolition of pigtails in most parts these two defects have become obsolete); cure his own maladies; keep off vermin; fight with his fists; manage a steamer; keep military or naval discipline (Yüan Shī-k'ai led the way to improvement here just when the early edition of this book came out); handle trust money honestly; tell a plain, unvarnished story; be punctual; show nerve in times of sudden danger; eat cheese; or tolerate a female "master."

The complicated question of Chinese character does not permit of settlement in a few cursory pages, but the above will at least serve to indicate the general impression which over a quarter of a century of residence among Celestials ended by leaving on my mind; and it must always be remembered that the Chinese individual, as well as the Chinese State, is still in the crucible, the amount of new scum being doubtful.

CHAPTER XV

RELIGION AND REBELLION

PEOPLE are apt to confuse themselves by first harking back upon the obsolete historical word *religio*, the very derivation of which is contested and obscure, and secondly by confusing the word "piety" with religion. This vagueness leaves open the door to unlimited argument, the total result of which is to land us in quite as foggy a region of thought as that in which most men's actual feelings on religion generally flounder. We must go to the root of matters at once and ask ourselves: What is the popular view and ordinary effect of formal religion? With us in Great Britain the first thing is to "go to church," and not to work on Sundays; then to say our prayers, to say grace, and (in a progressive string according to the degree of our piety) to be chaste, sober, charitable with money; to praise God, look to a future life, and so on. Except that there is no Sunday, and the curious idea of "praise" has never entered a Chinaman's mind, a "good man" in China—which means in this connection exactly the same thing as a pious or religious one—is very much a counterpart of the good Englishman. He visits the church or temple with quite as much or as little understanding as most of ourselves of the reason why he does so; and says prayers—but only when he has anything to pray for; he pours out a libation

or scatters a thank-offering for his food, and moreover does not forget an acknowledgment, often daily, to his ancestors. In chastity perhaps inferior, in sobriety decidedly superior to our average selves, he is infinitely more charitable, especially to relatives; in his private, but not in his public capacity. As to a future life, he is totally indifferent on that subject so long as his head is kept on his shoulders in this one, in order that he may make his bow in decent form when he arrives in any other sphere there may be. In "natural religion," therefore, a Chinaman differs little from ourselves.

In "faith," "doctrine," and "dogma" it is different; and I do not believe any power will succeed in drumming any one of the three into the Chinese mind, which is much too clear to take on trust any mere insistence upon alleged facts which cannot be proved by plain evidence. With us a cook who wants a good situation advertises that she "holds Church views." Most Chinamen have also their views, and if not so orthodox to our taste as those of the cook, they are usually at least more intelligible. There would never be any "missionary rows" if things were allowed to stand in the "view" stage; but (sometimes unhappily) our churches militant think it their duty to try and effect a change, not only of view, but also of behaviour by active means, instead of allowing the Chinaman to think and act (as they themselves do) for himself. The average Chinese, though behindhand in science, is, in many matters, the intellectual superior of the average European; hence comes the trouble.

The foundation of religious feeling seems to have been much the same in ancient China as elsewhere. The sun was seen to rise, shedding warmth and light; the moon did the same, in

part. Hence the saluting or worshipping of the sun ; and, by analogy, to a lesser extent, the moon. The wind and rain were as often agreeable as objectionable. Hence the idea of bad and good forces, with an appeal to the pair for some show of discrimination in their favours. When life sped, it was difficult to imagine (the body being still there) whither the intelligence and activity had gone. Hence confused ideas of souls, ghosts, gods, and so on. It is easy to extend this natural system. Desire for children, gratitude to parents, remorse for injury done to the dead ; mysterious noises in darkness and solitude ; droughts, floods, eclipses. In a word, Chinamen saw themselves surrounded by many things they could not understand, and their imaginations (like those of our early ancestors) constructed strange "beliefs" to account for them.

The next stage was the Confucian, and it was only in Confucius' time that written thought became really intelligible and connected, and that older works of value were made more distinct. Confucius had the good sense to say that he understood nothing about souls and supernatural mysteries ; he therefore declined to discuss them. But meanwhile forms and ceremonies had insensibly grown up with advancing wealth and experience ; besides which Taoism and other philosophical doctrines were beginning to make men speculative and polemical. Confucius, therefore, did his best to reconcile popular customs or prejudices with the practical business of state ; he does not seem to have much sympathised with mere "thinkers." He evidently thought Laoicius a humbug, and he would have thought Kant a humbug too. He was a sort of popular democratic Lord Chesterfield, and tried to teach his children of China how to be

decent, orderly, and gentle; how to give and take without violence; how to observe distinctions of rank; how to keep women in check; and so on. He did this with such success (despite a suspicion of priggishness) that his influence still remains; for dynasty after dynasty has found support therein for "monarchism." He was no religious teacher; but as a moral instructor he must be given rank after Jesus of Nazareth,—possibly even after Shakyamuni; with, but before Mahomet. Even the Republic, after abolishing him, has plumped for him once more. It must be stated, however, what is not generally known, that a couple of centuries earlier the practical statesman Kwan-tsz¹ anticipated a good portion of both Laocius' and Confucius' teaching.

A further great revolution in thought took place about two centuries before our era; the time coincides with the conquests of the Parthians, and it is possible that Græco-Roman civilisation was affected by the same wave that influenced China—whatever it was. At all events there was a general movement and a simultaneous expansion in the world, all the way from Rome to Corea. The result was that China now first heard of India, Buddhism, and the Parthians; and before long Buddhist philosophy took a firm hold on the Chinese mind, just as Christianity at the same time gradually got a grip of the Roman or Greek mind. The history of the spread of Buddhism over the Far East is a long one. Like Christianity, later on it soon became surcharged with useless "doctrine" and priestly corruption; in other words, the men who handled it were but poor representatives of the founders. Hence it lost caste, and had its ups and downs from dynasty to dynasty, just as our European religions had during Tudor times. But it left

¹ See pp. 43, 238.

behind a lasting effect in this way. Buddhism was democratic; it was the enemy of class feeling, luxury, cruelty, and greed. It was merciful, favoured simplicity and economy, and gave women an equal status with men. Hence it has had a decidedly good influence upon men's minds, and especially upon women's; in fact, Chinese women, having nearly always been uneducated, and therefore unable to read or understand contentious philosophy; being assigned moreover by Confucius a back seat in life, could have no religion or moral teaching except Buddhism and "nature." All Buddhist "doctrine" is discredited in China by men of intellect now, and so are priests as professors of it; but the true and simple teaching of Shakyamuni survives; and, as priests possess glebes; are independent; and are usually travelled and sometimes even well-read men, with a leisured taste for calligraphy and antiquity; they often enjoy the respect and companionship of the learned. The Republic, having begun rather summarily with priests, gradually reconsidered their vested rights, and things do not seem to be quite settled yet. Both they and their temples are more popular with women than men like to see, and in some provinces there is moral laxity; just as in Brazil, Manila, or Hungary the Catholic priests are less strict than they are in England, Germany, or France. When men die, the families, and especially the women, like to have a few priests in, and they are not particular as to doctrine, or even as to religion, so long as chaunting and processions of some sort go on. Just as distinguished French scoffers are reported to send for a priest at the last moment, so even a Chinese mandarin thinks it good form to summon a Taoist or a bonze when a calamity takes place. It is only another

form of "church parade." In Singapore there is a Roman Catholic church in which a figure of the Blessed Virgin has somehow acquired a repute amongst the pagans; and, as the Portuguese priest in charge himself told me, there is a sort of annual pagan "wake" held every year there. The fact is that, politics apart, the Chinese take an easy and broad-minded view of all religions, and would never persecute anyone so long as no gross immorality or interference with administration, custom, and liberty took place. The Mussulmans in North China are never in the least interfered with, because they have the good sense (like the early Jesuits had) to fall in with popular feeling, and "let things be." The Chinese, in turn, give them a free hand in circumcision, pork, wine, and other specialities. It is only in Yün Nan and Kan Suh, where Mahometans have at times become rather aggressive, that wars and persecutions have taken place, the faults, as usual, being on both sides.

Such was the state of affairs when Christianity first appeared. I say "first" advisedly, for though Nestorians, Mazdéans, Manichæans, Jews, and other Western sectarians had been alternately tolerated and suppressed at various times between the seventh and the thirteenth century, they had never been clearly separated, in the popular mind at least, from Buddhists and Mussulmans, of which they were considered perverted forms. At first there was no hostility to speak of; but the attitude of the less prudent Roman Catholics in the seventeenth century towards the time-honoured custom of "ancestor-worship" (which is really much the same as the annual visits to cemeteries in vogue in France and Italy) sowed the germs of future trouble. The disputes of the Jesuits, Dominicans, the

Franciscans involved the Pope and the Manchu Emperor in antagonistic polemics; persecution was the result; and for two centuries Christianity only existed in the provinces by stealth. The treaty of Nanking (in 1842), and still more that of Tientsin (in 1858), gave a fillip to propagandism; and now perhaps there are a million or more of nominal Christians in the empire, *i.e.* about two or three for every thousand souls, and it must cost quite a million pounds a year to give them spiritual comfort. It is quite a mistake to suppose that the Chinese masses entertain any hostile sentiments towards religious feeling as such: they respect it, in whatever form; and the gentle doctrines of true, simple Buddhism, which possess so much that is (externally at least) similar to those of true, simple Christianity, have, as already stated, on the whole, exercised a lasting effect for good on the Chinese mind: so do medical missionaries and really charitable school teachers exercise a decidedly good effect upon the Celestial mind of to-day: but by reasoning kindness, not by dogma. What causes trouble is the clashing of militant doctrine with the village customs and social habits naturally dear to the rustic mind. I will just enumerate a few instances to illustrate my meaning. Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries alike inveigh against foot-binding. This is not unreasonable, and even the Chinese themselves are beginning to see that it is an evil custom. The old Dowager explicitly condemned it some years ago, and now it is distinctly on the decline, besides being presidentially denounced; but prudence is still required, otherwise it is manifest that hostility and jealousy must arise between conservative and progressive females, just as with us a too energetic display of the Bloomer costume or a divided skirt

is apt, as a mere novelty, to cause a "row." Both Roman Catholics and Protestants rightly inveigh against the use of opium; and happily there is no longer any risk of hostility on this ground, as both the Republican and the British governments are whole-heartedly doing their best. The Protestants, but not the Roman Catholics, usually make an unnecessary fuss about the use of spirituous liquors. Coming as they do from drunken countries where liquor too often means vice, they have not the discrimination to see that their exhortations are quite unnecessary in a land where intemperance is practically unknown. It is to be hoped that the suppression of opium smoking will not bring dram-drinking into vogue; and it is also to be hoped that the Japanese will be generous enough to discourage the profitable trade in morphia and its apparatus. The questions of slavery and concubinage are more serious; but here again Europeans are misled by their own words. Slavery in China has never at any time savoured of the brutality the black variety assumed in European or Arab hands: in denouncing Chinese slavery—which, though admitted by the Chinese themselves to be objectionable, is really more a social caste distinction, or *diminutio capitis*, than a heartless traffic in human flesh—the missionaries are unjustly censuring the Chinese in principle for the past abominable crimes of their own ancestors. Since the recent legal reforms, slavery has been nominally abolished throughout the Empire, but no doubt old customs still persist in parts inaccessible to new influences; as, for instance, in remote Kwei Chou province, where "official sales" of poor children were disclosed in 1908. So, again, the word "concubinage" connotes with us degrading ideas which the corresponding Chinese word in no way expresses. Apart from the fact

that polygamy was universal at one time both with our own religious ancestors the Jews and with our own political ancestors the Romans; it is still the rule rather than the exception all over Asia, and there seems to be nothing inherently or naturally evil in it; in fact, the devastating results of the great war are now suggesting a *Kultural* revival of it in order to restore the already unfavourable balance of sexes. We have no right to force on other peoples rites and ceremonies when the sanctions and grounds do not exist which render those forms incumbent on us. Then there are the village temple feasts, the prayers for rain, the exorcising of demons, in Manchu times the obeisance to Imperial tablets, even under the Republic to Confucius' shrine, and so on. These last are the points where the narrow-minded views and actions of some missionaries have been apt to give most trouble. If it is the custom for all to subscribe to a temple or other "superstitious" feast, it is monstrous for a too strait-laced missionary to back up the protest of a more or less genuine convert who may simply want to escape paying his scot: in fact, the missionary himself ought to subscribe to anything in the shape of local rates which has the approval of authority. Anyway, he has no business whatever to question an official decision touching the incidence of rates or popular levies upon a Chinese. Our own church rates, though not now compulsory, have been so at times. Even admitting that the Chinese customary levies are absurd and unjust, we must allow they are not so much so that we are entitled to condemn them more severely than many of our own follies committed in the name of religion, ancient custom, or local tradition.

So far from being irreligious, the Chinese are decidedly religiously inclined, though their

religious feelings may not take that gloomy, Anglo-Dutch form which is the peculiarity of "dissenting" countries. In the first place, all Chinese have a deep veneration for the idea of a soul, or the continuity of life; this idea is derived partly from the old Shamanistic or natural religion, and partly from the Buddhist notion of transmigration. Hence the great care of the dead, the love of funeral ceremonies, the readiness to spend money upon graves, the desire to propitiate the ghosts of ancestors, the yearning for a son, the strong family sentiment of unity, and the strict subordination of younger to elder, the chief rock upon which law reforms partly came to grief. Hair-splitting doctrine has no charms for the Chinese mind, which, however ill-trained, is essentially intellectual and liberal. The most militant and aggressive religion on earth, that of Mahomet, has learnt to live in peace everywhere in China except on the borders where foreign races complicate the situation; and a Mussulman might be and occasionally was a Chinese (*i.e.* Manchu time) Viceroy; as, indeed, even a Christian might be if he would only make reasonable concessions, and give us a little more bright, cheery, tolerant human nature, instead of seeking to condemn those whose consciences do not permit them to accept his views of what is right and true. Under the Republic all religions have been declared free, and, as the American traveller Rodney Gilbert has this year shown us, a powerful Mussulman general has accepted Chinese rank and is virtually ruling Islam on the Tibetan frontiers as an independent satrap.

The above being the general feeling of the Chinese, we may now go on to describe them as exactly the contrary of what they are usually supposed to be; that is, they are religious-

mindful, tolerant, and non-militant; but neither the educated nor the ignorant classes will have what they honestly believe to be humbug thrust down their throats, and such religious animosity as exists—which has never been exercised in one single instance against the Russian Orthodox Church—has often had to thank the mistaken zeal of Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries for its own birth and growth; or, as in the “Boxer” case, is indirectly owing to the “blood of the martyrs” having been used (as was done by Prussia) for political gain. This brings us to the germane subject of Chinese rebellions and secret societies, which have invariably been provoked by religious sectaries.

In the beginning of the year 1308, immediately after John of Monte-Corvino had been consecrated Archbishop of Cambalu (Peking), Christian priests, Buddhist bonzes, and Taoist monks were ordered to “pay taxes in future like any one else,” and steps were taken to put a stop to the “exacting claims of Buddhist priests.” The evident connection of religion with rebellion is apparent from the following: “Princes and Tibetan priests in the imperial *cortège* having oppressed the people on the roads, such things are now prohibited. Prohibited is also the White Lily Sect; and their buildings will be destroyed: their sectaries will once more be made common people.” Again, in 1322: “Prohibition of White Lily Buddhist business.” And in 1349 there was a red-turban revolt in the north of modern An Hwei, once more under the ægis of the White Lily Society. It was given out in this connection that Mâitrâya (the Buddhist Messiah) was coming to earth. Shortly after this a Buddhist priest turned the Mongols out, and founded the Ming dynasty. In 1622 a White Lily revolt broke out in the exact spot

where the madcap "Boxer" rebellion of 1900 had its birth. The Jesuits, then establishing themselves in China, were not unnaturally connected with this rebellion in the Chinese mind, and for some years the Prime Minister severely persecuted them. Meanwhile the White Lily leader gained headway, sacked Peking, and put an end to the Ming dynasty, which was replaced by the very Manchus whose assistance the Ming statesmen had sought. During the greater part of the two first centuries of Manchu rule there were not many serious popular rebellions; but, such as they were, religion was always at the bottom of the trouble. In 1778 a revolt in South Shan Si brought the White Lily Society once more under review. In speaking of a Mussulman schism of the same date, the Emperor says: "It is similar in principle to the White Lily faith amongst bonzes." Rebellions were then spreading rapidly all over the Empire, which was really in a very parlous state when the aged K'ien-lung abdicated in 1795 to his son, after a splendid reign of sixty years. In that year the leading White Lily chief was taken and executed; the services of General Nayench'êng (grandson of Akwei, the Manchu sent to conquer Burma) are now first mentioned. In 1813 a "Boxer" revolt broke out once more in the old spot (South Shan Tung), and some of its secretaries even gained admission to the Peking Palace. The Emperor Kia-k'ing's life was only saved by the bravery of his second son, afterwards the Emperor Tao-kwang. Though the term "Boxer" is used by General Nayench'êng in connection with this rising, its lineal descent from the White Lily sect is amply attested by him, though the official name at the time was *T'ien-li*, or "Heavenly Order" Faith. Its indirect connection with Christianity, or at

least with Christian ideas, is possible from the fact that the term "White Ocean Faith" is also vaguely used by some of the conspirators.

At last, in 1850, the direct connection of Christianity with rebellion was made perfectly clear when the standard of revolt was raised in Kwang Si by a student of the Christian doctrine named Hung Siu-ts'üan : he styled his sect the Shang-ti Hwei, or "Society of God," and reigned for ten years as "King of Heaven" at Nanking, claiming blood relationship with Jesus Christ. It was not until 1864 that the late Marquess Tsêng's¹ father succeeded in retaking the city ; and meanwhile half China had been ravaged. I have already referred to the Great Rebellion in the chapter on "Population."

It is unnecessary to inquire into the exact religious or anti-religious motives which inspired the present "Boxer" revolt : matters of opinion in religion and superstition alike are of no scientific importance to anyone but the holder, so far at least as they are unsupported by evidence of truth : but, so far as those opinions bear upon practical human affairs, it is interesting to note several indisputable facts : (1) the "Boxers" were inspired by the tenets of the old White Lily Society—*i.e.* they were a protest made by the spirit of Buddhism against the spirit of militant Christianity ; (2) the militancy against which the "Boxers" protest is the evident connection in their minds between the land-acquisitiveness of Europeans and the supposed alliance between European militant missionaries and European political aims. As usual in human affairs, the protests of ignorant men assume a violent form, and passion feeds upon itself as it rages.

The "Boxer" rebellion had two most impor-

¹ Minister to Great Britain a generation ago.

tant literary consequences. The great library of the Han-lin Academy, and that of the Russian College at Pei Kwan, were both utterly destroyed: most of the "Albazins," or Russified Chinese, also perished. In retaliation, the Russians carted off to Europe the whole of the vast manuscript collection from the Mukden Palace: this included manuscript copies of the Greek and Roman classics, which must have been brought from Europe either by the early missionaries, or by the Mongols after their conquests in Hungary.

CHAPTER XVI

LAW

AFTER the excitement caused by the Russo-Japanese war, a Chinese imperial decree dated April 24, 1905, recited how the Throne had been advised to recast some of the laws in accordance with the spirit of the age, and how it had been resolved to abolish at once the cruel lingering punishment of hacking the body. It is apologetically explained that the Manchus, previously to their assuming control of the Chinese Empire 260 years previously, knew no punishment severer than simple death; but that, "contrary to their own merciful inclinations," they had been induced to take over this and other exaggerated forms from the laws of the preceding dynasty. In future, therefore, decapitation and strangulation, either immediate or after a period of revision and delay, were to be the only death punishments; the branding of criminals on the face, the exposure of decapitated heads, and the decapitating of dead bodies in the case of criminals not taken alive, were also abolished. A later decree foreshadowed the abolition of torture during trial; and shortly afterwards one of the stipendiary magistrates at Peking was dismissed from his post by the Emperor for disobeying the new law in a civil case brought before him. However, even under the Republic,

it is unquestionable that, although nominally abolished, the practice occasionally survives. In pursuance of the 1905 decree, the Board of Punishments Throne at once set to work, and the laws of England, France, Germany, and Belgium were compared with the Chinese code laws which prevailed 500 and 1,000 years ago. The matter was still in a transition state when the Dowager and the Emperor died in 1908.

The fact that Chinese law is in need of practical reform in no way involves the admission that China is devoid of a legal history and equitable principles; nor must it be forgotten, when we criticise Chinese severity, that until a hundred years ago Englishmen guilty of treason were cut down from the gallows whilst alive, and had their entrails taken out and burnt before their eyes: women were burnt alive for treason until 1790; and even until 1870 men convicted of treason were supposed to be quartered after execution. Until William the Fourth's reign, highwaymen and other notorious criminals were gibbeted in chains and handed over to surgeons for dissection; and the late Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, in his Digest of our Criminal Law, himself alludes to the atrocious severity of our former larceny laws: hanging for sheep-stealing, for instance, was common enough in Dr. Johnson's time. I believe I am correct in saying that up to the beginning of the late Queen Victoria's reign there were 200 offences for which a man might be hanged. We must therefore make reasonable allowances for other nations; and in any case it must be conceded that a peaceful industrious civilisation, containing within it such enormous powers of passive resistance to foreign aggression as China does, necessarily possesses many an occult virtue.

As a matter of fact China possesses a very

extensive and perfectly consecutive legal history: throughout all the changes of dynasty appeal has been made unswervingly to the same ancient principles, and there has been almost no borrowing at all from foreign sources. The foundations of existing legal principle are nearly all to be found in the old classical literature,—the same literature which suggested to Confucius, and to the other Chinese philosophers and legists, both before and after him, the various types of political religion: in fact, ritual, law, and religion are simply different expressions of the single all-pervading principle of *patria potestas* or filial piety, which is the kernel or root-motive of all Chinese ethics.

Even in our own time, the conception of the word Law as meaning nothing more than *a series of sovereign commands* is only gaining ground very slowly, after having been laboriously worked out by the great jurist Austin. This idea is clearly brought out from the very beginning of Chinese legal history, except that the automatic sanction and the command of nature seem to form at first one indivisible unit. Sir Henry Maine, in his *Ancient Law*, has pointed out that Austin fails to provide us with a motive for command; but the Chinese view that all government must accord with the smooth workings of nature supplies the missing motive. "Punishment laws" rather than "laws and their punishments" is the idea as conceived by the Chinese mind, including the inseparable connection between making war and enforcing the law: under the head of the "greatest punishments" come making war and putting to death; the "secondary punishments" included castration, cutting off the feet, slicing off the kneecap, and branding; the "minor punishments" flogging and the bastinado. The object of law

was to keep the feudal states in order, to make officials do their duty, and to restrain the people from excess. Thus it will be seen that the Chinese conception of law is pre-eminently criminal law. The Emperor as sole lawgiver was the Vicegerent of Heaven, and it is his duty to govern directly and through his agents in accordance with the harmonious order of nature : if he fails to do so, and persists, he is liable to be overthrown.

Unjust judgments shock the smooth workings of nature, and call down various disasters. So far as man is concerned, his five natural relations are those of subject, father, husband, brother and friend. But, so long as the Emperor governed with reasonable integrity, he was entitled to the absolute obedience of all his lieges. The Emperor was to the State on a large scale exactly what the *paterfamilias* is to the family on a small scale, the function in either case being that of maintaining order; as the ancient Chinese said :—"The lash may not be relaxed in the family, nor punishments in the State, nor arms in the Empire." The laws are like the stings used by insects for self-protection ; beginning with war and ending with rules of propriety ; instruments for maintaining an even level ; and so on. The government in no way interferes with the management of the family ; on the contrary, the whole resources of the State are placed at the service of each family-head, on condition of his being politically responsible in return for the loyalty and order of his family. The whole Chinese administrative system is based on the doctrine of filial piety, in its most extended signification of duty to natural parents and also to political parents. China has thus always been one vast republic of innumerable private families, or petty *imperia*,

within one public family, or general *imperium*; the organisation consists of a number of self-producing and ever-multiplying independent cells, each maintaining a complete administrative existence apart from the central power. Doubtless it is this fact that in a large measure accounts for China's elastic indestructibility in the face of so many conquests and revolutions.

The Chinese idea of law thus being castigatory, it is not to be wondered at that, apart from recent discussions and reforms, there is no science of civil jurisprudence in the European sense. Moreover the executive and the judicial powers have always been wielded by the same hand, and the distinction between the two was not even clearly perceived or provided with distinctive names until 1905. All matters^{of} what we should call Family Law were left entirely to the family or clan; the government in no way concerned itself—at least so far as taking the initiative goes—with births, marriages, deaths, burials, adoption, legitimacy, divorce, mourning, testamentary dispositions, division and transfer of property, joint ownership, mortgages, sanitation, medicine, midwifery, sobriety, or morals. These were, and to a large extent still are, all questions for the family council, and it is only on the comparatively rare occasions when the council actively and spontaneously seeks the assistance of a court that the officials take cognisance: even a murder might be quietly ignored if the clan concerned decides not to complain. In the same way, commercial jurisprudence lay within the private ken of the different trading guilds; banking questions were decided by the marvellously close and effective organisation of private bankers; junkmen, fishermen, pawnbrokers, post-offices, squatters,

money-lenders, doctors—in short, all industries—managed their own affairs and paid the fees with the minimum of government interference, if any; and even then the official action was taken in the interests of public order rather than to assert a legal principle: and although a few laws concerning marriages, inheritance, land transfer, usury, brokerage, etc., were laid down in the codes, these rather expressed what was the universal custom than imposed any fresh “command.” Many of these matters, however, were already in the latest Manchu times being gradually brought under the cognisance of newly constituted Boards—Agriculture, Trade, Communications, etc., or Bureaus—Customs, Fisheries, Post Office, and so on; meanwhile the Republic has not yet found its feet sufficiently to enable us to declare finality on any given point. There is, strictly speaking, under the unreformed *régime*, no contract law at all except as touches the supreme contract of marriage. Thus, take the rate of interest that pawnbrokers might charge, and their licences; or the permits to sail in and out of port: in the one case the needy classes are protected from extortion; in the other travellers are protected from pirates. Should it happen that any family or any industry saw fit to claim the sanction of a court of justice, it did not at all follow that such court would announce, still less create, a law for itself: on the contrary, it would do exactly what our courts do, and what they did to a greater extent before statute law largely replaced common law—it would declare the law, or adopt the customary law, local or general, as ascertained on evidence. This is only another way of saying that in most matters China was and still largely is governed by the customs of ancestors, or common law; that the common law was adminis-

tered by the people themselves; and that the State (unless when specially invited) only stepped in to prevent a breach of the peace.

According to cherished tradition—which, however, the best-informed Chinese do not take too seriously—the most ancient monarchs maintained order by inculcating the principles of propriety, only introducing punishments occasionally; even then it was usually found sufficient to “imagine” the punishment, and to attire prisoners in a singular garb supposed to correspond with this or that penalty: thus those by way of being branded wore black hats; those to be deprived of their noses, red trousers; those condemned to sliced knee-caps, black coats; those to be castrated, coloured shoes; those to be decapitated, petticoats and no collar; and so on. From the very earliest times banishment was resorted to. Under extenuating circumstances the principle of ransoming punishment for a money payment was admitted; and up to our own day the same thing was allowed, at least in theory, though in practice it had a good deal fallen off. But even so far back as 230 B.C. the Chinese philosopher Sün-tsz, who took a pessimistic view of human nature, exposed in his chapter on Law the fallacy of this view of ancient leniency: he said:—

“It is evident crime went on then as now, else there would have been no prisoners liable to these severe nominal punishments. The principle is a false one, moreover. If you are going to abolish death for murder, and mutilation for injuries done, how are you going to make the people dread? The great thing is to prevent crime; to condone it is to nourish wrong-doing. All this nonsense about pictorial or imaginary punishments is but a latter-day protest against

the cruel and capricious excesses of modern times. Rewards for good, punishments for evil—the principle is the same; uncertainty and inconsistency are the only bane. Consequently a good government is always a strict one, and a bad government is always a lax one. The real meaning of the much-quoted ancient tradition about pictorial chastisements is that punishments were always figured or pictured after the *tao* or method of Heaven.”

Here we have a Chinese philosopher, whose works are still extant, laying down 2,200 years ago what is practically Jeremy Bentham's doctrine of pleasures and pains. He also alludes to the principles of justice recommended by the great democratic apostle Lao-tsz who lived three centuries before him, and in such a way as to suggest that he must have been familiar with Lao-tsz' writings, or even with those of Kwan-tsz, from whom Lao-tsz seems to have copied, consciously or unconsciously.

Although competent critics are agreed that precise dates in Chinese history cannot be ascertained further back than 841 B.C., there is no reason to doubt the main facts first handed down by oral tradition, and later recorded in their chronicles; especially when these same facts are persistently cited in various connections, in works of different classes, and by each successive dynasty. Thus about 950 B.C., 150 years after the establishment of a new dynasty, but when times had become degenerate once more, the King or Emperor decided that law reform was necessary in order to maintain proper order amongst “the hundred families”—as the Chinese people are still in 1917 collectively termed. Dr. Legge gives a full translation of this ancient code in the fifth section

of his Chinese Classics. As to the second historical code, during the lifetime of the rival philosophers Lao-tsz and Confucius, that is towards the end of the sixth century before Christ, at a time when imperial and vassal China was about to break up into a collection of warring independent states, the prime minister of one of these vassal states, who was a near relative of the reigning duke, and also an acquaintance of Confucius, for the first time in history had the laws cast in metal for the information of the people. The premier of a neighbouring state disapproved of this action as a dangerous innovation calculated to make the ignorant people look to the fixed letter of the law instead of abiding by the ancient principles of propriety, as declared on the merits of each case after each case had occurred; in other words, instead of accepting the *themis*, *diké*, or inspired judgment of the magistrate. Even the radical philosopher Lao-tsz had always preached the doctrine of keeping the machinery or "implements" of State concealed from the vulgar eye; and in this particular instance he was supported by Confucius, who argued that the standard of right and wrong would henceforth infallibly be transferred from the ruler's conscience to the written law. He was full of admiration for the innovator on other grounds, but not on this one; and he outlived him seventeen years. This event of defining the law publicly was considered so important that dates were at that time occasionally calculated from the "year of the casting of the laws"; just as the Romans used to count juridically from the "year of the Twelve Tables," which were cast or engraved upon metal about eighty years later than their Chinese prototype. These laconic Western laws, the written foundation of

Roman jurisprudence, just as the Chinese tripod laws may be termed the remote basis of existing Eastern codes, exemplify very plainly the two different casts of mind in East and West. The Roman laws dealt with proceedings in a civil suit; action by wager; slavery for debt; the absolute power of fathers over children and slaves; inheritances, testaments, women's position, and tutorships; ownership, prescription, and transfer; easements; crimes against person and property, the *lex talionis*, lampoons, the rate of interest, and false witness; appeal from the judge to the people; cost of funerals; caste marriages; pledges for sacrificial debts, and so on. Nearly all these matters were either abandoned to the jurisdiction of the family, or were ignored by the earliest Chinese legislators, though several of them find a place in later codes. So far as we can judge by more modern categories of the quality of ancient Chinese offences, they seem to have been in the great majority of cases treason, robbery, theft, arson; or official pilfering and bribery; and the only questions for the judge were whether to execute, mutilate, or flog; for the ruler how to secure justice, see that the punishment fit the crime, and stave off Nature's wrath by making it the interest of his judges to be just. In those days there was a popular saying that "coffin-makers always like a plague," meaning that "the policeman likes a good case"; and in the same way it was argued that if the central government, in its anxiety for tranquillity, encouraged those local authorities who exhibited the greatest zeal in securing convictions, the inevitable result would be to discourage the upright men who worked honestly for the people's interest. As with our own law, no child under seven years of age could be held guilty of, or be punished for, a felony :

this merciful provision was extended by the ancient Chinese legislators to old persons of eighty and upwards.

There were two other prime ministers of the fourth century before Christ who made for themselves lasting reputations as legislators. One, Li-k'wei, instituted a new land system, very like that proposed for China by Sir Robert Hart a dozen years ago, under which every available acre was worked out for adequate but fair taxation. He also collected into six books or main heads all that was best in the laws of the different feudal states, and composed therefrom a work styled the "Legal Classic," which may be compared (very humbly) with the Roman Institutes of Gaius. Most of these Chinese laws were connected with robbery; the lighter offences being roguery, getting over city walls, gambling, borrowing, dishonesty, lewdness and extravagance, transgressing the king's commands, etc. This work was carried to the powerful kingdom which 150 years later conquered the whole of China by a young man (Wei Yang) who reorganised, developed, and became premier in that kingdom, where it was adopted as a kind of code, but with considerable additions in the direction of cruelty. It is really this code which, in a modified form, is at the root of all later Chinese law of the positive kind. In spite of his great services to this rising state, the chancellor in question made enemies by his unrelenting thoroughness, and was in the end put to death on the accession of a new king he had offended whilst yet a mere prince or heir-apparent. The other man, Shên Puh-hai, is often called the "Chinese Draco," on account of the extreme severity of his laws; in addition to which he was a philosopher of the Taoist school; and, indeed, at this time there can be

no doubt that such precise philosophical notions as the Chinese were beginning to have upon the political branch of law were drawn from the stern and radical Lao-tsz rather than from the courtly and conservative Confucius : but that does not mean very much, for it was then the complaint of both these philosophers that men went on fighting for power and personal interest, totally oblivious of the prophets who were crying out in the wilderness for man's salvation through propriety and right. Yet another Taoist philosopher and severe lawyer (who has left some of his works behind him), Han Fei-tsz, sought office under the same powerful revolutionary state one century later than the above two events : this was just when the conquest of China was beginning ; but the jealousy of the then chancellor (Li Sz) of that rising kingdom, who poisoned his guest and rival, prevented the lawyer in question from having any permanent practical influence upon China's destinies. It is curious to notice, however, that most prime ministers of minor kingdoms were introduced from other states ; and this fact may possibly have something to do with the evolution of a comparatively modern rule (*cf.* p. 261) that no civilian can serve in his own province.

All that has preceded refers to the period anterior to the great revolution of the third century before Christ, to the destruction of literature in 213 B.C., and to the founding of centralised absolutism much as it existed until 1911. In those good old days, though the punishments were cruel, there were none of the more modern lingering tortures ; nor were relatives of a criminal punished with him, though it appears that in very ancient times at least a threat of this kind had been made. Doubtful cases were tried

in public, and the benefit of doubt was conceded. Moreover, even mutilations were coupled with, or excused by, a kind of compassionate utility : thus (*cf.* p. 313) the branded were made gate-keepers ; those deprived of a nose sent to serve as frontier pickets ; those without feet, and therefore unable to chase, looked after valuable wild game as park-keepers ; those whose virility was cut off tended the female apartments ; whilst the un mutilated convicts performed gang-work. It was one of Sir James F. Stephen's favourite sayings that, as material civilisation advanced and we became "more comfortable," men grew less and less inclined to make their fellow-creatures, and even their animals, more miserable than was absolutely necessary.

But there are abundant maxims and sayings, notwithstanding, that prove the existence of merciful feeling in the ancient rulers. One, quoted century by century to this day, was : "Rather let a rogue escape than risk killing an innocent man." Whilst moderate justice was considered appropriate for a normal political condition, it was held on the other hand a wise precaution to be exceptionally severe when the State showed signs of anarchy. Perhaps the oldest maxim of all is : "In punishment be intelligently compassionate." In hopelessly degenerate times the radical philosopher Lao-tsz was in favour of the fewest and simplest laws ; but he insisted on prompt, secret, and effective application of punishment by properly qualified officials. Confucius (a little later) has left several striking remarks on record. He says : "As to convicts, I go with the rest ; we must necessarily condemn, if only in order to avoid condemning still more of them later on." Again, "The ancients understood better than ourselves the art of preventing crime ; now the best

we can do is to avoid punishing crime unjustly. The ancient magistrates always hoped to save a prisoner's life: now we seek to prove it forfeit. Better let a real criminal go free, however, than slay an innocent man." Once more: "I allow one generation to a new dynasty for the gradual introduction of benevolent rule, and I allow a hundred years to abolish killing and mutilation altogether." "A benevolent ruler must have courage too; his rectitude manifests itself in preventing crime." "Unjust punishment damages the administration, and a bad administration touches each man's person." "Government must strictly execute its own terms." Kwan-tsz, however, had said nearly all this two centuries earlier. Two centuries later than Confucius, Mencius has a few remarks to make: he allows considerable latitude, and even indulgence, to a ruler so long as that ruler keeps in sympathetic touch with the people; but he says: "No truly benevolent ruler will slay an innocent man, even to make secure his own rule."

The great Chinese conquest revolution of 2,150 years ago introduced several new crimes as well as many monstrous punishments. The chief intellectual agent in it was the chancellor, mentioned above, who poisoned his visitor. It was, at his recommendation, made an offence punishable with death to conceal books, or to own any except the few agricultural and scientific works which were not on the "Index Prohibitory"; fearful tortures were introduced, and three generations of relatives were involved in one man's political crime. The name for "Emperor" (originally written "self-ruler," but later "white ruler"), up to 1911 still in use, was then first introduced, and a homogeneous system of administration in all important matters was

effectively established all over China. But though this powerful innovator was an able man, his methods were altogether too tyrannical, and after his death in 210 B.C., and then after eight more years of very chivalrous and picturesque fighting, a new and permanent dynasty was founded on practically the same lines: ever since that things have remained very much *in statu quô*, even down to our own days.

In accordance with one of the ancient politico-legal maxims just mentioned, the new dispensation began by abolishing the whole network of harassing law, and by enacting three simple rules for the orderly government of the Empire; to wit, death for homicide; compensation and imprisonment for wounds and robbery; all else being left to the people themselves. This was called the "Tripartite Bargain with the Elders of the People," and the "all else left to the people" still holds good, whether intentionally or no, in great measure to this day. The frank and tactful geniality of the new ruler's personality has probably more to do with the credit his memory still enjoys than the intrinsic wisdom of his summary legal methods; but, however that may be, his "three short rules" have established a reputation in China little short of that achieved by King John's Magna Charta amongst ourselves. But the Chinese are and always have been very grateful to their rulers for small mercies, and they have always been found ready to idealise any gracious sovereign acts. The Emperor, under the guidance of an astute chancellor, rightly refrained from introducing new measures, and was probably only giving fuller effect to ancient laws and customs when he granted this short charter; and this was apparently all that King John did, except that, unlike the Chinese ruler, the

English king had only the grace to do it under compulsion. The vicarious punishment of relatives was abolished, but official superiors and witnesses were obliged to denounce offenders. However, the much-vaunted three simple rules were soon found insufficient for practical use when things quieted down; when the sword gave way to the ploughshare; and when the new dynasty felt secure in its power. The next chancellor, who (as also his successor in office) professed the "masterly inactivity" principles preached 300 years before that by the philosopher Lao-tsz, found it necessary to reintroduce vicarious punishment for treason, and to select as many of the general laws of the revolutionary and conquering dynasty but recently ousted as were suited to the people's old traditions, and also to their changed position; he proceeded to construct therefrom a code in nine heads (being in effect the six heads of the "Legal Classic" plus three new ones), which code, subject of course to extensive alterations, has from dynasty to dynasty always served as the basis of Chinese law; just as the Corpus Juris of the Christian Emperor Justinian forms in a way the practical basis of European law as a whole, affecting indirectly even the English and Scotch statutory laws, and in some instances the decisions under our common law. We have already seen that revolutionary China had borrowed its Institutes of Law from an active legal author in one of the feudal states; and thus we have an unbroken historical chain extending back from our own time for about 3,000 years, with no admixture whatever of foreign notions, or, at all events, of foreign law. The preceding dynasty's revolutionary law against concealing books was abolished by the new dynasty founder's son, and literature was soon restored

to its former influence, after a quarter of a century of extinction.

Now we come to a very prominent turning-point in Chinese legal history. The founder, his usurping empress-widow, and his strictly legitimate son by her had all passed away; the obnoxious law against concealing books had, as we have said, been repealed, and another son, born in less honourable wedlock, sat on the imperial throne. On account of his calm, philosophic, and humane temperament, Han Wên Tî is occasionally styled by Europeans the Marcus Aurelius of China. His first act was to issue the following edict: "Enforcements of the law are executive acts, the object of which is to prevent violence and assist the well-disposed: to visit the sins of convicted criminals on innocent parents, spouses, brothers, sisters and children seems to me most unreasonable. I wish for a report." His counsellors, after due deliberation, advised that it had hitherto been found good policy to make people feel uncomfortable in anticipation by visiting upon them the sins of their kinsmen after crimes committed, and that it would be better not to make any change. A second decree ran: "When the law is met, the people are honest; when punishment is appropriate, the people accept it without murmur. Moreover, officials are supposed to act as guides: if, instead of guiding the people, they punish them irregularly, they become tyrants. I wish for a further report." On this the counsellors gave way: "Your Majesty's merciful will covers far more ground than we can presume to understand the necessity for." To illustrate the continuity of Chinese history, it may be mentioned that this edict of over 2,100 years ago is still on record; is quite intelligible to modern ears; and still forms part of

the stock legal diction, just as does the celebrated declaration of the English barons upon the subject of legitimacy: "We will not change the laws of England which have hitherto been accepted and approved by our ancestors" (*cf.* p. 288).

But, if we inquire closer into Chinese history, we find that this picturesque event is only another case of idealising; not to mention his grandson and most illustrious successor, whose financial straits and palace intrigues led him to enact many hasty and cruel laws, that very "Marcus Aurelius" himself was, during a subsequent rebellion, unfortunately induced to depart from his own noble principles. There was, however, one other *cause célèbre* during the reign of this humane Emperor: it happened after he had been on the throne for nearly twenty-five years, and the anecdote is as well known in China as the story of Brutus and his condemned sons Titus and Tiberius is known in Europe. A Chinese physician and local official was summoned to court for peculation, a crime which rendered him liable, under the new code as under the older ones, to the penalty of mutilation: having five daughters, but no son, he bewailed the luckless fate which deprived him of a representative capable of sacrificing himself upon the altar of filial duty in accordance with the maxim "A father's debt the son repays." The youngest daughter, stung by these reproaches, and knowing that her father was the victim of private spite, insisted on accompanying her parent to the imperial court, where she pleaded his case before the Emperor with such eloquence and effect that his Majesty at once decided to abolish as barbarous the punishment of mutilation. Hard labour at the Great Wall, shaving the head, wearing the heavy yoke, bastinado and flogging,—these were sub-

stituted for mutilation, and really form the nucleus of the modern system.

The above and similar imperial orders were, it must be confessed, often rather symptoms of growing change than definite registrations of permanent radical improvements; for, owing to China's enormous size, and to the apathy of local rulers, satraps, and magistrates, the imperial decrees, unless repeated and persisted with, seem often to have remained a dead letter, especially where only the interests of the masses were concerned, and where no powerful influence was at work to insist on following up the order. The first of Chinese true historians was himself cruelly deprived of his manhood by the grandson just mentioned of this humane Emperor, and this for the purely technical offence of remonstrating with the monarch in favour of a defeated general; and he leaves on record a pathetic letter to a friend bewailing in resigned terms his miserable fate, and characterising himself as "what's left from the knife and the saw." It was this Emperor who encouraged informers and delators, and developed the idea of forcing out confessions under torture, a process which I cannot find to have existed in more ancient times. Still, notwithstanding the caprice or weakness of this or that ruler, the progress in the direction of reason and mercy was now fairly steady: doubtful cases were reheard at the capital; the local authorities were urged to use prompt dispatch, and not to confine people too long upon mere suspicion; steps were taken to check the bribery of officials and the corruption of clerks and police; a growing disinclination to extort confessions under the lash or rack was manifested; fasting and solemn formalities were enjoined when the time for carrying out death sentences approached; the number of bastinado

strokes administered was more than once reduced along the whole line of offences; in spite of the evergrowing additions to the law categories, earnest endeavours were made to simplify the law as much as possible: and generally, it may be stated that during the 400 years of Han dynasty rule (200 B.C. to A.D. 200) a steady advance took place in the direction of mildness. For many centuries after that the question of reintroducing the mutilation punishments came up for discussion; dynasty after dynasty "secured the stag" (as the Chinese poets say when they refer to the contests for empire); and each reigning house naturally had its own special code, but always based on the same old general principles, modified to suit the exigencies of the times. There never were any surprises or rival doctrines in China, such as our Gavelkind in Kent, and Borough-English in other parts of England, which flatly contradict the ordinary laws of descent and inheritance.¹ Referring back now for light, we may be disposed to ignore the codes of the minor dynasties that only reigned for a generation, in favour of those of renowned houses which maintained the throne for centuries; but that would be a mistake: each new dynasty of course assumed (and hoped) that it would continue, so to speak, for ever. Consequently we find that many of the most far-reaching and even best improvements were often introduced by short-lived reigning houses that only endured a lifetime or two. The general tendency of change ran in the direction of sparing life, facilitating appeals in doubtful cases, lightening the load of fetters, flogging on

¹ Local rules of inheritance, etc., belong to private and patriarchal family customs, which very rarely come before the imperial jurisdiction. See the present writer's *Comparative Chinese Family Law*, 1878 (out of print), originally published in the *China Review* for 1878.

parts of the body less susceptible of vital injury, and sparing the modesty of females. The principle was laid down, moreover, that women were only responsible for the crimes of the family into which they married, and not of that which they had quitted. In the middle of the third century of our era there were thirty-seven groups of punishment for ordinary offences ranged under the following heads: death three, shaving four, corporal without mutilation three, hard labour three, ransomable eleven, fines six, miscellaneous satisfaction seven; and the chief heads under which offences were arranged were, as of old, robbery (not including terrorising or trafficking in human beings), thefts, cheating, defrauding, trespassing, falsifying royal acts of state, etc. Treason was still punished by cutting in two at the waist, but responsibility did not extend to grandparents and grandchildren; for rebellion the whole three generations suffered; their bodies were pickled for exposure in the market-place, and their dwellings rased to the ground. In homicides the principle was recognised that relatives might take vengeance, but not after an imperial amnesty had been granted to the murderer. In the whole history of China I have not come across a single case of civil jurisprudence in the strict sense, *i.e.* where any abstract rights between individuals have been threshed out with considerations touching relevancy of evidence, damage to character, equitable set-off, nice definitions in contract, and so on. All cases brought before the Crown are, so to speak, brought up by special reference, because the official judge, or the family, or the commercial court below cannot settle them, and applies for assistance.

For three centuries, 280-580, North China was under Tartar rule, and the native dynasties

for the first time had to cross the Great River (or Yang-tsze Kiang, as we usually call it) and fashion the best empire they could out of Chinese colonists and southern races only half Chinese. The march of law and order was about the same in both halves of China: for if the literary classes had carried part of their civilisation over the river with them, the Tartars remained in possession of the old civilised soil and documents; and thus both empires based their legal principles and humane improvements upon the same old classics and unshakable ideals. Strangling is now heard of for the first time as a death penalty; less grave than decapitation, because the body remains undivided for reappearance in the next world; the ancient punishment of tearing the body to pieces by means of horses is formally revived by both dynastic groups. No new legal principle of any kind is introduced by the Tartars, but one or two droll punishments certainly suggest foreign origin; for instance, wizards were condemned to carry a ram on the back, embrace a dog, and jump into a pond. In China proper, though the laws against inciting the people with baseless talk are severe, I have never discovered any law against wizardry or religion. Both in the north and south the "grievance drum" was introduced, so that persons having a grievance could call forcible attention of the Emperor and his officers to an unredressed wrong. The native procedure of the Tartar dynasties was of course quite summary, the tribe chiefs disposing of causes in a rough-and-ready way in front of the Khan's or sub-Khan's tent; as nomads they possessed no fetters or prisons, and being destitute of any native system of writing (unless they kept a Chinese scribe), they made arrests and recorded judgments by means of

wooden tallies : most homicides could be ransomed with cattle and horses, as by our own *weregild* ; but all treasons were punished with pitiless extermination of the family. Yet just as the rude Goths at exactly the same date carved kingdoms and made excellent codes out of the *débris* of Roman civilisation and law, so did the Tartars rapidly acquire at least a veneer of Chinese refinement ; and some of their adapted Chinese codes are as much entitled to respect, when compared with the codes of the pure Chinese dynasties, as the Edict of Theodoric the Eastern Goth or the Breviary of Alaric the Western Goth, which did excellent duty in North Italy, France, and Spain. Curiously enough, a great Chinese statesman named Ts'ui Hao, who acted as premier and historian to the Tartars of the fifth century, was put to death with his three generations for telling the plain truth about the Tartar origin in his history. It is now that we first begin to hear of the characteristic Chinese punishment known to us as the *cangue*, or wooden collar, a kind of yoke or portable stocks. A good deal of the legislation consists in defining the weight and size of this instrument, the thickness and smoothness of the whip and bastinado, ameliorating the lot of prisoners, arranging the rate of ransom in copper and silk, and so on. Flogging on the back was abolished because one Emperor had chanced to see a picture of the human anatomy, and had discovered that the bowels were perilously near the spine. There is even one solitary instance in which the Buddhist desire to save life is coupled with an appeal to old classical principles as a reason for extending the system of ransoming crimes.

The second great turning period in Chinese legal history was the seventh century of our

era, when, after many centuries of interminable civil strife and foreign war, China was once more permanently reunited under a vigorous native dynasty. Even before the sixth century was out, China had been reconquered by a native house of great intelligence and energy; but excessive ambition soon led to its premature supersession. Judgments had now (seventh century) to be written; law students were for the first time trained; the punishment of family members was abolished; the triple reconsideration of death sentences was introduced; and, generally, some far-reaching reforms were ordered, if not actually made. The principles of Buddhism had by this time been thoroughly examined; and moreover Christianity, the Persian religions, the teaching of Mahomet, had all been introduced into China: therefore there was some opportunity to compare notes, and to soften away the asperities of the old punitive codes, though it must be confessed that none of the foreign systems is officially honoured by the least mention; a little later the Manichean disciplines seem to have attracted attention. Amongst the distinguished officers who received a commission to reform the laws on the basis of the improvements introduced by the short dynasty (580-620) just mentioned, but minus its severities, was a strong supporter of Buddhism; and yet curiously enough he was one of those who pleaded for the retention of mutilation as a merciful respite from death. But the Emperor was firm, and from this date the ancient Five Punishments, as they have been above¹ described, were theoretically re-established almost exactly as they now are; that is to say, death (decapitation and strangling); three degrees of banishment with or without flogging and hard labour to remote provinces; five degrees of penal servitude

with or without flogging to places in one's native province; eight degrees of the greater bastinado, and five of the lesser bastinado; twenty punishments in all—although even so late as 1078 the question of re-introducing literal nose and foot cutting was unsuccessfully mooted again. Permission to commit suicide at home now appears for the first time amongst the favoured official classes. Offences were grouped under twelve heads: statutory definitions, or qualifications of the ancient statutes; protection of the Emperor; questions of official duty; marriages; imperial mews and stores; independent political action; theft and robbery; litigiousness; cheating and falsifying; miscellaneous statutory offences; deserters and escaped prisoners; trials. There were, as in ancient times, eight grounds upon which special privileges might be claimed after sentence, but not in the case of the "ten odious crimes," of which we now first hear. Nothing could be more unsatisfactory or indefinite from our juridical point of view than this clumsy classification, which with slight variation seems to have remained almost unchanged for 1,400 years: of course it can only be made even partially intelligible to us by examining one by one the specific crimes ranged under each heading; but even on the face of it as it stands, it will be apparent, in spite of vagueness, that political offences occupy the chief place in the Chinese legislator's imagination; and perhaps that may be the reason why the Chinese, as a people, have always been obstinately inclined to leave politics to those whose business it is to run the machine of state, and have invariably managed their own private affairs with the minimum of application for state assistance: so far as I am aware, there has never been asserted a claim for popular rights beyond the mere

right of being left with a bare competence for wife and family. The people of China have never "cornered," still less executed their sovereigns.

It is to the seventh century that belongs the definite establishment of another great principle which has possessed great vitality, and that is what we have called the triple applications for a death-warrant. The Emperor having had reason to regret the fact that he had hastily ordered the execution of certain offending courtiers or statesmen, gave peremptory instructions that in future his commands were to be ignored until he had repeated them three times at decent intervals extending over at least two days; so that, to use our English expression, his Majesty could sleep upon his wrath; moreover, warrants for execution were not to be forwarded any longer by express messenger, the idea being that the prisoner should enjoy every possible surviving chance of a reprieve. There are some grounds for supposing that in very ancient times this triple appeal to conscience existed in the form of a thrice-repeated pardon, the last cry of which was by a legal fiction supposed to be too late to overtake the prisoner.

A few special instances of Crown Cases Reserved may be mentioned as illustrating the concurrent effect of scriptural injunction and ever-changing legal precept in evolving the principle of a judgment, or what our lawyers call, in imitation of the Roman juriconsults, the *ratio decidendi*. A youth deliberately murdered his father's enemy, and was, on the face of it, liable to execution. But, it was argued, the ancient Book of Rites says that a son cannot live under the same sky with his father's enemy; whilst Confucius's annotated history asserts in general

terms the duty of a son to avenge his father's wrong. The law nowhere actually lays down that such homicide is specifically excusable; if it did, it would appear to encourage murder and family feuds: still, the law is confessedly based on the general principles of the classics; hence in this case there is apparent conflict between general legal principle and specific law. It was decided that each such case must be separately reported and judged upon its merits. Another case occurred of a youth killing a man whom he saw in the act of attacking his father, and then voluntarily giving himself up to justice. It was argued from Confucius's history that the motive of an act should be taken into account in proportioning a sentence; here the youth gave himself up, so that escape or concealment was not in question: he therefore received a reduced punishment. In one case the Emperor had not the heart to execute a corrupt official at Canton, who at an earlier stage in his career had done him good service. The Emperor said: "I am supposed to carry out impartially on behalf of Heaven the rewards and punishments that may be due. In this case I am afraid I am manipulating the law to the discredit of Heaven. Put up a matshed in the southern suburb for three days so that I may do penance at the Altar of Heaven there." (This singular compromise with Heaven recalls the expression *colpo di stato di Domeniddio* used apologetically by His Holiness Pope Pius IX to excuse his appointment to Westminster of Archbishop Manning.) The same romantic Emperor once in a fit of generosity sent to their homes 390 prisoners whose names were down for execution, ordering them to come up for judgment after the autumn. Not a man failed, and so all were pardoned.

In another instance the T'ang Emperor de-

clined to sanction the death of an elder brother serving at a distance when the younger brother was found guilty of rebellion : eleven hundred years later a Manchu Emperor took exactly the same step. Another Manchu Emperor had a father's enemy case on appeal brought before him, and reversed the decision of the T'ang dynasty. But in the later case the circumstances differed ; a son killed the son of the *convicted* murderer of his own father ; the murderer being in the hands of the law, the son had no vengeance to satisfy, for the murderer was legally dead : moreover, by killing the murderer's son, two lives were taken from one family in satisfaction of one life in the other. Hence the murdering son was sentenced to decapitation, subject to the chance of a general amnesty taking place before his name should be finally ticked off for execution. In the case of an escaped murderer, who delivered himself up on hearing that his father had been arrested, a conflict of opinions arose : it was argued that at no period of Chinese law had murderers been let off death ; however, the Manchu Emperor considered the man's behaviour " closely approaching nobleness," and respited the decapitation for banishment and a flogging. But to go back. After the wars and revolution which accompanied the fall of the great T'ang dynasty there was only one copy of the laws to be found ; but this was enough, and it formed the basis from which the next group of short-lived dynasties fashioned their codes. To this period belongs the abolition of confiscation of property and of the responsibility of relatives in all cases but treason ; the cleansing of prisons, medical treatment of prisoners, decent conduct towards mere witnesses, and regular tabulation of the rates of ransom : but the anarchy was too great for these important

reforms to be properly consolidated; however that may be, in any case they were symptoms of healthy progress.

A law of the year 977 (native Chinese Sung dynasty) made the murder by a stepmother of her husband's earlier son punishable as an ordinary homicide. In 1729 the Manchu Emperor made the offence punishable as before by strangulation if the murder deprived the husband of heirs. If the husband was dead, the stepmother must not have the privilege of ransom accorded to women, but her own favourite son, if any, must be strangled. If no son, then she must quit the family and go back to her own family, her husband's property being given to the murdered son's brothers and sons in equal shares. It is about 900 years ago that the lingering death punishment (abolished in 1905) first appears both in South China and amongst the Kitan Tartars ruling North China: it seems to have been reserved for the Mongols (1260-1368) in North China to introduce it on a regular scale.

Instead of plodding on from this point with the somewhat monotonous history of Chinese legal changes, it may be more interesting to start back from the position of to-day, and to work our way in a reverse direction to the point where we have broken off. The present Manchu dynasty reigned without a break for over 267 years, and the very first thing the new Emperor did on his accession in 1644 was to ordain that the laws of the native Chinese Ming dynasty—which had governed China for nearly 300 years (1368-1643)—should be modified so as to include Manchu customs, and should be reissued as the Laws of the Manchu Dynasty. In dealing with the question of general amnesties on joyful occasions, the responsible statesmen of the day

gave signal proof of the continuity of legal history by quoting the dictum of a codifier 1,050 years before them : he had asserted that "the states which find pardons unnecessary are the states which have just laws" : he also cited a second codifier of 600 years back, who had quoted the classical saying that "appeal to principle was sufficient for the good, even though chastisement might be the sole effective appeal to the bad man." The Emperor, in justifying what may be styled "benefit of clergy," or special trials in favour of officials, and the exemption of Manchus from certain punitive degradations, referred back to the eight privileges introduced about 1200 B.C., *i.e.* the privileges of blood, friendship, virtue, ability, service, rank, zeal, and hospitality (the last referring to ambassadors). In another instance reference was made to the plea used by the girl who tramped after her father to the court of the Chinese Marcus Aurelius, namely, that "a man once judicially slain can never come to life again, however innocent he may be."

The second Emperor, the famous K'ang-hi, likewise made many appeals to classical principles, and, like his successor, laid down very definite rules exempting women from the necessity of appearing before the courts : all female witnesses and persons concerned in a case (provided they were not themselves accused) were to be examined on commission in their own houses. The treason laws of the expelled dynasty, it must be confessed, are as ferocious as they have ever been in China at the worst of times : all the odious punishments abolished by the decree of April 1905 were in full swing when the Manchus took over their predecessors' code, and have remained so ; that is to say, slicing to pieces, and decapitating the dead ;

besides responsibility of relatives to the third generation both ways, slavery of the women and young boys, and so on. The fourth Emperor in 1740 issued a new edition of the Manchu Code, alluding in his preface to the supposed pictorial punishments of extreme antiquity, and to the first real code of 960 B.C., mentioned above as translated by Dr. Legge. In addition to justifying several of his specific decisions in Crown Cases Reserved by referring back to the classics, the Emperor cites two cases a thousand years old, specially named in the Chinese legal records, in order to amend two decisions connected with the justifiable murder of a father's enemy by that father's son. These two cases have already been alluded to under the T'ang dynasty (p. 333). The same principle is repeatedly laid down by the Manchu Emperor that was asserted by one of the Roman Emperors, namely, that "though above the law, they considered themselves bound to live within the law."

The punishing of mandarins *ex post facto* for not having foreseen, or for not having punished, a crime is also an extension of the responsibility theory which seems to have grown up under the Manchu dynasty.

Legal activity at headquarters in China seems to have fallen off with the advent of Europeans: of course ordinary routine business was submitted to the Throne and disposed of in the usual way; and of course special legislation—as for instance in the matter of opium—has been sometimes found necessary. Curiously enough, the falling off in Manchu jurisprudence coincides in date with the translation of the Manchu Code by Sir George Staunton, who was with the Lord Macartney mission of 1793. At present our knowledge of Chinese law, as presented to us in its most recent or Manchu form, must be in a

large measure gathered from that work, which is now quite out of print; but it must be mentioned that Staunton only translated the original kernel or ancient "statute" part of the law, much of which is obsolete; he left entirely untranslated what may be termed the judge-made or case-law, which really forms the most important part of the work. The close corporation of law secretaries, who have had quite a monopoly of the law clerkships in all Chinese courts, were up to 1911 the real persons who manipulated the latest decrees, fashioned the judgments, and held a balance between the Emperor and his judicial officers. By them the judge-made law was really created and applied. It is another instance of a trade worked with the utmost secrecy. Even so far back as 800 years ago, it was complained that "all law now depended on the clerks' memories."

The legal records of the purely native dynasty of Ming, which occupied the throne during the reigns of our Houses of Lancaster, York, Tudor, and Stuart, distinctly state that all jurisprudence to their date is based upon the Nine Chapters of 200 B.C. (Han dynasty), as subsequently expanded and codified in A.D. 630 (T'ang dynasty). In 1373 this Ming dynasty published its code, which is confessedly based on that of 630, and has exactly the same twelve divisions.¹ The Mongol dynasty, which practically began, so far as China was concerned, with Kublai Khan in 1260, is much better spoken of by the historians than one would expect, considering that it was a completely foreign government ruling China by pure force. Kublai is spoken of as quite a benevolent prince from a juridical point of view, and even his less capable successors are charged rather with a certain slipshod carelessness than with wanton injustice. Special

features of this dynasty were the abolition of strangulation, and the creation of legislative privileges in favour of Buddhists, and at times of other priests, Christian included. The Chinese both in the north and south seem to have had nearly all the benefits of old Chinese law ; but the Mongols, mostly of course military men or officials, were under a special dispensation. For three centuries previous to the Mongol conquest, China was under two concurrent governments, that of first the Kitan and then the Nüchên Tartars in the north, and that of the pure Chinese dynasty in the south : the space at our disposal will not permit of our saying more than this : the whole legal history is on record ; progress can be traced step by step ; and no considerable departure was at any time made from the accepted principles handed down from ancient times.

On the whole it may be said, continuing our way backwards, that the southern dynasty was as shiftY and as merciful in laws as it was literary and unusually weak in arms. But officials were now obliged to study the law, and scholars began for the first time to hold judicial posts. For fifty years previous to this north and south rule, China had been split up into innumerable contending local dynasties, and it need hardly be repeated that during this welter of anarchy no startling advance was made : yet each dynasty—at least each of the five successive central ones, which are the only ones usually recognised by standard historians—naturally took for granted the possibility that it might endure for ever ; and thus the very first step taken by each founder was to issue a code of his own, based, of course, upon the old codes already described (*cf.* p. 326).

Previous to that the great T'ang dynasty, to

which we now return, ruled the whole of China with great glory for 300 years, these 300 years roughly covering the period of our Saxon kings : the legal history is very minute, and the special decisions are both amusing and interesting : as already stated, some of them are cited at this day, just as mediæval authorities may be quoted in England. So great was the reputation of the T'ang dynasty, that in the south of China the Cantonese even now invariably describe themselves in colloquial speech as "men of T'ang." On the other hand (*cf.* p. 30), the general name for Chinese in the north is "men of Han," "language or writing of Han," and so on, having reference to the glorious period described in the earlier part of this chapter, that is from 200 B.C. to A.D. 200, when three successive branches of the Han family sat upon the Chinese throne. During the 300 years between A.D. 280 and 580 China was ruled by Tartars in the north and native houses in the south : there is plenty to say about legal development in both, but this is not the place for saying it.

To sum up, the two great law dynasties of China are the Han (200 B.C. to A.D. 200) and the T'ang (600 to 900), and they alone of all purely Chinese dynasties (*i.e.* not counting the Mongols and the Manchus) succeeded in extending Chinese influence to Persia and India : hence to this day the pure Chinese are proud to call themselves "men of Han," and "men of T'ang."

After the collapse of China that followed upon the Japanese and "Boxer" wars, the question of legal reform was seriously taken up, one of the chief motives being to imitate Japanese success and get rid of extraterritorial jurisdictions. The numerous memorials presented to the Emperor by the most distinguished Manchu and Chinese statesmen and viceroys, central

or in the provinces, are all recorded in full, and amply prove the literary, logical, and even legal capacity of the writers, if only their colleagues intrusted with the carrying out of excellent laws could honestly and fairly administer the laws so well understood and approved.

The first point was to expose clearly the difference between executive and legislative functions, and to lay stress upon the unwisdom of continuing these two separate functions in the hands of one and the same man or group of men. The second reform of supreme importance was to secure the independence of judges and to establish proper courts of first and second instance, appeal, and so on, both in the capital and in the provinces. The precise legislative and executive rights of Parliament on the one hand and the Boards and Supreme Law Courts on the other, were shrewdly discussed. This useful work began in 1905, and was proceeding apace when the Empress-Dowager and the Emperor died in 1908. Meanwhile Wu T'ing-fang, the present (end of 1916) Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was commissioned to draw up a code. With him was associated one Shên Kia-pên, a native of the region that for centuries has had a monopoly of law-clerk business, and very learned in native law. "Mr. Wu" himself is a British barrister, well known for his eminence as Minister to the United States. After some elaboration the Code was drawn up largely after Japanese model, and from a European point of view a very fair code it was, apart from the fact that it got rid of many anachronisms. But it met with serious viceregal opposition on account of the novelty, not to say coarseness of its style, its use of ill-understood semi-foreign definitions, and its failure to recognise the ethical principle of Chinese Law, based on *hiao*, or the natural family

rights, duties, and responsibilities as defined in the Confucian classics.

Things are in such a state of flux under the Republic that it is hardly safe to say what law is actually followed by Chinese judges; what is the juridical capacity of those judges; and what is the *ratio decidendi*. So far as I can judge, whatever the law and the judge may theoretically be, justice to the average claimant is as far off as in past times, and the Chinese courts are as unfitted to replace the extraterritorial consular courts as ever they were.

CHAPTER XVII

THE LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

As to the most ancient Chinese writings, within the past few years a mass of entirely new evidence has been discovered in the shape of numerous bone inscriptions, unearthed chiefly in the true "Central Kingdom" of Old China. The meaning of these bone inscriptions is plain in some instances; in others it is as uncertain as their date; but, whether connected with divination, dynastic successions, or family records, it seems clear that they exhibit little or nothing in the direction of sustained thought or connected history. A large number of the rude characters can be easily identified with the modern forms as evolved through the improvements of centuries. Those which have not been identified manifestly run "on the same lines" as modern characters; but in the absence of inscriptions on old bronzes wherewith to compare them, we must fain leave such unsolved for the present. However that may be, this most ancient period of about a hundred pictographic signs, gradually reinforced by perhaps four hundred more ideographic characters, endured without much local variation down to the year 827 B.C. or thereabout; and really we do not seem to possess a single trustworthy specimen of even the most primitive Chinese script older than, say, another 827 years before that. That

the 827 B.C. script reform was the "articulate" expression of genuine public opinion budding for the first time seems evident from the fact that the interregnum period (841-828) was characterised as *Kung-ho*, or "together harmonising," a term freely used within the past five years to denote the "Republic." During the restoration reign of 827 to 782 B.C., a court annalist introduced a new phonetic system of writing, a great improvement upon the sprawling old hieroglyphs and pictographs, which were only called and considered as "names," without any suggestion of grouping similar sounding names, still less of splitting up such sounds into initials and finals, tones and rhymes. His "book" or vocabulary, consisting of fifteen bamboo or wooden "chapters," cannot have exceeded about one thousand characters in all, and this estimate is made from the number used in the actual or recorded documents that have come down to us written in that character, many specimens of which still survive in the shape of vases, drinking-vessels, sacrificial tripods, bricks, tiles, and commemorative bronze bowls, one especially fine instance of the last-named being at this moment visible to the public in the Victoria and Albert Museum, together with translation, history, and arguments as to its genuineness.

It is now only that real history, accompanied by effective connected thoughts and expressive if limited writing, really begins, and with it the period of material progress and local autonomy. Writing was a laborious and clumsy art even in its improved and tentatively phonetic form, and "books" were rare and heavy objects made up of strips strung together at one end like (and probably the indirect origin of) bamboo fans; ordinary business was conducted by one or more

wooden or bamboo slips like our tallies, each containing a dozen or so of characters, the form of which was apt to differ slightly in each semi-independent state. Confucius's celebrated Annals (c. 480 B.C.), the first real definite history ever attempted in China, was a laconic record of events in his own state so far as they led him to observations on and relations with other states, including the decaying imperial state or extremely limited area under direct imperial rule. There is reason to believe that most if not all the other states kept similar annals, and portions of the same, in fact, have been dug up from graves at various comparatively modern times. Confucius and his contemporaries probably did not make use of 2,500 separate characters between them. Confucius's history, which covers a retrospective period of about 250 years, is scarcely literature, though the three largely amplified commentaries upon it (published several centuries later) which are usually meant when people speak of Confucius's celebrated Annals, are decidedly interesting and readable.

There can be no doubt that during the period 820-220 B.C. the total number of written characters had increased from 1,000 to over 3,000, for 3,300 were at the latter date collected in a vocabulary or book. Education was widely spread; that is, the limited ruling classes had broadened their base, cultivated literary treasures, used to consult the oracles, and saw to it that the mercantile, industrial, and agricultural commons possessed at least a knowledge of written character sufficient for the ordinary business purposes of life, including the learning off by heart of moral maxims and principles of decency. If no current everyday specimens have come down to us as (only in very recent years) in the cases of the Egyptian *papyri* and Babylonian

clay, it must be largely because wood and bamboo are so perishable by fire and rot.

After the uniting of the contending feudatories and imperial appanage into one centralised state in 213 B.C., the conqueror and his ministers naturally inclined to favour the use of their own variety of script when it became a question of deciding which variant had best claim to be the standard. Weights and measures, cart-wheel axles, and political ideas were all thenceforward to be organised and standardised. It is highly probable that (as with the Egyptian demotic writing) scribes, whose routine business led them to deal with numerous oracular, administrative, or mercantile matters, had for long quietly and empirically indulged in a kind of short-hand among themselves and their clerical colleagues of other states, which process would lead naturally to a general simplification of the more formal and laborious mode of writing discovered or codified in 827 B.C., in the elaboration of which simplification, we are told, two of the conqueror's ministers and a private scholar took independent parts: shortly after that an anonymous individual unified these three collections in a single book of 3,300, as just stated. In his eagerness to begin things afresh, this imperial founder proceeded to call in and destroy not only so much of the ancient literature as he could lay his hands on, but also to summon and destroy the philosophers, scholars, and politicians who opposed his innovations on the, to him, most irritating ground that the sages of antiquity had taught wiser and better things. Thus it comes about that even those portions of genuine old classical writings rummaged for and patched up from memory several generations after the tyrant's death, and of course after the total collapse of his short-lived dynasty, are

open to suspicion as to their genuineness and accuracy, as few persons could after that interval even decipher, let alone explain, the old texts found, whilst a large number of the 827 B.C. characters had disappeared for ever. If this seem incredible, then how many of us can make out even Queen Elizabeth's writing in the British Museum?

The Han dynasty in its western and eastern divisions we have seen covered a period of 400 years, *i.e.*, the first 200 years before and the second 200 years after the beginning of our Christian era—exactly the same periods of time as those covered by the Hiung-nu dominators, who used Chinese just as (Cæsar tells us) the Gauls and Germans used Greek script. These 400 years were exceedingly active in a military as well as in a literary sense. The first dictionary (as distinct from mere vocabularies) was published about A.D. 220, and contained over 9,000 words. Not only was the written character further developed and made easier to write, but the hair ink-brush had come into general use instead of the scratcher or style and the rough bamboo paint-brush; paper was invented; various special guide-books and vocabularies were made; distant military posts were established, and expresses conveyed despatches rapidly from one end of the empire to the other—Dr. Aurel Stein has unearthed hundreds of them from the dry desert sand, and the original specimens may now be seen in the British Museum: the dominions of China were enlarged by discovery; but at no period does the Chinese literary *taste* seem to have been in the remotest degree affected by foreign importations, nor have the Chinese writers ever given the smallest hint that the form of their script owed anything in the way of inception, change, or improvement to examples

or suggestions from abroad : in fact, they never even heard of any rival writing system or conceived the possible existence of any except their own until they were brought into political contact with the Indo-Scythians (whence India) and the Syrians (whence Rome). Thus any supposed Babylonian effect, say, in 600 B.C. (even if it had existed at all) could only in any case be looked for now in connection with the forms that have largely perished, and not with the forms now in use. The Japanese (as admitted in the *Times* by Baron Kikuchi) had no letters of any kind previous to the seventh century A.D.

But as to the specific point of invention, is there any real necessity for persisting in or even assuming that writing was in remote and "prehistoric" times the exclusive invention of any one nation or tribe? Nay, further; the attempts to prove that the Chinese derived their primitive pictographs from the Akkadians or Sumerians of Babylonia seem to defeat themselves when we read in the British Museum guide-book that both these ruling peoples are "believed to have come from Central Asia, and to have belonged to the Turanian family of nations"; *i.e.*, of necessity either to the Chinese, or Tibetans, or the Hiung-nu and Scythians; to wit, the Turks. What scientific ground is there for assuming that any nation or race is older than any other? Every existing man and woman must have had a father and mother, and *they* also must have had parents; and so on *ad infinitum*, or at any rate until at least pleistocene and even pleiocene times. In any case it seems rash to assume connection or borrowings on the ground that the primitive sounds uttered, or scratched on a tree, show some similarity. There are only one pair of legs and one pair of arms to clothe, whether we elect

for petticoat, clout, or breeches; and there is, and for, say, 250,000 years has been, only one kind of throat and nose to speak out of, whether, living remote from each other, we incline towards clicks, tones, grunts, sniffs, labials, sonants, nasals, surds, or gutturals. Not to speak of the Neanderthal man, the Heidelberg jaw, and the Ipswich skeleton, still more recent discoveries—and in point of time we must not overlook the fossil “fabulous” dragons found personally by a genuine British Consul in China only last year (1916),—the most recent human “finds” distinctly point to complete man, brain-power included, even in pleiocene times. History is nothing but events, and events disappear for ever unless they are recorded; hence for untold generations man's doings are lost in oblivion, and leave not a wrack behind. Primitive man probably made one of his greatest discoveries when he began to conceive definite numbers. As to the mere act of thinking, he must have been, for he still is, on the same plane as other animals, and it is quite manifest that thinking cannot possibly connote speech of necessity, inasmuch as those persons born deaf and dumb can not only think, but read, and “get along” in matters generally as well as ordinary folk. Man's next step would probably be the development of speech, which is merely a “short-distance” record of our thoughts. Primitive man, having at last grasped the idea that his own tree hole and his own wife were only one set of many similar, would be led to “record” this and other simple facts more permanently with his nails, with shells, or with sticks, on his wife's skin, or on a tree; if there were no trees handy, he might make a shift with other suitable material; for instance, clay; and he would advance a step further when he found that

the sun, later fire, made the clay durable. The Chinese have plenty of *loess*. Possibly because it is too friable to convert into viscous mud, they never seem to have imagined the virtues of clay "paper," though numerous very hard-baked bricks and tiles, probably *not* made of *loess*, contain valuable ancient "inscriptions" of a terse and limited kind. It was Chinese ill-luck to choose the most perishable of materials—wood, bamboos, silk, and paper—and (unless many more bone or tortoise-shell inscriptions and tomb treasures turn up) one of the consequences now is that we shall have few literary antiquities in China except in stone, brick, or bronze. But that circumstance is far from proving that the Chinese owed any culture to other nations, or that their mental capacity needed foreign stimulus.

By the commencement of our era the Chinese had written two genuine "world" histories as they knew the world. Take, for instance, the chapters on the Hiung-nu in both these histories, about as long as the "Cæsar" and "Tacitus" used in our schools. The Chinese descriptions of the Hiung-nu are in general grasp marvellously like the Roman descriptions of the Gauls and Germans. The language and flow of thought are not only as precise and intelligent, but each sentence may be translated almost word for word into good Latin of similar terseness and grip; and conversely, the Latin will go quite comfortably into Chinese of 90 B.C. and 90 A.D. style. Although the first dictionary of 9,000 words published about A.D. 220 contains fewer than half the characters used by first-class schoolmen after the perfect and refined polish of 1,000 years later, and only one quarter or one fifth of the characters given in the imperial dictionaries of to-day, the clear and simple style of 90 B.C. to

A.D. 100 has never been excelled, and it is excellent reading even to-day, without greater need for a glossary than we ourselves require for, say, the Shakespearean plays. The Chinese have never shown any capacity for "applied history," but as recorders of bare facts and describers of definite events they are unequalled for trustworthiness. Have the Egyptians or the Babylonians ever written anything that one can sit down to read by the hour consecutively and conscientiously, and enjoy like a novel? The thousands of clay and papyrus documents indirectly describing conquests, family dealings, and so on are of course when pieced together intensely interesting to our curiosity. But are they literature? Is there any "style," or philosophic, logical thought about them? Above all, have they any "art" or beauty to the imagination, as approached through the eye? If a nation can struggle during a total period of 500 years out of its bald annals scratched on laconic slips, create an argumentative philosophy worth destroying, repair that destruction, rise "like a phoenix from the ashes," and achieve the highest degree of artistic calligraphic and literary taste, charming to the eye, unfettered by "grammar," and *good for any spoken language*, what need is there to charge upon its mental capacity an imaginary debt to the Egyptians and Babylonians?

* * * * *

From a general point of view no language can be postulated more difficult than another, for every language is the easiest expression by the native speaker thereof of his sentiments; specifically, Chinese is provably as easy to speak as English, for any English child born in China, and given a free hand to grow up amongst native

servants and friends, speaks the local dialect with absolute perfection along with his mother's English. The difficulty of a language cannot therefore be inherent, but must lie in the difference between the language already spoken and that which is to be learnt; it is only the difference between braying and neighing in another degree, the aims being identical. Chinese, accordingly, is so different from English, that it becomes increasingly difficult in the ratio of the learner's established custom: hence—given equal natural intelligence—a youth of 18 invariably progresses more rapidly than an adult of 40.

These sententiousities apart, however, Chinese is, by reason of its seemingly grotesque differences, *apparently* very hard to learn at all; and, by reason of its innumerable and confusing dialects, *really* very hard to learn correctly, unless you study it in a place where everybody speaks in the same way; for in China, except in one's own place, no one does speak the same way; and in Peking, where officials from every city and village in China do congregate, no one but a born native speaks absolutely "right." It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that amongst a group of native officials forming a government committee of any mixed-interests kind, no one can be guaranteed clear in his expositions unless he "yells at" you, and you at him, occasionally; or unless he indulges in *pi-t'an* (=pencil chat), *i.e.* jotting down, or merely indicating by flourishes of his forefinger, the written character intended to express the particular sound he is "mouthing," for the special benefit of his colleague's provincial ear. In Manchu times it was execrably bad form to misunderstand what the Emperor—and still more the peppery old Dowager—was talking about; and as the racy

brogue of Peking is precisely the same in a mule-cabman's mouth and in the mouth of the "all-highest," most local men admitted to audience were glad to slur over the formal conversation prescribed and shuffle out as quickly as possible from the imperial presence: some viceroys were so incapable of disguising their broad "Doric" that they received a pretty broad hint to give as much of their room and as little of their company at the metropolis as rigid rule admitted of.

The moral of all this is that a beginner must choose a dialect and stick to it. The reason is this: as will shortly be shown, all dialects are regular; that is to say, no matter how unlike they may be, the changes in pronunciation follow definite fixed rules: hence instinct teaches every native to make mental allowances for speakers of other dialects, and it is obvious that these mental allowances are more easily made when the speaker is "in order" than when he speaks imperfectly. For instance, when a Scotsman says *sair taes* for "sore toes," or when an Irishman talks about *Tay Pay* O'Connor drinking a cup of *tay* at the *say* side, even the dullest English yokel soon learns instinctively that certain classes of *o* and *i* (or *ee*) are changed to *ei* (or *ay*) in a Scotchman's or Irishman's mouth respectively; but if Scotch changes were irregularly mixed with Irish changes, neither the Scotsman nor the Irishman would be so well understood by the yokel in question.

Another point. All the Chinese dialects, and all the "tonic" languages akin to Chinese (Annamese, Miao, Yao, Lolo, Shan, etc.) are monosyllabic, *i.e.* no matter what single word, whether noun, verb, adjective, conjunction, or what not, that word is enunciated in one syllable; the only apparent qualification of this statement being that the vowel of many such syllables is

often what may be called an “inverted diphthong”; thus *chiang* and *chang*, *chui* and *chu*, though monosyllables, contain vowels of different degrees of purity or simplicity; like the word “gardener,” by a few old-fashioned people still pronounced “gyardner,” or like the faint difference between the vowels in *chew* and *choose* made by some clear speakers. But, after all, this monosyllabic theory of the Chinese languages must not be overweighted. All languages, even the most sesquipedalian, are monosyllabic, in the sense that all polysyllables must consist of single syllables; and all inflections, agglutinative particles, and so on, are either pure unmodified monosyllables with a definite meaning, or impure monosyllables the original meaning of which it is difficult to trace back. *Independence* and *Unabhängigkeit* are both exactly the same word: if, like the Chinese, we had always kept our European syllables separate and uncorrupted, we should have been equally comprehensible if we had said “Not from hang like way,” or, as we still say, “not hang on to others,” or “to one’s mother’s apron strings.” The important difference is that the Chinese in all their parts of speech, whether primary or auxiliary in meaning, have only had their own single language to deal with, whereas we in England have borrowed from so many sources that most of us are ignorant of what our own monosyllables mean. German occupies a midway position between English and Chinese: it may be said aphoristically, “Every Chinaman knows analytically exactly what he is saying; every German knows pretty well what he is saying; few Englishmen have any exact analytical idea of what they say.” What with Greek, Latin, and other borrowings, we in England have frequently lost all trace of our component parts.

Every one talks of "insufficient circumstances," and knows generally what this means, but how many people can split these words up and define *why* each syllable has its partial or contributes to the total effect? This instinctive wholesome feeling every Chinese has, no matter what dialect he speaks, and thus there are no Mrs. Malaprops in China, and no hawkers of "haspidesterers" or "enuncrancies" for the "drorin" room flower-pots. The Dowager-Empress could enjoy her street chaff, on precisely equal dialectic terms, with any old peasant crony who brought her a bowl of rice to the countryside; and it is recorded that she did.

There is no grammar in Chinese: this is the next point to be examined. How many of us can explain the word "grammar" which we use so confidently: *gramma* means "a word" or "a written sign," and "grammar" by extension "the study of forms of speech"; but the idea conveyed to the popular mind is a vague collection of half-understood terms, such as nouns, verbs, adjectives, tenses, cases, moods, and so on. Every Chinese word, written or spoken, is absolutely unchangeable; it cannot be inflected, agglutinated, or "parsed" in any way. Which of us can explain the word "parse"? The mere utterance of the word is all the parsing, partitioning, or defining a Chinese requires, just as we have shown that the most ancient written signs were "names," and there was an end of it. The Chinese word for a written *gramma* (ideograph) is no longer *ming* or "name," but a word only 2,000 years old as used in that sense called *tsz*, and a "not-recognize-*tsz*" means "an ignoramus." *Wên-li* (grammar) means the "orderly arrangement" of *tsz*, and an official statement by the Board of Education roundly asserted quite recently that

less than 1 per cent. of the whole Chinese race (seven per mille) were acquainted with literature. As a matter of fact, a much larger proportion of male Chinese have for many centuries had a casual acquaintance with the *tsz* sufficient to carry them through their daily business, women in most parts having been, until a few years ago, entirely ignorant; but this slender male knowledge was before the introduction of newspapers and advertising a generation ago: now both sexes are rapidly advancing, and the dullest minds are stimulated by curiosity as to what is going on in the outer world. But all Chinese, illiterate or learned, have as much grammar as we have; that is to say, they arrange the order of their words by hereditary instinct and daily practice in such a way that they extract the same effective results as though they had all our moods, tenses, declensions, and cases. The main difference between vulgar speech and literary elegance is that the latter aims at eschewing tautology, repetitions, expletives, coarseness, and vagueness; the style tends to the telegraphic in its economy. The most learned Chinese *litteratus* cannot in the least explain how he arrives at "style"; yet the official, historical, narrative, and other styles are all recognised and mentally fixed, subject of course to the qualification that real masters of style attract special attention, as with ourselves: official dispatch writers form a sort of semi-secret guild.

The fact that Chinese written characters or hieroglyphs are final and unchangeable cannot possibly have anything to do with the fact that the spoken language is (as above qualified) monosyllabic and uninflected, for men spoke and formed their language for the current purposes of life long before they ever thought of even elementary writing; moreover, even within

historical memory, Chinese writing was so laborious and clumsy an art, writing materials were so expensive and unwieldy, that only an infinitesimal number of scholars in a very few capital cities could have had the independent means to study critically. In the same way it must be remembered that Chinamen spoke long before the idea of "grammar" was conceived in other lands; the peculiarity of Chinese is that the people, literate or illiterate, have continued to speak as they have always spoken, without the faintest idea of "good grammar" or "bad grammar" having entered a single mind, and this over a period of some 4,000 years. Speech has no formal recognition at all, except as an ordinary function of life, like toddling, walking, suckling, weaning, eating, belching, or drinking. A school-master may chide a boy for rude acts and expressions, just as Don Quixote warned Sancho about *erutar* and *regoldar*; but he never dreams of correcting his "grammar"; nor are there any books on grammar. With us the omission or insertion of an *h*, a "you *was*" instead of *were*, "kep" instead of "kept," *srimp* instead of *shrimp*, may affect a young man's whole career in life, because, in addition to a more or less artificial grammar, we have evolved a more or less "caste" pronunciation, which is not that of the *profanum vulgus*. But plants grew before botany was invented, with its artificial classifications and impossible Greek or Latin words, invented to split up leaves, anthers, and other component parts into innumerable imaginary departments, futile to all but specialists; and plants will continue to grow *in omne ævum*, subject only to the few insignificant graftings or unnatural modifications that science may occasionally supply. So language grew through untold generations of gradual development before

grammar was invented to harness it to the restraint of fancy rules. Even in Europe, dialects still run wild, and "correct" speech is only ancillary to local brogues, whereas in China no one has ever dreamt of regulating mere speech, however finically rules for poetry and essay-writing may have developed. Every Chinese official speaks or tries to speak "mandarin" of some kind; not necessarily Pekingese (the fashionable language for the last thousand years, and, it seems, still the only one in which really good colloquial novels are published), but some form of that vast series of correlated brogues current over the whole of China, Manchuria, and (if Chinese be spoken at all) Mongolia, Corea, and Tibet, which pass by that unsatisfactory generic name. But no Cantonese or coast-Chinese of any kind holding an official position under the Manchu dynasty would ever speak his native "non-mandarin" brogue officially in public; interpreters were always used in courts of law, and it was no uncommon sight to witness, say, a Cantonese judge, who himself spoke imperfect "mandarin," having the evidence of a Cantonese prisoner (which he meanwhile understood perfectly) interpreted to him in another form of "mandarin" equally imperfect. This, of course, is only an exaggerated or extreme form of the general fact already stated—that mere speech is a private and personal affair not to be seriously taken; whilst *litera scripta manet*, whatever dialect be used; for composition in no matter what form, legal, official, narrative, essay, poetical, historical, or what not, is always resolvable into perfectly regular local elements, though six men may (as they do) pronounce one identical written word as *chi*, *cup*, *cake*, *kip*, *dji*, *kih*, and so on.

It may strike Europeans as singular that the total number of syllables for 40,000 written characters ranges between 350 to 800. But this seemingly alarming statement is subject to qualifications which reduce it to comparative impotence. In the first place 12,000 characters easily embrace the whole gamut of reasonable literature, and probably of the three or four million men in China officially dubbed "literate," not one million can be depended on to pronounce clearly upon more than 8,000 or 9,000. Three-fourths of the characters are waste; duplicates or "cranks" of this or that kind. A good average knowledge, sufficient for supervising correspondence, reading proclamations (not too exactly), glancing over the newspapers and official gazettes, dealing with commercial documents, etc., would be 4,000 or 5,000. Hence it follows that no character beyond this last number can possibly have a local pronunciation that can be depended upon; that is to say, if a person, Chinese or other, does not know it from personal experience, he must accept the native dictionary pronunciation; and this itself is imperfect, because the native dictionaries, in arranging their initials and finals, have only been able (1) to go back to ancient *dicta*, or (2) to accept the personal pronouncements of individuals (who may be provincials) in court circles. To put it in another way, the ordinary business Chinese of standing only makes use during life of 4,000 or 5,000 words in the whole of his conversation and business, and can only fit that conversation with the same number of signs. Hence the European student need not burden his memory with more (unless he wish to be a specialist); and if he stumble across either strange words or strange characters he must look them up; after which done, he is as

good an authority as the average Chinese, who must do the same thing.

As to the number of syllables in a monosyllabic language not exceeding 350—indeed the Hankow dialect has only 320—it is doubtful if even in polysyllabic English our separate monosyllables would reach 1,000. The whole Japanese language from first to last, including Chinese importations, is expressed by fifty separate monosyllables; but then that language is highly polysyllabic, and there are many clippings, prolongations, and “thickenings”—such as in Welsh *d* for *t* (Llandudno and St. Tudno)—to help it out. In China the same helping out effect is partly gained by tones, which practically double, treble, or even quadruple the distinctions, according to refinement of dialect: yet, with all that, one of the real difficulties of Chinese—especially the “mandarin” dialects—to foreign students, even those with a good ear for tones, is, it must be confessed, the want of variety in word-sounds, which difficulty is of course accentuated in the case of persons—and they are many—who cannot for the life of them “get into” the tones at all. The reason why some dialects have only 400 whilst others have 800 sounds is that either initials or finals or both have been merged in the cases of the “mandarin” group—*i.e.* in the current correlated brogues of nine-tenths of interior China—whilst they have been preserved—sometimes most carefully—in the ignored dialects of the coast. It is easily provable, from close examination of the present form of Corean, Japanese, and Annamese words taken over from Chinese (from A.D. 1 till, say, A.D. 1300), that the Cantonese dialect, which is far and a long way the highest in development, corresponds most closely with the theoretical or dictionary form of

ancient times, still rigidly adhered to for poetical purposes, though no Chinaman can explain why. This is the more remarkable in that the Cantonese people are not of pure "Old China" stock; and the explanation probably is that, as the Tartars gradually possessed themselves of North China (as expounded in the chapter on history), the pure Chinese colonised the south in huge numbers by way of the lakes, and took their speech with them. On the other hand the now existing "mandarin" dialects of Old China, West China, and the foreign provinces above enumerated, evidently represent corrupt forms as debased by successive inroads by Tartar rulers, who (just as the Koreans and Japanese have done with adopted Chinese words) would tend to make a clean sweep of tones, surds, sonants, aspirates, and other refinements strange to their own guttural and agglutinative speech. The case of the Cantonese is well illustrated by a parallel with Quebec (and French Canada generally); there sixteenth or seventeenth-century French is spoken, which I personally found barely intelligible. The case of "mandarin" is well illustrated by a parallel with France itself, where Northmen have played such havoc with Latin that a debased but fashionable "mandarin" form has thrust the purer Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Romance, and Rumanian into the political background. To illustrate the extent of "mandarin" corruption: what ought to be *ki*, *tsi*, *kik*, *kip*, *kit*, *tsik*, *tsip*, *tsit*, are all debased into one uniform "mandarin" form *chi*; thus a Cantonese—who, moreover, subdivides his four theoretical tones into about twenty colloquial tones—has eight chances at guessing right against one "mandarin" chance in this particular instance; in fact, he has 8×5 , or forty chances.

The whole question of comparative tones,

aspirates, sonants, surds, etc., is, however, one that no casual student can be expected to tolerate for a moment. Sanskrit purists in the shape of Buddhist priests first explained it to the Chinese, or tried to do so. A final piece of practical advice may, however, perhaps here be hazarded :—If you want to learn Chinese, no matter what dialect, get a native who does not understand a word of any foreign language, and is guaranteed to be a safe moderate scholar, speaking his own dialect only. Do not bother yourself with grammar, but start off by pointing to something, gradually working your way up to such words as “give,” “me,” the numerals, the negatives, the way to say “is” and “has” (practically the sole real “verb” or verbs in existence). Make the man read; follow his sounds, take notes, keep him in good humour by letting him smoke and drink tea; and, having thus got the thin end of the wedge in, go ahead in the way most agreeable to yourself, repeating all doubtful points the next lesson, and going on repeating day by day till you are clear. With regard to reading and writing, take notes of the sounds as they seem to you, and postpone dictionary work, or comparison with other men’s views, till you feel you are on your own solid ground. Do not trouble to learn the radicals (*i.e.* the 214 conventional, mostly obsolete, characters used in forming parts of hieroglyphs), but get a Chinese brush, Chinese ink, and Chinese slab; watch how the teacher rubs the ink, holds the brush, and in what order of strokes he writes each word. Imitate him, always keeping up Chinese conversation withal. The main rule is this: (1) No word should be allowed to pass for an instant unless you can utter its tone and sound, (2) recognise it on paper, and (3) write it as the teacher writes it.

The above remarks chiefly concern Pekingese, the "mandarin" dialect most usually studied, not only because it is the fashionable court brogue, but because it is (or was until quite recently) the only one provided with adequate machinery in the way of handbooks, etc., for foreigners: etymologically it is a decidedly corrupted dialect. It may in a general way be said that no one except missionaries ever seriously engages a purely local dialect: of course there are very occasional exceptions, and Cantonese is not rarely taken up by officials and other non-missionaries on account of the practical needs of Hong Kong; and there are excellent Canton dictionaries, besides handbooks. The dialects of Amoy and Ningpo seem to be picked up by local smatterers—apart from missionaries—with unusual facility, perhaps because both are "unliterary," and full of local locutions which cannot be written with recognised standard *tsz*; both are provided with good dictionaries. Such strange "abortions" as the dialects of Foochow and Wênchow are never studied except under *force majeure*; yet both have been thoroughly dissected and explained in published papers.

Few practical students who may take up Chinese, whether Pekingese, "southern mandarin," "western mandarin," or any of the coast dialects, will care or have time for comparative or etymological studies. If they should wander into these pleasant pastures, they will find that China follows out nearly all the "laws" of change we are accustomed to in Europe; such, for instance, as the passage from surd to aspirate, from sonant to aspirated surd, from one class of nasal to another, from faint nasal to pure consonant, from *o* to *ue* (as in Spanish), from partial omission of final conson-

ants to entire omission with occasional resuscitation (as in French), etc. In short, there is scarcely any bizarre change to be found in Europe that cannot be closely paralleled in Chinese; even the pure Welsh *ll* is extensively found in one of the Cantonese group, where it takes the place of *s*. Through all this maze it is comparatively easy to grope one's way for practical purposes if the student masters and adheres to one definite dialect, never passing to a second unless he feels that he can do so without wrecking the first; for even Chinese themselves can very rarely speak two dialects with sufficient purity in each case to pass muster to a native speaker as a native speaker of either; and it may be here repeated that speech in China takes quite a back seat, and (except between natives of the same tract) it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that no two men talk alike: one might even go farther, and say that few persons quite understand a complicated conversation without calling for repetitions and explanations; these, indeed, form the salt that gives zest to an interchange of ideas, just as with us the broad racy talk of a native of Perth entertains and amuses the educated Englishman, and *vice versâ*.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE RISE OF THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

A RUSH of very detailed books upon this subject burst upon the world four or five years ago, but the present account reviews the whole question in condensed proportions, under the light of official Chinese documents published from day to day, and from the standpoint of one who was actually present as events progressed in most of the countries concerned. The "Awakening of China" began when Turkestan was reconquered, and the Marquess Tsêng (who subsequently wrote a paper thus entitled) succeeded in negotiating a favourable treaty with Russia. At the same time Li Hung-chang, then Viceroy at Tientsin, managing also external relations generally, thought it good policy to encourage treaties between foreign powers and Corea so as to thwart designs upon that vassal state's virtual independence.

Meanwhile French activity in Indo-China (1884) led up to the loss of China's first war fleet and of Tonquin, whilst the Pendjeh incident in Affghanistan had the indirect effect of causing a strained situation in connection with the British occupation of Port Hamilton off Corea. The death of Sir Harry Parkes at this juncture (1885) deprived us of our one "push and go" man who understood the situation. China made efforts to create a new navy

and fortify Port Arthur, Wei-hai Wei, etc., an operation which was by way of placing Great Britain in an unusually sympathetic relationship with her had not our occupation of Upper Burma in 1886 stimulated the Marquess Tsêng from his London post of observation to attempt with us at Bhamo a repetition of his successes with Russia touching the Ili domain. The question of Indian trade with Tibet subsequently complicated the Burma frontier discussion, which latter ultimately involved China in triangular difficulties with ourselves and France (1894-5).

In 1891 the Siberian railway (the Tashkend extension of which had already attracted China's uneasy attention in 1881) was inaugurated at its far-eastern end by the present Czar, and simultaneously Count Cassini appeared upon the scene at Peking. For some years since the Port Hamilton bungle of 1886, things had smouldered in comparative quiet in Corea, but China's general attitude had meanwhile become somewhat aggressive, haughty, and notably anti-missionary, after Admiral Lang—a British Captain, lent to China—had shown the dragon flag in the southern and Japanese seas; she had lost foreign sympathy. In 1894 the sudden outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, however, took every one by surprise, culminating, as it did, in the crushing defeat of China, the destruction of her fleet for the second time, and the loss of Formosa: Germany, notwithstanding, successfully engineered a joint effort with Russia and France to secure Japan's renunciation of the Liao Tung peninsula point of vantage; but Japan held on to Wei-hai Wei, on the mainland opposite, as security for the fulfilment of other peace-treaty conditions; and now began the first of those heavy foreign borrowings which have since landed China into such financial embarrassment.

Li Hung-chang, after settling matters with Japan, proceeded to Europe and America in 1896 to see what he could do there to mend matters politically; as he was still burning with a sense of personal and patriotic humiliation at his diplomatic defeat by Count Itō in Japan, it seems certain that he must have had a large share (probably when in Russia) in the concoction of the Cassini treaty concluded at Peking that autumn; indeed, he was appointed on his return to assist at the Foreign Office only a day or two after its conclusion. In a secret clause of that treaty certain preferential "options" at Kiao Chou (never published, I think, except in Chinese) were granted to Russia.

Meanwhile Germany, as "honest broker" in the Liao Tung affair, had received no reward; but at an interview with the Czar about that time, William the Second seems to have twisted some sort of an acquiescence out of the Kiao Chou discussion with the Czar and Prince Lobanoff or his successor (just before or shortly after that statesman's death in August 1906), which, on the murder of some German missionaries in 1897, he treated as part justification for his audacious seizure of what was a secret option rather than an admitted Russian "right"; and thus we find Germany plumped down almost exactly opposite the commanding spot on which she had hypocritically objected to the Japanese presence. Russia was therefore not long before she found an excuse for leasing the coveted Port Arthur. Japan's security hold on Wei-hai Wei being now liquidated, China, ever ready to set one barbarian against the other, agreed in May 1898 that Japan should hand it over to Great Britain for as long as Russia held Port Arthur; and, moreover, the mainland territory opposite Hongkong was largely extended for Great Britain's benefit.

Meanwhile in April the French had taken "French" leave and secured a free port, with *Hinterland*, in the extreme south; and even the Italians were claiming countervailing coastal concessions between Ningpo and Foochow (successfully resisted). Thus abject China had almost resigned herself to the "melon-slicing" or spheres of influence process when the young Emperor, under the vivifying influence of the Cantonese reformer K'ang Yu-wei, suddenly took every one's breath away by launching a series of revolutionary edicts with the object of shaking up China from her lethargy; but, as to popular representation, there had been, up to this date, no visible demand for it; reform was inspired from above. There was really nothing amiss about the matter of this reform; it was rather the abrupt manner of the move that roused conservative and pocket interests to hostility. The old Dowager, who had long retired with her eunuchs to an inoffensive *otium cum dignitate*, now angrily emerged from her seclusion. K'ang Yu-wei and the Emperor tried to suppress her, and enlisted the aid of Yüan Shī-k'ai (who since the disastrous Japanese war had been training up an effective army near Tientsin). But instead of murdering the Dowager's nephew the Viceroy Jungluh, Yüan made to him, as his military chief, a clean breast of the business; the Viceroy hastened to Peking; the Emperor was placed under surveillance; the Dowager assumed charge once more; and all the premature reforms were summarily annulled. But with these suspicious events a glimmering of true patriotic feeling, coupled with sympathy for the Manchu Emperor, had now begun to possess even the Chinese mind; to which must be added a sentiment of disgust at Manchu cabinet's incapacity to defend the integrity of an ancient empire against

foreign aggression in the same way that the Japanese had done for themselves.

This indefinite bitter feeling culminated in the ill-conceived "Boxer" revolt, which was simply an inarticulate protest and an arms-taking against the sea of troubles mistily visualised. Practically it ended in the "Boxers" saying to the dynasty:—"Clear these (European) foreigners out, or get out yourselves." It was this consciousness of a quandary that forced the Dowager to adopt the hedging or "run with the hare and hunt with the hounds" attitude that proved so mystifying to onlookers during the Legation siege. Her sanest adviser close at hand was Jungluh. Fortunately the experienced as well as extremely sane viceroys of the Yangtsze valley, co-operating with Governor Yüan Shī-k'ai of Shantung province, saved the situation beyond the bounds of Peking just in time; and after the Legation relief in the autumn of 1900 it was the task of the veteran Li Hung-chang to cobble up the best peace he could with the assembly of eleven foreign envoys at Peking. But, after indulging in this egregious dance, China had naturally to pay the piper, the necessary huge foreign loans of course increasing her permanent commitments to an enormous extent. On return in 1901 from her self-imposed exile in West China, the Dowager set industriously to work upon real reform, military, judicial, financial, administrative, and what not, acting chiefly under the earnest and detailed exhortations of the two Yangtsze viceroys Liu K'un-yih and Chang Chī-tung above referred to.

Meanwhile Yüan Shī-k'ai, who on Li Hung-chang's death had become Viceroy at Tientsin, and had seen with his own eyes how well foreigners administered that place, showed an excellent example by putting locally into prac-

tical effect a number of foreign methods, coupled with genuine reforms. At Peking a thorough investigation into constitutional principles was made, with a decided bias in favour of the limited German and Japanese types. The Dowager herself gradually followed the lines taken in 1898 by the rash young Emperor she had ruthlessly put in the background, and by 1906-1907 not only was a Constitution promised within nine years, but effective armies were created, a free press spread general intelligence, and China was rapidly being covered with a network of business-like railways. The fierce war of 1904-5 between Russia and Japan had meanwhile practically left China proper untouched, and indeed had given her as a *tertia gaudens* a welcome respite of breathing time; as for Manchuria, which economically scarcely concerns—or then concerned—China at all, it had been for a time quietly abandoned or ignored as a heaven-sent cockpit for the two formidable combatant neighbours. China's official history scarcely mentions the war! It was quite a coincidence and not by calculation that Great Britain—since 1902 an ally of Japan—also found 1904 a convenient year for settling her accumulated disputes with Tibet about rival influences there, and so far from “grabbing” anything for herself beyond the long-stipulated frontier trade, she really placed Manchu authority in Tibet in a stronger position than it had been for some years; in fact, the way was left almost too generously open for the reconstitution of Chinese suzerainty during the four years of the Dalai Lama's flight, and a fair understanding with Russia was arrived at besides.

But now we come to the more immediate causes of the revolution of 1911, the brewing of which, as we have seen, had been in reality

going on steadily ever since the fringes of China—Corea, Manchuria, Formosa, Annam, Burma, Tibet, and part of Ili in turn—had either dropped off or been lopped off. The Dowager-Empress and the Emperor unexpectedly died within a few hours of each other, and whilst the forgiven but unrepentant Dalai, on his way back to Tibet, was actually on the spot in Peking to see things for himself and contribute his prayers for the imperial souls. Instead of continuing to utilise Yüan Shi-k'ai's services in conjunction with those of the surviving elder statesmen at Peking, the late Emperor's brother and wife (the Regent and the new Dowager) unfortunately soon succumbed to a vindictive palace intrigue, having for its main object the avenging of the late Emperor's 1898 failure; and thus the only remaining statesman in China who had had practical dealings with the representatives of all nations, and had been able to test in the actual working improved administrative and military measures based on foreign concrete examples, was relegated under a silly pretext to private obscurity.

The master hand having been thus removed, the new provincial councils began to meddle, and attempts were made to speed up the National Assembly temporarily acting for the Parliament promised for 1915. Moreover, the newly created foreign-drilled armies rapidly discovered that they possessed a coherence and a dignity *vis-à-vis* of civilians they had never enjoyed before. This unwelcome military provincialism, particularly in railway management, coupled with the perception of its ominous political importance, made the Manchus on the one hand as eager for central control as the provinces on the other were determined for local management: the attempt on the part of

the Imperial Government to place Manchu princes in control of military, naval, and other departments might have succeeded if these young men had exhibited adequate strength of character. Financial reforms were nullified by rival central and provincial claims to *likin*, which, so far from being abolished as stipulated under the Mackay treaty of 1902, was actually used more and more by short-sighted foreign financiers as a security for further loans. Thus many local leaders of the Chinese people, at first sympathetically inclined towards the Regent, his infant son the new Emperor, and the new Dowager-Empress (widow of the late Emperor, the Regent's brother), gradually began to despair of ever obtaining the promised Constitution, and shrank back with horror at the prospect of effective central military and railway control riveting their loosened chains to Peking corruption once more; the National Assembly actually did meet in 1910, and a programme of graduated work was sanctioned, the Emperor, however, remaining "above the law, but living within the law," like Justinian of old and the Emperor of Japan anew.

So, when the Hankow-Wu-ch'ang revolution prematurely broke out in the autumn of 1911 (October 10), the cry of "Away with the Manchus" raised there was immediately caught up by the provinces generally; Sun Yat-sen and the exiled republicans of 1898 hurried back to China with all speed; and then, as a last hope, the Manchu government, in their consternation, appealed perforce to the very man they had flouted in 1909, begging him to come back and save the situation. This on pressure he at once loyally attempted to do, first as Viceroy of Hu K'wang (the two lake provinces) and with combined powers as Generalissimo for the whole

Yang-tsze valley, and then as Premier at Peking (13th November), where again he was at once placed in supreme command over all the metropolitan forces.

Meanwhile as anarchical war was still going on or threatening in the provinces, with a professed view to stopping bloodshed, the baby Emperor under the Dowager's and Regent's direction announced to the spirits of his ancestors (26 November) the Magna Charta of nineteen articles which the Senate or Deliberative Parliament (*Tsz-chêng Yüan*) had passed on 2nd November, and as a further act of propitiation all Manchu princes were removed from high military and naval command. On 6th December the Regent gave up his seals of office, and the next day an imperial decree, countersigned by all the heads of departments, sanctioned the cutting off of the Manchu queue, and likewise the discussion of a Western or solar in place of the ancient lunar-solar Calendar. On the 28th December an edict of the Dowager-Empress, bearing the imperial seal and countersigned by all departmental ministers, left it to an Emergency Parliament (*Lin-shi Kwoh-hui*) to decide whether the new form of constitutional government should be monarchical (*Kün-chu*) or republican (*Kung-ho*). However, all these and many other desperate efforts to save the dynasty were of no avail, and the very last imperial decrees, dated 11th February, but issued the 12th February, announced that the Dowager-Empress and the Emperor had formally abdicated under agreed conditions then fully set out: it is characteristic that the deceased old Dowager's brother Kweisiang was, as though by a Parthian shot, at the same moment appointed to a lucrative post in the Peking Octroi (he died in the following December).

On the 13th Yüan Shī-k'ai issued his first mandate as "Plenipotentiary to function as Emergency President of the Republican (*Kung-ho*) Government," from which circumstance it stands out plainly as an historical fact that, in technical form at least, the Republic was not a self-creation, but the result of an act of imperial grace. The following day the Hawaiian-born Cantonese Sun Yat-sen, who had arrived in Shanghai on the 26th and been elected President on 29th December (elected at Nanking, but election sanctioned by the Shanghai delegates), telegraphed his congratulations to Yüan and, with the Nanking Assembly's approval, announced his willingness to resign; his Vice-president Li Yüan-hung also sent from Wu-ch'ang a friendly message, and promised to arrange with Nanking for a conference: the official gazette of the 17th February (30th of the 12th moon) contained an announcement that Yüan Shī-k'ai had telegraphed (presumably on the 29th) a reply to Sun Yat-sen and to the Nanking Assembly (*Ts'an-i Yüan*); and in the gazette of the 1st moon (cyclic year, not reign year), but dated 30th of the 12th moon, appeared an announcement from "the newly elected President Yüan" to the effect that "we must now use the first day of the purely solar year, *jên-tsz*, of the endless cycle, and style it the 18th day of the second month of the first year of the Chinese Republic" (*Chung-hwa Min-kuo*). These details are historically important in view of the fact that Li Yüan-hung had in October already used the endless cyclic era beginning conventionally with the mythical Emperor Hwang Ti (2697 B.C.), and had styled A.D. 1911 "the 4609th year of Hwang Ti."

Thus also it is historically recorded how, by ingenious manipulation, Yüan Shī-k'ai succeeded

in getting rid of the Manchu dynasty on dignified terms agreeable to the Manchu princes themselves; how the Manchu dynasty, ignoring the Nanking Republic, created the Republic in a voluntary way through their own plenipotentiary agent Yüan; and how Yüan in turn never took any notice of the new love at Nanking till he was clearly off with the old love at Peking; Nanking making the first advances to him, he himself as the "newly elected" (inferentially by Nanking included) in the plenitude of his powers establishing a *Min-kwoh*, which was neither monarchical (*Kün-chu*) nor *Kung-ho* as suggested by the Emergency Parliament on 28th December. It is necessary to emphasise the exact bearing of all these points, in order to bring out the generation of the Chinese Republic in its true historical light.

At the end of February a serious military revolt, accompanied by looting, broke out at Peking, to the personal humiliation of the President, whose position had really been upheld by these very men's support: it was suppressed with difficulty, and not on creditable terms: it formed, however, a fair pretext for Yüan's declining to proceed to Nanking for investiture, as he had to "preserve order" at Peking. On 10th March Yüan Shī-k'ai was formally and duly installed as President, took the oath of fidelity to the Republic in the presence of the Nanking delegates, the Army chiefs, the Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and Turki representatives, the Foreign Customs and Post-office officials, and the European, Japanese, and American journalists: the *yoh-fah* (=concise law) or Constitution of fifty-six Articles as drawn up by Li Yüan-hung at Wu-ch'ang in December and adopted, with him as Vice-president, by the Nanking republic, seems to have been promul-

gated as part of what on 10th March the new President swore to maintain; the defect in this hastily drawn-up document was that it had been draughted by neo-Chinese, *i.e.* by men more ignorant of Chinese administrative history and practice than competent to introduce theoretical European reforms; and this absence of experienced northern deliberative concurrence naturally kept open the cleft between the conservative or northern and the ultra-radical or southern elements; these latter were represented by the *T'ung-mêng Hwei* or "United League Association," founded by Sun Yat-sen and [General¹] Hwang Hing shortly after the "Boxer" humiliation of 1901, but afterwards known as the *Kwoh-min Tang* or "Popular Party," under which name after Yüan's installation it deliberately set to work, by means of the two-thirds vote rule, to thwart the action both of the new President and of his provisional Parliament.

Meanwhile Yüan's old Corea henchman T'ang Shao-i (now enrolled as a member of the United League) as Premier had formed a ministry; Hwang Hing had been propitiated with the post of Chief-of-the-Staff, also with the rank of Field-Marshal to maintain order in the Yang-tsze Valley; and an important railway inspectorship had been invented in order to conciliate the disappointed Sun Yat-sen, who was evidently waiting for a "job," as he does not appear to have formally abandoned his southern presidency until a little later, *i.e.* on 29th March. No doubt it was under the restraint of this inconvenient covert opposition that Yüan on 19th March issued his "scrap of paper," denouncing by "mandate" those misguided persons who advised a return to monarchy, and

¹ Died as such towards the end of 1916, and buried with the highest official honours as a good patriot.

referring once more to his solemn oath of fidelity to the *Kung-ho* principle. On 13th April the Vice-president Li Yüan-hung, though remaining at Wu-ch'ang, was made Chief-of-the-Staff, and a mandate recommended the "five races" composing the Chinese dominion (*cf.* p. 375) to take advantage of the new privilege of intermarriage: one more effort was made also to secure the abolition of the barbarous "squeezed feet" custom amongst purely Chinese females. The temporary Parliament now gave way to a National Assembly or Advisory Council (*Ts'an-i Yüan*) of more manageable proportions. A few revolts or rebellions, now of the military discontents, or anon the "last ditchers" of the Manchu Party, in several provinces, were quelled without much difficulty one after the other; but still the civil agitators of the United League displayed persistent hostility at Peking, where the northerners or conservatives had, notwithstanding, at last succeeded in reversing the practical balance of power.

For some time attention was now concentrated upon foreign loan negotiations; the question of what military and naval flags should be adopted was finally settled; and presidential mandates once more dealt seriously with the necessity of getting rid of the opium curse. Then there were difficulties with Tibet and Outer Mongolia, both of which territories had at an early stage declared their independence; similar tendencies manifested themselves in Chinese Turkestan and the Tarim valley. T'ang Shao-i, harassed by United League squabbles, soon got tired of his premiership, from which he quietly "walked away" one day; as he did so narrowly escaping assassination by a political crank at Tientsin. Meanwhile, talk became more general in China about the advantages of a Dictatorship, if only in order to put a stop to this eternal parlia-

mentary wrangling; at the same time it must be allowed that Sun Yat-sen and Hwang Hing had a hearty reception when they visited Peking in August, though in view of the recent execution at Peking of two of their quondam military friends they felt extremely uneasy as to their own safety. On 10th January, 1913, Parliament (elected mysteriously) was announced to meet in April, and it was amidst all these seething intrigues that the second Dowager died on 22nd February; and after the assembly of Parliament in April America and Mexico "recognised" the Republic.

The murder at Shanghai of the Popular Party's hero, Sung Kiao-jên, in March 1913, placed Yüan Shih-k'ai in rather a suspicious position, and perhaps it was as a consequence of the general uneasy feeling as to his connivance that in May a really serious revolt broke out once more in the Yang-tsze provinces, the disgruntled Hwang Hing joining hands in the fray, in open declared war against Yüan's growing pretensions; against Hwang & Co. was pitted by Yüan the redoubtable General Chang Hün with his "pig-tailed" army, which subsequently captured and mercilessly sacked the city of Nanking. Chang Hün is one of the most curious and picturesque products of the great revolution; he had faithfully held Nanking for the Emperor in 1911 until, driven out by the republicans, he succeeded in escaping with his defending army to the important land and water junction of Sü Chou in North Kiang Su, one of the three or four real hinges or pivot points of the whole empire¹; emerging from this stronghold (where he is still practically independent in 1917), he assisted early in 1914 in the White Wolf robber campaign, and ever since then he has, by his *pronunciamentos* upon "policy" generally,

been a danger to the best interests of public order ; no one can get at him or round him.

But, to return to 1913. In the autumn Yüan arrested certain members of both houses of Parliament, and began to take strong measures towards "controlling" recalcitrant votes. The result of all this intriguing was that on 6th October he was elected Permanent President, and was solemnly inaugurated as such on the second anniversary of the 1911 revolution, receiving in due course the coveted recognition of the "Powers" that chiefly mattered to him, *i.e.* the European Powers and Japan. The Committee charged to draft a new Constitution were so obstinately impracticable, however, that the result of their efforts by the beginning of November was only to clog still further the wheels of real progress, and to chain President, Cabinet, and Judiciary alike to the uncertainties of parliamentary caprice ; seeing which Yüan Shī-k'ai, now firmly seated with the desired foreign support, summarily broke up the Popular Party altogether, and by a sort of Pride's Purge drove its members entirely out of Parliament.

As a reward for retaking Nanking in 1913, Chang Hün had been temporarily rewarded with the military governorship of Kiang Su, from which post (after declaring his "independence") he was only coaxed out, in January 1914, by heavy money payments, and by his appointment to the nebulous new charge of Supreme Inspector of the Yang-tsze Defences, which in 1917 he still holds against all comers.¹ It is impossible to deny that all this action of Yüan's in 1913-1917 was a *coup d'état* tending towards monarchy, and it seems certain that the final *dénoûment* was solely prepared in secrecy by the President himself ; but up to this date Yüan Shī-k'ai had by no overt act disclosed dynastic

¹ Though *nominally* Military Governor of An Hwei.

ambitions, contrary to his declaration of March 1912; and, indeed, the fact that his ministry included such staunch radicals as Liang K'i-ch'ao and others showed that a firm policy had now the general approval. The arch-reformer of 1898, K'ang Yu-wei, seems to have kept in the background during the whole revolution, but his then comrade Liang, now in power, succeeded in obtaining for K'ang and his family their confiscated estates near Canton. It was also now that the Vice-president Li Yüan-hung (who, however, had to steal off in the night like a thief in order to avoid his jealous soldiers' constraint) thought he might safely lend his moral support to Yüan and venture to Peking, where he duly arrived on 10th December; formed a marriage alliance with Yüan's family, and for a couple of years disappeared into absolute obscurity as Chief-of-the-Staff.

As a next step, to take the place of the obnoxious Parliament, the President organised an Advisory Council (*Ts'an-chêng Yüan*) of members (paid) nominated by himself, and in the following May Li Yüan-hung was appointed nominal chief of it with a salary of \$10,000 a month; many of the other members were prominent men. A good deal of really useful work was accomplished during the year 1914; the military and civil governorships were reorganised under historical names¹ sounding less aggressively republican; the lesser high officials in the provinces were recast, and had their relative degrees of subordination to the Peking Boards and the Provincial Governors more intelligibly fixed; revenue began to flow into Peking from the provinces; Sir Richard Dane got his hand well in upon the reformed Salt Administration; internal loans proved successful; foreigners were content with the situation; and it really looked as though

China were settling down at last to a practicable Republic—in name at least, if monarchical in effect; the only uncomfortable thing, was, What shall happen if Yüan dies? Is good Vice-president Li capable of wearing gracefully and effectively the mantle of succession? President Yüan anyway played a bold hand, and at Christmas time proceeded in state to worship Heaven for all the world like any Emperor; even the dethroned Manchu house agreed to certain modifications in its status.

The breaking out of the great European war in August 1914 must necessarily have had some effect in strengthening both the coherence of China and the firm hold of Yüan, if only because financial busy-bodies and grasping syndicates of all nationalities had now less leisure and less money at their disposal for the Far East than had been the case before. The year 1915 opened with the arrangements for the drafting of a new Constitution in place of that so summarily abolished in 1913. It had been originally proposed by Japan that Germany should hand over Ts'ing-tao to China "for the period of the war"; but when the *Emden* started out on her raids, and the presumptuous Kaiser treated Japan's offer with contempt, he received a sarcastic ultimatum, and his governor was ultimately ejected, bag and baggage; moreover, for her own protection Japan was obliged to formulate certain at first sight harsh and peremptory demands upon China in order to forestall Teutonic spite or intrigue, and any future attempt of the tricky Kaiser to wrest from China by violence any *Ersatz* "place in the sun" to "take the place of Kiao Chou" under an easily forced construction of some such provision in the 1898 treaty. In cavilling at the excess of Japanese demands, the unfriendly press of the Far East seem to have

forgotten this prime necessity for Japan : “ *no Power* ” to be granted any coast or island territory by purchase or lease ; that is, specifically, treacherous Prussia.

The first serious signs that something uncanny was brooding in the President’s mind, or in the minds of those of his creatures who were susceptible to foreign gold and intrigue, manifested themselves in the summer of 1915, when a mysterious society called the *Chu-an Hwei* or “ Peace-promoting Association ” suddenly blossomed into existence, promoted by three prominent members of the Advisory Council itself, its avowed object being to discredit the republican in favour of the monarchical idea, or at all events to deprecate government by popular clamour in favour of concentrated individual rule. The next thing was the unexpected pronouncement of the American Professor Goodnow, one of Yüan’s political advisers, in the same sense ; it being well known at the same time, or at all events generally believed, that no such germinations had taken place in the universally trusted British Adviser Dr. Morrison’s sagacious mind. On the whole, the Japanese Adviser Ariga, seems to have personally favoured monarchy. Then came a number of Chinese “ petitions ” of doubtful provenance from all quarters, and at the same time fairly definite news that Yüan’s scapegrace eldest son Yüan K’êh-ting was interesting himself in the movement ; whilst on the other hand the Minister of Justice, that uncompromising republican Liang K’i-ch’ao, showed a decided tendency to leave the Government. The Japanese Minister, M. Hioki, hastened back from furlough to Peking, but made no opposition, and the Germans (who had recently displayed considerable intriguing activity in Harbin, Tsing-tao, and Ningpo) re-

mained remarkably silent (so far as the general public was aware).

It was at this moment that Yüan Shī-k'ai himself seems to have fallen under some occult baleful influence, and the monarchical agitation accordingly grew apace. At last on 8th October appeared a Presidential Decree setting forth how the Advisory Council had received a representation from the Temporary Parliament (*Lih-fah Yüan*) explaining that all the provinces, dominions, Banners (including the one-time Manchu Heir P'ulun), Mongols, Tibetans, Turki, Chambers of Commerce, Universities, etc., were through their representatives (2,006 votes) of one mind in favour of a constitutional monarchy (*Kün-chu lih-hien*), or "sovereign lord with a constitution," and suggesting that a popular vote should be taken. Then it was that the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires, M. Obata, accompanied by the British and Russian Ministers, paid a hurried visit to the Foreign Office to recommend postponement until the end of the war, on the ground that troubles might break out and involve the treaty ports; this advice was endorsed by France and Italy shortly afterwards. Undoubtedly at this moment the majority of the trading interests, foreign as well as Chinese, were in favour of trusting Yüan; but as yet no one seems to have contemplated that the so-called Constitutional Monarchy would take the ultimate form of a despotic hereditary dynasty on the old model. The United States were too "proud" to interfere in China's internal affairs; the Grand Lamas of Tibet remained silent; and the predatory powers, *i.e.* Germany, with her insignificant satellite Austria, still observed a mysterious silence.

Gradually the movement which began so unaggressively gained irresistible momentum;

adulatory appeals to the "Emperor" followed each other in rapid succession; but at least one sane document justified in logical and circumstantial terms the reversion to monarchy, arguing the matter out on plain business-like grounds; and this remarkable paper was a long *apologia* of 4,000 characters (8,000 English words), published in the official gazette day after day for some time, by the Preparation for Parliament Bureau. On 13th December, after the regulation three refusals, Yüan accepted the imperial crown in a mandate countersigned by Luh Chêng-siang, the Secretary of State; the "questioning" Powers, evidently non-plussed, simply stated that their attitude would be "expectant." Two days later Vice-President Li was created a Prince; further mandates in very good taste explained and justified the step taken by the President; but on the 22nd a real "imperial" tornado fairly burst in a shower of dukedoms, marquisates, earldoms, viscounties, and baronies, all with pensions. Whilst it raged, many of the President's best men quietly slipped away on various pretexts; but an attempt to secure at least their neutrality in some particularly important cases was made by creating "Four Intimates" from three ex-viceroys and a well-known sterling Hanlin Academician. There were also distributed some posthumous honours to persons who had suffered for the State, and the new Emperor (who, however, never once assumed that title, or its honorific attributes, *himself*) took the opportunity of abolishing the employ of eunuchs and the supply of pretty girls for the *menus plaisirs* of the palace; nor was there to be any *kotowing* at his audiences.

The fat was now irrevocably in the fire notwithstanding this personal moderation, and the unfortunate Yüan, having once mounted the

tiger, had to go on with his John Gilpin ride. His very last mandate as President conferred a princedom upon the hereditary Duke Confucius the Seventy-sixth, who expressed his thanks a week later¹; Li Yüan-hung, by the way, had declined *his* princely title three times. On the 1st January a new era was created under the style 1st year of *Hung-hien*, which term may be here translated "Great Constitution"; but Yüan never at any time abandoned the modest "mandate" in favour of the old imperial "decree, respect this." However, simultaneously with these events, which at first appeared to be proceeding quite smoothly, came the ominous news from Yün Nan that the province had declared its independence.¹ The *ex-tutus* Ts'ai Ao (Ch'oi Ngok), who had been "allowed to resign" and then coaxed to Peking in 1913-1914, and had later been given a high-sounding sinecure post there, became diplomatically ill in November when the monarchy boom was at its highest, sought "medical" advice in Japan,² and worked his way thence, *via* Tonquin, to his former province. Japan declined to receive a special complimentary envoy from China "at this juncture," which probably meant that the American, German, and Austrian *promise* of recognition did not find favour in that quarter.

The discontent fomented by Ts'ai Ao spread; two other southern provinces pronounced; then two coast provinces; and soon the whole of central and southern China was in such a blaze of republican enthusiasm that the unhappy

¹ 25th December, which date has now been declared a national holiday.

² He again sought Japanese advice, this time quite seriously, as military governor of Sz Ch'wan, towards the end of last year, and died there in December 1916, receiving from President Li the highest posthumous honours, and, as Hwang Hing, a public funeral.

Yüan had to give way and go through the humiliation of reverting to the republican era (*Min-kwoh*), of course withdrawing his imperial or at least monarchical pretensions (March 23rd). His former Secretary of State (one of the Four Intimates) tried to save the situation by resuming his old post; but it was too late, and on 22nd April he resigned in favour of Twan K'i-jwei. The cry, "Yüan must go," was caught up on all sides; his deadly enemy, the fire-eating ex-vice-roy "Shum" (Ts'ên Ch'un-hüan), emerged from his exile in the Straits Settlements and joined in the fray as Generalissimo of the South. Both he and Sun Yat-sen issued angry manifestoes; T'ang Shao-i and Wu T'ing-fang published "open letters" of cynically friendly advice, and Liang K'i-ch'ao gave to the public press a lengthy *exposé* of the fraudulent measures that had been adopted by Yüan in order to "nobbler" the voters in each province. Yüan, having squandered his funds, made the situation worse first by proclaiming a moratorium, and then by endeavouring to create out of the Parliament Preparation Committee an Emergency Parliament, later on a real Parliament (*Lih-fah Yüan*) to meet on 1st May instead of on its legal date in September. Harassed by all this humiliation and worry, the unhappy man as a last shift took ill, and finally died of uræmia on 6th June, leaving behind him a short, dignified, valedictory testament. The next day the Vice-president Li Yüan-hung announced his succession by law, and since then party quarrels seem to have largely subsided. Meanwhile Twan K'i-jwei as Premier has formed a responsible Cabinet with Wu T'ing-fang as Foreign Minister; and here I close (15th February, 1917).

GLOSSARY

Abkhaz. Probably a Tartar word meaning "sky," "heaven."

Ainos = Aino word *Ainu*, "men."

The ancient Chinese call them "shrimp, barbarians," and as the vulgar word for "shrimp" is *hwa-mi*, this is probably the origin of the Japanese *ye-bi*, "shrimp," and *ye-bi-su*, "shrimp people," or Ainos.

Ak-su = Turkish "White Water."

Aktagh (Turkish). Apparently the Chinese *Peh-shan*, or "white hills" north of Harashar.

Altai. The Kin-shan or "Gold Mountains." The word *Altun*, *alchu*, *aisin*, appears in many Tartar forms.

Amoy. Local pronunciation of Hiamén, "gallery-gate."

Annam = Chinese "pacifier of the south," a title granted to the rulers of Kiao-chi, just as Antung, or "pacifier of the east," was granted to the rulers of Corea.

Ausgleich = German for "that which evens out."

Bilga = Turkish "wise," a common appellation of reigning Khans and other princes.

Binh-thuan = Annamese form of Chinese *P'ing-shun*, "run smooth"; but, query, which language has precedence, as the Chinese seem to have "re-imported" the local pronunciation in the form *Pin-t'ung*.

Bogdo Khan I suppose this is connected with the Russian *Bog*, "God." The Chinese *T'ien-tsz*, or "Son of Heaven," reappears in the Hiung-nu *Tengri-kudu*, the Turkish and

Uigour *Tengri-khagan*, the Arabic "Facfur" (Marco Polo), the Japanese *Tenshi* (*Sama*). Urga is called Bogdo Kuren, "Holy City."

Bonze = Japanese *bo-dz*, being their pronunciation of the modern Chinese *jou-t'u*, which in the sixth century spelt *Buddh*.

Boxer. Translation of *K'uan*, "fist," or *ta-k'uan*, "to box." The *I-ho K'uan* are the "Patriotic Harmony Fists."

Burma = Burmese "Bamma," or Miamma, first called *Maen* in Mongol times. An earlier Chinese name was *P'iao*, the people called *Byu* in the early Burmese records.

Cambalu = Khanbaligh, "Khan's citadel."

Cambodgia. The word *Kam-put-chi* occurs in mediæval Chinese history for old Fu-nam country. This last dissyllabic word seems to occur in *Pnom-(penh)*, the present capital. It is curious to note that the Chinese name for the ruins of Angkor is "Temple of the Ts'in King," which looks as though the visit of Antoninus' envoy had left some tradition in the land.

Candareen = Malay *kondrin*; in the Chinese ports = 10 cash (about), or $\frac{1}{16}$ of a silver ounce.

(Copper) *Cash* = Portuguese *caixa*, a tin coin used at Malacca and brought from India; cf. Sanskrit *Kārshāpana*, "copper coins."

Chagan Khan = Mongol "White" Khan. *Chagan Nor* (sea), *Chagan Kuren* (city).

- Ch'ang-sha* = "Long Sands."
Chefoo = *Chu-fou*, a very ancient name of no very intelligible meaning, — "sesame-net."
Chemulpo = Corean pronunciation of Cantonese *Tsarmetpo*, or "mandarin" *Tsi-wuh-p'u*, "Porterage Cove."
Ch'êng-tu = "Has become a centre or metropolis"
Chingnampo = (Rice) - steamer-south-cove, (Corea).
Chinkiang = *chên-kiang*, "rule the river."
Chat (Hindoo *Chitthi*), a word in universal use in India and China for "letter," "memo.," "I.O.U.," "notice," etc.
Chow, or *chou*, in such words as Wênchow, Wu-chow, is simply "flat-land" or "plain," followed by a place-name, descriptive or original. In accepted names like Foochow the popular form is used throughout this book
Ch'ungk'ing = "Double Joy."
Chusan = *chou-shan*, "boat-hill."
Champa. The word *Cham* appears in several forms of the Chinese name. I take *pa* to mean "country" in some Hindoo tongue, for Singpa in Chinese means "Pânjâb," or "land of the Sikhs," or "Singhs."
Compradore = Portuguese "purchaser" The business factor in most foreign "houses," banks, consulates, etc.
Confucius = K'ung fu-tsz, "the philosopher K'ung," as Mêng fu-tsz is Mencius. In both cases the *fu* can be omitted, and "Conscious" or "Mencius" would do as well. Out of the sages Tsêng and Chwang we might create Cincus, Sancius.
Coolie. This is an Indian word, but in "mandarin" fitted with Chinese characters to mean "hard work."
Corea = Corean *Ko-ryê* (pronounced exactly like the English word), being the local form of the Chinese *Kao-li*, or *Kao-kou-li*, "the Kou-li state of the Kao clan."
Cowloong = Cantonese for *Kiu-lung*, "Nine Dragons."
Daumyo = Japanese pronunciation of *ta-ming*, or "great name," a term not used historically or officially in China.
Dalny = Russian "distant" (*Ta-lien Wan*); a name chosen by the Czar, apparently to "hit off" *Ta-lien* (Japanese *Dairen*).
Decima. I suppose Japanese *Deshima*, "go-out island."
Dolonor = Mongol *dolon - nor*, "Seven Lakes."
Dungans, a contraction of *turigan* or "colonisers," descendants of Arabs, Persians, etc., who have married Tibetan and Mongol women.
Ephthalites. In old Chinese *Iptat*, the Corean pronunciation of which is still *Éptal*.
Esmok. The Burmese have a way of putting a final *k* at the end of Chinese words, just as the Russians put a *znak tverdi*, or "hard sign." I noticed the sign-board of a Chinaman named Lu Ts'ai, at Blamo, marked "Lew Ch'aik" "Sz-mao" is an impossible mouthful for a Burmese.
Fah-hen = "Law's manifestation."
Farjo = corrupt Chinese *hwui-p'u*, or *hwei-an-p'u*, "assembly shops," or "assembly-of-peace-shop."
Fiador = Portuguese "suretyman"; in pidgin English, "hab got man can skewer."
Foochow = "Happy region," locally *Houk-chu*, or, by euphonic rule, *Uchiu*.
Formosa = Portuguese "beautiful," cf. *T'aiwan*.
Frank appears in various forms, *Fu-lin*, *Foh-lang-ki*, *P'i-lung*, etc. (cf. *Ferenghi*, *Frangkikos*, etc.).
Fusan Chinese *Fu-shan*, "Pot Hill," in Corean *Pusan*.
Gayuk = Mongol *kuyuk*, "clever."
Genghiz. The Hung-nu khans called themselves *shen-yu*, which is retrospectively equivalent to something like *zen-ghi*, or *ᠰᠡᠩᠭᠢ*; possibly there may be some

- etymological connection. The title appears in the middle-ages word *Jenuye*.
- Ghalbo*. The Chinese always write this Tibetan title *tsan-p'u*.
- Godown* = Malay *godong*, "warehouse."
- Hainan* = Chinese "sea-south."
- Hanphong*. The Chinese *hai-fang*, or "coast defence."
- Han*. A proper name; rarely has any literary meaning.
- Han Wu Ti* = "Han Military Emperor," or *Divus Martialis*.
- Hankow* = "Han (River) Mouth."
- Hanoi* = "River - interior," the Annamese (*ha-nou*) form of *Ho-ner*, Cantonese *Ho-noi*.
- Hideyoshi*. His Chinese name is P'ing Siu-kuh.
- Hing-hwa* = "Start civilisation"
- Hinterland* = German "behind-land."
- Hiung-nu* = "Hiung slaves."
- Hoang-ho* = "Yellow River": *hwang* is one syllable, and not *ho + ang*.
- Hoihow* = Cantonese for *Hai-k'ou*, "Sea Mouth."
- Hong* = Cantonese pronunciation of *hang*, "a store" or "shop"; but the word is little used except in reference to foreign "houses," and native "trade-guilds."
- Hung-tseh* = "Vast Marsh."
- Hwai-k'ing* = "Cherish joy."
- Ich'ang* = "Should be glorious."
- Ilk*. In the sixth century the Turkish Khans already used the style Ilk-Khan, which may possibly be the "Ilkhans", of Western writers.
- Irrawaddy* = in part Arabic *wādi*, "a river," but I cannot say what *Irra* means. The Chinese used to confuse the Upper Irrawaddy with the Upper Yang-tze, or Gold-sand River.
- Issyk Kul* = "Hot Sea" in some Tartar tongues; *Denghiz Nor* in others; the Chinese also call it *Jéh-hai*, or "Hot Sea."
- Japan* = Chinese *Jih-pén*, "sun's origin."
- Java*. From ancient times known as *She-p'o*, or *Djaba*; later *Chao-wa*, usually misprinted *Kwa-wa*.
- Jaxartes*. In old-times Chinese called the *Yok-shat*.
- Junk*. Probably *shun*, the Cantonese form of *ch'wan*, "a ship," as seen in the Javanese *jung*.
- Kachyn* = Burmese "wild man." They call themselves *Singp'o*, or "men."
- Kalgan* = Mongol "Gate," called in Chinese *Chang-kia K'ou*, or "Chang-family Pass."
- Kalmuck* = "remaining ones"; those of the *Dzun* ("right" or "east") who were "left," when Uriankhai abandoned the "Wala," or "confederacy." Hence *Kalmuck*, *Dzungar*, *Eleuth*, *Oirat*, *Wala*, *Turgut*, are all much the same thing. The *Boron* ("left" or "west") tribes fell under the power of the *Kirghis*, and were absorbed; hence "Borongar."
- Kanagawa* = (I suppose) Japanese "Golden Stream."
- Karakutans* = Turkish for "Black Cathayans."
- Kazaks* = "vagabond"; the Kara-Kirghis call themselves "Kirghis"; the Eleuths call them "Buruts"; the Kazaks call them "Kara-Kirghis." The Kazaks, or Kirghis-Kazaks, speak the same language as the Kara-Kirghis, whom they detest. The Russian word *Cos-sack*, or *Kazak* (also meaning "day labourer"), is evidently the Turkish *Kazák*.
- Kewkiang* = "Nine Rivers."
- Kiao-chi* = "Parted toes." I myself was struck in Annam with the extraordinary "apartness" of the big toe. Possibly our word "Cochin (China)" comes from this. Another name is *Kiao-chou*, "Mutual Plain."
- Kiao Chou* (German) = "Glue-plain."
- Kia-yüh Kwan* = "Beautiful Gem Pass."
- Kihung* = "Chicken Hamper."
- Kirghis* = (according to the Chinese) "red-faced" in the Kirghis tongue.
- Kobé* = Japanese "Divine - portals."

Kokand. Until Manchu times usually known by names corresponding to "Ferghana."
Kokonor = Mongol "Blue Sea," or "Lake"; cf. *Chagan*.
Kongmun = Cantonese for *Kiang-mên*, "River Gate."
Koxinga = local Kwok-sing-ya, "State's-surname-sire."
Kublai = Mongol *höbilai*, "re-embodiment." The re-born *hutukhtu*, or saints, are in their baby stage called the *hubilkhan* of the said deceased saints, lamas, etc., e.g. at Lhasa, Shigatse, Urga, etc.
Kumchuk = Cantonese *Kom-chuk* (*Kan-chuh*), "sweet bamboo."
Kunsan. The Korean form of *K'unshan*, "Flock Hill."
Kuren = Mongol "city." The Chinese call Urga *K'ulun*.
Kutlug = Turkish "happy"
Lama Miao = "priest temple." The Tibetan word *lama* (meaning "without superior") is now adopted into northern Chinese.
Lao, Yao, Miao, are the T'ang, Sung, and modern names for the ill-defined wild tribes (not Shans, and not Lolos or Tibetans).
Lao-kai = Chinese for "Old market-street."
Lao-tsz, or *Laocius*. Usually translated "Old Boy," but really "the Philosopher Lao," or "the Old Philosopher." He might be called "Lafucius," if it were not that (in his case) the *fu* is always omitted; cf. *Confucius*.
Lao-wa T'an = "Crow Rapid."
Lappa. Apparently some aboriginal word which cannot be written in Chinese; nevertheless the two words *Tapa* and *Lappa* (Islands) seem to mean "rubbish-grounds."
Lari = Tibetan *lha-ri*, "god-mountain." Compare *Lhasa*.
Lau Vinh-phuc = Annamese for Liu Yung-fuh (Cantonese *Lao Wingfuk*), formerly Black Flag Rebel chief; died Dec. 1916.
Lukin = Chinese "percentage," or "per mille."
Likin, likuen, lit'ou = "percentage."

Loess = German *löss*, "loose."
Lolo = No, the native word for themselves. Like the Kirghis, they have black and white "bones," or castes.
Loochoo. The word first appears in A.D. 600 under its present form *Luu-k'iu*, which, if it is anything more than an imitation of native words, seems to mean "string of beads," i.e. "islands."
Macao = Ma - ao, or Ma-ngao, "Goddess' Bight"; but it has many other Chinese names; the usual one is, locally, Ou-mun, "Bight Door," in "mandarin" *Ngaomên*.
Mace = Malay *mas*, from Indian *masha*; in China ports $\frac{1}{4}$ of a tael or ten candareens.
Malay. I cannot find more than one trace of this word before the *Mulayu* of Kublai's time. The Chinese never seem to have conceived the existence of a Malay "state" *par excellence*.
Mah-kha and **Nmai-kha** are Kachyn words for "Little" and "Great" *kha* or "rivers." *Kha* is perhaps allied to the Chinese *ho*, still pronounced *ha* in Corea and Annam, and *ka* in Japan.
Manchu. According to the Emperor K'ien-lung, this word is connected with the *Chushên* tribe of Tunguses. In Confucius' time they were called *Sushên*. It is just possible that the Buddhist word *Mandjus'ri* may have been adapted or utilised, as the earlier Turks and Tunguses often took Buddhist names in compliment to themselves or their country.
Mandarin = Portuguese *mandarin*, "a ruler."
Mangu = Mongol *môngge*, "per-severing."
Manila = the local river of that name.
Mampur. Only known to the Chinese as *Kasé*; the Burmese say *Kathé* (*th* as in English *thin*).
Manzi. The Chinese *man-tsz* or "Southern barbarians," a word I have myself seen in a procla-

- mation issued by the Tartar General of Canton, referring haughtily to the Cantonese.
- Masanpho* = "Horse-hill Cove."
- Mei-ling* = "Plum Ridge"
- Méngtsz* = in the Shan tongue, "the district Tsz." See also *Confucius*.
- Mikado* = Japanese "Imperial Gate," "Sublime Porte."
- Ming* = Bright.
- Mokpo*, the Corean form of *Muh-p'u*, "Wood Cove."
- Mongol* = "silver" (perhaps). The word "mungku" appears at least 1,000 years ago as a tribe of Turko-Tungusic origin near the Shilka River.
- Mukden* = This seems to be a Tungusic word for "glorious capital." Its ancient name in Corean times was *Shên-yang*.
- Nagasaki* = Japanese "Long-point."
- Nanking* = "South Metropolis."
- Nepaul*. The oldest Chinese word is *Nip'olo*; then *Parpu* (*Palpa*), and now *Kwo-r-k'a* (*Goorkha*).
- Newchwang* = "Cow-village."
- Ningpo* = "Calm the Waves."
- Novgorod* = Russian, "New-town."
- Nuchéns* = a supposed native word something like "Djurchi," meaning "west of the sea."
- Octroi* = "authorised (charge)," or "grant"
- Odon-tala*. I believe this word means "Thirteen Seas," but I have forgotten the number.
- Ogdai* = Mongol *ogedei*, "superior."
- Ordos*. This word first appears 600 years ago. Several Mongol princes still have their *ordo* in this plateau, which possibly takes its name from the fact. Cf. *Urga* and *Yamén*.
- Ouigour*. Name of one of the T'ie-le or Tölös tribes. The Turkish tablets discovered a generation ago never use the word; only the word Tölös, or sometimes "Tokuz Uguz," which corresponds to the Chinese "Nine Surnames" of the "Ouigours."
- Oxus*. In old Chinese called the *Wei* or *Kwei*, the Oech of *Zemarchus*.
- Pakhoi* = Cantonese for Peh-hai, "North Sea."
- Pamir*. This word appears in Chinese as *po-mit* in the eighth century (*pa-mir* according to philological rule).
- Pecul* = a Chinese cwt. of 133½ lbs.
- Peh-seh* = "100 colours," probably some Shan word.
- Peking* = "North Metropolis."
- Persia*. Always called *Po-sz* (= *Pas*, or *Pars*) by the Chinese
- Pescadores* = Portuguese *pescador*, "fisher." The Chinese name is *P'êng-hu*, "Lake P'êng."
- Philippines* = Spanish *Filipinos*, or "(King) Philip's (isles)."
- P'ing-jang*, Corean *Pyông-yang* = "even soil"; a very ancient name.
- P'ing-shan* = "Flat Mountain."
- Pirouz*. In Chinese *Pi-lu-sz*.
- Port Arthur* (from Captain Arthur) in Chinese *Lü-shun K'ou*, or "Port Agreeable to Travellers" — a hopeful name.
- Po-yang* = "Spread out."
- Pulo Condor*. The Malay *pulo*, "island," and the Chinese *K'un-lun*; but, query, which language has precedence.
- Quelpaert* (Dutchman's name), called *Tan-lo*, or *Tamra*, by the Chinese and Coreans.
- Samshu* = Cantonese *sam-shiu* (*san-shao*), "thrice distilled" Mentioned by Dampier 220 years ago, but uncertain.
- San-tu Ao* = "Three centres bight" (cf. *Macao*).
- Shamien* = "Sand-surface," pronounced in Cantonese *Sham'in*. The flat islet constructed from the rubbish of the "Thirteen Hongs" after the second war, much on the principle that *Decima* was set apart for the Dutch in *Nagasaki Creek*.
- Sam-shui* = "Three Rivers."
- Shan-hai Kwan* = "Mountain-sea Pass," or "Barrier."
- Shashi* = "Sand Market."
- Shimonoseki* = Japanese *shimo-no-seki*, "lower pass, or barrier of the lower."

Shroff = Hindoo *sarráf*: the handler of dollars and other coins in most large foreign concerns. "To shroff" has come to mean to "test," or to "sample," or "taste."

Si-an Fu = "West-peace City," the more modern name of Ch'ang-an, or "Lasting Peace."

Sikkim. Known to the Chinese by an imitation of the native name "Demajong."

Si-ning = "West Peace."

Sōngchun, or *Syōng-chin*. The Korean form of Ch'eng-tsin, "City Ford."

Soy = Japanese *shō-yu*, the Chinese *tsiang-yu*, or "sauce-oil."

Stroganoff. There is a Russian word *strog*, "strict," but I cannot say if it is the origin of such a word as "strictly ruled ones" (genitive plural).

Sun. The founder was hereditary Duke of Sun. Nearly all dynasties were "territorial" by name, until the "Iron" (Kitan), "Golden" (Nuchên), "Chief" (Mongol), "Bright" (Ming), and "Clear" (Manchus).

Sumatra This name first appears in Kublai's time as one of many petty states in the island, which never had a Chinese name as a whole.

Sung. A proper name; no meaning in literature.

Swatow. Local form of *Shan-t'ou*, "end of the Shan (river)."

Sz-ma = "Rule the Horses"—Captain-general; (a Chinese double "surname" or family name).

Tael. The Chinese *liang* or "ounce," said to be the Malay *tal*, which I suppose is allied to the Siamese *tical* (pronounced tick-all). Père Richard says it is the Hindoo *tola* through the Malay *tahl*; cf. *Mace* and *Candareen*.

T'ai-p'ing = "Great Peace," or by extension "Reign of Peace."

T'ai-wan, or Terrace Bay = Formosa.

Takow = Ta-kou (Cantonese *ta-kao*), "beat dogs," probably a corrupted Formosan word.

Taku = "Great Reach."

Ta-hen Wan = "Purse Bay." Often written with other characters signifying "Great Unity Bay." Cf. *Dalny*.

T'ang. A proper name; no meaning in literature.

Tangut. This word does not occur often in Chinese. When it does, it seems to refer to a common language, including the civilised Tibetans and the wandering tribes of that race. So far, I have not come across any Chinese use of the word anterior to the Manchu dynasty. There were Tang-ch'ang and Tang-hiang tribes in Kan Suh, but Marco Polo's Tangut is never called anything except Hia, or West Hia, being the whole Ning-hia region of to-day.

Tartar. From ancient times the word *Tatan*, *tata*, *tata-r*, or *ta-tsz*, has been used for loosely-defined tribes between the Turks and Tunguses. The word *ta-tsz* is still used jocularly by the pure Chinese in the vague sense of our word "Tartar."

Tashkend. Turkish *tash*, "stone"; Persian *kand*, *kent*, "city." The oldest Chinese name is Chech or Djedj, in imitation of the ancient native word *Dyadj*, corrupted by the Turks to *Tash*. The Chinese also call it *Shih-ch'êng*, or "stone city."

Tashkurgan = Turkish "stone-tower." Sir Aurel Stein thinks Ptolemy's "Stone Tower," however, must be at or near Daraut-Kurgan.

Ta-tsien Lu = "Strike arrow stove," a meaningless imitation of Tarsando (Tib.).

Ta-ts'in = "Great Ts'in," or, in the older form, *Deun*, which is probably *Syr* or *Syria*. The later Chinese form *Sz-li* occurs in reference to the inhabitants of the Syro-Persian region.

Tea = local pronunciation *té*. It is pronounced *ta* in Foochow, and *tesha* in most parts. The Russian *tschai* is simply the Pekingese *ch'a-ye*, "tea-leaf."

Tibet. The Chinese first called

- the civilised Tibetans *t'upo*, usually mispronounced *t'ufan*. The second syllable is *bod* (what the Tibetans call themselves) = Tibetan, *sKod-Bod*, or *sTod Bod*, pronounced *Tō Bhōt*, and meaning "Upper-Bod." *Bodgul* or *gyul* means "Land of Bod."
- T'ien-shan*. "Heaven Mountains" = the Tengri Tagh of the Tartars. See also *Bogdo*.
- Tientsin* = "Heavenly Ford"; a modern name.
- Ting-hai* = "Settle the Sea."
- Toba* = "born in the sheets," but the Chinese give other fanciful meanings for this Tungusic word.
- Tokyo*. The Chinese words *Tung-king*, "eastern capital."
- Tonquin*. The Chinese words *Tung-king*, "eastern capital"
- Tsardam*. Said to mean "marsh" in some local tongue.
- Ts'ing* = Clear.
- Ts'in-wang Tao* = "Prince of Ts'in's Island," probably alluding to the conquest of Corea by the T'ang Emperor Li Shī-mūn, who passed that way and had borne that title (seventh century).
- Tsung-ü Yamēn* = "General-management Office," short for the full title "General-management of Different Countries' Affairs Office";—Foreign Office. After various changes, it is now called the *Wai-kiao Pu* or "Foreign Relations Board."
- Tsushima* (pronounced almost in two syllables like *Tzhuma*) is written by the ancient Chinese *Tun-ma*, or "Facing Horses." I cannot say which language gave the original sounds.
- Tsumu* = "Earth Tree." I have twice been there.
- Tungkwan* = "East Sedge."
- Tung-t'ing* = "Cave Court," probably alluding to the royal centre of the aboriginal races.
- Tunguz*, *Tunguses*, generally supposed to be a term of Russian origin derived from *Tung-hu* or "Eastern Tartars"; but the point is not certain.
- Turk* = Turkish word "*türk*," or "helmet," from the shape of a mountain in their earliest habitat.
- Tycoon* or *Shōgūn*. The first is the Japanese way of pronouncing the Chinese words *Ta-kun* or *T'ai-kun*, a term, like the corresponding Korean *Tai-wōn-kun*, applied to the second personage in the state. The second is simply the Chinese *tsiang-kun*, or "generalissimo," being the word "Imperator" in its original military significance. Compare *soy*.
- Uliassutai*. This seems to be the Chinese word *t'ai*, "post-station," added to the Mongol word *usu*; *Ulia-usu*, the "River" *Uha*
- Urga*, said to come from *orgo*, a palace; but see *Ordos*.
- Uriangkha*. I do not know if this is the Eleuth tribe mentioned under "Kalmuck," but there are still Eleuth settlements in Tsitsihar and Kokonor as well as in Ili. In Kublai's time this term was applied to Nayan's appanage of Manchuria, from the Amur to Corea.
- Vladivostock* = Russian "rule the east."
- Wangpoo* = "Yellow Cove," meaning the Shanghai River. The same sound signifies "Yellow Depôt," or Whampoa near Canton.
- Wei* = state or dynasty. A proper name; no meaning in literature.
- Wei-hai Wei* = "Awe-the-sea Garrison."
- Wei River of Si-an Fu*, not to be confused with the Wei River of Wei-hwei Fu (written differently). The first-named is dubiously mentioned 3,000 years ago as being either clear or muddy, and the *intellectuels* disputed for 2,000 years which of the two it was; until the Manchu Emperor K'ien-lung ordered the learned Viceroy of Kan Suh to go to the source in the desert, and follow the stream personally all the way down to its junction with the King, so as to close the question for ever.

Whampoa = Wongpou, "Yellow Quays," the Cantonese form of Hwang-p'u.

Wōnsan = Chinese *Yuan-shan*, or *Ngüan-shan*, "Head Hill"; in Japanese *Genzan*.

Wo-nu = "Japanese slaves." Cf. *Hiung-nu*.

Wu-hu = "Jungle Lake."

Yamên = Chinese "gate of the *ya*." The *ya* was first "a flag"; then the entrance to the camp-gate where the flag was planted; then "head-quarters"; then "nomad court," or "ordo." *Yamên* now means "public residence," or "office." Cf. *Urga*.

Yang-tsze = the "philosopher Yang": the old name for the

modern salt depôt of Ichêng near Chinkiang, and, of the Great River in that vicinity, or a ford of it. The usual translation "Son of the Ocean" seems incorrect.

Yedo = Japanese "River-door."

Yin Shan = "Sombre" or "hyperborean" mountains.

Yuan-kung P'u = "Duke Yuan's Cove."

Zanzibar. This word seems to occur in the Chinese *ts'êng* or *Dzǎng*, "black slaves" from which place were imported by the Arabs. As to *bar*, see the remarks on *Ciampa*, *Lappa*, *Singpa*, etc

Zunder Zee = Dutch for "South Sea."

NOTE—In GILES' *Anglo-Chinese Dictionary* (first edition) I have given the pronunciation in eight dialects (also in Korean, Japanese, and Annamese) of every important Chinese word. In the Philological Essay contributed to the same work, I have explained the etymological rules involved. I have not yet seen the later edition of Giles' dictionary. For most of the Mongol words I am indebted to Mr. Zach, of the Foreign Customs in China. Père Richard's Geography is responsible for the Indo-Malay coin words, and Mr. L. C. Waddell for one or two Tibetan meanings.

Although the paragraphs on Korean and Formosan trade have been expunged from this edition, the Korean and Formosan place-names still appear in this Glossary.

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